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This thesis examines how Lesotho came to depend on the export 
of its men to South African mines; what the experiences of 
these men were; and how all this impacted on Basotho society 
during the years between c.1890 and 1940. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on the 
context and dynamics of labour migration and recruitment in 
Lesotho during the late 1880s to the late 1930s. This Part 
lays the basis for subsequent sections by showing which 
sections of Basotho opted for labour migrancy; and why it was 
men and not women who, initially at least, became migrants. 
In discussing the decline of the Basotho economy in the 1920s 
and 1930s, this section also shows how this was characterised 
not only by dependence on migrantsJ earnings, but also by the 
orientation to and concentration of Basotho labour on the 
Witwatersrand gold mines. 
Part II discusses various themes relating to life and 
conditions on the mines and in the compounds during the period 
up to c.1940. While specific note is taken of the African 
minersJ death and accident rate, most attention is devoted to 
the various ways which Basotho miners developed for dealing 
with the sickness, death and destitution befalling their 
compatriots in the compounds and on the mines. Conversion to 
Christianity was an important part of some miners 
experience, as church forums and the bible could be used for 
recreational purposes, while literacy classes imparted many 
with essential skills which could lead to promotion on the 
mine. But competition for promotion and favours, as well as 
conflicting survival strategies, often resulted in violent 
conflict among African miners. Although some scholars have 
mistakenly attributed such conflict to ethnic factors alone, 
this thesis argues for an approach which is simultaneously 
historically and materially grounded. 
Part III, by using the case of infectious and occupational 
diseases, and prostitution and commercial beer-brewing, traces 
ii 
and analyses the impact of the migrant labour system on 
Lesotho. The thesis shows how the spread to Lesotho of such 
diseases as syphilis and tuberculosis was directly linked to 
contact with South African towns and mining centres through 
wage labour. Beer canteens and brothels emerged and flourished 
in colonial Lesotho not only because of the decline of the 
countryJs economy and the breakdown of Basotho social 
structures, but also because these establishments serviced the 
migrant labour traffic itself. 
The significance of this study lies in two areas. 
Historiographically, this study seeks to contribute to migrant 
labour studies in Lesotho in particular and Southern Africa in 
general. Its approach stands between economism which 
attributes the causes of labour migrancy solely to economic 
factors, and those paradigms which privilege ideas and culture 
over material factors. There is a dialectical interplay 
between material factors and ideas, although the former 
ultimately determines the latter. 
Secondly, the significance of this study lies in the fact that 
many of the issues raised, especially those in Part III, 
continue to pose serious problems for Basotho people and their 
government to this day. Knowing something about the origins 
and history of these problems may contribute to finding 
lasting solutions. This study, therefore, is about Lesotho, 
Basotho, and the mines. 
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Most historians are acutely aware of the limitations of their 
source material, but in the case of this thesis, critical 
comment about its sources is particularly necessary. Firstly 
and most importantly, the extremely poor state of the 
government archives housed at the National University of 
Lesotho in Roma is a matter of grave concern, not least 
because they lack a trained archivist. Most of the files for 
the 1920s and subsequent years are missing, except for those 
of Leribe which were found by chance in the 1970s by David 
Ambrose. Researchers have to work in these archives without 
any professional assistance whatsoever. Furthermore, large 
parts of the archives are not well referenced, and files 
mentioned in the catalogue are missing on the shelves. Where 
files do exist, their contents are often damaged and already 
incomplete. On some documents dates are missing, while on 
others, reference tags have been removed. It is for these 
reasons that in the bibliography I have file names without 
their codes, and some references which are unavoidably 
incomplete. 
Missionary sources have been preserved in journals as well as 
in archives, and have proved to be extremely useful for 
migrant labour studies. Chapter Five of this thesis, on 
religion and conversion in the compounds, is based on such 
material, especially on the microfilmed records of the Paris 
Evangelical Missionary Society. Pretoria and Orange Free 
State Archives have been particularly useful. One key 
archival source remained closed to this study, however. 
Several attempts to gain access to the Chamber of Mines 
Archives went unanswered. In this, my experience was no 
different than that of several other mining and labour 
historians, all of us victims of the South African mining 
houses~ obsession with secrecy. It is to be hoped that the 
day will dawn when they are compelled to open their archives 
to scholarly scrutiny. 
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Oral sources provide one way around company obduracy, and they 
have indeed been put to great use by Jeff Guy and Motlatsi 
Thabane. I also conducted interviews in Basotho villages, 
meeting old miners. An insurmountable obstacle, however, is 
the fact that most men who are still alive, only began their 
migrant careers in the 1930s, by which time the system had 
been standardised and the majority of Basotho men were going 
to the mines now of necessity rather than discretion. Most 
Basotho old men are also notoriously suspicious, always 
concerned about their nationalist "image", and tend to be 
protective especially of their chiefs. Others who had 
suffered from mine accidents and had never been compensated, 
saw an interviewer~s presence as an opportunity to make their 
case for claiming money owed to them. All too often, they 
tend to glorify mine work, pretending that they had no 
problems 
who had 
prior to the accident in question. 
fought in the Second World War 
One also met men 
and were never 
compensated. On more than one occasion, I found a group of 
veterans, often with the wives of deceased ex-soldiers, 
waiting for me, thinking that I was there to investigate their 
cases. And finally, I must emphasise, especially with 
Chapter Seven in mind, that I was unable to find female 
informants for the period covered by this thesis. This was 
probably because almost all of the women who were the subjects 
of this study had left Lesotho to settle permanently in South 
African towns. 
Letters, advertisements, reports, and articles in Sesotho 
newspapers were very useful. Leselinyana la Lesotho ("Little 
Light of Lesotho") was established in 1863, from its inception 
being owned by the French missionaries.1 The letters~ 
section is full of reports by miners about various events and 
themes in the compounds and elsewhere. Naledi ea Lesotho 
("The Star of Lesotho") and Mochochonono ("The Comet") which 
were owned by middle-class Basotho, balance the views 
1 On the importance of this newspaper in the study of 
other aspects of Basotho history, see D.P. Kunene, 
"Leselinyana La Lesotho and Sotho Historiography", History in 
Africa, vol.4, 1977. 
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expressed in Leselinyana which tended to be used as an 
evangelising tool by the missionaries. Unfortunately, though, 
unlike Leselinyana which was bound and kept in the Morija 
Archives, most issues of Naledi and Mochochonono are missing, 
and I was unable to locate complete sets. The Chamber of Mines 
newspaper Umteteli wa Bantu ("The Voice of the People") 
established in 1922, also published a number of letters from 
Basotho workers. It should be kept in mind, of course, that 
all of the newspapers tended to reflect the view-point of 
literate Basotho, though in some instances miners commissioned 
their literate mates to write letters on issues that affected 
them, and in this way reached the attention of the colonial 
authorities and chiefs. 
The Proceedings of the Basutoland National Council of chiefs, 
or Litaba tsa Lekhotla la Sechaba, are also a valuable source. 
The report for the 1903 ENC, that is, the very first one, is 
in the archives, and one or 
complete. All of them were 
sections in English. Up to 
two gaps aside, the series is 
published in Sesotho, with some 
1927, however, the reports are 
extremely time-consuming to read because they have neither a 
table of contents nor an index. Nonetheless, they repay 
careful study. People would approach their chiefs with the 
issues they wanted raised at the BNC, and these were sent to 
the Resident Commissioner before the sitting of the Council. 
These grievances are preserved, as are the debates among the 
chiefs, all of which provide some sense of how issues were 
taking shape in villages. 
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GLOSSARY 
Baaotho (sing: Mosotho) refers to the people; Lesotho, their 
country. "Basotho" and "Sotho" are used as adjectives 
interchangeably, depending on the context. "Sesotho" refers 
to the language spoken by Basotho, but can also be used to 
refer to the Basotho culture. "Basutoland" was the name 
applied to colonial Lesotho, but for reasons of stylistic 
variation "Lesotho" is occasionally used in the text. 
I also use L to represent a pound, because the computer I am 
using has no sign for British currency. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
No country in the whole of southern Africa is more dependent 
than Lesotho on the export of labour to South Africa. 
Hundreds of thousands of Basotho men oscillate between their 
homes and South African mines for work. By the 1980s, the 
earnings of migrant workers were estimated at $3 for every $4 
produced in Lesotho. The centrality of labour migration for 
Lesotho is reflected in the amount of attention which this 
subject has attracted since independence in 1966. Development 
economists, sociologists and anthropologists, are among those 
who have studied this phenomenon. The main focus has been on 
the possibilities for Lesotho#s independent development and 
consequent escape from its labour reserve position; but other 
areas of study have included the social impact of oscillating 
migration on Basotho society, and especially women.1 
Remarkably, however, there 
historical study of this 
has never been an in-depth 
phenomenon. The one partial 
exception to this general rule is the much-cited introduction 
to Colin Murray#s Families Divided; The Impact of Mi~rant 
Labour in Lesotho, the body of which is devoted to an 
anthropological, field-work based study of labour migrancy and 
marital relations in Lesotho during the 1970s.2 
1 See, for example, J.E. Bardill, and J.H. Cobbe, 
Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa, (Westview 
Press, London, 1985); J. Gay, "Wage Employment of Rural 
Basotho Women: A Case Study", South African Labour Bulletin, 
vol. 6, no. 4, 1980; E. Gordon, "An Analysis of the Impact of 
Labor Migration on the Lives of Women in Lesotho", Journal of 
Development Studies, vol.17, no.3, 1981; R. Leys, "Lesotho: 
Non-Development or Underdevelopment: Towards an Analysis of 
the Political Economy of the Labour Reserve", in T. Shaw, and 
K. Heard, (eds.), The Politics of Africa· Dependence and 
Development, (Halifax, N.S., African Studies Series, 1978); C. 
Murray, Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in 
Lesotho, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981); A.D. Spiegel, 
"Rural Differentiation and the Diffusion of Migrant Labour 
Remittances in Lesotho", in P. Mayer, (ed.), Black Villagers 
in an Industrial Society, (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 
1980). 
2. Murray, Families Divided. 
2 
MurrayJs book marked a major advance on most previous 
accounts. During the period of colonial rule no critical study 
of migrant labour emerged. Although the missionaries were 
concerned about the "vices" to which they believed Basotho men 
were exposed at the labour centres, they saw the acquisition 
of cash through the sale of labour as inseparable from their 
"civilising" mission.3 Migrant labour per se was not 
criticised, because through it their converts were socialised 
into the industrial work ethic, the wearing of European 
clothes, the use of ploughs, and the consumption of 
manufactured products. The first serious study of migrant 
labour had to wait until 1935, when Sir Allan Pim produced his 
report on the financial and economic position of Basutoland. 
While the benefits of migrant labour for the colony were 
celebrated, some concerns were raised and proposals made on 
how to avoid certain of its negative social effects.4 But 
these modest gains did not survive World War II. In 1952, 
Hugh AshtonJs detailed anthropological study based on field-
work conducted in 1935-36 was published. Disappointingly, it 
dedicated only some five pages to the subject of migrant 
labour, and even they were suspect. Working from a 
functionalist perspective, Ashton treated the phenomenon 
unproblematically without providing either analysis or 
history.o 
The first historical study of Basotho labour migration was 
undertaken by Judy Kimble. Her Masters thesis focused on the 
period 1830s-1870s, parts of which she published in the form 
3 R.C. Germont, (ed.), Chronicles of Basutoland; A 
running commentary on the events of the years 1830 1902 by the 
French protestant missionaries in Southern Africa, (Sesuto 
Book Depot, Morija, 1967), p.541; V. Ellenberger, A Century of 
Mission Work in Basutoland, 1833-1933, (Sesuto Book Depot, 
Morija, 1938), pp.352-57. 
4 A. Pim, Financial and Economic Position of Basutoland: 
Report of the Commission Appointed by the Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs. January 1935, cmd.4907. 
0 H. Ashton, The Basuto, (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1952), pp.162-65. 
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of chapters in edited collections.a Subsequently, her 
doctoral thesis attempted to tackle the period 1890-1930. 7 
The importance of Kimble in the historiography of Lesotho lies 
not only in relation to migrant labour studies, but also 
extends to the study of chieftaincy and the colonial state. 
Kimble moved beyond those studies which had looked at the rise 
of the Basotho nation-state in the 19th century by focusing on 
the personality of Chief Moshoeshoe. Instead, she tried to 
apply the Marxist model developed by, in particular, French 
anthropologists to developing an understanding of pre-
capitalist African socio-economic formations. Instead of 
celebrating the ingenuity of Moshoeshoe and his statesmanship 
as had hitherto been the tendency,e Kimble located Basotho 
ruling lineages within the context of exploitation and surplus 
appropriation. Arguably, though, her study of migrant labour 
was handicapped by a reductionist approach which treated the 
movement of Basotho men to the Kimberley mines and their 
s J. Kimble, "Towards an Understanding of the Political 
Economy of Lesotho: The Origins of Commodity Production and 
Migrant Labour, 1830-1885", (M.A, National University of 
Lesotho, 1978); idem, "Labour Migration in Basutoland, c.1870-
1885", .1n S. Marks, and R. Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialisation 
and Social Change in South Africa, (Longman, London, 1982); 
idem, "~Clinging to the Chiefs~: Some Contradictions of 
Colonial Rule in Basutoland, c.1890-1930", .1n H. Bernstein, 
and B.K, Campbell, (eds.), Contradictions of Accumulation in 
Africa; Studies in Economy and Society, <Sage Publications, 
London, 1985). See also her unpublished "Aspects of the 
Economic History of Lesotho, 1830-85", History Workshop Paper, 
National University of Lesotho, July 1976. 
7 • Kimble, "Migrant Labour 
Africa: the case of colonial 
University of Essex, 1985). 
and Colonial Rule in Southern 
Lesotho, 1890-1930", (Ph.D, 
e. See especially, P. Sanders, Moshoeshoe; Chief of the 
Sotho, (David Philip, Cape Town, 1975); L. Thompson, Survival 
in Two Worlds; Moshoeshoe of Lesotho, 1786-1870, (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1975); J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu 
Aftermath; A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa, 
(Longman, Essex, 1966); W.F. Lye, and C. Murray, 
Transformations on the Highveld: The Tswana and the Southern 
Sotho, (David Philip, Cape Town, 1980). Several influential 
Basotho historians are still working from this personality-
cult perspective; see, for example, L.B.B.J. Machobane, 
Government and Change in Lesotho; 1800-1966: A Study of 
Political Institutions, (Macmillan, London, 1990); and M. 
Damane, Histori ea Lesotho, (Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 1986). 
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accumulation of guns as simply a conspiracy on the part of the 
Koena dominant lineage. She paid most attention to structure, 
leaving little place for agency. 
her reliance on a limited range 
annual colonial reports and the 
Transvaal Labour Commission. 
In part, this grew out of 
of sources, most obviously 
proceedings of the 1903 
Elizabeth Eldredge~s recently published A South African 
Kinidom; The Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho 
addresses some of the shortcomings in KimbleJs study. But 
there is a powerful sense in which EldredgeJs reliance on a 
"pursuit of security" model and "rational choice" theory leads 
her back to precisely the problem of personality from which 
Kimble had saved us. And her short chapter on migrant labour 
is weakened by its reliance on the proceedings of the 1903-05 
South African Native Commission.9 
These developments in the academic study of LesothoJs past are 
part of several historiographical shifts in southern African 
studies in the course of the last three decades. So far as 
labour history is concerned, the publication in 1976 of 
Charles van OnselenJs Chibaro was a watershed. In the course 
of tracing the history of the Southern Rhodesian mining 
industry, van Onselen not only analysed strategies for capital 
accumulation in the context of colonial political economy, but 
also the African minersJ creative and militant responses. His 
argument, however, was weakened by a tendency to subordinate 
miners experiences to a repression/control/resistance model 
which failed to capture the full complexity of workersJ 
lives.10 Just how complex these could be was underscored by 
9 E. Eldredge, A South African Kingdom; The Pursuit of 
Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1993). 
1° C. van Onselen, Chibara; African Mine Labour in 
Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933, (Pluto Press, London, 1976). See 
also, C.W. Gutkind, and R. Cohen, et al, (eds.), African Labor 
History, (Sage Publications, London, 1978); R. Sandbrook and 
R. Cohen, (eds.), The Development of an African Working Class; 
Studies in Class Formation and Action, (University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 1975). This political economy tradition still 
5 








by close links between labour and community 
All of this pushed the masses to the centre-stage 
and compelled historians and other social 
to revisit their paradigms. One response was the 
"history from below" which was subsequently 
by the University of the Witwatersrand History 
Studies of squatter movements, women and their 
protests, gangs, townships and culture, flourished.11 
Recently Dunbar Moodie and Patrick Harries have produced 
studies which show the worth of entering the Witwatersrand 
goldmine compounds to attempt to reconstruct the lives that 
African miners built for themselves.12 Moodie~s historical 
sociological study extends its scope into the 1980s and is 
"about character, about the practical integrity of black South 
African migrant miners".13 His six chapters explore various 
themes linked to life in the compounds. These include social 
networks and solidarities, control and resistance, sexuality, 
and "faction fights". Though acknowledging the role of 
has its adherents. Its most recent example is V.L. Allen~s 
The History of Black Mineworkers in South Africa, Volume I, 
The Techniques of Resistance, 1871-1948, (The Moor Press, 
Keighly, 1993), a book which has many of the weaknesses and 
few of the strengths of the studies which preceded it. 
11. To date, five History Workshop collections have been 
published. See, B. Bozzoli, (ed.), Labour, Township and 
Protest Studies in the Social History of the Witwatersrand, 
(Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1979}; idem, (ed.), Town and 
Countryside in the Transvaal, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 
1983}; idem, (ed.), Class, Community and Conflict; South 
African Perspectives, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987); P. 
Bonner, et al, (eds.), Holdini their Ground; Class, Locality 
and Culture in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century South Africa, 
(Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1989); P. Bonner et al, (eds.), 
Apartheid~s Genesis, 1935-1962, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 
1993}. 
12. T.D. Moodie, (with V. Ndatshe), Goini for Gold; Men. 
Mines and Migration, (University of California Press, Los 
Angeles, 1994); P. Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity: 
Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c,1860-1910, 
(James Currey, London, 1994). 
13. Moodie, Going for Gold, p.2. 
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structural factors, Moodie, however, focuses on "experiences" 
without systematically relating them to material and 
historical factors. 
HarriesJ Work, Culture and Identity, is, as he points out in 
his introduction, inspired by developments in labour history 
in Europe and North America towards cultural history.14. The 
latter "new" school brings together postmodernism and 
symbolic-interpretative anthropology (as espoused by Clifford 
Geertz). Historicism and "grand narratives" are renounced. It 
is argued that the external world is accessible to us only in 
a discursive form; and that rather than trying to establish a 
law and pattern in history, historians should study the 
genealogy of these discourses. Culture is seen as a system of 
symbols with little regard to material factors; focus is on 
interpreting these symbols to reach to the "meanings" that are 
entangled in them. "Local knowledge", or the meaning that a 
particular people make out of the world, can be accessed 
through the "reading" of these symbols.15 
HarriesJ study is historiographically an important development 
beyond the works of Allan Jeeves and others whose approach to 
labour migrancy was institutional, focusing on personalities 
14. See also his "Histories New and Old", South African 
Historical Journal, vol.30, 1994. 
15 For a discussion of cultural history, see L. Hunt, 
(ed), The New Cultural History, (University of California 
Press, Los Angels, 1989); R. Chartier, Cultural History: 
Between Practices and Representations, (Polity Press, Oxford, 
1988). For a critique of the implications of discourse theory 
for historical studies, see B.D. Palmer, Descent into 
Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of 
Social History, (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990); 
and G.M. Spiegel, "History, Historicism, and the Social Logic 
of the Text in the Middle Ages", Speculum, vol.65, 1990. For 
a critical discussion of postmodernism as a social theory, see 
R. Boynes, and A. Rattansi, (eds.), Postmodernism and Society, 
(Macmillan, London, 1990); and Theory. Culture and Society, 
vol.5, 1988, which was dedicated to the discussion of this 
subject. 
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and the infrastructure of labour recruitment and mining.is 
His work is also macroscopic in focus, dealing not only with 
the Shangaan people in southern Mozambique and Portuguese 
colonial encroachment there, but also with the emigration of 
Shangaan labour to Natal, Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. 
Harries also unpacks the struggles around the making of 
Shangaan labour central to goldmining. And while privileging 
culture, Harries also pays attention to processes and changes 
over time, and accords a significant role to material factors. 
In their turn, migrant labour studies in Lesotho have been 
variously affected. Phil Bonner focused his attention on 
Basotho in the Witwatersrand townships, with particular 
reference to those women who made a living from prostitution 
and beer-brewing, and Basotho participation in gang 
violence.17 Jeff Guy and Motlatsi Thabane, working from 
oral interviews, paid attention to the interplay between 
labour migrancy and mine work, and Basotho ethnic 
identity.is David CoplanJs collection of and 
anthropological-textual analysis of Basotho migrantsJ songs 
(called lifela tsa liparola naha: "songs of travellers) also 
18 . A.H. Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South AfricaJs Mining 
Economy: The Struggle for the Gold MinesJ Labour Supply. 1890-
l.92Q., (Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1985); J. 
Crush, et al, South AfricaJs Labour Empire: A History of Black 
Migrancy to the Gold Mines, (David Philip, Cape Town, 1991). 
17 P. Bonner, "The Russians on the Reef, 1947-1957: 
Urbanisation, Gang Warfare and Ethnic Mobilisation", in Bonner 
et al, (ed.), ApartheidJs Genesis. 1935-1962; idem, 
"JDesirable or undesirable Basotho women?J: Liquor, 
prostitution and the migration of Basotho women to the Rand, 
1920-1945", in C. Walker, (ed.), Women and Gender in Southern 
Africa to 1945, (David Philip, Cape Town, 1990); idem, "Backs 
to the Fence: Law, Liquor, and the Search for Social Control 
in an East Rand Town, 1929-1942", in J. Crush, and C. Ambler, 
(eds.), Liguor and Labor in Southern Africa, (University of 
Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1992). 
is. J. Guy, and M. Thabane, "Technology, Ethnicity and 
Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the South 
African Gold Mines", Journal of Southern African Studies, 
vol.14, no. 2, 1988; idem, "Basotho Miners, Oral History and 
Workers J Strategies", in P. Kaarsholm, (ed. ) , Cultural 
Struggle and Development in Southern Africa, (Baobab Books, 
Harare, 1991). 
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provide migrant labour historians with another perspective to 
the question. 
interpretation of 
These lifela reveal Basotho migrants~ 
their own experiences and sense of 
identity.ie My study intends to build on the works of these 
social historians, as well as on those by Kimble, Eldredge, 
Moodie and Harries. 
However, the importance of the rapproachment between history 
and anthropology has long been noted.20 Anthropological 
knowledge is obviously important in understanding the impact 
of labour migrancy on kinship structures and marital 
relations, the significance of the use of charms, symbols and 
certain ritual performances, as well as the formation of 
various forms of social consciousness and identity. But the 
approach in my study is informed by a materialist conception 
of culture; in particular I do not privilege witches, zombies 
and ghosts. Culture is best understood when located within 
material and social structures, and especially historical 
processes. Rather than seeing the rural background of African 
migrants as fixed and static as Moodie tends to do, I 
emphasise the flexibility and sophistication of such men. 
Their rural heritage was not only made up of aspects of their 
pre-industrial society, but was also marked by years of 
colonial and missionary encounters. There was no one-way, 
linear relation between their rural and urban "worlds". Not 
only were Basotho migrants aware of the dynamics of the 
"whiteman~s world" and its difference with their own, but they 
developed a whole variety of ways of dealing with them. 
1 9 See D.B. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals; The Word 
Music of South Africa~s Basotho Migrants, (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994). 
2o See, for example, E.P. Thompson, "History and 
Anthropology", .1n his Making History; Writings on History and 
Culture, (The New Press, New York, 1994); R. Rosaldo, 
"Celebrating Thompson~s Heroes: Social Analysis in History and 
Anthropology", .1n H.J. Kaye, and K. McClelland, (eds.), E.....E.... 
Thompson; Critical Perspectives, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1990); and K. Thomas, "History and Anthropology", Past and 
Present, no.24, 1963. See also the special issue of Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History, vol.12, no.2, 1981. 
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In this conceptual context, my thesis examines how Lesotho 
came to depend on the export of its men to South African 
mines; what the experiences of these men were; and how all of 
this impacted on Basotho society. This period c.1890-1940 was 
chosen for three reasons. Firstly, the thesis builds on the 
works of Judy Kimble and Elizabeth Eldredge whose study of the 
preceding decades provides insight into Basotho~s migrancy to 
South Africa. Secondly, it was during this period, especially 
the 1920s-1930s, that Lesotho degenerated from being a granary 
of South Africa to becoming a labour reserve. And finally, 
the Second World War and the opening of the Orange Free State 
gold mines from the 1950s impacted on the pattern of Basotho~s 
migrancy to South Africa and their distribution on the mines, 
therefore making the post-1940s more complex. 
Part I, that is, Chapters One, Two and Three, traces the 
process whereby Lesotho gradually became a labour reserve. 
However, because not all Basotho became labour migrants, 
(indeed some Basotho continued to produce agricultural exports 
even as the economy generally declined) the commoditisation of 
agricultural production and the differential penetration of 
capitalist relations are noted. Attempts are made to show how 
the latter, together with wars, ecological factors and 
colonial rule, affected different social groups in Lesotho. 
This Part lays the basis for subsequent sections by showing 
which sections of Basotho opted for labour migrancy; and why 
it was men, and not the women, who were the ones who initially 
at least, became migrants. In discussing the decline of the 
Basotho economy in the 1920s and 1930s, this section also 
shows how this was characterised not only by dependence on 
migrants~ earnings, but also by the orientation to and 
concentration of Basotho labour on the Witwatersrand gold 
mines. Basotho migrants, for their part, developed various 
strategies and cultural responses to accommodate and reshape 
their experiences. The significance of road, bridge and 
railway-line construction to and in colonial Lesotho for the 
mobilisation of migrant labour is discussed in Appendix II. 
Part II, that is, Chapters Four, Five and Six, discusses 
10 
various themes relating to life and conditions on the mines 
and in the compounds during the period up to c.1940s. While 
specific note is taken of the African miners death and 
accident rate, most attention is devoted to the various ways 
which Basotho miners developed for dealing with the sickness, 
death and destitution befalling their compatriots in the 
compounds and on the mines. Conversion to Christianity was an 
important part of some miners experience, as church forums 
and the bible could be used for recreational purposes, while 
literacy classes imparted many with essential skills which 
could lead to promotion on the mine. The thesis shows that the 
missionary societies were not the only factor in the 
propagation of this religion in the mine compounds, and that 
the efforts of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society among 
Basotho miners were not without difficulties and frustrations. 
But competition for promotion and favours, as well as 
conflicting survival strategies, often resulted in violent 
conflict among African miners. Although some scholars have 
mistakenly attributed such conflict to ethnic factors alone, 
this thesis argues for an approach which is simultaneously 
historical and materially grounded. 
Part III, that is, Chapter Seven, discusses the social impact 
of labour migrancy and the encounter with the mines, with 
specific reference to the introduction of infectious and 
occupational diseases in colonial Lesotho and the fate of 
Basotho women. Appendix III uses the case of two Basotho 
women prostitutes to illustrate points discussed in Section 
Two of the chapter in question. 
This thesis, therefore, examines not only the migrant labour 
system in colonial Lesotho and South Africa, but also various 
aspects of the economic and social history of Basutoland. 
11 
CI-IAP'TER ONE 
COLONIALISM, CHIEFI'AINCY AND LABOUR MIGRATION, 1884-1940 
Lesotho became a British Protectorate in 1868 but was handed 
over to the Cape Colonial government in 1871. However, it was 
later taken back by the Imperial government in 1884 after the 
failure of the Cape~s direct rule policies. Basutoland, as 
the British called it, was divided into seven districts 
ultimately controlled by a Resident Commissioner (himself 
answerable to the High Commissioner based in Cape Town). 
Central to this British system of government was the use made 
of the structures of chieftaincy. This involved dissolving, 




But Basutoland was run as an appendage of South 
little attention payed to the development of the 
was under British rule that Lesotho lost her 
position as the granary of South Africa and became a labour 
reserve. 
Any study of labour migrancy requires an understanding of the 
political, social and economic context within which the system 
operated. In this particular case, it is important to pay due 
regard to the pre-colonial Basotho socio-economic formation; 
missionary influences; the penetration of merchant capital; 
the colonial encounter and the nature of the colonial state; 
the contradictory role of the chiefs; and the limits imposed 
by natural disasters and the environment. This approach is 
necessary in order to account for the pattern that labour 
migrancy took in Lesotho. Additionally, as Bozzoli and Walker 
argued,l. it cannot be taken for granted that it was men - and 
1 B. Bozzoli, "Marxism, Feminism and South African 
Studies", Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 
1983; C. Walker, "Gender and the Development of the Migrant 
Labour System, c.1850-1930", in idem, (ed.), Women and Gender 
in Southern Africa to 1945, (David Philip, Cape Town, 1990). 
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not women - who opted for migration. On the contrary, it was 
the subordination of women in Basotho precolonial society 
which made male migrancy possible. Nor can the 
"underdevelopment" of Lesotho be explained only by reference 
to external factors as the dependency and world-system schools 
have tended to do. There is a need for a dialectical approach 
that has as a starting point the internal dynamics of Lesotho 
to show how its people contested and negotiated the terms of 
their integration into the world capitalist system. This 
approach helps us to see how stratification within Basotho 
society shaped capitalism~s uneven impact. 
Pre-colonial Lesotho 
The geographical unit which was to become British Basutoland 
in 1868 was a product of the 1850s-1860s struggles over land 
in the Transoragia between the indigenous people and trek 
Boers from the Cape Colony. In the process, the borders of 
Lesotho were defined and finally fixed in the 1860s, with the 
Basotho losing 70% of their arable land to the Orange Free 
State Boers. 
Lesotho has two major topological zones - the Lowlands and the 
Highlands. About two-thirds of the country is in the latter 
zone which is the eastern mountainous part - the Maluti - with 
an altitude of over 6 000 feet. The remaining one third is 
the Lowlands zone, lying in the western part of the country 
and it is here that most people were settled (see Map 2 in 
Appendix I ) . 
Pre-colonial Lesotho as a political and an economic unit, was 
a product of the upheavals in the Transorangia in the 1820s 
which led to the disruption of normal life and the migration 
of populations.2 In the course of this, Moshoeshoe of the 
2 There has been 
nature of these upheavals 
especially, J. Cobbing, 
Dithakong and Mbolompo", 
much debate around the cause and 
- the so-called Mfecane period. See 
"The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on 
Journal of African History, vol.29, 
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Mokoteli lineage - from his mountain fortress at Thaba Bosiu 
near modern Maseru - attracted people around himself and 
subjugated his neighbours, thus laying the basis for the 
emergence of a Basotho nation-state. 
Pre-colonial Lesotho had three principal branches of 
production - namely: cultivation, pastoralism, and hunting and 
food gathering. The primary agricultural crop and staple was 
sorghum - even though maize was also an important dietary item 
- which was sown around August and harvested in winter (April-
July). However, pastoralism was more important than 
cultivation for a number of reasons. These included the 
vulnerability of the region to drought; the low level of the 
development of the productive forces; and the lack of long-
term grain storage facilities. 
surpluses be readily disposed of. 
Nor could agricultural 
Cattle assumed a central 
position in such a system because of their use-value (being a 
source of meat and dairy products, the skin used for clothes, 
and the bones for making various tools and kitchen utensils) 
and exchange-value. They could be easily moved in the case of 
wars or drought, and were also used in bohali (bridewealth) 
transactions. As the most valued item, cattle could be 
acquired through war, cattle-raiding, inheritance, bohali, or 
the mafisa loan from the chiefs or other wealthier 
commoners.3 
Land was owned communally with each married man having the 
land. The right to 
basic unit 
of a male 
a residential site, grazing and farming 
of production was a homestead or household 
head, his wife or wives, offspring, and, 
made up 
in many 
cases, sons# wives and grandchildren. Agricultural work was 
performed by women, and they were not allowed to handle cattle 
no.3, 1988; and E. Eldredge,"Sources of Conflict in Southern 
Africa, ca.1800-30: The #Mfecane# Reconsidered", Journal of 
African History, vol.33, no.3, 1992. 
3 E. Eldredge, A South African Kingdom; The Pursuit of 
Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1993), pp.58-81; H. Ashton, The Basuto, 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1952), pp.120-157. 
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which were the preserve of homestead heads. Young and 
unmarried men (the cadets) passed their time herding cattle 
and other livestock. They, like women, did not own any 
property. But, unlike women, 
lebollo (their initiation into 
their position improved after 
manhood) which paved the way 
for them to marry and set up their own homesteads. It was, 
however, their fathers who chose wives for them and provided 
bohali cattle for marriage.4 
Homestead heads lived from the proceeds of the labour power of 
their wives, daughters and sons, while occupying themselves 
with local and national politics as well as issues of war and 
cattle-raiding, and tasks such as hunting, skin-tanning and 
preparation for clothes-making, and other crafts like iron-
working. Arguably, their labour power was quantitatively 
underutilised.5 
The bohali transaction involved the transfer of female 
productive and reproductive functions from one homestead to 
another. Unlike the cadets, women could not significantly 
improve their status with the passage of time. They were 
treated as minors, and laboured in the fields, or performed 
household chores and other productive services. They were 
important not only for the reproduction of the Basotho society 
but also of the homesteads themselves. The children they bore 
increased the labour power available in the homestead; and 
daughters brought bohali cattle. Hence the failure to bear 
children could result in the woman being scorned, or even the 
demand for the return of the bohali cattle (that is, 
divorce).S 
4 Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.126-46; Ashton, 
Basuto, p.178. 
5 Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.82-111; Ashton, 
Basuto, pp.88-99. 
s. See, J. Guy, "Gender Oppression in Southern AfricaJs 
Precapitalist Societies", in Walker, (ed), Women and Gender; 
Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.101-16, 126-46; Ashton, 
Basuto, pp.62-99. 
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But the low level of the development of the productive forces 
meant that the labour power of both men and women was 
underutilised aa more time was spent, for example, hoeing a 
farm to produce what could be produced in lesser time had the 
technology used been more advanced.7 This factor, combined 
with the communal ownership of land, limited the amount of 
surplus that could be produced in agriculture. The amount of 
agricultural output was tightly linked to the number of women 
and cadets under the command of a household head. Hence the 
"accumulation" of women and children was crucial to the 
Basotho socio-economic formation. But frequent droughts made 
agriculture unreliable; and wars often resulted in people 
fleeing and villages being abandoned. These factors led people 
to prefer cultivating small gardens and keep their value in 
cattle. On the other hand, hunting was used as an important 
supplement to the diet, while food gathering, by women, 
assumed importance during times of distress.a 
Chiefs in pre-colonial Basotho society had political, 
Judicial, military and ritual powers. They ran and governed 
the polity, tried criminal and civil cases, declared wars, 
opened ploughing seasons, and led rain-making ceremonies. 
They also had a right to tribute labour - letsema - from all 
adult males for four days on the fields of their senior wives. 
But they did not have absolute power. At the village level, 
homestead heads congregated daily at the khotla (chief~s 
court), to talk, exchange views on important questions, 
participate in court hearings, weave and prepare skins, while 
drinking joala (beer) prepared by women. The chief had his 
own lekhotla (council of counsellors) which advised him in 
taking decisions. A pitso (popular assembly) of all able-
bodied men, could be convened to take decisions on issues of 
greater significance. The chief spoke last during the 
proceedings of the pitso, his role being to summarise view 
7 Two to three days of ploughing on a small farm was 
equivalent to one-week of hoeing by two people; see Eldredge, 
South African Kingdom, p.104. 
s . .lhid, pp.101-16. 
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points and establish a consensus. It was not uncommon for the 
chief to be criticised during such proceedings. Though 
Basotho chiefs could not be instructed to take poison like in 
other parts of Africa, their power was checked and 
circumscribed through these structures. Dissatisfied subjects 
could always break away to attach themselves to another chief. 
This ensured that chiefs remained sensitive to popular 
views.9 
But chiefs were able to accumulate wealth because of their 
power and right to letsema. Cattle raids and external trade 
were also key areas of accumulation. The organisation of big 
feasts, providing the poor with mafisa cattle, and serving 
food and beer during letsema on their farms, all further 
legitimised chiefs~ position. Besides chiefs, counsellors, 
high-ranking military officers, the official medicine-man and 
rain-maker, craftsmen, and well-placed members of the ruling 
lineage (that is~, chief~s uncle, brothers, cousins, and so 
forth), all comprised the better-off sections of Basotho 
society.10 
The upheavals of the 1820s in 
cultivation and pastoralism as 
the Transorangia disrupted 
people fled from their 
villages. Many Basotho went to the Cape Colony and Griqualand 
(near modern Kimberley) as refugees. When order was restored 
to the region - and with the first missionaries of the Paris 
Evangelical Missionary Society arriving in 1833 people 
relied primarily on cultivating small fields, because they had 
lost many of their cattle. Labour migration to the Cape 
Colony was used to acquire and rebuild the cattle stock. So 
effective was this strategy that by the 1850s cattle were 
being exported from Basutoland.11 
9 Ashton, Basuto, pp.186-248; L.B.B.J. Machobane, 
Government and Chan~e in Lesotho; 1800-1966: A Study of 
Political Institutions, (Macmillan, London, 1990), pp.1-28. 
10 . Ibid. 
1 1 Eldredge, South African Kin~dom, pp.59, 184. 
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Christianity, Commerce and Colonialism 
Encounters first with missionaries and then with Cape colonial 
rule from 1872, had contradictory effects on the Basotho. 
Colonial rule brought intra-African wars and cattle raiding 
under partial control, and therefore removed some of the major 
occupations of Basotho men. The introduction of guns and 
horses, and Boer encroachment into the region for hunting 
purposes, also depleted herds of wild game. "By 1880", writes 
Eldredge, "eland, reebok, and hartebeast were scarce in the 
mountains, and each year hunters had to go into the Jinnermost 
reachesJ of the mountains to find game ... by 1900 only a few 
kinds of antelope, monkeys and birds remained".12 
The relative peace in the region also encouraged permanent 
settlement and population growth. Land dispossession and 
anti-colonial struggles beyond LesothoJs borders led to an 
influx of refugees between the 1850s and 1890s. 
Notwithstanding problems with the census figures, the 
population in the country increased by some 70 percent between 
1875 and 1891, and some 60 percent between the latter year and 
1904. As early as the 1870s, signs of pressure on the land 
were accumulating as people began to settle in the Highlands. 
This move to the Maluti accelerated in the 1880s, and in 1890 
the Paramount Chief placed his son as ruler over the area. 
Two years later the Resident Commissioner established the 
Qachas Nek district. As the cultivation of sorghum and maize 
at above 6 000 feet put those crops at the risk of being 
attacked by early frosts, Basotho in the Maluti turned to the 
cultivation of wheat (which had been introduced by the 
missionaries) as this crop required a shorter growing period 
than maize and sorghum.13 
1 2 Ibid., p.65. 
13 J. Kimble, 
Southern Africa: the 
(Ph.D, University of 





Labour and Colonial Rule in 
Colonial Lesotho, 1890-1930", 
1985), p.262; Eldredge, South 
Basuto, pp.144-57. 
It was the ox-drawn plough, also introduced 
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by the 
missionaries, which revolutionised Basotho agriculture, as 
this increased output and integrated cattle with 
cultivation.14 According to Hugh Ashton, "these new 
implements [ploughs] soon came to be regarded as such 
essential articles of domestic equipment that a girl could 
justifiably refuse to marry a man who did not possess 
one".15 But the adoption of and access to ploughs was 
mediated by the differentiation already existent within 
Basotho society. Well-off groups were the only ones who could 
buy this new implement. Christian converts, also adopted 
ploughs.1s 
The commoditisation of production was not, however, due to 
this technological development, but to the existence of a 
market for the realisation of value. One missionary observed 
in 1855 that: "A great part of their [Basotho] time is devoted 
to agriculture and, as it is only exceptionally [sic] that 
they employ the plough, and they are still reduced to turning 
the sod with the hoe, they have a great deal of labour to 
perform".17 The Basotho adopted ploughs in larger numbers 
in response to an increased demand for grain. 
Grain exports from Lesotho were reaching the markets of the 
Cape Colony as early as the 1840s, and by the 1860s Orange 
Free State farmers were said to be dependent on Basotho wheat 
and maize as their economy was based on hunting and 
pastoralism. The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in the 
late 1860s expanded the Basotho grain export market. Grain 
14 Kimble, "Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule", p.261; 
Eldredge, South African Kingdom, p.104. 
10. Ashton, Basuto, p.124. 
1s C-H. Perrot, "Premier annees de lJimplantation du 
christianisme au Lesotho, 1833-1847", Cahiers dJetudes 
Africaines, vol.4, no.13-16, 1964, pp.106-09. 
17 R.C. Germond, (ed.), Chronicles of Basutoland: A 
running commentary on the events of the years 1830-1902 by the 
French Protestant missionaries in Southern Africa, (Sesuto 
Book Depot, Morija, 1967), p.453. 
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exports increased from some 72 000 bags in 1871 to 100 000 in 
1873, as wagons full of grain left Lesotho for the Free State 
and Kimberley. Some Basotho men, and especially the Rolong in 
Thaba Nchu, purchased wagons - some also working for white 
traders - to transport this grain. The dramatic increase in 
the number of ploughs and wagons between 1875 and 1904 (Table 
1.1) shows the extent of this booming grain trade, as what 
were formerly small gardens were transformed into big fields. 
In this way, a section of Basotho society was able to resist 
proletarianisation as it paid the imposed 10s tax from the 
proceeds of the grain exports, rather than having to turn to 
labour migration.1s 

















Source: Kimble, "Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule", p.261. 
Although the introduction of ploughs transformed cultivation 
and integrated this branch of production with pastoralism, the 
labour process and the division of labour did not change to 
the favour of women. Because the latter were not supposed to 
handle cattle, men assumed responsibility for ploughing, 
leaving weeding, bird-scaring, and most of the harvesting and 
threshing to women. This meant that men became occupied 
between August and December with ploughing and sowing.19 
18 Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.147-53; J. 
Kimble, "Labour Migration in Basutoland, c.1870-1885", 1n S. 
Marks, and R. Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialisation and Social 
Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and 
Consciousness, 1870-1930, (Longman, London, 1982); T. Keegan, 
"Trade, Accumulation and Impoverishment: Mercantile Capital 
and the Economic Transformation of Lesotho and the Conquered 
Territory, 1870-1920", Journal of Southern African Studies, 
vol.12, no.2, 1986. 
19 . Eldredge, South African Kingdom, p.104-06. 
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The ploughing process involved, according to a mid-1930s 
account, the use of two to eight oxen (depending on the weight 
of the plough and ones wealth) and a human team made up of a 
small boy who led the team, a youth who drove the oxen, and an 
older and experienced man who handled the plough.20 
Basotho#s participation in the regional economy through 
commodity production radically increased the amount of cash 
circulating in the country. Though this did not totally 
replace the system of barter and the use of grain, beads, 
copper and cattle as currencies, the arrival and presence of 
traders - and the introduction of credit - made money an 
increasingly important factor in Basotho society. Traders 
would buy grain from Basotho producers and trade it in the 
export market. Often these traders would buy grain from 
Basotho and keep it to resell during a drought at higher 
prices. But as the government paid 2s.6d for a bag of grain in 
the 1870s to discourage Basotho from paying their tax in kind 
in order to promote migrant labour, Basotho preferred going to 
traders who paid 12s for a bag.21 
Traders introduced Basotho to manufactured goods which had a 
contradictory impact on the country. On the one hand, the 
introduction of clothes, wooden and iron implements and 
utensils, saved Basotho from the arduous tasks of skin-, 
iron-, clay- and wood-working in order to make clothes, 
spoons, pots, spears, hoes, baskets, and bowls. The 24 work-
days normally spent in preparing and tailoring skin for 
clothing could now be used for other purpose as wool and 
cotton blankets could be purchased for between 10s and 30s. 
The digging by women of salt for seasoning food and red ochre 
for ointment and make-up, was also rendered redundant by 
cheaper ointments and salt available at trading stores. But 
this also threatened Basotho#s indigenous crafts, as the 
demand for traditional goods and services related to these 
20 Ashton, Basuto, p.124. 
21 Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.97, 153; Ashton, 
Basuto, pp.166-67. 
21 
crafts declined. The purchasing of European manufactured 
goods became no longer discretionary but necessary, and people 
became more integrated into commercial networks where they 
bought what they previously made themselves. The number of 
traders increased from 20 in 1872 to 120 in 1891, 168 in 1907 
and 200 in 1937. In the mid-1930s, 80 percent of the items 
sold at the trading stores were soft goods, 70 percent of 
which were blankets.22 
Basotho 1 s adoption of European manufactured goods and 
participation in commodity production was not simply due to 
new "needs" and missionary influence as Kimble suggests,23 
but, as Eldredge also argues,24 was primarily a strategy to 





the quantitative underutilisation of 
Basotho men had increased due to 
the 
the 
disappearance of hunting, intra-African war, cattle-raiding, 
and some Basotho specialised crafts. On the other hand, as we 
saw, the patriarchal subordination of Basotho women had freed 
men from performing productive functions. Hence some men were 
available to leave the homestead without significantly 
affecting production and the subsistence base. 
But encounters with missionaries, colonialism and merchant 
capital 
affected 
combined with natural 
Lesotho in the long term. 
disasters negatively 
One factor was the shift 
of some Boer farmers to cultivation for the market after the 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. A year later, 
22 Eldredge, South African Kioidom, pp.87-89, 94-99, 
155-58; H. Dieterlen, and F. Kohler, "Les Bassoutos 
D1 Aujourd 1 hui", in Livre d 1 0r de la Mission du Lessouto, 
(Maison des Missions Evangeligues, Paris, 1912); Ashton, 
Basuto, pp.166-68; idem, "A Sociological Sketch of Sotho 
Diet", Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa, 
vol.17, 1940. 
23. J. Kimble, "Lesotho and the Outside World, 1840-70: 
Prelude to Imperialism", International Conference on Southern 
African History Paper, National University of Lesotho, August 
1977, p.9. 
24 . Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.68-69, 149-50. 
22 
the South African Republic imposed a tariff on Basotho grain 
imported into the Transvaal, preventing peasants from reaping 
the fruits of the mushrooming goldmining industry. It was 
estimated in that year that this tariff wall cost Basotho 
about 120 000. In September 1892 the Basutoland Chamber of 
Commerce (formed in 1890 by traders) complained to the High 
Commissioner about this tariff. The arrival of the railway 
line in Johannesburg in 1893, for its part, flooded that 
market with Australian and American wheat and maize. It was 
reported in the 1893-94 Basutoland annual colonial report that 
trade had stagnated during the year due to both the tariff and 
the railway line. In 1894 the Orange Free State also imposed 
an import duty on Basotho wheat.25 
These efforts aimed at undermining the competitive position of 
Basotho peasants did not produce immediate results. The Free 
State farmers took time to turn to cultivation, and in the 
1880s and early 1890s continued to rely on Basotho produce. 
Kimberley was still "largely supplied from Basutoland" in the 
late 1880s, as traders in Lesotho exported grain to that place 
and the Transvaal at high prices. There were also many 
Basotho who regularly crossed the border to exchange their 
grain for manufactured goods at the Free State borderline 
stores. Though the Free State grain could enter the Transvaal 
duty-free under the 1889 Potchetstroom Convention - with about 
60 percent of the grain sold in the Transvaal in the 1890s 
coming from the Free State - much of this produce in fact came 
from Lesotho. Wagons were also moving from the Transvaal to 
purchase Basotho grain; in one instance in April 1889, 650 
grain-loaded wagons were traversing through Senekal a week on 
their way from Lesotho to the Rand. It was for this reason 
that the Free State farmers opposed the 1893-94 proposal to 
construct a railway line-extension to the eastern part of the 
republic as this would benefit Basotho peasants. Many Free 
2 ~ Basutoland, Colonial Report Annual (henceforth 
CAR), 1892-93; J. Walton, Father of Kindness and Father of 
Horses: A History of Erasers Limited, (Morija Printing Works, 
Wepener, 1958), p.31; Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.147-
81. 
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State farmers also petitioned their government during this 
period against the selling of Basotho produce as Free State 
grain in the Transvaa1.2a 
Hence one trader based in Maseru was to testify to the 1903-05 
South African Native Affairs Commission that "the principal 
source [of income for Basotho] is agriculture, but other 
sources are cattle-raising, horse-breeding, wool and mohair. 
They have a good many strings to their bow. They are not 
bound to one source".27 One missionary described Lesotho in 
1910: "Lesuto is perhaps an African country which in relation 
to its size, occupies the first place from the point of view 
of agriculture; this country 
but [also] exports each year 
Free State between 150 000 
not only feeds 
to the Transvaal 
and 200 000 bags 
its population, 
and the Orange 
of grain".28 
This meant that by the turn of the century most Basotho still 
relied on the produce of their land for subsistence and tax 
payment. It is this factor that made the recruitment of 
Basotho for mine work and their subordination to the 
exigencies of migrant labour such a protracted struggle. 
The capacity of some Basotho to resist capitalist penetration 
and proletarianisation also shaped British colonial policy 
towards the country. The turning of Lesotho into a "native 
reserve'' was not the initial objective of colonial rule, but 
the result of the failure of the Cape governmentJs attempts to 
disarm Basotho and to open Quthing (in the south) to white 
settlement. These attempts sparked the Gun War (1880-81) 
which forced the British government to take direct 
2a Great Britain, Her MajestyJs Colonial Possession. 
no.31, Basutoland; Report of the Resident Commissioner for 
1.8.81, c.5249.-28; CAR, 1888-89; T. Keegan, Rural 
Transformations in Industrializing South Africa; The Southern 
Highveld to 1914, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1986), p.17; 
Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.159-76. 
27 South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-05; 
Minutes of Evidence, vol.4, p.399. 
2s. A. Bertrand, En Afrigue avec le missionare Coillard a 
travers l"Etat libre dJorange, le pays des ba-Souto, 
Boulouwayo, (C.H. Eggimann and Co., Geneva, 1913(?]), p.104. 
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responsibility for the running of the colony. Had Basotho 
given in to Cape, white settlement and the implementation of 
the provisions of the 1894 Glen Grey Act, would have been 
among future possibilities. This would have resulted in, 
among other things, land dispossession, the introduction of 
the individual land tenure system, and the undermining of the 
position of the chiefs.2e 
The first British Resident Commissioner, Colonel Marshall 
Clark, and his successor, Godfrey Lagden, did not tamper with 
the Basotho communal land tenure system nor consider white 
settlement. This policy was supported by Alfred Milner who 
became High Commissioner in 1897. That same year, he was 
already clear in his mind that "I want to preserve the Basuto 
and the Bechuana, for the present at least, from the tender 
mercies of the [Cape Afrikaner] Bond and our friend Cecil J. 
Rhodes".so During his April 1898 visit to Lesotho, Milner 
was approached by the Basutoland Chamber of Commerce with a 
set of demands, one of which was the granting of land rights 
to traders, but he refused. The Chamber of Commerce applied 
again for land rights in 1906 and 1909, but was turned 
down.s1 
Basotho strength was also reflected in the failure of attempts 
to open Lesotho to mineral prospectors. As early as 1887, a 
number of applications for the prospecting of minerals were 
2e On the Glen Grey Act in the Transkei, see C. Bundy, 
"Mr Rhodes and the Poisoned Goods: Popular Opposition to the 
Glen Grey Council System, 1894-1906", .in W. Beinart, and 
Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa; Politics and 
Popular Movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape, 1890-1930, 
Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987. 
30 . C. Headlam, (ed.), The Milner Papers; South Africa. 
1897-1899, (Cassell, London, 1931), p.178. 
31 Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette 
(henceforth Friend), 15 April 1898; R.P. Stevens, Lesotho, 
Botswana, & Swaziland: The Former High Commissioner 
Territories in Southern Africa, (Pall Mall Press, London, 
1967), p.32. 
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being received and turned down by Clark.32 In January 1895 
the then High Commissioner, Henry Loch, wrote a lengthy and 
confidential memorandum to the Resident Commissioner, Godfrey 
Lagden, indicating that "I have for some time had it in 
contemplation whether the time has not arrived when the policy 
of keeping mineral prospectors out of Basutoland should not be 
relaxed, as I am of opinion that such relaxation may be 
desirable alike in the interests of the people and to escape 
from the stigma that Basutoland is neither more or less than a 
mere Native Location".33 But Lagden disagreed.34 He 
addressed the Scottish Geographical Society in June 1901 on 
this question: 
There are indications of iron, copper, and tin [in 
Basutoland]. It has been stated that traces of gold and 
diamonds have been discovered ... Government has found it 
expedient to avoid active research, because of the 
intense national feeling against it. The Basuto believe 
that exploitation and discovery of precious minerals 
have, more than anything else, led to many of the 
troubles in South Africa, as well as to the political 
obliteration of those countries in which they were found. 
They know and often allude to the action of Paul Kruger 
[President of the Transvaal Republic], who, at one period 
of his life, made it a penal offence amongst his burghers 
to announce the existence of payable minerals in the 
Transvaal. Similarly it is reported of the late 
paramount chief Letsie that on one occasion when a man 
found and produced for the chiefJs inspection a stone 
believed to be of mineral value, the unfortunate creature 
was hurled over a precipice, in order that his secrete 
might perish with him ... At times when a report 
maliciously circulated by the Boers gained ground that 
prospecting was to be forcibly permitted, the whole 
country has been convulsed with alarm amounting to 
madness. During any part of the last sixteen years it is 
probable that ill-advised attempts to prospect for 
minerals would have met with armed resistance - perhaps 
rebellion ... Even now a mysterious traveller prowling 
about in quiet places with a kodak is regarded with 
32 See Her MajestyJs Colonial Possessions. no,31, 1887, 
p.5. 
33 University of Witwatersrand Manuscripts, (UWM), 
Lagden Papers, Loch to Lagden, 12 January 1895. 
34. UWM, Lagden Papers, Lagden to Loch, 3 February 1895. 
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suspicion and ill-disguised aversion.35 
But, ironically, the success of Basotho in keeping their arms, 
preventing white settlement and mineral 
lay the basis for their country to be 
African labour reserve. 
Chieftaincy and the Colonial State 
prospecting, helped 
turned into a South 
The Basotho maintained the powers of their chiefs more 
successfully than their counterparts in South Africa. Unlike 
South Africa where chiefly power was dismantled and 
reconstructed with the use of magistrates - be it in the form 
of the Shepstonian or the Transkeian Glen Grey systems36 -
after their defeat of the Cape government in the Gun War, 
Basotho chiefs were incorporated into the British indirect 
rule system. Even by comparison with other High Commission 
Territories, Basotho chiefs fared better. Chiefs in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate were weakened by their number and 




dynastic squabbles, and the presence of white 
and concessionaries, seriously undermined the 
But, paradoxically, Basotho chiefsJ retention 
of most of their powers was their weakest point as the British 
modeled chieftainship according to the imperatives of colonial 
35. G. Lagden, "Basutoland and the Basutos", Scottish 
Geographical Magazine, vol.17, 1901, p.354. 
36. J. Guy, "The Destruction and Reconstruction of Zulu 
Society", .1n Marks and Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialisation and 
Social Change; H. Slater, "The changing pattern of economic 
relationships in rural Natal, 1838-1914", .1n S. marks and A. 
Atmore, (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South 
Africa, (Longman, London, 1980); P. Delius, "Sebatakgomo: 
Migrant Organization, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt", 
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol.15, no.4, 1989. 
3 7 . J. Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor 
Reserve in Southern Africa, (Westview Press, London, 1984); 
A.R. Booth, Swaziland; Tradition and Change in a Southern 
African Kingdom, (Westview Press, London, 1983). 
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rule. 
The key to the reconstruction of chieftaincy in Basutoland was 
the emergence and consolidation of the position of the 
Paramount Chief. The Basotho nation-state emerged from the 
wars and disruptions of the mid-1820s, 'when Moshoeshoe 
received and brought San, Sotho-Tswana and Nguni refugees and 
other displaced people, into his fold, giving them access to 
land and cattle (especially through the mafisa system), and 
protection. By 1833 when he received two young Paris 
Evangelical Society missionaries, Moshoeshoe was in a stronger 
position, although the Tlokwa of Sekonyela (in the north) did 
not recognise him as their chief, and the Phuthi of Moorosi 
(in Quthing) regarded themselves only as his allies. His 
defeat and dispersal of the Tlokwa in 1853 and the crushing of 
the Phuthi by the Cape colonial government in 1879, opened a 
new phase in the process of Sotho state formation. Moshoeshoe 
was assisted by the French missionaries in his struggle to 
assert Koena hegemony and himself as the central ruler in the 
Caledon region. The missionaries, on their side, supported 
the position of this particular Sotho chief, as they linked 
the success of their work to his fortunes. What they failed 
to understand was that Moshoeshoe had invited them for 
political and strategic reasons. He placed them 
strategically; first, at Morija which was along the attacking 
r.oute of the Griqua marauders, and later among the Taung of 
Moletsane (who had placed themselves under Moshoeshoe in the 
mid-1830s), the Tlokwa, and the Phuthi. The missionaries were 
even seen as "baruti [missionaries] of Moshoeshoe". 
The missionaries even created a "Sesotho" language for this 
one chief by reducing a synthesis of Fokeng and Thlaping 
dialects into a written language, at the expense of other 
local dialects. (The Tlhaping influence came from the London 
Society missionary Robert Moffat). This culminated in the 
translation of parts of the Bible, and in 1863 the missionary 
newspaper Leselinyana la Lesotho started to appear. "Sesotho" 
came to represent not only the language, but also became a 
source of national identity and prestige. The adjective 
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"Sesotho" came to be applied to music, culture, "customs", 
space and time. The category was used to order the world; 
compare what is and not of Basotho. Together with this 
development, was the missionaries' application of the European 
notion of "nations" to Moshoeshoe's subjects. The 
missionaries now spoke of and wrote about the "Basotho"; the 
notion of the history of "Basotho" began to emerge, and 
converts were socialised into seeing themselves as "Basotho" 
and "Christians". The emergence of Basotho intellectuals from 
mission schools at the turn of the century further gave 
legitimacy to this notion of "Basotho nation". In particular 
"Sesotho" literature began to appear. Though the 1850s were 
years of reaction against missionaries in Lesotho due to 
colonial pressure, the impact of missionaries in this respect 
could not be reversed.38 
Wars against the Boers in the 1850s and mid-1860s, and the Gun 
War against the Cape colonial government, were other factors 
which contributed to shaping the Basotho national identity. 
Wars against the Boers resulted in the loss of the western 
part of the Caledon River to the Orange Free State, and 
Moshoeshoe, by asking for British protection which he received 
on 12th March 1868, was able to keep Lesotho out of the reach 
38.This and the preceding paragraph based on P. Sanders, 
Moshoeshoe: Chief of the Sotho, (David Philip, Cape Town, 
1975); L. Thompson, Survival in Two Worlds; Moshoeshoe of 
Lesotho, 1786-1870, (Oxford University Press, London, 1975); 
Perrot, C-H, "Premier annees" ; idem, "Les missionaires 
francais et la construction d'un Etat: Le Lesotho au temps 
d'Eugene Casalis, 1833-1855", .in D. Bach, (ed.), La France et 
l'Afriaue du Sud; Histoire, mythes et en.ieux contemporaines, 
<Karthala, Paris, 1990); T. Holmes, "Missionaires francais et 
traites britanniques en Afrique australe , 1830-1900", in 
Bach, La France; L. Vail, "Introduction: Ethnicity in 
Southern African History", 1n idem., (ed.) The Creation of 
Tribalism in Southern Africa, (James Currey, London, 1989); 
N.P. Maake, "A Survey of Trends in the Development of African 
Language Literature in South Africa: With Specific Reference 
to Written Southern Sotho Literature c.1900-1970", African 
Languages and Cultures, vol.5, no.2, 1992. On Sesotho 
language, see D.B. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals; The Word 
Music of South Africa's Basotho Migrants, (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994), pp.107-08; and idem, "History 
is Eaten Whole: Consuming Tropes in Sesotho Auriture", History 
and Theory, vol.32, no.4, 1993. 
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of the Boers. But this in turn meant that the boundaries of 
Lesotho were finally fixed, and to Basotho~s sense of 
themselves as a national unit, was added the sense of space 
defined by physical limits. The British later handed over 
Lesotho in 1871 to the Cape Colony which tried to apply its 
system of direct rule. The situation took a turn for the 
worse when the Cape government announced the doubling of the 
10s tax and its intention of opening Quthing to white 
settlement. At the same time, the Basotho were required to 
give up their guns and spears. This, as we saw, sparked the 
Gun War which led the Cape government to return the colony to 
Britain. 
The British reversed the Cape#s system of rule. Chiefs were 
allowed greater space in the running of the country. Letsie 
I, Moshoeshoe#s successor, was designated "Paramount Chief", 
and was protected against any force that threatened to assert 
its independence from him. At an ideological level, Basotho 
came to accept their position as subjects and "children" of 
the British monarchy. The name of Moshoeshoe, their "father", 
and the treaty he signed after "wise" consideration, were used 
to legitimise colonial rule. But this paternalism went 
together with force as the Paramount Chief came to accept that 
the word of the local representative of Her Majesty was final. 
He and other Basotho chiefs came to associate resistance to 
British colonial rule with the alternative of opening Lesotho 
to the Boers. Threats of reincorporation into the Union of 
South Africa from 1908 further reinforced this dependence on 
British protection.39 
The British, in harnessing Basotho chiefly structures of 
government, redefined their functions. 
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level of the Paramount Chief, and the seven Assistant 
Commissioners worked with principal or "ward" chiefs in their 
respective districts. Legislative powers were in the hands of 
the High Commissioner in Cape Town. 
The Cape government had convened the pitso each year from 1874 
onwards, but only to announce new regulations and laws, and 
"correct public opinion". This practice was taken over by the 
British, the pitso being reduced to a forum for receiving 
colonial guests and making announcements. The Paramount Chief 
came to depend on his counsellors, who now included the 
Resident Commissioner, when taking decisions. As he gradually 
lost his sensitivity to popular opinion, so his dependence on 
the colonial government increased. In 1903 the system of 
pitso was replaced by the Basutoland National Council which 
was given statutory status in 1910 and transformed into a 
Legislative Council in 1960. The idea of establishing such a 
Council had first been raised in 1886 and approved in 1890, 
but its implementation was suspended due to opposition from 
some chiefs. 
It was Letsie I~s successor, Lerotholi, with the support of 
Lagden and Milner, who pushed forward with the idea of a 
council, because he wanted to strengthen his position as 
Paramount Chief. The National Council was made up of 100 
members; five nominated by the Resident Commissioner who also 
chaired the proceedings, and the remainder by the Paramount 
Chief. During the Council~s first sitting, eighteen "customary 
laws", Laws of Lerotholi, were adopted. However, the then 
Resident Commissioner, H.C. Sloley, made it clear that these 
had no legislative force; they were not "laws" but merely 
"customs". These laws mostly related to the powers and rights 
of the chiefs, including their right to letsema; the powers of 
chiefs~s courts and their relation to the colonial courts to 
which people could appeal; and to land allocation and use. By 
defining the powers of the Resident Commissioner, Paramount 
Chief and colonial courts, these laws instead of being a 
codification of "customary laws", gave legitimacy to 
structures of authority which had their origin in the British 
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system of rule. Moreover, their prime focus was on 
entrenching the structure of chieftaincy as it then existed, 
without addressing the system of checks on the powers of the 
chiefs. The second sitting of the National Council in 1905 
was followed by another in 1908, afterwhich it was decided 
that the Council should sit annually.-40 
The British indirect rule system essentially supported chiefs 
and the Paramount. In the process, chiefs came to rely on the 
colonial government rather than the people to remain in power. 
"Greater emphasis was now placed", argues Weisfelder, "on 
prescriptive dimensions such as hereditary rights to rule and 
the necessity of obedience to any legally established 
authority".-41 Chiefs came to abuse letsema and their courts 
to amass wealth. Chiefs, even minor ones, now demanded tribute 
labour for work on the farms of each of their wives, the 
produce of which was destined for the export market. Many 
widows were dispossessed of their farms by the chiefs on the 
pretext that they were underutilising them. Chiefs also 
played a key role in the collection of taxes. About ten 
percent of the tax collected was given as an allowance to 
principal chiefs, with a big portion going to the Paramount 
Chief. In 1894 Lerotholi complained that his 11000 annual 
"salary" was not enough and wanted it increased.42 
The transformation of chieftaincy under indirect rule went 
through several stages. The Letsie I era (1870-1891) could be 
characterised as the formative stage. During this stage the 
40 This and the preceding paragraph based on 
Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana, pp.29-38; Machobane, Government 
and Change, pp.29-125; R.F. Weisfelder, The Basotho Monarchy; 
A Spent Force or a Dynamic Political Factor, <Ohio University 
Centre for International Studies, African Series No.16, 1972). 
41. Weisfelder, Basotho Monarchy, p.38. 
42. R.M. Cassidy, "Britain and Basutoland: A Study 
of Men and Policies from the Gun War to the Anglo-Boer War", 
(Ph.D, University of California, 1967), pp.165-66, 168-70; J. 
Kimble, "JClinging to the ChiefsJ: Some Contradictions of 
Colonial Rule in Basutoland, c.1890-1930", in H. Berstein and 
B.K, Campbell, (eds.), Contradictions of Accumulation in 
Africa: Studies in Economy and State, (Sage Publications, 
London, 1985), p.48. 
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British were not yet sure about the future of the colony, and 
experimented with their indirect rule, while asserting and 
strengthening the position of the Paramount Chief. 
Lerotholi's period (1891-1905) was the completion of the 
process already underway. Besides the rinderpest epidemic and 
the South African War, the greatest victory as far as British 
rule was concerned was the defeat of Chief Masupha in 1898 by 
Lerotholi with the active support of Lagden, which removed the 
last barrier to the consolidation of the position of the 
Paramount Chief and colonial rule itself. Masupha, one of 
Moshoeshoe's three sons by his senior wife (the other two were 
Molapo and Letsie), had been a problem for the Cape 
government and the British. He had led the most militant 
section of the population, even refusing to pay and collect 
tax until 1894. In 1899, Moorosi's grandson, Mocheko, tried 
to assert the independence of the Phuthi, but was imprisoned 
during the South Africa War. In 1902 he was tried, stripped 
of his powers and removed from Quthing. The establishment of 
the Basutoland National Council in 1903 was, therefore, a 
conclusion to the formative phase. Letsie II reigned briefly 
(1905-1913), and was succeeded by Griffith (1913-1939). This 
was the period of consolidation. It was during the reign of 
Griffith who had been converted to Catholicism in 1913, that 
the Catholic church gained prominence in Basutoland. By the 
end of his rule, the Catholics had overtaken the Paris 
Missionary Society in church membership.43 
To further legitimise themselves, in 1919 the chiefs declared 
the 12th of March (the day that Moshoeshoe accepted British 
protection in 1868) as "Moshoeshoe Day". This decision was 
prompted by World War I and Lesotho's involvement in it in 
terms of supplying men and raising money for the war effort. 
After the war, Griffith went to England to join in the victory 
celebrations. It was in this context that Moshoeshoe Day was 
declared, thereby consummating the alliance between the 
43. Weisfelder, Basotho Monarchy, pp.39-58; Stevens, 
_L_e_s-o~t-h_o~,...._~B-o~t....-.sw ....... a-n._a, p.30; Machobane, Government and Change. 
p.40. 
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colonial government and the chiefs. In the 1920s this 
Moshoeshoe Festival came to be an important event for Basotho 
chiefs and the elite, and spread to the Witwatersrand.44 
Decline of the economy 
The transformation of Lesotho into a labour reserve was made 
possible by the collapse of the Basotho economy. But it was 
not every Mosotho who resorted to nondiscretionary migration, 
as social differentiation within Basotho society mediated the 
process of the penetration of commodity production and 
relations. 
The degeneration of 
traced to a number of 
played a role in 
Lesotho into a labour reserve can be 
factors. Firstly, natural disasters 
underming Basotho self-sufficiency, 
especially from the 1890s. Locusts attacks in 1892, 1893, 
1895 and 1898 affected Basotho grain production, while the 
country suffered a severe and prolonged drought between 1894 
and 1898.46 More critical, however, was the rinderpest 
epidemic which attacked the country between November 1896 and 
August 1897, killing 80 percent of Basotho cattle stock. As in 
other parts of southern Africa, this epidemic was a critical 
catalyst of proletarianisation. Political, social, religious 
and other creative responses by Africans to the loss of their 
cattle and their impoverishment varied according to the level 
of development of the productive forces, the nature of the 
political system, ecological conditions, and the impact of the 
epidemic itself.46 Many Basotho resorted to the use of 
44 Umteteli wa Bantu, 22 March 1930; 15 March 1930; 
16 March 1935; 23 March 1935; Mochochonono, 17 April 1935; 7 
January 1939; Basutoland News, 12 March 1940. 
46 . Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.80-81. 
46. C. van Onselen, "Reaction to Rinderpest in South 
Africa, 1896-97", Journal of African History, vol.13, no.3, 
1972; C. Ballard, "The Repercussions of Rinderpest: Cattle 
Plague and Peasant Decline in Colonial Natal", The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.19, 
no.3, 1986; P. Phoofolo, "Epidemics and Revolutions: The 
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34 
stones in bohali transactions, postponing the payment of 
cattle. When the ploughing season arrived in 1897, Basotho 
returned to their iron hoes and made more use of family labour 
to work the fields. In some instances. donkeys and ponies were 
used in ploughing. But the absence of rain frustrated these 
efforts. The outbreak of a four-week civil war in January 
1898 between Masupha, who was the principal chief in Berea, 
and the Paramount Chief Lerotholi, not only took 80 lives, but 
also disrupted life in many villages. Although this war 
coincided with the arrival of rain, people in the affected 
villages could not take advantage of this to begin sowing 
their crops. And, as if rinderpest and civil war were not 
enough, the population was then ravaged by smallpox, typhoid 
fever and dysentery.47 
The impact of rinderpest, diseases, war and drought, put 
colonial Lesotho in its worst crisis since the civil war that 
had followed the Gun War. These disasters would almost 
certainly have changed the course of Basotho history had the 
1900-02 harvests not been good. But of crucial importance 
were Basotho strategies for restocking and rebuilding their 
economy. This involved releasing more men for labour 
migration; hence the number of passes issued for labour 
purposes increased from some 20 000 in 1895 to over 30 000 in 
1898. In part, this was made possible by the changes already 
referred to which had freed men from many of their traditional 
responsibilities and activities. The number of labour 
recruiters in the country also increased dramatically (see 
Chapter Two). No less important, even as grain exports fell, 
Basotho were saved by the British demand for their horses and 
labour caused by the outbreak of the South African War (1899-
1902). The price per horse increaeed from L6 in 1899 to 119 
in 1901 and 120 in 1903. The number of Basotho horse exports 
increased from 1 869 in 1899 to 4 419 in 1900 and 15 684 in 
Africa··, Past and Present, no.138, February 1993. 
47 Eldredge, South African Kingdom, p.80-81; 
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The cessation of mining on the Rand and the disruption of 
agricultural production in other areas of South Africa during 
the war, was compensated by the employment of Africans in the 
British army. In November 1899 two labour depots were 
established by the British army - one in De Aar for recruits 
from the Ciskei and Transkei, and the other in Bloemfontein to 
cater for Basotho recruits. In March 1900 Lagden was then 
asked to send 2 000 Basotho recruits to the latter depot for 
work in the construction of a railway line to Sannah's Post. 
The Paramount Chief, however, told Lagden that his men were 
only willing to work for 60 shillings (s) (with rations) per 
month (like recruits at De Aar), instead of the 40s being 
offered. The army officials gave way, and Lagden was able to 
enlist the required number. Another 1 000 men were recruited 
by the Bloemfontein depot between April and May, while only 4 
944 passes for work at other labour centres were issued during 
the 1899-1900 fiscal year. The following year 11 477 Basotho 
were recruited by the army, as opposed to 8 580 passes for 
other labour purposes. Basotho men were attracted to the army 
by the short (three-months') contracts and the high wages 
offered. Transport drivers, for example, could earn as much as 
15.lOs per month.49 These strategies, selling horses and 
becoming migrant labourers, helped a significant number of 
Basotho to overcome the effects of the 1890s crisis. Many of 
them imported stock to rebuild the material base of their 
homesteads.ISO Hence by 1910, as already shown, some Basotho 
could still be described as net exporters of grain. 
48 Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.161, 189. 
49 P. Warwick, "African Labour During the South 
African War, 1899-1902", Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
Seminar Papers, October 1975 - June 1976; idem, Black People 
and the South African War. 1899-1902, <Ravan Press, 
Johannesburg, 1983), pp.52-74; QAE, 1899-1900, 1900-1901; Free 
State Archives Depot, (VAB), SORCO 557/02, CO 57, Paramount 
Chief (henceforth PC) to Resident Commissioner (henceforth 
RC), 12 March 1902. 
1So. Eldredge, South African Kingdom, p.81. 
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Nonetheless, pressure on the Basotho economy intensified. A 
severe drought attacked the country again in 1903 and, for the 
first time, large quantities of food had to be imported. For 
the majority of Basotho, the response was to release more of 
their men again, hence the number of migrant workers leaving 
the country exceeded that of 
until 1906, but another one 
1898. This drought continued 
attacked the country in 1912-13, 
quantities of grain had to be killing stock, and large 
imported again. These years were followed by a period of 
gradual recovery which culminated in 1928, for some Basotho a 
year of prosperity, as the total value of grain, mohair and 
wool exports had increased from 1839 097 in 1927 to Ll 013 392 
in that year.61 
The 1929 economic depression followed by a severe drought in 
1932-33, radically reversed the situation. The depression 
affected the price .of Basotho wool and mohair exports; and 
drought led to quantities of grain being imported. So serious 
was this crisis that many Basotho were obliged to sell their 
cattle. The number of cattle exported increased from 1 496 in 
1929 to 8 337 in 1931 and 17 491 in 1933.52 Following 
these years of hardship and disaster, Lesotho was unable to 
return to her previous paradise as a granary of South Africa. 
Labour migrancy ceased to be a strategy for survival during 
times of distress but became a necessity for the subsistence 
of homesteads. 
Even so, natural disasters were not the only factor that 
undermined the Basotho economy. Colonel Clark was given 
instructions that in running Basutoland, his expenditure 
should never exceed his revenue, and this became policy in 
subsequent years. One consequence of this policy was the 
51 A. Pim, Financial and Economic Position of 
Basutoland: ReDort of the Commission Appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, January 1935, 
cmd.4907, pp.190-92. Fluctuations and changes in the economy 
are covered in CAR for the years 1905-06 to 1934; and Ashton, 
Basuto, p.173. 
62 . Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.190-92. 
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problem of soil erosion.53 
As schemes for white settlement and mineral prospecting were 
not implemented and Basutoland was increasingly seen as a 
"native reserve", it became the objective of the colonial 
government to transform the country into a labour-exporting 
economy. In 1898 Lagden made it clear when addressing the 
Basutoland Chamber of Commerce that "the government policy was 
to induce labour by all reasonable means".5-4 It was his 
belief that more Basotho should rely on wage labour as this 
was important for the business of white traders: 
The land should produce as much as possible, but if it 
were overstocked with cultivation [sic] the remedy was to 
teach the surplus population to be less dependent upon it 
(applause). Last year over 30 000 men received passes for 
labour only. If each returned safely with a few monthsJ 
wages, the benefit to commerce must be considerable 
( chee1~s) . 66 
LagdenJs commitment to 
tax increase (from 10s 
this position can be seen from the hut 
to Ll) he announced at the November 
1898 pitso, even though the country was going through a severe 
drought and the people were recovering from the effects of the 
Masupha civil war. When the Paramount Chief approached Lagden 
at the peak of drought in November 1898 about the fate of men 
who were unable to leave as migrant workers because of age and 
their health and disabilities, Lagden, according to the Friend 
of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette, "expressed himself 
as opposed to afford help to men who are able to work, and has 
announced that should it become necessary to assist such 
persons, he can only recommend that grain in small quantity be 
issued to them as wages for labour rendered on some kind of 
relief works".ea 
53. K.B. Showers, "Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of 
Lesotho: Origins and Colonial Response, 1830s-1950s", Journal 
of Southern African Studies, vol.15, no.2, 1989. See also 
Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.59-65, 167-94; Cassidy, 
"Britain and Basutoland", pp.165-70. 
5 4 Friend, 25 November 1898. 
55. Ibid,, 25 November 1898. 
66 Ibid, 9 December 1898. 
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The colonial strategy involved more than simply increasing tax 
or obliging men to seek work. Although in the past essential 
food items were only imported during times of distress, in the 
1920s the colonial government developed a tendency of 
importing maize and sorghum for the southern districts, while 
exporting some from the northern districts. 
justified in the following terms: 
This was 
... but it may be asked why such articles of native food 
as kaffir corn and maize were exported to the value of 
L48 000 [during the fiscal year 1920-21], when it was 
necessary to import food of the same nature to the value 
of L78 000. The answer is that transportation from one 
district to another is not only costly, but generally 
unprocurable when most required, and it follows that it 
would cost more to convey grain from the northern 
district, where crops are usually more abundant than in 
the south, than to bring their requirement from farmers 
in the Union of South Africa living on the Southern 
boundary.67 




no attempt was made by the colonial government to 
road system inside the country. All efforts went 
developing and improving communication lines with 
South Africa.Ba 
Yet economic decline did not affect everyone equally. At 
every stage its effects were mediated by social and economic 
differentiation. Social stratification was particularly 
influenced by the missionary presence. Missionary work had 
been accompanied by educational work as schools were regarded 
as an important weapon for evangelisation. The number of 
schools belonging to the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, 
the Catholic church and the Anglicans, increased significantly 
between the turn of the century and the 1930s (Table 1.2). 
67 CAR, 1920-21, p.4. 
68 See Appendix II. 
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Table 1.2: Number and Size of Missionary Schools, 1901 and 
1933. 





















Source: Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.102. 
* 1931 
The 531 elementary schools in 1933 taught up to Standard III, 
the 38 "intermediate" schools (with 1 868 pupils in 1933) 
continuing to Standards IV, V and VI. There were in addition 
nine institutions for the training of various categories of 
teachers, one of which was the Leloaleng Industrial school 
where Basotho men were trained in various crafts.se 
The colonial government~s participation was in the form of 
subsidy to missionaries. In 1909 a central Advisory Board for 
Education was set up, and this culminated in the establishment 
of the Educational Department in 1914 with a Director of 




were enrolled in schools. A survey of "some 
of Basotho men leaving for the mines at about this 
25-30 percent of recruits to be literate. This 
proportion of literacy and the number of children in schools, 
compared favourably with Africans in South Africa.so 
Western education not only affected Basotho~s world outlook 
but also facilitated the emergence of a petty bourgeois class. 
Lesotho did not have "mission reserves as in colonial Natal 
where they were important for the emergence of the kholwa or 
"progressive" peasantry,si but, as in other parts of 
~ 9 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.102-04. 
so Ibid., pp.104,106. 
s1 N. Etherington, "Christianity and African 
society in nineteenth-century Natal", .1o A. Duminy, and B. 
Guest, (eds.), Natal and Zululand From Earliest Times to 1910: 
A New History, (University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 
1989). 
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Southern Africa,62 graduates of mission schools became 
proponents of tsoelopele (progress) and occupied important 
positions in the colonial hierarchy. Some were absorbed into 
the bureaucracy of the colonial administration. while others 
left the country in search of lucrative jobs on the mines and 
in the towns. Teachers and evangelists were the most highly 
qualified Basotho for most of the 20th century, and some of 
them invested their income in business. One example was Eben-
Ezer Malakane who qualified as a teacher in 1909, and later 
opened a cafe and a butchery. By the time of his death in 
1950, reported a missionary journal, "he had become a farmer 
with a farm in the Free State, a miller with a mill in 
Basutoland, a trader with trading stations in Basutoland, and 
an owner of a garage, a wheat thresher, omnibuses and other 
enterprises".63 Thomas Mofolo, the first Mosotho novelist, 
was also trained as a teacher, but, as Chapter Two will show, 
ended up as a labour recruiter, trader, miller, omnibus owner, 
and a farmer. 
Unlike Natal, relations between Basotho chiefs and 
missionaries were generally cordial, as Moshoeshoe had invited 
these agents himself. Among the first generation of French 
mission converts were three of Moshoeshoe~s sons, two of his 
wives, some of his principal counsellors, his brother in-law, 
and some of his leading military officers and friends. It was 
only after the 1848 reaction against missionaries when many 
converts abandoned their new religion and some chiefs became 
hostile, that commoners became important in mission 
membership. The anti-mission hostility had subsided by the 
turn of the century. By 1904 about 15 percent of the total 
population was in the church.64 As converts generally sent 
their children to mission schools, this suggests that the 
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previously dominant groups. The church had created an opening 
for social upliftment for at least some ordinary people. 
But the emergence and consolidation of the tsoelopele class 
was circumscribed by government policy and the labour reserve 
objective. This was particularly evident in the case of 
Basotho entrepreneurs. The procedure for granting a trading 
license perpetuated the domination of powerful traders. An 
applicant would submit his credentials to the Assistant 
Commissioner with his proposed project, and local traders 
would be consulted. A whites-only committee would then sit to 
look at the application and responses from the local traders, 
also considering the following: (a) economic conditions in the 
country; (b) the "needs" of Basotho; (c) "keeping up a clean 
balance in competition in trade"; and (d} personal factors 
relating to the applicant.66 This procedure frequently led 
to Basotho applications being turned down. Basotho traders 
were also barred from dealing with wool and mohair exports 
which were reserved for whites. Also, Assistant Commissioners 
turned a blind eye to whites traders who used their licenses 
for multiple purposes, but prevented Basotho from doing the 
same. Basotho traders were not even allowed to transfer their 
license. In all of these ways, a check was kept on the growth 
of a Basotho entrepreneurial strata.es 
Not only was 
minority of 
trade monopolised by whites but actually by a 
the minority. In Mafeteng in 1926, trade was 
monopolised by three whites: one owned a hotel, butchery, 
bakery and a "native eating house"; J. Scott being a labour 
agent, also owned a bakery and a butchery, and ran a taxi 
service to Wepener; and F. Stratton, also a labour agent, had 




60 Lesotho National Archives (LNA), S3/26/1/10, 
of the Mafeteng licensing board, 4 December 1928; 
Resident Commissioner (henceforth RC), 12 December 
to RC, 11 December 1928. 
66 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.60; 
Ashton, Basuto, p.167; LNA, S3/19/72, Acting Assistant 
Commissioner (hernceforth AC) (Teyateyaneng) to Government 
Secretary (henceforth GS), 4 September 1929. 
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over 1250 per year), and owned two taxi "cabs".67 Pim 
estimated that two-thirds of 194 trading stores in Lesotho in 
1933 were in the hands of two traders.es 
Reactions to this situation varied. In Leribe in the north, 
Chief Jonathan invited Indian traders in the 1890s to counter-
balance white traders~ domination and their manipulation of 
grain prices.es Aspirant Basotho traders also campaigned 
across the country with the support of some chiefs, demanding 
that priority be given to them as the natives of the country. 
But to a petition signed by 53 Basotho in the district in 
October 1926, the Assistant Commissioner of Mafeteng made it 
clear that "you must remember this [is] a Government Reserve, 
and that the Europeans referred to have taken out Licenses for 
the business in which they are interested in and that they 
have equal rights 
The government 
to make application 
was of the opinion 
for such licenses".70 
that Basotho did not 
understand "healthy competition".71 Of the 194 trading 
licenses issued in 1933, 175 were to whites, 16 to Indians and 
two to Basotho. Marginalised, Basotho entrepreneurs resorted 
to working as "touts" for white labour agents who also 
dominated the recruitment business, hawking and peddling, and 
the omnibus or "taxi" business.72 
The emergence of the tsoelopele class did not immediately pose 
a serious threat to the position of the chiefs and other 
previously dominant groups whose wealth had improved as a 
result of colonialism and commodity production. In 1934, one 
chief owned 200 cattle, 1 500 small stock, 90 horses, 31 large 
farms with an average annual yield of 300 bags of grain; his 
67 LNA, S3/19/59, AC (Mafeteng) to GS, 18 October 
1926; Musi to AC (Mafeteng), 20 October 1926. 
68 . Pim, Financial and Economic Position. p.60. 
se L. Rantheba, "The History of the Indian Traders 
in Lesotho", (BA Dissertation, National University of Lesotho, 
1985), pp.10-25. 
7 0_ LNA, S3/19/59, AC (Mafeteng) to GS, 2 November 
1926. 
71. Ibid., AC (Mafeteng) to GS, 18 October 1926. 
72 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.60; 
Ashton, Basuto, p.166. 
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other revenue were the LlOO government allowance, and court 
fines which amounted to L20, 200 cattle and 225 small stock. 
The estate of Chief Jonathan was valued at L20 000. 73 
Chiefs spent their money on manufactured goods, cattle and 
agricultural implements. And, wrote Ashton after his 1935-36 
field-work in Lesotho, "now that [chiefs~] political power is 
largely independent of popularity, there is no need for them 
to do this [help the poor] and they and other wealthy people 
can, if they wish, expend their wealth on advanced education 
for their children and luxuries for themselves, such as 
expensive tailor-made suits, large houses built on European 
lines, motor cars, travel, liquor and race-horses".74 
Although Lesotho~s economy was increasingly under threat, 
chiefs continued to multiply in numbers because of the placing 
system that Moshoeshoe had used to subjugate neighbouring 
groups. This system was now used even by minor chiefs to 
"place" their sons in areas within their jurisdiction. It was 
not until the Pim Commission, appointed by the Colonial Office 
to investigate the financial and economic position of 
Basutoland after the 1932-33 drought, that this issue was 
decisively addressed. The reform process recommended by this 
commission began in 1938, and the number of chiefs was 
decreased from 1 340 in 1939 to 117 in 1946. The number of 
chiefs~ courts dropped from 1 300 in 1938 to 122 in 1946. The 
establishment of the Native Treasury in 1946 removed the 
"eating up" of people by the chiefs through their abuse of 
court fines and the confiscation of stray stock, as 
"recognised" chiefs were now going to earn salaries instead of 
getting commissions from the tax collected. Letsema was 
abolished in 1950. These reforms led to a lot of resistance, 
especially on the part of minor chiefs, and this resulted in 
medicine murders Cliretlo) in the 1940s. 75 
As early as the turn of the century, Basotho commoners had 
73. Ashton, Basuto, p.173. 
74 Ibid., p.175. 
7 5 Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana & Swaziland, pp.39-
66; Machobane, Government and Change, pp.126-233. 
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begun complaining about the chiefs~ strengthening position and 
abuse of their power. The tsoelopele class grouped itself in 
the Basutoland Progressive Association in 1908. Attacks were 
levelled not only at the abuse of chiefly power, but also at 
the lack of commoner representation in the Basutoland National 
Council, as this class felt that merit rather than heredity 
should be a primary consideration for political office. The 
missionary-ran Leselinvana, and Naledi ea Lesotho and 
Mochochonono were the important mouthpiece of this class. But 
the BPA never challenged the colonial authority, as the 
interests of the tsoelopele class were linked to colonial 
presence and to commodity production. It was Lekhotla la Bafo, 
formed in 1919, which came to attack missionaries and colonial 
rule. With its grassroots support and orientation, LLB 
supported chieftaincy but criticised the chiefs for being 
puppets of the colonial administration. This struggle 
climaxed in the 1920s. Between 1922 and 1926, EPA mounted its 
attacks, leading 
chief~s courts 
to the amendment of some clauses related to 
in the Laws of Lerotholi. The colonial 
government tried to intervene to give the Resident 
Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners some powers over the 
running of the chiefs~ courts. In 1927 the Resident 
Commissioner presented proposals aimed at increasing control 
over the chiefs, but the National Council rejected the 
proposals with the support of LLB which saw the move as an 
attack on chieftaincy. The proposal intended to put 
Basutoland~s indirect rule system on the same line with other 
British colonies.76 
However, the elite, made up of chiefs and the tsoelopele 
class, was able to survive epidemics, droughts and famine, far 
better than most Basotho, and continued farming despite the 
declining of the economy. Some of them could even hire 
76 Paragraph based on Machobane, Government and 
Change, pp.126-233; Weisfelder, Basotho Monarchy; idem, "Early 
Voices of Protest in Basutoland: The Progressive Association 
and Lekhotla La Bafo", African Studies Review, vol.17, no.2, 
September 1974; R. Edgar, Prophets with Honour; A Documentary 
History of Lekhotla La Bafo, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 
1988), pp.3-41. 
45 
Basotho labour. Hence, during 1936-37 which was described as 
a "good year", the average output per acre of 2 bags of grain 
increased to 2.6 bags,77 despite the fact that the 1932-33 
drought had reduced the majority of Basotho homesteads to 
dependence on migrant labour. According to Ashton~s 
description of the poor: 
Most of them are adequately though simply housed, but a 
few live in hovels. They are poorly nourished and 
shabbily dressed, find difficulty in paying their tax, 
and can only afford one or two small cooking pots and 
implements such as hoes. Ploughs and other such things 
are beyond their means and only rarely can they buy minor 
articles such as salt and knives. Their income are often 
inadequate, even for their simple requirements, so that 
their women-folk have to supplement it by selling beer, 
or labouring in rich menJs fields or on European farms. 
In bad seasons many actually go hungry and literally 
dress in sackcloth.78 
It was for this reason that Ashton concluded that "the reasons 
why Basuto seek work are mainly economic: they go to work to 
supplement an inadequate income. Sons of wealthy families 
rarely go to the mines ... whereas the sons of poorer families 
frequently do so, and those who have adequate lands and stock 
go far less frequently than those who have not".79 
A Labour Reserve 
As LesothoJs degeneration into a labour reserve intensified in 
the 1920s and 1930s due to the combined impact of ecological 
factors and colonial rule, many Basotho, as Ashton indicated 
above, lost their food self-sufficiency and labour migrancy 
became essential for the survival of their homesteads. The 
cost of living in 1933 was estimated at Ll per month for an 
individual Mosotho; 13 (or the equivalent of a monthly wage on 
the gold mines) for a married man; and L15 for a tsoelopele 
p.153. 
77 Ashton, "Sociological Sketch of Sotho Diet", 
78 Ashton, Basuto, p.175. 
7s Ibid., p.164. 
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Mosotho.so Basotho responded to the decline of their economy 
in four ways, depending on the ownership and distribution of 
stock, land, wagons and agricultural implements. 
One response was to try to increase agricultural output by 
increasing land under cultivation, farms expanding to the foot 
of the Maluti mountains. The problem with this was that, taken 
together with the problems of overpopulation and overstocking, 
it diminished land available for grazing. The practice of 
allocating land to every married man and the inheritance 
system which parcelled out land to male heirs, led to smaller 
and smaller farms and a shortage of land. Already by the 
1890s, the effects of this was being felt, with disputes over 
land and grazing area becoming common.Bi However, this was 
accompanied by the effective concentration of land and 
livestock in the hands of the tsoelopele class and the chiefs. 
The other Basotho response was to try to diversify crop 
production for food and export. This was the case in the 
Lowlands in the 1920s as people began cultivating wheat as a 
winter crop primarily for export, while the people in the 
Highlands continued to cultivate this crop in summer. Judy 
Kimble#s neglect of this factor caused her to generalise about 
the significance of wheat in the Basotho economy and commodity 
production, attributing it a centrality that it never 
occupied.82 The integration of wheat into the agricultural 
cycle of Basotho was, rather, a product of the weakening 
position of other crops in the case of the people in the 
Lowlands; and because of the difficulty of growing other crops 
in the Highlands. But this does not suggest that Basotho 
would not have adopted the crop had the situation been 
otherwise. What is important is to contexualise and 
historicise changes in the Basotho system of cultivation and 
their choice of crops. 
00 . Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.60. 
9 1 Ibid., pp.161-65; Ashton, Basuto, pp.144-57; 
Eldredge, South African Kingdom, p.65. 
e2 Kimble, "Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule", 
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As grain exports suffered a series of droughts and also from 
diminishing returns from the land, many Basotho gradually 
turned to wool and mohair as primary exports. Some Basotho 
had adopted merino sheep from the Orange Free State Boer 
farmers in the 1850s, and wool was exported from the 1870s. 
Mohair exports began in the 1890s as angora goats were 
introduced by the colonial government. By the 1930s merino 
sheep and angora goats had replaced the traditional types.83 
From 1902 wool and mohair began to feature as important 
export items, and by the 1920s had overtaken wheat, maize and 
sorghum as LesothoJs principal exports. By the 1930s, wheat, 
maize and sorghum, were no longer important sources of revenue 
for the majority of Basotho. Grain now supplemented income 
derived, firstly, from labour migration and, secondly, from 
wool and mohair exports.84 It is for this reason that 
prohibiting Basotho traders from dealing with wool and mohair 
was so important. But wool-mohairJs displacement of grain as 
the primary export had implications for BasothoJs food 
security. 
Migrant labour was the fourth response by an increasing number 
of Basotho to their weakening position as the countryJs 
economy declined. As this will be discussed in detail in the 
coming chapters, suffice it to single out two important points 
here. Basotho migrants at first resisted taking longer 
contracts, preferring three to four monthsJ contracts in order 
to return home to help with ploughing and harvesting. But as 
the situation changed, in the 1920s and 1930s, the length of 
the absence of men increased. Also, most Basotho men used to 
refuse to go to the gold mines, preferring the diamond mines 
where they were able to control their earnings. But the 
numbers going to the gold mines increased from the 1920s 
because of the vulnerability of diamond mines to economic 
83 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, pp.148-61; 
Ashton, Basuto, pp.134-35; Eldredge, South African Kin~dom, 
pp.70-71, 163. 
84 . Pim, Financial and Economic Position, pp.191-92. 
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recession. 
By the 1920s, it had become an accepted practice among many 
Basotho that each man should go to the mines at least once in 
his lifetime, and boys were socialised into going to the 
mines. David Coplan has recently suggested on the basis of 
his anthropological research in Lesotho, that lebollo (the 
initiation school), which was in decline in the 1930s, came to 
play the role of preparing young men for the mines.85 
Moreover, Ashton had observed that "curiosity, a spirit of 
adventure, and admiration for returned miners with their airy, 
glamorous stories and enviable successes with local girls, 
encouraged youngsters to go out to work, and a spell of work 
in the mines has almost come to be regarded as an essential 
part of education, as a sort of initiation to manhood".86 
This suggests that as BasothoJs relations with labour migrancy 
became more complex, noneconomic factors also came to 
contribute in pushing men to the labour centres. Moreover, as 
Chapters Two and Four will show, the involvement of chiefs in 
migrant labour went beyond economic interests. Concerned at 
losing control over their men, chiefs, including the 
Paramount, regularly visited the labour centres. Often, they 
also sent their sons to accompany the men; and it was also not 
uncommon for chiefs themselves, especially minor ones, to 
accompany the men. On the mines, chiefs and their sons were 
given special treatment and supervisory positions, as a way of 
ensuring closer control of labour. 
But migrant labour had a number of implications for Basotho 
society. In the beginning, homestead heads were able to use 
their position to release cadets from herding to send them off 
as labour migrants. But, by the turn of the century, the 
proportion of married men leaving as migrant workers had 
increased not only because of droughts, epidemics and the 
B.!5 D.B. Coplan, "Eloquent knowledge: 
migrantsJ songs and the anthropology of experience", 
Ethnologist, vol.14, no.3, 1987, p.415. 




increased need for cash, but also because of the changes in 
the allocation and distribution of labour time which had 
resulted in men being freed of most of their precolonial 
occupations. But even so, men were not leaving on long 
contracts of the sort which became common from the 1920s 
onwards, and they generally returned home and settled down 
when they had reestablished their stock and productive base. 
Cases collected and surveys conducted by Ashton and Pim in the 
mid-1930s are useful indicators of the extent of changes in 
the migrant labour system during the period under discussion. 
The absence of alternative case studies makes Ashton-Pim's 
examples invaluable. 
Case A 
A Headman - Age 45 [Pim cited a case collected by Ashton] 
- His father was rich and there was no need for him to 
work. However, he was adventurous and, attracted by the 
glamour of the mines, he went to Kimberley in 1909. He 
spent a year there and sent home L12 with which he later 
bought a horse. After a stay of two years at home, 
during which time he was married by his father, he 
wandered about the South West Free State and finally 
ended up again at Kimberley. During this time he sent a 
blanket to his wife and his mother and L3 to his father. 
After about a year he went home with three blankets, some 
trousers, shoes and a hat. After a short holiday he went 
to the Premier Mine, and then on to Johannesburg on a 
nine months~ contract. During this time he sent or took 
home seven or eight blankets and a couple of pairs of 
trousers. When he went home again he abducted a girl, 
who became his second wife. Soon afterwards he went to 
the Rand again, and sent a blanket to each of his wives 
and his mother. This was his last trip, for his father 
now began to feel the effects of a riotous middle age ... 
so he had to take on the duties of headman. To pay tax 
he had sold most of the stock his father left him. He 
also acts as [labour] tout for a nearby store, for which 
he gets paid lls. a month. This helps him to meet his 
obligations. Later, his two half-brothers went out on a 
nine months' contract, and never sent a thing home. They 
went purely for the experience, and for the novelty of 
the thing. When they came back they got married and have 
since remained quietly in the village. One lives with 
his mother and wife and two children; between them they 
have five fields, which enables him to pay tax. The 
younger died last year - age 33 ... He has two younger 
brothers. The elder of them, about 27, has been twice to 
Johannesburg. The first time he spent two years, then 
nine months. During the time of his return he got 
married, with eight cattle, after first eloping with the 
girl. These eight cattle were given for his sister. 
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Later, he gave another three which he bought with his 
earnings on the mines ... The second brother, about 23, is 
at present in Johannesburg, where he has gone for the 
third time. He spends most of his money in Johannesburg, 
but used to send some back to buy cattle for him. Two of 
these cattle have now calved, and with this small herd 
and a further instalment from his sister#s husband ... he 
hopes to get married.87 
Case B 
[He] has been up to the mines three times, being away 
about five years altogether. He has spent most of his 
money in buying cattle and has been able to marry two 
wives, eloping with both. He paid five cattle for the 
first ... but has paid nothing yet for his second wife as 
he eloped with her only a couple of months ago ... Another 
man in the village, of the same age as the above, first 
went to the mines with him. He went on three nine 
months# contracts, sending back money and blankets to his 
father, and to his wife, whom he married on his second 
visit home. When he was away the third time, his father 
died; he came back to arrange his affairs and after a 
short stay returned to the mines. That was three years 
ago, and he has been there ever since. He occasionally 
sends money home, or a blanket to his wife, and then only 
after considerable pleading by his women folk. Last year 
during the famine [1932/33] he only sent back about L2, 
all of which was used to buy food.BB 
Cases A and B show that - compared to the tsoelopele class and 
the chiefs much of poorer Basotho migrants# earnings were 
commonly spent in purchasing soft goods rather than 
agricultural implements.Be But more important was that much 
of migrants# earnings were invested in cattle and bohali. As 
late as 1933, according to Pim, "the Basuto prides himself on 
the numbers of his cattle. His constant endeavour is towards 
increase".eo Samples of bohali transactions collected by 
Colin Murray in his study of migrancy and marital strategy in 
Lesotho, show that the use of cash in bohali began to feature 
87 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.38. 
ss Ibid., p.39. 
se It was estimated in 1976 that Basotho migrants 
spent 83 percent of their total earnings on luxury goods and 
clothing; see A.D. Spiegel, "Rural Differentiation and the 
Diffusion of Migrant Labour Remittances in Lesotho", in P. 
Mayer, (ed.), Black Villagers in an Industrial Society, 
(Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1980), p.8. 
90 . Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.146. 
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prominently only in the late 1950s.si Even my informants 
who married in the 1930s, indicate that they used their wage-
earnings to purchase bohali cattle instead of paying their in-
laws directly in cash.92 Therefore, unlike southern 
Mozambique,93 Basotho 
cattle and pastoralism 
War II, despite the 
society.94 
managed to maintain the value of their 
at least until the outbreak of World 
monetisation of exchange in their 
But the bohali price was rising at the same time that most 
Basotho were becoming increasingly impoverished, and averaged 
between ten to twenty cattle in the 1930s.95 With income 
from grain sales and wool and mohair exports declining, 
especially from the 1920s, men had to sell their labour to 
afford bohali. This had two consequences. On the one hand, 
Basotho men without cattle resorted, as cases A and B show, to 
chobeliso (eloping with women). On the other hand, many men 
remained unmarried right into their thirties. This, 
inversely, led to the increase in the number of single women 
of marriageable age.es 
Case A shows that by the 1920s and 1930s, parental control 
over migrants~ earnings had weakened. Sayce observed in 1924 
that "until recent years, when a man returned home from the 
mines, his wages were handed over to his parents. Nowadays, 
he often contents himself by presenting them with one or two 
91 C. Murray, "Marital Strategy in Lesotho: The 
Redistribution of Migrant Earnings", African Studies, vol.35, 
no.2, 1976, pp.106-07. 
s2. See for example, interviews with Phomolo Matsabisa, 
born 1914; Pitso Sonki, born 1918; Thaba-Tseka Mokokolo, born 
1920. 
93. P. Harries, "Kinship, Ideology and the Nature of 
Pre-Colonial Labour Migration: Labour Migration from Delegoa 
Bay Hinterland to South Africa, up to 1895", in Marks and 
Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change. 
94. Ashton, Basuto, p.172. 
95 • Murray, Families Divided; The Impact of Migrant 
Labour in Lesotho, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981), pp.62-
87; Ashton, Basuto, pp.64-73. 
96 . Basutoland, Litaba tsa Lekhotla la Sechaba sa 
Lesotho, (henceforth Litaba), 1923, p.250. 
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blankets".97 And, noted Ashton, "formerly bachelors and 
women ... were regarded as minors and therefore were not 
entitled to own or administer any property other than a few 
personal effects ... Popular opinion in this matter is changing 
and unmarried men and women are now often allowed by their 
parents to keep private earnings and even their wages from 
continuous employment as domestic servants, school-teachers or 
mine-workers".98 But this practice had no legal sanction 
according to codified customary law, and some parents 
successfully gained access to the earnings of their sons 
through the courts. Consequently, more and more cadets 
preferred to remit their money, as Case A shows, to friends 
who would buy cattle for them while they were away.99 
Moreover, cadets~ independent access to 
practice of arranged marriages. Gone 
fathers used to pay bohali for their 
made by Pim: 
cattle affected the 
were the days when 
sons. This point was 
Any earnings obtained by 
father, and in return the 
son~s debts and misdeeds, 
cattle for his first wife. 
a young man were given 
father was responsible 




The labour market has opened a wide field for young men 
out of parental control, where they can earn and spend 
money as they wish. The tendency to break away from home 
is a natural result, as is the related tendency to choose 
their own mates.100 
But the increase in Basotho men~s length of stay on the mines 
did not, as cases A and B show, necessarily bring more cash 
into the homesteads. 
97 R.U. Sayce, "An Ethno-Geographical Essay on 
Basutoland", Geographical Teacher, vol.12, 1924, p.287. 
98_ Ashton, Basuto, p.178. 
99_ .lb.id., p.179. 
100 . Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.42. 
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Table 1.3: Pim~s Interview 
Taxpayers Each in Quthing101 







1. Number found at home 32 
2. Number found absent at: 
(a) Gold mines 55 
(b) Farms 1 
(c) Miscellaneous 3 
labour in SA 
(d) Unknown and 6 
wanderers 
(e) Total number 68 
absentees 
3. Number who never worked 6 
in SA 
4. Number who worked in SA 87 
5. Av. no. of yrs absent to 1.4 
SA to work 
6. Av. no. of yrs absentees 1.2 
have been away 
7. Average no. of stock 
owned: 
(a) Cattle .27 
(b) Equines .08 
(c) Small stock .57 
8. Number with no stock at 80 
all 
9. Average number of lands .22 
10. Number with no land at 84 
all 
11. Average number of .67 
dependents 
101 lb.id., p.41. 
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Table 1.4: Interview of 84 Thembu and 120 Sotho Taxpayers in 
Quthing by Pim102 
Thembu Sotho 
% % 
1. Always at home 10.7 5 
2. Are at home at present 63 40.8 
3. Are working on the mines 29.76 33.3 
4. Are working on farms 6 6.6 
5. Are away from home working 35.7 56.6 
6. Are at home but normally to mine 33.3 12.5 
7. Are regular mine workers 63.09 45.8 
8. Are retired miners and now peasants 15.4 13.3 
9. Are at home but usually go on farm work 2.3 
10. Are retired farm workers 3.5 8.3 
11. Away at work over 2 years 9.5 25 
12. Number at work but not remitting money 20 22.5 
13. Number at work and remitting money 80 77.5 
14. Number away on mines who are married 56 57.5 
15. Number on mines not married 44 42.5 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 serve as important indicators of the 
position of labour migrancy in Basotho society and the 
distribution of wealth in the 1930s. However, one problem 
with these tables needs to be acknowledged. These surveys 
were conducted in Quthing, situated in the Highlands. The 
Lowlands, where most of the people were settled, would have 
been a better choice. Nonetheless, (i), (ii) and (iii) in 
Table 1.3 represent different age groups, even though the 300 
informants did not necessarily belong to those specific age 
categories. The Thembu-Sotho distinction in Table 1.4 is 
artificial 
"Basotho". 
because people now considered themselves as 
As the tax-paying age was 21, it can be assumed that in Table 
1.3 (i) refers to men in their early 20s; (ii) to those in 
their late 20s and the 30s; and (iii) to older and retired 
men. This illustration then suggests that the older a Mosotho 
man became, the more the migrant experience was acquired and 
102 Ibid,, p.40. 
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wealth accumulated. Taken with cases A and B above, Table 1.3 
suggests that the average length of absence of many men to the 
labour centres in a single contract exceeded a year. Case A 
above also showed that as years progressed, the returning 
migrants tended to stay for shorter periods at home, with the 
frequency of new contracts increasing on the other hand. This 
suggests that even in the case of men who returned home after 
the expiry of their contracts, the tendency was now to stay 
for short periods and quickly leave on a new contract. 
Moreover, socio-economic and political changes in the country 
had increased the number of landless and stockless people. 
Unlike the case in South Africa, labour tenancy and share-
cropping never emerged in Lesotho because, at least, of the 
absence of an individual land tenure system and the absence of 
white settlement. But a survey conducted in the Highlands in 
1936 concluded that 11 percent of the people had more than 20 
head of cattle and 50 smallstock, while 30 percent had no land 
or stock.103 Table 1.3 not only suggests that male 
ownership of land and livestock increased with age, but also 
that the number of cadets acquiring land and livestock was on 
the increase while that of homestead heads with no land nor 
livestock was also increasing. Those without stock and 
agricultural implements would sometimes get assistance from 
their relatives. Others hired these means of production from 
the rich in return for their labour. The problem with the 
latter was that Basotho in that situation began their 
ploughing quite late as the better-off would insist on their 
farms being worked first.104 
The notion of "developmental cycle" or "domestic 
useful as a model to understand this correlation 
cycle" is 
for men 
between access to migrant earnings and access to land and 
103_ Ashton, Basuto, p.175. 
104 .lili.d, p.125. The relationship between access to 
migrant earnings and the possession of land and livestock in 
Lesotho was noted by anthropologists in the 1970s. It was 
also estimated that migrant earnings accounted for 71 percent 
of the total income of an average rural household; see 
Spiegel, "Rural Differentiation", p.2. 
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livestock in Lesotho. The first phase of the cycle is when 
bohali is paid and presents given to 
wife. The man would then stay with his 
in-laws to acquire a 
parents, contributing 
to the homestead income in various ways. The second phase is 
when the newly-wed man, after some years with his parents, 
leaves to establish his own household. He would then need 
land, livestock, access to ploughs and family labour, and to 
regularly give his chief, headman, and friends presents as a 
sign of loyalty and to maintain relations. The third phase is 
when the sons in this new homestead are now grown-up and begin 
their migrant career. The homestead head would then retire 
and live from the proceeds of his sons earnings and the 
labour of his daughters and wife (or wives). The fourth phase 
is when the homestead now begins to decline as a result of the 
sonsJ departure to set up their own homesteads. The homestead 
head would then sell his livestock to subsist and pay his tax, 
or even resort to engagements like farm work.105 
The first phase required cattle for bohali, and a regular 
inflow of cash was also critical to the subsequent phases of 
the cycle. But Table 1.3 seems to suggest that, at least in 
the 1930s, many Basotho homesteads had not yet degenerated to 
the point where the third stage of the cycle was followed by 
the process of decline as was found to be the case in the 
1970s. What appears to be the case was that many Basotho men 
became migrant labourers in order to acquire stock, and then 
retired in their middle-age to concentrate on farming. 
While dependency on labour migrancy was the result of the 
deteriorating position of the economy, the prolonged absence 
of men in turn further undermined the Basotho material base. 
This absence of men was a source of serious concern. According 
to Ashton: 
Owing to the dearth of males, due to labour migration, 
the most varied combinations [in ploughing] may be found. 
Sometimes there is no leader, at other times boys of 
1oe. Spiegel, "Rural Differentiation", p.9; Murray, 
Families Divided, pp.97-99, 104-07. 
twelve or thirteen may have to 
and women often have to be 
ploughmen. The effect of this 
and an important contributory 
of Basuto agriculture.ice 
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take the plough and girls 
inspanned as drivers or 
absence of men is serious 
cause of the low standard 
The impact of Basotho men#s extended absence on women was 
("I, the mother of the captured in Azael Makara#s 1936 poem 
children feel the pain"). The poem is about 
distress of a Mosotho mother whose three sons and 
the cry of 
husband had 
abandoned her for work on the mines and for staying with 
prostitutes in Lesotho: 
I have nobody to plough for me, I am suffering! 
Poor women who are left alone in Lesotho, 
They are crying, their cry is a touching one! 
There is no food, there are no children at home! 
Who is [moreover] to give a woman a child 
While her husband lives with prostitutes? 
I, the mother of the children feel the pain! 
The poem then continued: 
I go out to milk the cow, 
Every drop goes to the ground, 
There are no kids [to breast-feed], this milk is burning 
my breasts! .. 
Our chief Letlama is done 
He is left alone with few men, 
Old men of old tunes, 
People who sit on their knees; 
Tsoalla, Sehlahlo and Maele, where have they gone 
to? 
They live underground in the shafts, 
The Boer is stamping and kicking! 
I, the mother of the children feel the pain!io7 
It can then be argued that the process fuelling the emergence 
of women-headed households in Lesotho - a factor that was to 
attract scholarly attention in the 1970sios - was almost 
ios Ashton, Basuto, p.2. See also, Pim, Financial 
and Economic Position, p.46. 
io7 A. Makara, Liphsamathe, (Mazenod Book Centre, 
Lesotho, 19?), pp.102-07. 
ios Spiegel, "Rural Differentiation"; Murray, 
Families Divided; S. Wallman, "Conditions of Non-Development: 
The Case of Lesotho", Journal of Development Studies, vol.8, 
no.2, 1972; J. Gray, et al, "Lesotho: A Strategy for Survival 
after the Golden Seventies", South African Labour Bulletin, 
vol.16, no.4, November 1980. 
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complete by the 1930s. As migrantsJ earnings were now 
critical to subsistence in the homesteads, migrants who 
abandoned their families - 20 percent in Table 1.3 - must, as 
MakaraJs poem also suggest, have created great difficulties, 
especially for the abandoned wives. Many of these women, as 
Chapter Seven will show, turned to commercial beer-brewing and 
prostitution to close the gap in the income for their 
homesteads. 
Migrant labour also provided avenues for Basotho youngsters, 
thus weakening parental control and the stability of extended 
families. In March 1905 ten Basotho chiefs and one headman in 
Mokhotlong addressed a petition to the Assistant Commissioner 
regarding "our children" working in South Africa who refused 
to return when ordered to do so, and those who were running 
away to the labour centres.100 By the 1920s this was a 
serious concern with Basotho parents and chiefs raising an 
outcry about boys of ages as low as 12 and 15 years, who were 
deserting heardboy duties in order to take farm work in South 
Africa. A law was subsequently passed which required young 
men under the age of 21 who wished to take a labour contract 
to produce letters from their parents and chiefs. But this 
was not effective as some labour agents helped the youngsters 
to forge such letters.110 
Chiefly and patriarchal control over women was also weakening. 
As early as 1892 Basotho chiefs were complaining about the 
problem of Basotho women "absconding" with their lovers to the 
Orange Free State and the fact that they were hampered in 
efforts to "recover" them. In that year chiefs presented a 
petition to the Resident Commissioner, and one of the 
grievances was their inability to recover "absconding" wives. 
During the South African War, a number of Basotho women went 
to Bloemfontein to work as washerwomen 
commercial beer-brewing and prostitution. 
and engaged in 
In March 1904 an 
10s LNA, S7/l/4/16, petition to AC (Qacahs Nek), 3 
March 1905. 
110 Litaba, 1923, pp.263-71. 
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Resident Magistrates of 
Ladybrand, Ficksburg, 
and Zastron, to help 
repatriate Basotho women who took refuge there. Bethlehem and 
Harrismith joined the arrangement in 1906 as the "problem" 
continued to spread. This arrangement was questioned in 1913 
on legal grounds. In 1915 Proclamation No.3 was passed at the 
insistence of the chiefs. It required Basotho women wishing to 
leave the country to have a pass signed by their husbands or 
fathers.111 Controlling women was essential to the 
homestead because of their reproductive and productive 
functions. But, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, 
these measures were not successful, and by the 1930s Basotho 
women were a significant feature of the Witwatersrand. 
Conclusion 
Labour migrancy in Lesotho was, therefore, not solely the 
result of "underdevelopment", as Basotho had been working in 
the Cape Colony and the Free State as a strategy to rebuild 
their material base some decades before their encounter with 
merchant capital, missionaries and colonial rule. But the 
transformed nature of a growing number of BasothoJs dependency 
on labour migration was the result of the combined impact of 
their encounter with the latter forces on the one hand, and 
ecological disasters on the 
became critical to the income 
to accept longer contracts, 
weakening. 
other. As migrantsJ earnings 
of Basotho household, men began 
their bargaining power also 
But the capitalist penetration of Lesotho and colonial rule 
had uneven impact on Basotho. Some sections, especially 
111 For cases of "absconding" women, see VAB, CSO 
2364/06, CO 404, correspondences of the Orange River Colony 
Colonial Secretary, 1904 to 1910.CAR, 1898-99 and 1892-93; 
Friend, 17 May 1898; J. Kimble, "JRunaway WivesJ? Basotho 
women, chiefs, and the colonial state, c.1890-1920", School of 
Oriental and African Studies Seminar Paper, University of 
London, June 1983. 
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members of the dominant lineage group and their political 
associates, benefited from commodity production. The 
tsoelopele class, formed in mission schools, also joined the 
latter section as the elite in Lesotho. These survived 
ecological disasters and continued farming with some success -
even investing their income in other profitable fields. The 
majority of Basotho families, however, had to turn to labour 
migrancy to survive. The next six chapters largely focus on 
this section of Basotho society. 
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Cl-I.APTER TWO 
MIGRANTS AND HIGRANCY, c.1890-1930a 
The migration of Basotho to labour centres in southern Africa 
began as early as the 1820s when many (mostly with their 
families) fled from their villages to take refuge in the Cape 
Colony at the height of the socio-political turmoil in the 
Transorangia. This was, however, a qualitatively different 
form of early migrancy as these Basotho were primarily 
refugees, and many returned to their homes in the 1830s and 
1840s after peace had been restored to the Transorangia. A 
turning point came in the 1870s after the discovery of 
diamonds at Kimberley, which ultimately transformed the socio-
political and economic map of southern Africa. By 1877, c.5 
000 Basotho were employed at this new mining centre. Some were 
sent by their chiefs, in most cases to acquire guns for the 
defense of the Basotho polity; others were missionary converts 
seeking money to purchase European dress and other goods; 
still others were the victims of the 1860s wars of 
dispossession.1 
The Orange Free State and Cape Colony farms, and Kimberley 
diamond mines, established themselves as the leading employers 
of Basotho labour. It was, however, the discovery of gold in 
1886 on the Witwatersrand which had long-term implications for 
Basotho. The number of Basotho migrants at other employment 
centres dwindled as the years progressed, while those heading 
to the gold mines increased. By the mid-1920s an average of 
15 000 Basotho were employed annually on the Witwatersrand or 
Rand mines. 
Because the gold mines still occupy a central position in 
1 Eldredge, South African Kingdom, pp.184-86; Kimble, 
"Labour Migration in Basutoland, c.1870-1885", .in Marks, and 
Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change. 
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Lesotho today, this chapter will focus on the process towards 
and the dynamics of Basotho~s shift to the gold mines. It 
will be argued that this shift to the gold mines was the 
result of BasothoJs weakening position and growing dependence 
on migrant labour. 
Gold Mines in the Early Years 
The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand did not affect 
BasothoJs migratory pattern until 1888. Moreover, the total 
number of migrants leaving Lesotho was insignificant in 
comparison with the years that were to follow. At this stage, 
migrants~ remittances were merely a supplement to homestead 
income; only 398 migrants left Maseru during the fiscal year 
1885-86, and only 1 840 "visiting" and "labour" passes were 
issued in Mohales Hoek during the same period. Between 1888 
and 1889 labour agents representing the Rand gold mining 
companies began to arrive in Berea and Maseru districts, and 
managed to recruit "large parties of men".2 
On the Rand itself, outcrop mining was initially conducted by 
hundreds of claimholders whose labour requirements were much 
smaller than those of deep-level mining some years later. The 
first major turning point was a crisis in 1889 which was 
sparked by the discovery that the pyritic rock in which the 
gold was embedded required sophisticated and expensive 
technology for maximum recovery. This led to the collapse of 
the share market as investors panicked. Wages for African 
workers were then reduced but, many of these miners, including 
Basotho, returned to their rural homes. The technological 
2 • Great Britain, "Further Correspondence Respecting the 
Cape Colony and Adjacent Territories, 1884-85", c.4589, 
British Parliamentary Papers, CB££), vol.17; "Further 
Correspondence Respecting the Cape Colony and Adjacent 
Territories, 1886", c.4838, BEE, vol.18; "Despatch from Sir 
Hercules Robinson, with Report of the Resident Commissioner, 
Basutoland, for the year ending 30th June 1887 and Secretary 
of State~s Reply Thereto", c.5238, BE£, vol.47; CAR, 1888-89; 
1890-91. 
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crisis was resolved by the introduction of the MacArthur-
Forrest gold-recovery process in 1892. This, together with 
the shift to deep-level mining in the course of the 1890s, 
required heavy investment. Small claimholders gave way to 
conglomerates, especially the Rand Mines company (formed in 
1893) and the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa.3 
The first large batch of Basotho to the gold mines arrived in 
August 1889 in a manner that even attracted the attention of 
the .s..t..a.r: 
The peaceful citizens of Johannesburg who went on 
marketing this morning must have been somewhat startled 
as a rather singular procession made its way across the 
market square. At the head of this small army rode three 
of the Mounted Police. Behind them, on a shaggy Basuto 
pony, rode a short stout gentleman of dusky and dusty 
appearance. This was Mama [Maama], son of Letsie, 
Paramount Chief of Basutoland. Mama was immediately 
followed by four lesser native dignitaries, also mounted, 
and behind them marched 150 Basutos in close order, with 
their polished kerries inclined at the same angle over 
their shoulders, with karosses or many-coloured blankets 
falling over their well-proportioned limbs, singing their 
marching song; while one finely-formed native executed 
the war-dance in front of them. The meaning of this 
cortege is speedily explained. Mama, the grandson of 
Moshesh, was bringing up 150 of his subjects to work in 
the mines."' 
This was seen as a political move on the part of Paramount 
Chief Letsie who had sanctioned this expedition in order to 
dispel a rumour that was being spread by the Orange Free State 
Boers that war was imminent with Lesotho. With Maama as their 
overseer, the 150 men signed a three-months contract with the 
Jumpers Company. But the men refused to work when they 
discovered that they were going to be paid 15s per week 
3 P. Richardson, and J.J. Van-Helten, "Labour in the 
South African gold mining industry, 1886-1914", 1n Marks and 
Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change; Harries, Work. 
Culture and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South 
Africa, c.1860-1910, (James Currey, London, 1994), p.109. For 
the most recent account of the significance of deep-level 
mining, see E.N. Katz, "Outcrop and deep level mining in South 
Africa before the Anglo-Boer War: re-examining the Blainey 
thesis", Economic History Review, vol.68, no.2, 1995. 
"'· St.ar, 10 August 1889. 
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instead of Ll.5s, as promised by the labour agent who had 
recruited them in Lesotho. Maama wanted to leave immediately 
with his men, but was persuaded by the local landdrost to 
stay. However, he was later summoned to appear before the 
court for "breach" of contract, but he fled with his men to 
Lesotho.o The following year Lesotho, the Free State and the 
Cape Colony, all put together, supplied only 937 black 
labourers to the gold mines. By comparison, 4 657 came from 
southern Mozambique alone.s 
The shortage of labour on the Rand mines, together with the 
relative strength of most indigenous economies, as the case of 
Maama cited above demonstrates, strengthened the hand of 
African workers against employers and kept wages comparatively 
high. But, as Frederick Johnstone has noted, the cost 
structure of the mines was a matter of serious concern to the 
Randlords. Besides the costly overheads required, mines on 
the Rand contained ore of low average grade. And the fixed 
price of gold meant that production costs could not be passed 
on to consumers. It was only the cost of labour that could be 
significantly reduced.7 The Randlords resorted to two major 
strategies. Firstly, there were the attempts to cut wages, 
especially in 1890, 1896-97, and 1902. Parallel to this were 
the efforts made to expand the geographic area from which 
labour was be recruited to deal with the shortage of labour 
and keep the price of the labour power of local recruits low. 
The Shangaan from southern Mozambique came to play a central 
role in this regard.a 
A second strategy included attempts to reduce the costs 
incurred in securing labour. This involved trying to reduce 
competition among the Randlords by establishing a monopsony in 
5 Ibid., 12 August 1889; 23 August 1889. 
s CAR, 1890-91. 
7 F. Johnstone, Class. Race and Gold: A Study of Class 
Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa, 
(University Press of America, New York, 1976), pp.13-49. 
s Richardson and Van-Helten, "Labour in the South 
African gold mining industry"; Harries, Work, Culture and 
Identity, pp.129-40. 
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labour recruitment for the gold mines. The formation of the 
Chamber of Mines in 1889 laid the basis for the coordination 
of the activities of the Randlords. But it was the 
establishment of the Native Labour Department in 1893 which 
aimed at reducing competitive labour recruitment. This 
Department was, however, weak in terms of resources and did 
not enjoy the support of the whole industry. The formation of 
the Rand Native Labour Association in 1896, with the support 
of most companies except those of J.B. Robinson, was another 
attempt. These early efforts eventually came to fruition with 
the formation of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
in 1901 and the Native Recruiting Corporation in 1912.9 
Relations with the state were still more problematic. Most 
Randlords regarded Paul KrugerJs government as unsupportive, 
especially with regard to its labour policies, railway rates, 
the high cost of dynamite, and taxation policy. Ironically, 
Kruger was unwilling to help the mines recruit labour, and was 
particularly unsympathetic to the use of "foreign" labour. 
The Randlords, however, saw the Shangaan as critical to the 
labour needs of the industry. Shangaan recruits stayed on the 
mines for up to three years (compared to local recruits whose 
contracts averaged three to six months); and were largely 
employed underground while local recruits preferred surface 
work. But Kruger was forced to intervene when the Chamber of 
Mines took the initiative in negotiating a labour deal with 
the Portuguese in 1893 to regulate the emigration of Shangaan 
labour. In this way a Lusa-Transvaal ad hoc labour agreement 
was reached in December of that year. The agreement, however, 
had little practical significance as most of the Shangaan 
labourers came from areas outside Portuguese control. 
Moreover, the Lusa-Gaza war of 1894-95 led to many Shangaan 
employees leaving the mines to take up arms at home. At the 
same time, the Gaza monarch took measures to prevent men from 
9 Harries. Work. Culture and Identity, p.145; A.H. 
Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South AfricaJs Mining Economy: The 
Struggle for the Gold MinesJ Labour Supply. 1890-1920, 
(Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1985), pp.37-
84. 
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leaving for the mines. 
supply coincided with the 
This sudden drop in the Shangaan 
labour crisis that had worsened in 
1895 as more deep-level mining operations were pushed ahead. 
With some 40 000 Africans employed in January of that year, 
the Chamber indicated that there was need of another 20 000 
recruits to rescue the situation. It was in this context that 
the abortive Jameson Raid of December 1895 took place, as 
attempts were made to overthrow the Kruger government to 
replace it with a government more sympathetic to the cause of 
the gold mines.10 
Though the raid was a failure, Kruger realised that his 
government 1 s position would not be secured unless at least 
some of the Randlords 1 grievances were addressed. Among the 
measures which followed was the 1896 Pass Law which aimed at 
curbing labour desertion and competitive recruiting on the 
Rand. Kruger also supported the 1896-97 wage cuts and the 
extension of the working month from 24 to 30 shifts. In 
November 1897, while African miners reacted to these wage cuts 
by withdrawing their labour, Kruger, together with the 
Chamber, successfully negotiated a new labour agreement (on 
the basis of the 1893 deal) with the Portuguese for a regular 
supply of the Shangaan labour. This step, together with the 
measures undertaken by the Portuguese (in the conquered 
territories) which included the imposition of hut tax and 
intensifying land alienation, increased the Shangaan labour 
supply.11 The proportion of Shangaan workers on the gold 
mines increased from 50 percent of the total African force in 
1890 to 75 percent in 1899.12 Together with this phenomenal 
10 P. Harries, "Capital, State, and Labour on the 19th 
century Witwatersrand: A Reassessment", South African 
Historical Journal, vol.18, 1986. See also Katz, "Outcrop and 
deep level mining". 
11 . Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, pp.141-73; idem, 
"Capital, State, and Labour". 
12 According to Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, 
p.140: "The phenomenal success of management in bringing 
through and holding a wage reduction of well over 20 percent 
while at the same time increasing the work force by 21 
percent, depended on the recruitment of cheap Mozambican 
labour". 
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increase in Shangaan labour went an increase in the overall 
African labour force,13 necessitated by the shift towards 
deep-level mining during 1890-95, while over much the same 
period expenditure on labour dropped from 25 percent of total 
working costs to about 20 percent.14 
But continued dissatisfaction on the part of the mining 
industry, or at least, a section of it, with the Transvaal 
government was among the central factors that led to the South 
African War (1899-1902); and eventually an end to KrugerJs 
regime.15 The post-war government of Lord Milner (1901-07) 
and the Het Volk government that followed, increased the 
stateJs efforts to support the cause of the Randlords. Of 
significance here was the importation and use of some 53 828 
Chinese labourers between June 1904 and January 1907, to 
address the labour shortage that followed the South African 
War, and the establishment of the Government Native Labour 
Bureau in 1907 by the Het Volk government.1s 
These developments and struggles affected the Basotho and the 
recruitment of their 
led to many Basotho 
Anglo-Boer war was 
labour in various ways. The Jameson Raid 
fleeing home in panic, convinced that an 
about to take place.17 Some Basotho 
13 The total number of African mine employees increased 
from 10 000 in 1889 to 90 000 in 1898. 
1 4. Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, p.145. 
15. For differing perspectives on the causes of the South 
African War, see S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the 
South African State", History Workshop, no.8, 1979; idem, 
"Lord Milner and the South African State reconsidered", in M. 
Twaddle, (ed.), Imperialism, the State and the Third World, 
(British Academic Press, London, 1992); A. Porter, "The South 
African War (1899-1902): Context and Motive Reconsidered", 
Journal of African History, vol.31, 1990; I. Phimister, 
"Unscrambling the Scramble for Southern Africa: The Jameson 
Raid and the South African War Revisited", South African 
Historical Journal, vol.28, 1993; Katz, "Outcrop and deep 
level mining". 
16 . P. Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 
Macmillan, London, 1982; Jeeves, Migrant Labour, pp.37-58. 
17 One correspondence wrote to the Friend of the Free 
State, 28 January 1896: "I have passed hundreds of [Basuto] 
natives on the road returning from Johannesburg, where they 
appear to have got a great fright, as bad as the Cornishmen 
who cleared from Johannesburg". 
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chiefs, including Paramount Chief Lerotholi, even prevented 
their men from going to the goldfields. Many of the Orange 
Free State farmers who were abandoning their farms to join 
their Boer compatriots across the Vaal River, spread a rumour 
to the effect that Basotho were preparing to attack their 
republic, and this led to many of Moshoeshoe 1 s men being 
turned back at the Transvaal border.is 
Before 1896 the Chamber of Mines had not regarded Basutoland 
as a key recruiting area. In 1895, Ernest Mabille, who had 
been dismissed from his service as a Paris Evangelical Society 
missionary, was commissioned by the Chamber to investigate 
labour recruitment possibilities in the country. But with the 
rumours of war circulating in the region in the aftermath of 
the Jameson Raid, labour for the gold mines became very 
scarce. At this point the Chamber appealed to Sloley, who was 
then the Acting Resident Commissioner, and appointed Mabille 
as the RNLA 1 s agent in Basutoland in February 1896. 
indicated that his government was prepared to help the 
Sloley 
gold 
mines but that the number of agents operating in the country 
made labour recruitment very competitive and difficult.is It 
was also during this time that an outcry 
be heard. "unscrupulous" labour agents began to 






recruited some Basotho and later induced them to desert to 
enrol them with another employer.20 
Towards the end of 1896 the rinderpest epidemic reached 
southern Africa, killing cattle in Lesotho until around August 
1897. This led to restrictions on the movement of people and 
livestock. Naturally, the number of migrants leaving Lesotho 
was affected; only 11 778 passes were issued for labour 
18 Friend, 28 January 1896; 7 April 1896; .cAR, 1895-96. 
19 Chamber of Mines Annual Report, <CMAR) 1895, p.54; 
1896, pp.54, 151-53. For an extended discussion of MabilleJs 
significance for the evolution of the system of labour 
recruitment, see the section "Recruitment, Competition and 
Labour Agents" in this chapter. 
20_ CAR, 1895-96; CMAR, 1896, pp.140, 151-53; Friend, 28 
January 1896; 7 April 1896. 
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purposes during the fiscal year 1896-97, as compared to 28 115 
for the previous year. During this crisis, Basotho recruits 
for the Rand, Free State and the Cape Colony, were required to 
leave from Aliwal North, via Quthing. One labour recruiter in 
the north in Peka, George Thorn - working with one prosperous 
trader, Charles Stevens - then negotiated a shorter route with 
the Free State authorities. By April 1897, Thorn was 
assembling his recruits at StevenJs store, from where he 
intended to accompany them to Johannesburg by train from 
Winburg. Arriving in Johannesburg, the recruits were free to 
go to the mine of their own choice but arranged for the 
deduction of 15s from their wages to pay Thorn for his 
services. Those who needed Thorn at the expiry of their 
contracts contacted him through Ernest Mabille who was now 
working for the South African Compound and Interior Mission at 
the Simmer and Jack gold mine. So successful was Thorn~s 
scheme that by July had employed three Basotho labour touts. 
Thorn now sent his men to the Robinson gold mine for surface 
work; and those who wished to choose their own mine now had to 
pay him Ll. The RNLA itself only managed to obtain recruits 
from Lesotho after the lifting of the restrictions towards the 
end of 1897.21 
1898 opened with a civil war between the followers of Masupha 
and the Paramount Chief Lerotholi and this coincided with a 
drought; their combined impact meant that Basutoland faced the 
worst crisis since the civil war of the mid-1880s. Towards the 
end of 1898 many Basotho started flocking to the labour 
centres on an unprecedented scale; 30 274 passes were issued 
for labour purposes in 1897-98 and 37 371 for 1898-99. This 
large exodus of Basotho reflected the hardship that most 
people had endured in the aftermath of rinderpest which had 
killed about 80 percent of their stock; drought; the outbreak 
of smallpox; and civil war that disrupted production in the 
country and destroyed many villages, especially in Berea. The 
exodus was so large that the mounted police in Ficksburg were 
2 1 CAR, 1896-97; 1897-98; .GMAR, 1897, p.117; Leselinyana 
la Lesotho, 1 April 1897; 15 July 1897. 
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unable to control the influx of Basotho into the district.22 
As large numbers of Basotho flocked to their offices, labour 
recruiters celebrated this "trade in what has been aptly 
termed - Basutoland ebony".23 In Mohales Hoek, some labour 
agents encouraged Basotho to leave, even smuggling some out 
without acquiring passes and paying the hut tax. Traders and 
labour agents also "speculated" in Basotho men, as a recruit 
could be sold two to three times before finally settling to 
work.24 
But the gold mines fared badly in this competition for Basotho 
labour. This caused the Chamber of Mines, which blamed the 
scarcity of labour on recruiters who lied to recruits, to 
write to the governments of Basutoland, Natal, Rhodesia and 
Bechuanaland, to propose that laws be passed requiring labour 
agents to be supplied with accrediting letters by their 
employers. The Resident Commissioner in Basutoland agreed, 
but still nothing was done. Pressure to control the 
activities of labour agents also came from the Basutoland 
Chamber of Commerce, which passed a resolution at its November 
1898 annual meeting, requesting that the government appoint a 
labour agent to monitor labour recruitment in the country. The 
following month, labour agents were required to carry 
certificates from their companies but, in the absence of any 
legislation, no effective control was achieved. The Chamber 
of Mines, still wanting to take hold of Basotho labour, 
continued to appeal for help until the outbreak of war in 1899 
intervened.25 
During early stages of the war, production was suspended on 
22 Friend, 30 September 1898; 17 August 1897; 
1898; 30 September 1898; 18 October 1898; 9 December 
December 1898; .c.AE, 1897-98; .cMA.E, 1898, pp.57, 68, 
1899, p.58. 
23 . Friend, 23 December 1898. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 30 September 1898; 17 August 1897; 
1898; 30 September 1898; 18 October 1898; 9 December 







the mines, and problems of the mines~ labour supply and labour 
agents were left largely to the future. 
found alternative employment in the 
Many Basotho instead 
construction.2s In July 
to resume production and 
army and 
1900 the Chamber of Mines 
labour recruitment, and 





Witwatersrand Native Labour Association <WNLA) which replaced 
the RNLA, established agencies in Lesotho with Mabille as one 
of its operatives. But the Association was unable to find more 
than a handful of recruits due to the reduction of the wages 
on the gold mines, and was forced to suspend its 
operations.27 Before the war African miners earned between 
49s.9d and 53s.9d per month on gold mines, but this was 
reduced and fixed at the maximum average of 35s per month and 
the minimum of 30s by the Chamber in 1900. The maximum average 
wage was then reset at 50s per month in 1901, but this did not 
lead to an immediate improvement in the labour supply. By 
comparison, the British army offered very high wages. An agent 
recruiting for the De Aar military depot for 13 per month with 
clothing and food rations, was said to be accounting for 90 
percent of recruits leaving Basutoland in March 1902.28 
The 1903 drought led to serious food shortages in Lesotho, and 
large quantities of staple foodstuffs had to be imported. A 
large number of migrants left the country on a scale bigger 
than that of 1898; in October 1903, 50 Basotho were passing 
through the Bethlehem district per day for work on railway 
26 Central Archives Depot (SAB), SNA 15, NA 274/02, 
Superintendent of Works (Johannesburg) to Commissioner of 
Native Affairs, 31 January 1902; SNA 10, NA 363/01, Provst 
Marshall telegram to Lagden, 12 December 1901; VAB, CO 57, 
557/02, RC to Paramount Chief (henceforth PC), 10 February 
1901; P. Warwick, Black People and the South African War. 
1899-1902, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1983), pp.52-74. 
27 SAB, SNA 7, NA 127, RC to High Commissioner 
(henceforth HC), 24 October 1901; WNLA to RC, 25 October 1901. 
2s QMAR, 1900; 1901; 1903; CAR, 1901-02; SAB, SNA 19, 
NA 494/02, Tulley to WNLA, 10 March 1902. See also, S. van der 
Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, (Jutas, Cape Town, 
1942), pp.164-75. 
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construction.29 In 1903-04, for the first time ever, the 
number of passes issued for labour purposes exceeded those 
issued for "visiting". By the end of the fiscal year 1902-03, 
60-70 000 "labour" passes had been issued and the following 
year the figure climbed to 98 022.30 
In February 1903 WNLA resumed its operations in Lesotho. 
Charles Tulley, a trader in Maseru since the 1890s, was chosen 
to head the new operation on the recommendation of the former 
Resident Commissioner, Godfrey Lagden, who was the chief of 
the Native Affairs Department recently established by Milner~s 
government. A letter was sent to Paramount Chief Lerotholi 
urging him td encourage his men to go to the gold mines and 
informing him about the new wage scale which was now 60s for 
underground work and 50s for surface work.31 In April WNLA 
proposed a scheme to the Resident Commissioner Sloley to 
facilitate the flow of labour and eliminate labour touts. 
WNLA would provide forms for chiefs to give to those Basotho 
men wishing to go to the Rand mines on six months contract. 
Such recruits would be received by WNLA agents in Winburg and 
Thaba Nchu who would then forward them to Johannesburg. The 
agents were then to stamp and return the forms to centres in 
Basutoland where they would serve as Ll tax for each recruit. 
But the proposal was not accepted.32 
With Tulley described as having no "time or, I suppose, the 
money to go into it [recruitment] on a large scale", WNLA 
announced two months later that it was employing two other 
traders, Douglas Fraser and Charles Stevens: "They have 
undertaken to work the country thoroughly, and will act as our 
sole agents in Basutoland, as we shall withdraw all 
recruiters, and only work through them and their 
employees". 33 Fraser was to work in the south, and was given 
2s VAB, CO 225, 7536/03, Orange River Colony, (ORC), 
Divisional Commandant to Colonial Secretary (henceforth Col. 
Sec.), 23 October 1903. 
30 .GAR, 1902-03; 1903-04. 
31 LNA, S7/730, WNLA to PC, 4 February 1903. 
32 LNA, S7/7/30, WNLA to RC, 8 February 1903. 
33 Ibid., WNLA to RC, 24 April 1903. 
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a letter for Lerotholi; while 
operation, and a letter to 
Stevens was given the northern 
Chief Jonathan. WNLA's new 
organisation, combined with the effects of drought, increased 
the number of its recruits in Lesotho and the Orange Free 
State from 421 in 1902 to 2 037 in 1903. But this improvement 
was still below the gold mines labour requirements, and 
Fraser later resigned, disillusioned by Basotho resistance to 
work on the gold mines. In fact, the continuing labour crisis 
on the gold mines led to the importation of Chinese workers in 
1904. The imminence of the repatriation of this indentured 
labour led to the collapse of WNLA in South Africa and the 
British Protectorates in 1906, as some member-companies, 
panicking and foreseeing a crisis, had begun recruiting 
independently. WNLA's recruits from Lesotho, having increased 
dramatically after 1903 to reach 2 350 in 1905, then dropped 
to 939 in 1906 (see Table 2.1). There was a slight increase in 
1908 when WNLA succeeded in recruiting 980 from Lesotho and 






5 000 were recruited 
member-companies. The 
following year the Association's best efforts brought 
precisely nil recruits. This compared to 4 093 recruited 
independently by various mining companies.34 
Table 2.1: Numbers Recruited by WNLA in Lesotho and the Orange 




1903 2 037 
1904 1 771 
1905 2 350 
1906 939 
Source: CMAE, 1906, p.606. 
The Chamber's attempts to turn Basutoland into a 
dependable recruiting ground had not been successful. 




apart from the problem of competition for labour, there was 
the fact, discussed in the previous chapter, that the combined 
impact of ecological factors and colonial conquest and rule 
had not affected the Basotho economy to the same extent as it 
had in southern Mozambique. Moreover, the colonial 
authorities in Basutoland had no stake in privileging one 
employer over the other, while the Portuguese by contrast, 
benefited from a deal in Shangaan labour by obtaining customs 
and railway rates concessions. 
One, many Basotho were able 
And, as discussed in Chapter 
to survive the crisis of the 
1890s. Their economy was also less monetised than some of 
their neighbours, as cash had not yet supplanted cattle in 
crucial transactions like bohali as among the Shangaan.35 
Anarchy and Crisis 
Until 1903, the colonial government made no serious effort to 
control the competition, or the "anarchy", in the system of 
labour recruitment in Lesotho. Although the 1898 boom in 
"Basutoland ebony" had demonstrated the necessity of 
controlling the activities of labour agents, the South African 
War had placed the problem on hold until 1901. When the 
British army applied to the Basutoland government for Basotho 
recruits in 1902, the Government Secretary pointed out that 
labour was not plentiful because of the number of agents 
competing for labour in the country. He suggested, however, 
that the army "should select some smart young fellow with 
experience in dealing with natives, and send him to me", in 
order that he might "explain to him our few simple ~Labour 
Regulation~ and put him in the way of commencing his 
work".36 The colonial government had not yet committed 
itself to regulating the system of labour recruitment. It was 
315 P. Harries, "Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-
colonial labour migration: labour 
Bay hinterland to South Africa, 
Rathbone, Industrialisation and 
Culture and Identity, pp.141-73. 
36 VAB, CSO 5338/02, CO 
Commissioner, 17 November 1903. 
migration from the Delegoa 
up to 1895", 1n Marks and 
Social Change; idem, Work. 
117, GS to Divisional 
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only following pressure from the chiefs, the Chamber of Mines, 
the Basutoland Chamber of Commerce, and with the 1903 drought 
affecting agricultural production and the payment of tax, that 
the government was forced to regulate the activities of the 
labour agents. 
Basotho migrants themselves were able to use the competition 
among labour agents and the absence of an active government 
role to their advantage. Primarily attracted to particular 
occupations by high wages, relatively good working conditions, 
and shorter lengths of contract, Basotho men used this crisis 
to go to employers of their choice. When the annual colonial 
report began listing destinations of Basotho migrants in 1898, 
the category "farm and domestic" accounted for most of the men 
who took out the "labour" passes in that year, followed by the 
5 971 and the 4 494 who were destined to Johannesburg and 
Jagersfontein, respectively. From 1903, a category 
"miscellaneous works" started featuring in the annual colonial 
report; and during 1905-06, 46 486 "labour" passes were issued 
under this category, as compared to 14 012 for Johannesburg, 
18 802 for "farm and domestic" work, and 12 699 for the Orange 
Free State mines. By declining to reveal their destinations, 
or by simply claiming to be heading to the Cape Colony and 
Free State farms, Basotho migrants could avoid binding 
themselves to labour agents. This gave them the freedom to 
shift from one employer to another if they wanted to. In some 
instances in later years, the colonial government even tried 
to intervene on behalf of the Randlords, by refusing to issue 
passes to Basotho men wishing to go to the Witwatersrand on 
their own.37 
The South African Native Affairs and the Transvaal Labour 
Commissions established in 1903 by Milner~s government to 
investigate the labour question in British South African 
territories were able to establish some of factors behind 
Basotho~s avoidance of the gold mines. Among these were the 
wages; the six months contract; underground work; and the 
37 .GAR, 1897-97 to 1905-06. 
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treatment of the sick.38 The Basutoland National Council 
also sat in 1903, and similar complaints were communicated to 
the High Commissioner. Lagden, now the head of the Native 
Affairs Department, regarded Basotho chiefs as people who "are 
characteristically brusque and need not be taken too seriously 
as they are in the habit of overstating their case very often 
upon unsupported evidence of boys who return from labour with 
a desire to magnify their difficulties and minimise the result 
in hard cash". His "Inspectors are always ready to listen to 
real grievances and to remedy them at once. My instructions 
to them are to discriminate carefully and not to disturb the 
whole economy of the Mines by entertaining or encouraging 
vexatious complaints".39 This attitude did not help to 
improve the reputation of the gold mines among the majority of 
Basotho. 
The deliberations at the Basutoland National Council resulted 
in the proclamation of the Labour Agent Bill in December 1903, 
which marked the first major attempt to control the activities 
of labour agents in Basutoland. Each recruiter was to carry a 
license valid for not more than twelve months, at the cost of 
10s a month. In the application for a 
to specify the name and address of his 
work, and the wage scale.40 But even 
license, the agent was 
employer, the nature of 
this measure did not 
bring order to the recruitment system. Some individuals came 
into the country, paid 10s for a one-month license, gathered 
recruits with false promises, and disappeared.41 
With the situation gradually worsening, the Paramount Chief 
convened emergency meetings with the Resident Commissioner in 
October and November 1906, at which the activities of agents 
38 South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905: 
Minutes of Evidence, vol.4; Report of the Transvaal Labour 
Commission Together with Minority Report, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, cd.1897, 1904. 
39. SAE, SNA 196, NA 325/04, Lagden to HC, 16 February 
1904. 
40_ SAE, SNA 196, NA 325/04, Labour Agent Proclamation, 
11 December 1903; RC to HC, 12 November 1903. 
41. LNA, S3/3/l/6, RC to HC, 4 February 1904; CAR, 1902-
03; 1903-04. 
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who were accused of robbing Basotho were discussed. The 
newspapers, especially the Friend of the Free State and the 
Rand Daily Mail, publicised these meetings. The Friend of the 
Free State was concerned with the interests of the Orange 
Free State diamond mines, and the Rand Daily Mail with those 
of the Rand mines.42 At the height of this conflict, one 
trader, Alfred Sterley, asked the colonial government to give 
him the monopoly of recruitment in the country in order to 
eliminate labour agents and competition. He was ready to open 
branches in all districts, abolish "native" touts, set aside 
half of his profit for a charity fund, and deposit Ll 000 with 
the government as security. The Resident Commissioner did not 
accept the proposal, possibly because of not wanting to give 
the whole recruitment business to a single trader. Another 
trader in Butha Buthe, J. White-Smith, also approached the 
government in June 1907 with a proposal to establish a 
monopoly of recruitment in Leribe for the same reasons as 
Sterley.43 
The solution was found in the passing of a proclamation in 
August 1907 to amend the Labour Agent Bill. The new law 
streamlined the definition of labour agents, and gave them the 
right to employ African "runners and messengers" (or labour 
"touts"). The most effective measure was to require all 
agents to deposit LlOO with the government 
instead of 
as security; 
a month. This licenses were to be for a year 
legislation put many agents out of business. Numbers dropped 
from 298 in 1906-07 to 69 and 30 in 1907-08 and 1908-09, 
respectively. An amendment to this Bill in December 1912 laid 
the framework for dealing with "deserters", and proclaimed 
that all contracts were now to be written down. The following 
year in January, the Resident Commissioner issued a circular 
instructing all his Assistant Commissioners to issue labour 
recruiting licenses only to agents who intended to reside in 
4 2 LNA, S7/7/37, RC to WNLA, 18 November 1906. Clippings 
from these newspapers are attached to this correspondence. 
43 LNA, S7/7/39, J. White-Smith to RC, 18 June 1907; 
S7/7/37, A. Sterley to RC, 1 November 1906; GS to Sterley, 20 
November 1906. 
Basutoland.44 These measures laid down the 
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legal 
infrastructure for managing the recruitment system; 
addressing principally the question of unscrupulous recruiters 
and labour deserters. This change in the government~s 
attitude was due to the increasing centrality of labour 
migration in the economy and Basotho society. 
Employment Frontiers 
The establishment of a legal framework to manage the system of 
labour recruitment and migration went together with the re-
orientation of Basotho migrants from other employment sources 
to the gold mines. 
Table 2.2: Number of Basotho employed in the Transvaal 
Year Mines and Works Other 
1903 1 874 3 503 
1904 1 398 4 319 
1905 3 303 5 002 
1906 3 593 5 462 
1907 5 832 4 058 
1909 4 346 4 022 
1910 8 210 2 565 
SQ1.u:~1:a~ : .QMAE, 1903 - 1910. 
• 4 • For the proclamations, see Basutoland, Orders in 
CQuncil, High CQmmissiQner~s Proclamations, and Government 
NQtices, 1868-1916. See also LNA, 83/3/1/6, RC~s circular to 
ACs, 7 January 1913; 87/7/39, Sterley to RC, 18 July 1907; 
S7/7/37, Secretary for Native Affairs (henceforth, SNA) to RC, 
3 September 1906; CAR, 1906-06; 1908-09. 
Table 2.3: Territorial Analysis 
Transvaal, July 1903. 




















Source: Transvaal Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 
1903. 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that up to 1905 most of Basotho who 
were employed in the Transvaal were outside the mines. In 
1905, the Chamber of Mines reported that "although large 
numbers of these [Basotho] natives leave their homes to seek 
outside work for short periods, most of them are absorbed by 
domestic employment in Johannesburg and other large towns, and 
by the outdoor service of municipalities".45 And as far as 
Basotho then on the gold mines were concerned, a number of 
them were employed as hospital staff. In 1904 at the City and 
Suburban mine, the workers there were said to be "well cared 
for by the Compound Manager and superior Basuto assistants"; 
the Randfontein gold mine employed a "good staff of Basuto and 
Xosa boys" for hospital service, and an "educated Basuto 
attendant" was responsible for health services at the Village 
Deep mine.48 WNLA tried in vain to induce Basotho migrants 
to accept standard four-month and six-month contracts in 1904 
and 1905. respectively. The Chamber finally accepted that 
"this territory [Basutoland] therefore does not afford much 
assistance to the labour requirements of the mines".47 
Besides having worked for municipalities and mine hospitals, 
Basotho had a long history of working on railway construction 
in Natal, the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony; they also 
45 .GM.AR, 1905, p.xxvi. 
4 6 Ibid., 1904, pp.25, 30, 33. 
4 7 . Ibid,, 1905, p.xxvi. 
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benefited from the post-South African War boom in railway 
works. The bulk of the 2 326 workers employed on the 
Bloemfontein-Modderpoort railway line in 1903 were Basotho 
"who are ... only willing", the Chamber of Mines was told, "to 
undertake this work owing to the fact that it is of a 
congenial nature, and that it lies in a close proximity to 
their homes, so that if this number were released from railway 
work it is doubtful whether they would swell the number 
available for work on the mines".48 
Natal coal mines and sugar plantations, and farm work in the 
Free State and the Cape Colony, were other alternatives. But 
most Basotho migrants avoided working on the coal mines, 
because of poor pay and working conditions there. The Chamber 
of Mines wrote in 1895 in relation to applications for labour 
from its affiliated companies that "one 
over from a coal company, 
men. Basutos refuse to 
awaiting the 
work in coal, 
application stands 
arrival of suitable 
and it is useless 
supplying men who, through discontent, are 
desert".49 Nor were Natal sugar plantations 




and its hot 
Farm work in the bordering colonies had been an important 
source of income for many Basotho migrants prior to the 
mineral revolution. But as the mines became the most popular 
destination, farm work came to provide employment mainly for 
mine-work rejects, the aged, juveniles, and women.51 
As early as January 1888, Basotho were being enrolled in the 
4 8 Ibid., 1903, p.87. The Harrismith-Bethlehem line 
employed 328 workers; the Springfontein-Jagersfontein, 31; and 
railway work on the Reef, 583. The workforce in the Orange 
River Colony was largely from Lesotho. 
4 9. Ibid,, 1895, p.38. At the end of the 1930s, several 
thousand Basotho were working on coal mines; see Table 2.10. 
Their history, however, falls outside of the scope of this 
thesis. 
5o. Ashton, Basuto, p.163. 
51 LNA, S3/5/18/1, "Memorandum on Native Labour 
Recruitment in Basutoland", 1928. 
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Bechuanaland Mounted Police. In 1896 some 250 Basotho were 
sent, with the help of the Resident Commissioner and his 
Assistant Commissioners, to help British South African Company 
forces suppress the Ndebele Rising in Southern Rhodesia. 0 2 
This experience was in sharp contrast to the Transvaal where 
the Chief Staff Officer of the South African Constabulary, 
after an unsuccessful experiment with Basotho police recruits, 
wrote to the Secretary of the Native Affairs Department in 
December 1903 asking for a suggestion of better recruits for 
the Rustenburg district. "The local natives are useless for 
Police purposes being 
Basutoland who have 
unreliable [sic], 





Division, S.A.C. have not been a success, they were of a bad 
stamp and could not speak any other language than their 
own".53 Similar experiments with Basotho police recruits 
continued for another 20 years,54 but the only real success 
was in Bechuanaland. 
Bechuanaland remained the major employer of Basotho police 
recruits until well into the 1920s. The Bechuanaland Resident 
Commissioner would contact his counterpart in colonial 
Lesotho, stating the numbers required. His Basotho counterpart 
would then notify the Paramount Chief and send a circular to 
his Assistant Commissioners who, in turn, asked local chiefs 
to identify and send possible candidates. Sometimes the 
Bechuanaland government would send an experienced Mosotho in 
their service to Lesotho to help with the recruitment and 
selection of the men. Arriving at the offices of the Assistant 
Commissioners, the men would be selected according to age (the 
preferred age being between 23 and 32 years) and height (the 
preferred height being between 5.1 to 5.10 feet). Conduct, the 
level of discipline and obedience, past police or military 
experience, the level of literacy and multilinguality, also 
52 Friend, 1 July 1898; F. Barkly, Among Boers and 
Basutos, (Roxburghe Press, United Kingdom, 1896), p.247. 
53 SAE, SNA 188, NA 3157/03, Chief Staff Officer to SNA, 
15 December 1903. 
54 In December 1920 some Basotho were recruited for 
police service in Kimberley; see SAB, GG 50/53, vol.1870, RC 
to HC, 29 March 1921. 
counted.55 Medical examinations were thorough. In 
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1930 
medical officers charged the Bechuanaland administration 
10s.6d per recruit examined, compared to the ls they charged 
for mine recruits. A medical officer examining one police 
recruit took the time equivalent to that required for 
examining at least fifteen mine recruits, because ... in 
addition to the examination which is required for a mine 
recruit, there is entailed, in the case of a Police recruit, 
comparative chest and abdominal measurements, test of height 
as compared with weight of the individual, examination of the 
nervous and digestive systems, and test of urine for albumen 
and sugar".56 
Recruits who passed the medical and other tests were given a 
10s to 12s advance, a railway warrant, and put on the train. 
At the same time, their names were mailed to the Resident 
Commissioner in Mafikeng. Contracts varied between six months 
and two years. Wages were quite high; in 1908 a sergeant 
earned L6 per month, a corporal L5, and a trooper L3. And 
Basotho remained an important component of the police force in 
Bechuanaland until their repatriation in 1920.57 
However, it was the diamond mines which were the major 
employer of Basotho labour in the period before the 1920s. 
Basotho had a long history of working in Kimberley where they 
56 Among the nine candidates selected in Mafeteng for 
the March 1918 batch were these cases: "~, No previous 
service, speaks and writes English, talks Zulu and some Dutch, 
age 26"; "John Lekhoaba, Served France [during World War IJ, 
good discharge, talks and understands English, young and 
smart, age 25"; "Keatsi, Served France, good discharge, writes 
Sesuto and talks a little English. Age 30 but does not look 
it"; "Johannes Masiu, No service, writes and reads Sesuto, 
understands Dutch. Good with horses, a groom, Age 28". See 
LNA, S3/21/3/l, Memorandum, "Candidates for Bechuanaland 
Protectorate Police", 23 March 1918. 
06 . LNA, S3/21/3/l, RC Basutoland to RC Bechuanaland, 17 
September 1930. 
~7 LNA, S7/7/39, Sterley to RC, 18 July 1907; S7/7/41, 
RC Bechuanaland to RC Basutoland, 20 October 1907; S7/7/44, RC 
Bechuanaland to RC Basutoland, 26 June 1908. LNA, S3/21/3/1. 
RC Bechuanaland to RC Basutoland, 24 April 1920; RC 
Bechuanaland to RC Basutoland, 14 March 1930; Leselinyana, 17 
March 1922. 
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were the third major source of labour after the Shangaan and 
Pedi.58 But with Cecil Rhodes~ De Beers Consolidated Mines 
establishing a monopoly in 1888 and cutting back on diamond 
production in order to control prices, the number of African 
miners employed on Kimberley mines dropped from 11 300 in 1887 
to 6 000 in 1890.59 For Basotho, though, the cutbacks at 
Kimberley were somewhat compensated for by the boom in diamond 
mining in the Orange Free State. 
Table 2.4: Number of African Workers F.mployed on Orange River 











Source: Orange River Colony Mines Department, Annual Report, 
1905 - 1908. 
Table 2.5: Average Number of Ba.sotho F.mployed on Selected 
Diamond Mines 
Mine 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 
De Beers 1736 1893 n/a 646 1458 
J/fontein 2374 2180 240 437 
K/fontein 293 226 9* 48 
Source: SAE, GNLB 97, 220/13/100, H.S. Cook to Colonel 
Creswell, 26 January 1928. 
* only for the period June to December. 
At the Jagersfontein and Koffyfontein mines,so Basotho came 
to be one of the key components of the labour force. Labour 
58 . See, W.H. Worger, South Africa~s City of Diamonds, 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1987), pp.64-109; R. 
Turrell, Capital and Labour on the Kimberley Diamond Fields, 
1871-1890, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987), 
pp.19-31. 
59 . Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, p.66. 
so. For a detailed history of this mine, see D.C. McGill, 
A History of Koffiefontein Town and Mine. 1870 to 1902 and 
1902 to 1980, (The Author, Koffiefontein, 1991). 
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for Jagersfontein, the leading Free State diamond mine, was 
primarily supplied by Lesotho and the Cape Colony. Of c.6500 
employed on this mine in 1912, about 4000 came from the Cape 
Colony and 2 000 from Lesotho. In 1910, an average African 
contract or piece-worker at Jagersfontein earned 2s.2d per 
truck loaded.61 So popular was Jagersfontein that labour 
never had to be recruited except in isolated instances.62 
The mine spent about 5s on each of the small number of 
recruits in 1914, and this was substantially lower than the 
gold minesJ recruitment expenses.63 
The Transvaal Premier Diamond Mine at Cullinan, (40 kms east 
of Pretoria) came to be a particularly attractive mine for 
Basotho migrant workers. The mine began operations in 1903 
and within a year, employed 2 000 Africans. The Pedi of the 
Northern Transvaal were initially a major source of labour for 
this mine because of their relative proximity to Cullinan and 
si Orange River Colony Department of Mines, Annual 
Report, 1905 to 1908; Union of South Africa, Native Affairs 
Annual Report, 1910; Friend, 31 January 1896; 16 June 1896; 
Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Natural Resources. 
Trade, and Legislation of Certain Portions of His MajestyJs 
Dominions: Minutes of Evidence Taken in the Union of South 
Africa in 1914, Part II, pp.20-23. 
62. Jagersfontein maintained an agent in Maseru during 
the period of anarchy, but by 1917 Basotho were arriving on 
their own. In 1923 the Government Secretary wrote to the 
Assistant Commissioner of Mohales Hoek that "it is not 
necessary for labourers desirous of going to Jagersfontein to 
go to labour agents, in fact a great number are known to go 
there direct". See, LNA, S3/3/l/8, GS to AC (Mohales Hoek), 
17 December 1923. 
63 The Chamber of Mines was paying as much as L4 to 
agents for each recruit in the 1890s; between 1903 and 1904 
the fee increased from L3.5s to L5 for a recruit for a 12 
months contract, Ll.12s to L2.10s for six months contract 
recruit. and Ll to Ll.5s for a locally recruited migrant for 
three months contract; see, van der Horst, Native Labour, 
pp.129, 192. It was reported (.QMAE, 1903, p.ix) that one of 
the reasons why Free State mines were so popular - possibly 
the Jagersfontein mine - was because "in addition [to the 
better food they supplied], [they] give all underground boys 
one tot of rum a day". Jagersfontein also supplied its 
workers with rations of tobacco (at least until 1914). 
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their long experience of working at Kimberley.64 Basotho, 
also with a long history of working on diamond mines, saw the 
Premier Mine as an important source of employment in the 
Transvaal and an alternative to working on the Rand gold 
mines.65 Basotho and Pedi came to be key sources of labour 
for the Premier Mine, hence the only two recruiting agencies 
of the mine in 1907 were in Pietersburg and Maseru. The 
number of Basotho on this mine increased from 849 between 
October 1905 and September 1906 to 1 768 between October 1906 
to September 1907; the latter figure was almost half of the 
total 2 952 Basotho employed in the Transvaal between July 
1906 and June 1907. This rapid increase in the Basotho 
numbers employed at the Premier was also made possible by the 
dramatic increase in the number of labour migrants that 
followed the 1903 drought. By June 1910, 4 000 Basotho were 
employed on this mine alone (Table 2.6). The dramatic increase 
in the average number of Basotho employed in Mines and Works 
in the Transvaal between 1904 and 1907 (see Table 2.4) was 
largely du~ to the opening of this mine. 
due to the 1 486 Basotho who left the 
Hence a drop in 1908 
Premier Mine after a 
"faction fight" there in September 1907.66 When one 
Basutoland official visited the major Transvaal mines in 
October 1911, he found Basotho distributed as in Table 2.6. 
64 See P. Delius, "Migrant Labour and the Pedi, 1840-
1880", in S. Marks, and A. Atmore, (eds.), Economy and Society 
in Pre-industrial South Africa, (Longman, London, 1980); idem, 
"Sebatakgomo; Migrant Organization, the ANC and the 
Sekhukhuneland Revolt", Journal of Southern African Studies, 
vol.15, no.4, 1989, p.582. 
65. Premier Mine was even popularly known among Africans 
as "Pikinini Kimberley" - Little Kimberley. 
66 Premier <Transyaal) Diamond Mining Company: Annual 
Report (PDMAR), 1907, p.10; SAB, SNA 465, NA 1578/10, Acting 
Assistant Director of Native Labour to Imperial Secretary 
(henceforth Imp. Sec.), 9 June 1910; LNA, S7/7/40, "Report as 
to Disturbance at Premier Mine", 6 September 1907. See also 
Chapter Six for a discussion of "faction fighting" at the 
Premier Mine. 
Table 2.6: Baaotho in Selected Mines and Works, 1911. 
Mine 
Nourse G.M 
City Deep G.M 
City and Suburban 
Cason G.M 










Source: SAE, NTS 2092, 216/280, George BoyseJs report to RC, 
October 1911 (undated). 
* about 4000 were employed in July 1910; the decrease was due 
to a "riot" on the mine in June 1910. 
The Managing Director of the Premier Diamond Mining Company 
was therefore partly correct when he told the Royal Commission 
in 1914 that "the Basutos are very fond of the diamond mines; 
they have been working in them for years, and they love this 
contract work, more particularly the loading. They go to the 
diamond mines more readily than the gold mines, and I think 
you will find that we have more Basutos than the whole of the 
gold mines put together".s7 
In 1914 an average African worker at this open-cast mine 
earned 3s per shift; piece-work in loading paid a minimum of 
3s.4d and a maximum of 4s.6d per shift or, fortnightly, 
Lll.2s.6d; and drilling paid 2s.11d per shift as a minimum and 
3s.2d as the maximum. This compared very favourably with the 
ls.8d maximum average wage per shift on the gold mines. But 
recruitment also played an important role in supplying the 
Premier Mine, because of its proximity to and competition from 
the gold mines. Of the 21 605 Africans employed on this mine 
in 1907, 13 088 had made their own way there. The balance of 
8 517 had been recruited by labour agents. Of the 17 862 on 
the mine in 1910, 13 017 had been brought by the agents. From 
1912 the Premier Mine, in an attempt to reduce recruitment 
costs, developed a strategy for encouraging voluntary labour 
by offering a Ll bonus to workers who arrived on their own at 
s 7 Royal Commission, p.38. 
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the mine. This system worked well, gaining popularity among 
Africans, until when it was suspended in 1926 when the mine 
faced an over supply of labour. By the 1930s the Premier Mine 
was employing between 6 000 and 8 500 Basotho workers.as 
There are several reasons which explain the popularity of 
diamond mines among Basotho migrants. One argument, used in 
the case of the Premier and Kimberley mines, is that African 
workers were attracted by the system of buying their own food 
from the mine stores.as But this would not explain the 
popularity of the Jagersfontein mine which supplied food 
rations to its workers.70 Another argument, accepted by 
Judy Kimble, was that Basotho resisted the gold mines because 
of underground work.71 However, Donald Fraser told the 
Transvaal Labour Commission in 1903 that Basotho initially 
resisted underground work at Kimberley and but later adapted, 
and that they were also in the process of accepting to this 
type of work on gold mines.72 
In fact, there appear to be three principal reasons which best 
explain the popularity of diamond mines. Basotho were 
attracted by contract or piece-work in loading, which offered 
68 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.44; SAB, NTS 
2076, 163/280, Clerk (Rayton) to Sub-Native Commissioner, 10 
April 1926; SAE, NA 209, 2279/1914/F473, General Manager 
(Premier Mine) to SNA, 22 June 1916; Royal Commission, pp.33-
42; South African, Mining and Engineering Year Book, 1920-21, 
p.103; 1921-22, p.30. 
se The Manager of the Premier Mine told the Royal 
Commission that one of the reasons that made his mine popular 
was: "I think ... the system of feeding themselves ... By 
feeding themselves they can get just what they fancy, instead 
of having a rigid ration of mealie meal served out to 
them ... ". See Royal Commission, p.35. 
70 . The Orange Free State Inspector of Mines justified to 
the 1914 Royal Commission the Jagersfontein practice of 
issuing food rations: "If you allow boys to ration themselves, 
the tendency, as has been proved on several occasions, is for 
them to neglect their food in order to save as much money as 
possible. I have heard that this has led to considerable 
mortality". See Royal Commission, p.20. 
71 Kimble uses testimonies to the Transvaal Labour 
Commission. See Kimble, "Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule", 
p.238. 
72 Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission, p.219. 
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them greater control over the labour process and their 
earnings. They organised 
targets, 
themselves in groups to load 
and therefore increasing 
the 
their trucks, setting 
earnings per shift. Secondly, the three-four months contract 
on the diamond mines, compared to the six months contract on 
gold mines, allowed Basotho men time to return to their homes 
for ploughing and harvest. Finally, one common observation 
was that "the open workings on the diamond mines with the ever 
possible chance of picking up a diamond and being rewarded, 





of finding stones" as one of the 
reasons accounting for the popularity of his mine.74 In 
1914, African miners were rewarded with up to 1100 at the 
Premier Mine for handing over any diamonds which they had 
picked up. There was in any event a flourishing underworld 
traffic in diamonds in the Orange Free State, with Basotho and 
Boers in the forefront.76 
Recruitment, Competition and Labour Agents 
Labour agents, as the previous section has indicated, also 
played a role in stabilising the migrant labour system. Among 
those who played a crucial role in shaping the system was 
Ernest Mabille who was expelled from the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society in 1894 after a case of adultery with his 
Mosotho servant. Mabille then wandered about, trying to 
obtain a job with the Dutch Reformed Church, and to start his 
own missionary training college in 
Lesotho, Mabille was 
Labour Commissioner 
commissioned by 
Johannesburg. Back in 
the Chamber of Mines~ 
in 1895 to investigate possibilities of 
country, and in February of the labour recruitment in the 
73. ORC Mines Department, Annual Report, 1907, p.6. 
74 Royal Commission, p.35. 
75 This illicit trade in diamonds had been taking place 
as early as the 1880s; some Basotho stole diamonds in 
Kimberley and sold them to Boers at one-tenth of the price. 
On this, see P. Hadley, (ed.), Doctor to Basuto, Boer and 
Briton, 1877-1906: Memoirs of Dr. Henry Taylor, (David Philip, 
Cape Town, 1972), pp.143-44. 
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following year was made 
Native Labour Association. 
would suffice, he wrote 
local representative of the Rand 
Not certain that this authority 
to the Resident Commissioner Lagden 
asking for "the support of your influence and authority to 
recommend me to the chiefs and their people".76 In March 
1895, he appealed to Sloley who was then the Government 
Secretary: "I may add that although I have undertaken the work 
in order to gain a living, still my great desire is to be of 
use to this tribe. Would you consider that you were using 
favouritism if you would give instructions to the government 
officers when boys take passes to mention my name as being the 
permanent Representative of the Chamber of Mines for 
Basutoland".77 He also sent a circular to traders in the 
country informing them about 
asking them to help him in 
later toured the country 
his new position and his scheme, 
return for a capitation fee. He 
with Lagden and an RNLA agent, 
visiting several chiefs to urge them to encourage their men to 
go to the Rand mines.78 
But Mabille was not happy with his position. He wanted Lagden 
to make him a Basutoland agent in Johannesburg: " ... you will 
understand that in my circumstances I must try everything to 
find a means of living. If I have undertaken this Labour 
Agency in this country on behalf of the Chamber of Mines, I 
have always considered it as something temporary, and as a pis 
a.lle1• en a.ttenda.nt mleux [a stepping stone]". 7 9 Lagden 
proposed to second him as interpreter for the 250 Basotho 
being sent for police service in Matabeland later that year, 
but Mabille turned down the offer. By the end of April 
Mabille had abandoned his job with the RNLA, and in June he 
left for Johannesburg to take a job with the South African 
Compound and Interior Mission at the Simmer and Jack gold 
mine. With the outbreak of the South African War, he left the 
Transvaal in October 1899 for Lesotho. Between April 1900 and 
76 LNA, S7/7/18, Mabille to Lagden, 28 February 1896. 
77 Ibid., Mabille to GS, 14 March 1896. 
7s Johannesbur~ Times, 4 April 1896. 
79 LNA, S7/7/18, Mabille to Lagden, 23 April 1896. 
June 1901, he worked as a Chief Interpreter 
Native Labour Depot in Bloemfontein. Later. 
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at the Railway 
he became the 
Superintendent of the Native Refugee Camp in Klerksdorp, and 
in December 1901 he took a job with the Chamber of Mines as 
the WNLA agent in Lesotho. There he stayed until May 1902 
when he joined the Native Affairs Department CNAD) at the 
invitation of Lagden. Mabille combined his job at the NAD 
with labour recruitment and missionary work. In the process 
he won for himself the appellation "Ralikoata", that is, 
"father/keeper of Basotho migrants".BO 
In October 1906, at the height of the labour agent crisis in 
Lesotho, Mabille placed an advertisement in a number of 
Sesotho newspapers. It introduced his labour recruiting 
partnership with a certain McComb. But when the Government 
Native Labour Bureau (GNLB) was formed the following year, 
Mabille was made responsible for Basotho affairs. He later 
returned to Lesotho to work for the labour contractors Marwick 
and Morris between 1911 and 1913, recruiting labour for the 
East Rand Propriety Mines. In 1920, after years of 
demonstrating his piety, as well as his commitment to Basotho, 
he was invited back to the Paris Missionary Society.Bi As a 
labour recruiter/contractor, missionary, and NAD/GNLB 
official, Mabille was able to leave his mark on the system of 
labour migration. The savings agency which was set up by the 
NAD in 1902 (see Chapter Three), the Basutoland Johannesburg 
Agent established in 1932 (see Chapter Three), and the 
expansion of the Paris Missionary Society to the Rand in 1922 
(see Chapter Five), were all due to his initiatives. 
eo Leselinyana, 15 November 1906; LNA, Maseru, Letters 
Despatched (1906-08), AC (Maseru) to GS, 6 September 1906; 
SAE, RAD 160, 4025-4026, "Claim for Compensation" form, 7 
April 1903; Journal des Missions Evangeligues, 1929, pp.559-
62. 
si Paragraph based on LNA. S7/1/4/22. Labour Agent 
licences issued, 3 January 1912; S7/1/4/23, Labour Agent 
licences issued, 18 January 1913; SAE, LD 762, AG 2610/04, 
Secretary for Law Dept. to SNA, 7 November 1904; LNA, Maseru, 
Letters Despatched (1906-08), AC (Maseru) to GS, 6 September 
1906; SAE, RAD 160, 4025-4026, "Claim for Compensation" form, 
7 April 1903; Journal des Missions, 1929, pp.559-62; Naledi ea 
Lesotho, 4 June 1907; Leselinyana, 15 November 1906. 
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As in other parts of Southern Africa, traders also played an 
important role in labour recruitment. The most important 
traders in Lesotho in the 1890s were George Hobson, Douglas 
Fraser. Alfred Sterley, Charles Tulley, and Charles Stevens. 
Hobson, Fraser and Sterley were the major traders in Maseru 
during the South African War, even preventing the government 
from issuing new trading licenses. Fraser began his 
activities in Lesotho in the 1870s and, by 1911, had 27 
trading stations in this country and the Free State. He 
entered into an arrangement with Stevens in 1888, dividing 
Lesotho between themselves; he took the south, and Stevens the 
north. By 1911, the latter had 19 trading stations in the 
Free State and Lesotho. Though Hobson~s operations were not 
as widespread as those of Fraser and Stevens, he was, however, 
the leading white settler-citizen in Lesotho from the 1890s to 
the end of the 1910s. He chaired the Basutoland Chamber of 
Commerce from its inception in 1890 for 27 years. But, 
except in isolated instances, Stevens, Fraser and Hobson, 
never focused their operations on labour recruitment. It was 
Tulley and, especially, Sterley, a trader in Maseru since the 
1890s, who went into labour recruiting in a big way - of the 
two, Tulley was in the weaker position. His poor finances led 
to his dismissal as a WNLA agent. In 1903 Sterley, on the 
other hand, was the leading labour recruiter in Lesotho until 
1910.82 
The most successful labour recruiting partnership in Lesotho 
during this period was the Basutoland Native Labour Bureau 
which was formed by Wright, Todd, Lacey and Gilchrist in 1907. 
The BNLB was very active during the years of "anarchy" 
discussed above, even changing hands in the process, and 
s2 Paragraph based on D. Ambrose, Maseru: An Illustrated 
History, (Morija Museum and Archives, Lesotho, 1993), pp.81-
140; T. Keegan, "Trade, Accumulation and Improvement: 
Mercantile Capital and the Economic Transformation of Lesotho 
and the Conquered Territory, 1870-1920", Journal of Southern 
African Studies, vol.12, no.2, 1986; J. Walton, Father of 
Kindness and Father of Horses: A History of the Erasers 
Limited, (Morija Printing Works, Morija, 1958); LNA, S7/7/57, 
AC (Maseru) to GS, 15 December 1910; S7/7/39, Sterley to RC, 
18 July 1907; S7/7/41, RC to SNA, 17 December 1907. 
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ultimately being taken over by Midgley and Wright. After the 
passage of the 1912 Labour Agent Proclamation which made it 
unlawful for companies to 
two owners simply applied 
be issued recruitment licenses, the 
for a license each. In 1919 the 
two agents were registered as recruiting for the De Beers 
diamond mine, Randfontein Central gold mine, "farm work", and 
the Free State Sundry Diamond mines. The company was dissolved 
in 1922, though Midgley remained in labour recruitment for 
another six years.83 
The formation of the GNLB in 1907 under the directorship of 
H.M. Taberer, was an attempt by the Het Volk government to 
intervene and improve the supply of labour for the gold mines. 
In 1908, however, Taberer left his position as the director of 
the GNLB to head the newly-formed Native Labour Department of 
H. Eckstein/Rand Mines company. This new scheme was another 
attempt to establish a monopsony for the Rand mines since the 
collapse of WNLA in South Africa and the High Commission 
territories. When the Native Recruiting Corporation was 
formed in October 1912 with Eckstein/Rand Mines~ Labour 
Department at its core and Taberer as the chairman, only J.B. 
Robinson refused to join. By the 1920s, after Robinson had 
joined the NRC in 1919, and with the rural economies of 
Basotho and similar areas in decline, the Rand lords found 
themselves in a position of strength.84 
The transformation of Eckstein/Rand Mines labour company into 
the NRC with Colonel Maitland Brown as its Superintendent in 
Basutoland, opened a new phase in the recruitment system in 
the country. Sterley and Tulley, the leading agents during the 
83 SAE, GNLB 226, 499/15/53, GS to Director of Native 
Labour (henceforth, DNL), 12 S~ptember 1918; LNA, Maseru 
Letters Despatched (January 1906 - January 1908), AC (Maseru) 
to RC, 25 December 1907; LNA, 83/3/l/2, AC (Maseru) to RC, 27 
January 1922; S3/3/1/13; AC (Maseru) to GS, 7 October 1928; 
S3/3/1/4, Labour Agent licences issued, 19 January 1919; 
Leselinvana, 17 July 1908, 19 June 1908; Naledi, 17 July 1908. 
84 Jeeves, Migrant Labour, pp.121-50; Great Britain, 
Report of Proceedings of the Basutoland National Council, 
1908, and Correspondences as to Affairs of Basutoland, 
cd.4196. 
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period of "anarchy", continued to operate for some time 
longer, but by as early as January 1912, the two were no 
longer recruiting for the gold mining industry. Sterley tried 
his luck for another 24 months after the formation of the NRC, 
recruiting for marginal employers such as the Voerspoed 
diamond mine in the Free State and the Germiston municipality. 
For his part, Tulley was simply swallowed by the NRC. He was 
employed as its sub-agent in Maseru until 1919.85 
Sterley was replaced as LesothoJs leading labour agent by 
Maitland Brown, an Australian who came to South Africa during 
the South African War to serve in the army. Although he 
arrived in Lesotho around 1909, he only became a factor in 
labour recruitment when he took a job with Eckstein/Rand 
MinesJ company in 1911. E.H. Stephens, another Australian who 
arrived in South Africa during the war, eventually became 
LesothoJs second most important recruiter after Brown. 
Stephens was employed as an overseer 
Mine where he worked for nine years 
Lesotho in 1915 to recruit for the 
by the Premier Diamond 
before being sent to 
mine. He later became 
known as "Mafafa" to Basotho because of the "bags" of money he 
gave to chiefs who induced their men to take labour contracts 
with him. By the mid-1920s he had established his own 
Stephens Labour Organisation, which had 
the independent firms outside the NRC. 
taken over many of 
He diversified into 
business in the 1930s, opening a store (close to the NRC 
office) and buying a hotel in Maseru. The third leading agent 
after Stephens was a Mafeteng trader, George Stuart, who had 
got into labour recruiting around 1912 while working for the 
Hadley Labour Organisation. 
Brown, Stephens and Stuart 
Lesotho. They elbowed 
By the 1920s, these three men 
dominated labour recruitment in 
out independent recruiters, 
standardising the system to suit themselves. 
B~ LNA, S7/l/4/22, Labour Agent licences issued, 3 
January 1912; S7/7/65, Mabille to GS, 8 March 1913; 
S7/1/4/25, Labour Agent licences issued, 2 February 1917; 
S3/3/l/4, Labour Agent licences issued, 19 January 1919; 
S3/3/l/13, Labour Agent licences issued, 3 January 1928; 
Leselinyana, 18 March 1911. 
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As labour agents became better organised, they started 
lobbying the colonial government over certain aspects of 
their enterprises. In February 1917 a delegation of labour 
agents met with the Resident Commissioner to raise complaints 
over the way in which the recruiting system was working. They 
demanded, among others, that the Labour Agent Bill be amended 
to define tout-agent relations along master-servant lines. 
They also wanted more power to be given to touts in order that 
they might enforce the terms of contracts, and so exercise 
more control over recruits to prevent desertions.ea 
This white-cum-NRC domination of the labour 
adversely affected those Basotho petty traders 
"business" 
who saw 
recruitment as an important avenue of capital accumulation. 
The period of "anarchy" had in fact provided opportunities for 
entrepreneurial Basotho and the tsoelopele class to take their 
own chances, despite Sterley, Tulley and the BNLB. Even the 
general secretary of the Basutoland Progressive Association, 
Simone Phamotse, tried his hand at recruiting for the South 
African Railways in September 1911.87 At the time of the 
establishment of the NRC in Lesotho, Jack Maoba, acting for 
the Eckstein/Rand Mines group in Leribe, was the most 
prosperous Mosotho labour recruiter. He was later 
Thomas Mofolo the famous Mosotho novelist 
joined by 
in 1912. 
Mofolo, a product of Paris Evangelical mission schooling, had 
left Lesotho in 1910 after an adultery case to exile himself 
in Northern Rhodesia, and later went to Johannesburg to join 
ea. This paragraph and the preceding one based on LNA, 
S7/l/4/35, Labour Agent licences issued, 2 February 1917; 
S3/3/1/4, Labour Agent licences issued, 19 January 1919; 
S3/5/18/5, RC to Brown, 8 March 1917; S7/l/4/22, Labour Agent 
licences issued, 3 January 1912; S3/5/18/ll, General Manager 
(Premier Mine) to RC, 8 November 1927; Ambrose, Maseru, p.135; 
Basutoland News, 29 October 1929; 12 June 1951. 
s 7 Among other independent Basotho recruiters during 
this period were one Emmanuel Lichaba (Mafeteng), Chief 
Letlatsa (Maseru), Chief Molapo Seetsa (Leribe), Jack Maoba, 
James Makepe (Leribe), Elijah Koloti (Butha Buthe), D.M. 
Molapo, Joseph Dichabane (Maseru). See, LNA, S7/1/2/32, 
Labour Agent licences issued, 3 January 1912; S7/7/65, AC 
(Leribe) to GS, 3 September 1912; LNA, Ll/3/14, SAR Native 
Labour Superintendent to AC (Leribe), 30 September 1911; 
Naledi, 27 January 1911. 
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Ernest Mabille. It was through this connection that he was 
despatched to Leribe in 1912 as a sub-agent for the 
Eckstein/Rand Mines group. But although Maoba was not 
particularly successful, Mofolo went on to accumulate enough 
wealth to establish a mill in Teyateyaneng in 1921, as well as 
a mail/taxi service between there and Ficksburg. When his 
position improved still further, Mofolo extended his little 
empire in the 1920s, recruiting for several diamond mines, 
farms, and a number of Natal sugar estates. He also opened 
stores in Bokong and Teyateyaneng. In 1937 he sold his 
property to buy a farm in Matatiel, but later became bankrupt 
after a futile struggle to protect himself from the Land Act 
in South Africa.es 
Maoba and Mofolo were exceptions, however. Labour recruitment 
was dominated by whites men, most of whom were traders. One 
strategy employed by the NRC, Stephens and Stuart, was to open 
sub-agencies in other districts through the employment of 
touts, thereby avoiding the necessity of taking out labour 
agent licenses and the payment of the LlOO deposit. This was 
one of the demands raised by the delegation of labour agents 
with the Resident Commissioner in February 1917 meeting, as a 
result of which a circular was sent to the various districts 
informing them that touts were to be considered as having the 
Power of Attorney for their employers. This meant that they 
could contract recruits without the labour agent having to be 
physically present. By the 1920s, thanks to this practice, 
Mofolo was the only Mosotho labour agent operating in the 
country. All other labour recruitment was now in the hands of 
the NRC, as well as Stephens and Stuart, who were operating 
from their headquarters in Maseru and Mafeteng. This provoked 
protests from the Basotho elite, and at a meeting with the 
Resident Commissioner and his Assistant Commissioners in 
es LNA, S3/3/1/10. AC (Leribe) to GS, 2 August 1925; 
G.H. Franz, "The Literature of Lesotho", Bantu Studies, vol.4, 
1930; D.P. Kunene, Thomas Mofolo and the Emergence of Written 
Sesotho Prose, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1989), pp.29-41; 
Dictionary of South African Bioiraphy, vol.1, 1968, p.551; 
E.W. Smith, "Thomas Mofolo", Africa, vol.19, no .1, 1949; 
Basutoland Witness, vol.4, no.2, April-June 1951. 
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November 1923, it was agreed that a mechanism should be worked 
out to limit the number of sub-agencies "staffed" by touts. 
The Government Secretary later met with Brown, Stephens and 
Stuart. all of whom opposed the proposal. Brown argued that 
any changes to the prevailing system would increase 
competition and the cost of labour. The idea was then 
dropped.es 
that the 
The overall result, as in the case of 
colonial state effectively frustrated 
trade, was 
the further 
development of the tsoelopele class. 
Shift to the Gold Mines 
Basotho migrants began entering the gold mines in larger 
numbers after the turn of the century, attracted primarily by 
piece-work in lashing and tramming (that is, shovelling ore 
into the trucks which were then pushed). This piece-work was 
popularised by labour contractors who had expanded their 
operations from production to labour recruitment during the 
labour "shortage" crisis which was sparked by the collapse of 
WNLA in British South Africa and the phasing out of Chinese 
labour on the gold mines. At first, labour contractors would 
enter into an agreement with a mining company to perform 
certain operations on the mine, but when the gold mines 
experienced a labour crisis 
1906-1912, many contractors 
to the supplying areas. For 
and Morris deployed labour 
Lesotho to supply the East 
and competition became rife during 
despatched their own labour agents 
example, J.S. Marwick of Marwick 
agents in Swaziland, Zululand and 
Rand Propriety Mines with labour; 
A.M. Mostert deployed his in such places as Lesotho and the 
Northern Transvaal to supply Robinson Randfontein Estates; and 
"Kaffir" Wilson operated in areas such as Zululand, Swaziland 
es LNA, S3/3/1/3, Brown to GS, 24 January 1924; 
S3/5/18/2, AC (Butha Buthe) to GS, 7 February 1929; S3/5/18/7, 
RC~s circular to ACs, 4 June 1931; LNA, QN Circulars (October 
1917 to December 1919), Circular no.5, 11 November 1917; LNA, 
MH 3/1/5, minutes of the meeting of Assistant Commissioners, 
19-20, November 1923. 
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and the Eastern Cape.so 
So popular was piece-work in lashing and tramming among 
growing numbers of Basotho migrants during this period that 
Sesotho newspapers carried advertisements with headlines: 
"Setoko/Stokwe!" a term that had entered the Sesotho 
vocabulary to refer to contract/piece-work.91 Some Basotho 
migrants preferred this piece-work because shovelling ore 
allowed them to bring their diamond mine experience where they 
specialised in working in loading trucks in groups. These were 
probably the "poorest" strata of the Basotho society who found 
it difficult to compete for better-paying diamond mine jobs. 
And, as on the diamond mines, this piece-work gave workers 
more control over their earnings, as some gold mines payed 
very high rates for every 100 trucks loaded.92 Some 
Randlords were aware of the relationship of this type of work 
to BasothoJs preference for loading on the diamond mines. The 
East Rand Proprietary Mine asked its labour agent in Maseru in 
August 1910 to find recruits for lashing and tramming, because 
no special knowledge is required and the work may be said to 
be exactly the same as that which the boys do in the diamond 
mines".93 Also, contract 
they partly controlled 
workers enjoyed relative 
the pace of their 
freedom as 
work, not 
withstanding the fact that lashing and tramming were the most 
physically arduous tasks of all underground work. Between 
1909 and 1914 the number of Basotho as a percentage of the 
total African workforce on gold mines rose from three to seven 
percent, partly due to piece-work.94 
so Jeeves, Migrant Labour, pp.92-99, 109-12, 158-60, 
243-47. 
91 Although some issues of these papers are missing, the 
surviving ones give us an idea of the extent of competition 
for piece-work labourers. See, for example, Mochochonono, 30 
September 1911; Leselinyana, 18 February 1911; Naledi, 27 
January 1911. 
92 On how piece-work system worked at the Wankie 
colliery in Southern Rhodesia, see I. Phimister, Wangi Kolia; 
Coal. Capital and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1894-1954, 
(Baobab Books, Harare, 1994), especially pp.122-24. 
93 LNA, Miscellaneous Letters (Maseru), 1910, Manager 
(ERPM) to L.E. Turvey, 10 August 1910. 
s 4 _ Jeeves, Migrant Labour, p.158. 
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Piece-work in lashing and tramming on gold mines was so 
popular that it even became a subject of the Government Native 
Labour Bureau enquiry in February 1913. Among the issues that 
emerged was that the leading labour recruiters for this type 
of work in Lesotho were the Merkel Brothers. Merkel had begun 
his activities as a labour contractor in 1909 at Robinson 
Central Deep gold mine, using his African "bossboys" to 
recruit labour illegally in the Rand labour districts. Within 
a short space of time he had about 200 workers under him, most 
of whom coming from Lesotho. Workers earned ls per truck 
loaded, with 25 percent of their earnings going to the 
"bossboys". Merkel later despatched his "bossboys" to 
Lesotho, establishing links with chiefs who, in turn, 
appointed their own "bossboys". In 1911, Markel was joined by 
his younger brother; and the following year he took out a 
recruiting license in Lesotho, employing his own labour touts. 
Eckstein~s Labour Department, before being transformed into 
the NRC, also competed for "setoko" recruits. Although this 
system was rotten with corruption involving chiefs, labour 
agents, labour contractors, "bossboys" and "policeboys", 
African workers nonetheless derived some benefit from it. 
Working under African "bossboys", 






For all these reasons, work on gold mines gradually increased 
in popularity. But this process was also facilitated by 
ecological crises in Lesotho and the vulnerability of the 
diamond mines, both of which increased the numbers of Basotho 
available for gold mine work. 
9 8 Ibid., pp.158-61; LNA, Ll/3/16, SNA to AC (Leribe), 
18 June 1913; SAB, GNLB 3, 313/09, "Report of Commission of 
Enquiry Appointed by Acting DNL to Investigate the ~Piece Work 
System~ (Lashing and Tramming) in Vogue on Central Mines on 
the Witwatersrand", 9 March 1913. 




















Source: SAB, GNLB 97, 
January 1928. 
220/13/100, DNL to Colonel Creswell, 26 
Table 2.8: Percentage of African Labour in the Transvaal Gold 
and Coal Hines 
Year Cape Colony Basotho Shangaan 
1904 12.7 2.91 66.23 
1907 14.47 2.33 69.37 
1908 24.38 3.09 54.98 
1909 24.31 2.48 54.32 
1910 26.02 3.17 51.96 
1911 23.19 3.82 51.59 
1912 26.17 5.22 47.93 
1913 22.04 5.68 52.15 
1914 24.97 7.44 47.71 
1915 33.00 6.24 42.09 
1917 29.79 7.04 46.93 
1919 32.37 6.92 46.14 
1920 26.70 7.33 55.60 
1921 30.82 10.56 47.08 
1922 34.52 7.91 44.24 
1928 29.21 7.99 49.78 
1929 29.99 10.53 47.15 
1930 35.33 13.17 37.11 
1931 36.31 13.62 32.71 
1932 42.08 13.61 25.10 
1933 42.86 14.34 22.34 
1934 41.96 13.03 24.67 
1936 39.23 14.46 27.83 
1939 33.92 14.98 26.11 
Source: Van der Horst, Na:ti~e Labour, p.216. 
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Table 2.9: Number of Passes Issued in Lesotho, 1905 to 1913. 
Year "Labour" Passes "Visiting" Passes 
1905-06 95 009 50 889 
1906-07 76 785 51 100 
1907-08 78 863 51 463 
1908-09 68 870 n/a 
1909-10 82 000 55 300 
1910-11 84 600 n/a 
1911-12 66 900* n/a 
1912-13 77 244 59 422 
1913-14 90 814 53 184 
Source: .cAR, 1905-06 to 1913-14. 
* only for the first nine months of the fiscal year. 
Table 2.10: Number of Passes Issued in Lesotho for Labour 
Purposes, 1921 to 1938. 
Year Gold Coal Diamonds Agri. Rail. Miscel. 
1921 12 301 2 082 20 843 
1922 11 578 2 032 20 016 
1923 15 613 794 33 437 
1924 14 834 862 40 929 
1925 13 194 233 43 253 
1926 19 217 659 41 484 
1927 13 309 1 854 9 697 9 507 173 23 407 
1928 15 490 764 9 269 7 353 284 20 718 
1929 18 995 694 9 016 13 483 449 32 125 
1930 21 571 572 6 383 12 778 185 23 298 
1931 24 162 252 2 434 12 099 27 802 
1932 25 642 47 62 12 678 19 628 
1933 25 731 72 15 237 10 816 
1934 22 994 156 220 6 700 8 372 
1935 29 502 472 83 5 584 9 852 
1936 34 877 627 229 6 964 13 878 
1937 30 460 1 428 847 3 782 14 811* 
1938 47 029 2 546 30 3 872 13 859# 
SourQe: Pim. Eioancial and Economic Eosition, p.195; .GAE, 
1937; 1938. 
* includes railway construction (88), roads (84), and other 
public works ( 206) . 
# includes railway construction C 94), roads (146) and other 
public works (349). 
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With the formation of Eckstein/Rand MinesJ Labour Department 
in 1911 and the repatriation of the Central African miners in 
1913, the proportion of Basotho on the gold mines increased 
from about four percent in 1911 to five percent in 1912 and 
six percent in 1913 (Table 2.8), although in absolute terms, 
the average number employed decreased from 7 481 in 1912 to 6 
667 in 1913. But the severe drought that hit Lesotho during 
the 1912-13 fiscal year killed stock and led to the 
importation of large quantities of grain. Consequently the 
number of "labour" passes increased from 84 600 in 1910-11 
and 66 900 in 1911-12 to 77 244 and 90 814 in 1912-13 and 
1913-14, respectively. This pushed the proportion of Basotho 
on the gold mines from six percent in 
1914; and the average number employed 
1913 to 10 557 in 1914 (Table 2.7). 
1913 to seven percent in 
increased from 6 667 in 
World War I led to the 
closure of diamond mines. 
suspended its work in 1914, 
The Premier Mine, for example, 
sending 14 000 African workers 
home. Another major suspension of production on the diamond 
mines in 1920 caused the number of Basotho employed on the 
gold mines to climb from 14 615 in that year to 22 115 in 
1921. As a result, the Basotho proportion of the total 
African labour force on these mines increased from about seven 
percent in 1920 to 11 percent in 1921. In its 1921 annual 
report, the Chamber of Mines did not hide its mixed 
appreciation of this improvement: "The increase in the supply 
[of African labour] was chiefly due to very considerable 
numbers of natives from British Basutoland usually employed by 
the diamond industry coming to the goldfields. Many of these 
natives will no doubt return to the diamond industry as soon 
as those mines are reopened".ss 
This pessimistic view was influenced by the ChamberJs past 
experience, and was confirmed in 1922 when the number of 
Basotho on the gold mines fell to 19 115, representing a 2.6 
percent decrease since the previous year. But the situation 
had nonetheless turned in favour of the gold mines. Between 
1922 and 1927 the average number of Basotho on gold mines more 
96 Q1AR, 1921, p.76. 
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than doubled from the 1909-1914 average of 7 196 to 15 343. 
The depression beginning in 1929 and the 1932-33 drought 
marked a significant turning point in the history of Lesotho. 
From this period Lesotho came to occupy its present position 
as a labour reserve. These crises affected the pattern of 
labour migrancy in Lesotho in three ways. 
Firstly, the number of Basotho workers on gold mines increased 
dramatically after the 1929 depression. With the drought the 
Basotho proportion on these mines increased by some one 
percent between 1932 and 1933 to reach 14 percent in the 
latter year, but dropped by another one percent to reach 13 
percent in 1934 (Table 2.8). In March 1931 the South African 
authorities, responding to the crisis sparked by depression 
and drought in southern Africa as a whole, imposed quotas on 
the labour supplying areas. The Resident Commissioner was 
asked to cut the number of Basotho leaving for the gold mines 
to 50 percent of the January 1930 figure. To implement this, 
the NRC placed an advertisement in several Sesotho newspapers 
informing Basotho that there was no more work for those who 
wished to go the mines on their own. In February 1932 the 
Assisted Voluntary Scheme (AVS) established by the NRC in 1928 
whereby migrants wishing to go to the Rand mines without 
binding themselves to a specific employer were given cash 
advances for food an train fare,97 was then expanded into 
what was publicised as the "Easy Way" to the Rand mines. This 
new scheme was coordinated by Stephens in Maseru and the 
northern districts, and Stuart in the southern districts. Men 
wishing to go to the mines in this way were supposed to go to 
specific offices where they were given cash advances for the 
train fare and food. On their arrival on the mines, if they 
wished, the men were given another L2 advance. Those failing 
to obtain employment were to present themselves to the WNLA 
compounds where they would stay until work was found for them. 
97 On the AVS, see LNA, S3/5/18/l, NRC Memorandum on 
"Encouragement of the flow of voluntary natives to the gold 
mines", 10 July 1928. 
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This AVS explains why the number of passes issued for 
"miscellaneous" labour began to drop after 1931 (from 27 802 
in that year) to 8 372 in 1934 (Table 2.10). 
In this way - as Basotho men flocked to the NRC offices on 
their own the process of phasing out labour touts 
accelerated. Government income from toutsJ licenses dropped 
from 1168 in 1931 to 149 in 1932, and 140 in 1934. Some touts 
even sent letters of protest to the Sesotho press, asking for 
support and solidarity! At the 1932 and 1934 Basutoland 
National Council sittings a number of chiefs appealed against 
the quota system, but in vain. However, the AVS scheme did not 
alleviate the problem of unemployment; by August 1934 the NRC 
bus taking recruits from Leribe was leaving only on one day a 
week.SB The situation was so desperate that the Basutoland 
Progressive Association attempted to form a "Basuto Unemployed 
League". 99 Mochochonono described the seriousness of the 
crisis: 
Things are still going as before with difficulties facing 
the Basotho nation due to poverty, drought and 
unemployment. Wool has no value in the stores, cattle 
have no price. People do not know where to go because 
there is even no work. People who stay in Camps like 
this one of ours, Maseru, see the misery of young and old 
men who are loitering about here wanting to be touted for 
work without success. The few that are fortunate are 
taken on certain days, and will be some twenty or thirty; 
hundreds and hundreds of hungry people who are naked, 
wearing rags of blankets which are now useless, others 
wearing rags of sacks, exposing their dry bellies, others 
wearing sheep-skins which have lost shape, cannot find 
work.ioo 
Table 2.10 shows that the number of Basotho going to the gold 
mines in the depression years, including the period of 
98 On the introduction of NRC buses in colonial Lesotho, 
see Appendix II. 
99 This paragraph and the preceding one based on 
Mochochonono, 22 October 1930; 25 September 1931; 6 January 
1932; 10 February 1932; 24 August 1932; 15 March 1933; 17 
February 1932; 24 February 1932; LNA, S3/5/18/4, RCJs circular 
to Acs, 10 April 1931; CAB, 1932; 1933; 1934. 
100 . Mochochonono, 10 February 1932. 
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drought, exceeded 20 000 per annum. By comparison, the 
number of Basotho on the diamond mines showed a tendency to 
decrease. By the mid-1930s an average of 30 000 Basotho men 
were heading to the gold mines annually. In 1938 alone, about 
40 000 took out passes to go to the gold mines (Table 2.10). 
The proportion of Basotho workers on the gold mines increased 
from about 13 percent of the total African labour force in the 
early 1930s to almost 15 percent by the end 
decade.101 
of that 
The second effect that depression and drought had on the 
pattern of labour migrancy in Lesotho was famine. With 
starvation in the country, the NRC office in Leribe arranged 
with the Assistant Commissioner to offer grain and blankets by 
way of an advance for potential mine recruits. 
also ran its own relief programme. This 
The government 
involved the 
employment of able-bodied men in public works in return for 
food. With the approach of the ploughing season in 1933, 
seeds were also distributed on credit through traders. But 
the government~s attitude towards its relief programme was so 
hard-nosed that people were supposed tq be medically examined 
to check whether they had taken any meal on that day or not, 
before qualifying for food rations. There were cases of people 
dying in queues before they reached the 
pellagra - a disease due to deficiency in 
doctor. Cases of 
vitamin B - were 
spotted from 1934 (76 cases in that year, 147 in 1935 and 242 
in 1936).102 Starvation and malnutrition led to many men 
being rejected by doctors as unfit for mine work.103 And 
101 The 1956 census shows that about a quarter of the 
total population was absent to labour centres in that year, as 
compared to about six percent (1911), ten percent (1921) and 
18 percent (1936). See, Basutoland, 1956 Population Census, 
p.73. 
102 .GAE, 1933 to 1937; Ambrose, Maseru, pp.133-35; 
Mochochonono, 29 March 1933; 18 October 1933; 1 November 1933; 
3 January 1934; 14 March 1934; Pim, Financial and Economic 
Position, pp.32-33; LNA, S3/3/1/11, Brown to GS, 21 March 
1930. 
103 One Sunday Times correspondent wrote in February 
1933: "On most Mondays the stores at Mohaleshoek are crowded 
with natives looking for work, many of whom are so starved and 
poverty-stricken that no doctor could possibly pass them as 
105 
Basotho on the mines, as shown in Chapter Three, remitted 
money to their families at an unprecedented rate. 
Thirdly, this crisis led to many Basotho settling permanently 
on the Rand. The female population in Lesotho actually 
dropped by 5 623 between 1936 and 1946, while the male 
population only increased by 7 639, compared to an increase of 
16 863 between 1921 and 1936.1.04 It was pointed out in 
the 1947 Basutoland Annual Report: "It is generally agreed 
that this fall [in population between 1936 and 1946] is not 
due to faulty enumeration but to certain economic factors such 
as land scarcity, soil poverty and a succession of bad 
harvests which has inevitably resulted in a large exodus to 
the Industrial Centres of the Union, where many have probably 
become permanently resident".l.05 
This emigration, together with the 1934-37 gold boom and the 
development of secondary industry on the Rand, increased 






home) among Basotho migrants. "It is also evident", 
to the 1947 annual report, "that many Basuto are 
on the Reef after the completion of their contracts, 
of returning home, finding casual employment and 
to cause overcrowding in the Johannesburg 
locations".1.os Some Basotho of the tsoelopele class even 
formed "Sons of Basutoland" with an initial membership of 200. 
to protect their interests on the Reef. For their part, 
traders tried to come together in a "Basutoland Co-operative 
Association". It was during this time that the celebration of 
Moshoeshoe Festivals on the Rand became an important event, 
especially for the Basotho elite.1.07 
fit for any kind of work" (cited in Leselinyana, 10 May 1933). 
1.o4 _ 1956 Population Census, p.69; Basutoland, Litaba, 
1934, p.212; Mochochonono, 21 March 1936; Journal des Missions 
Evangeliques, vol.1, 1934, p.351. 
1.05 CAB, 1947, p.16. 
106 . .lb.id., p.17. 
107 . Mochochonono, 21 March 1936; 17 April 1935; 29 March 
1933; 7 January 1939. 
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With more and more Basotho beginning to depend on migrant 
labour due to the combined impact of economic depression and 
drought, their bargaining power declined accordingly. The 
Chamber of Mines which for decades had failed to impose a six-
months contract on recruits from Lesotho, now found itself in 
a stronger position. In 1919, the Chamber finally managed to 
raise the minimum contract to six months (180 shifts), and in 
1924 to nine months (270 shifts).108 By the mid-1920s, the 
bulk of Basotho recruits employed by the Chamber of Mines were 
engaged for nine months contract, and in the 1930s many 
started taking 12 months (360 shifts) contracts. Basotho were 
now leaving their country for longer periods, and in 1935 the 
Chamber even urged its members to repatriate makholoa1os 
who had been working on the mines for two years or more 
without returning to their homes.110 
Shift to Shaft-Sinking 
Having initially entered the gold mines through piece-work in 
lashing and tramming, a significant number of Basotho migrants 
came to assert themselves in shaft-sinking. A shaft is 
central to most mining, but essential to deep-level mining. 
It connects the surface to underground working, and it is by 
this means that workers and material are transported between 
the surface and underground. The process of sinking a shaft 
went through three stages: blasting, shovelling and drilling -
performed by African workers (with the exception of blasting) 
under white supervision. 
Yet for an extended period, Basotho miners were absent from 
the shaft-sinking scene. As late as July 1929 one observer 
could still comment: "Ask any mine manager or mine captain for 
his views on the comparative quality of the labour in his 
10s. Van der Horst, Native Labour, p.206. 
10s From the abstract, bokholoa (sing: lekholoa). 
110 Van der Horst, Native Labour, p.212; Ashton, Basuto, 
p.165; Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.35. 
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charge, and without hesitation you will be told that of all 
the various races of natives which are attracted to the Reef 
by the lure of high wages, the Basuto is generally regarded as 
the dirtiest and the most indolent individual of any tribe 
recruited for this work".111 Yet, only six years later, in 
1935, Alan Pim indicated that "Basuto, like the Shangaan from 
Portuguese Territory, 
difficult and better 
are usually employed on the more 
paid tasks such as shaft sinking".112 
And, in January 1949, the Chamber of Mines introduced an 
article on shaft-sinking: 
It is the proud boast of the Basuto that they have sunk 
all [emphasis original] the shafts on the Witwatersrand 
gold mines. 
While this may not be literally true, the Basuto have 
certainly established a fine tradition in the specialised 
field of mining labour in which the closest co-ordination 
of all activities is essential;. The Basuto have set a 
standard of speed in drilling and "lashing" - shovelling 
rock - not lightly to be challenged and certainly beyond 
the reach of gangs composed of mixed tribesmen.113 
This was a stereotype and reputation with which Basotho were 
to be associated well into the 1950s, when mechanised lashing 
was introduced. 
Basotho, as discussed earlier in this chapter, became gold 
miners in increasing numbers during the early 1910s, attracted 
primarily by piece-work in lashing and tramming. By 1919, 
lashing and tramming was regarded, according to the Director 
of Native Labour, as "the class of work preferred by 
Basuto".114 In the same year, Chief Lekeketa of Mafeteng 
was sent by his father to spend time on the Reef 
investigating conditions and to find work for his people 
exclusively in lashing and 
December 1927 found the 13 081 
tramming.110 An inquiry in 
Basotho employed on the gold 
111 Sunday Times, 14 July 1929. 
1 12 Pim, Financial and Economic 
113 "Basuto Tradition in 
Witwatersrand", Mining Survey, vol.2, 
114 SAE, NTS 2092, 216/280, DNL 
115 LNA, S3/3/1/4, SNA to AC 
1919. 
Position, p.35. 
Shaft-Sinking on the 
no.1, January 1949. 
to SNA, 12 March 1919. 
(Mafeteng), 17 October 
mines distributed in the following manner: 
* lashing and tramming= 8 143 
* shaft sinking and shaft development= 237 
*machines= 407 
* developmental work= 20 
*hand-drilling= 99 
* other underground work= 2 687 
* surface general= 178 
* reduction works= 532 
* miscellaneous surface= 787 116 
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This distribution shows not only the concentration of Basotho 
miners in lashing and tramming, but also their preference for 
miscellaneous underground works and their growing 
concentration in shaft-sinking. 
Although more and more Basotho miners became shaft-sinkers in 
the late 1920s, the real change occurred after the devaluation 
of the South African pound in December 1932 increased the 
local price of gold and led to the opening of new mines as 
well as the expanded development of existing ones. The total 
African labour force on the gold mines increased by almost 100 
000 between 1932 and 1938; the 222 000 employed in 1930 
increased to 233 000 in 1932, and reached 324 000 in 
1938.117 
As part of this overall growth in the size of the mines 
labour force, Basotho workers discovered that they could not 
easily displace Shangaan and the Pondo miners from drilling 
which they tended to monopolise. Instead, Basotho miners 
increasingly turned to shaft-sinking. This suited them as it 
involved lashing and encouraged a much the same system of 
team-work as they had developed on the diamond mines. It is 
also probable that the mine managements themselves, aware of 
the Basotho~s display of skill as "lashers" and their mastery 
of team-work, gradually deployed such men in shaft-sinking in 
116 SAB, GNLB 137, 
"Mortality among Basuto", 
117. Van der Horst, 
al, South Africa~s Labour 
to the Gold Mines, (David 
2828/13/104, Dr Cluver~s report on 
5 November 1928. 
Native Labour, p.217; Crush, J, .at 
Empire: A History of Black Migrancy 
Philip, Cape Town, 1991). pp.33-54. 
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an attempt to speed up work and raise minimum levels of skill. 
Mine managements, according to one informant, even came to 
refer to Basotho as the "High Speed".11s 
Though the gold boom on the Rand only lasted from 1933 to 
1937, the subsequent loss of jobs was compensated for by the 
development of secondary industry and. more importantly, by 
the opening of the Orange Free State gold mines in the 1950s. 
This development in particular 
Basotho as shaft-sinkers, not 
geographical proximity of these 
Basotho later developed a career 
confirmed the position of 
least because of 
mines to Lesotho. 
the 
Many 
as "nomadic" migrants who 
moved from mine to mine, sinking one shaft after another 
without binding themselves 
Jeff Guy and Motlatsi 
to long contracts. According to 
Thabane, Basotho miners who had 
associated tramming 
endurance, later 
and lashing with 
extended this 
youthness, strength and 
ideology to shaft-
came to regard themselves 
fearless, the people who loved 
Even today, according to an 
sinking.11s Basotho 
toughest and most 
dangerous work.120 
Basotho miners like 
their muscles.121 







statistics Basotho migrants 
oscillating between 
were not, however, 
their homes and the labour centres. They 
developed varied and complex strategies to cope and deal with 
11s Interview with Ntate Mosalla, date of birth unknown. 
He worked on the mines as an induna from the 1950s until his 
retirement in 1990. 
11s. J. Guy, and M. Thabane. "Technology, Ethnicity and 
Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the South 
African Gold Mines", Journal of South African Studies, vol.14, 
no.2, 1988. 
120 P. Bonner, "Backs to the Fence: Law, Liquor, and 
the Search for Social Control in an East Rand Town, 1929-
1942", in Crush, J, and C. Ambler, (eds.), Liquor and Labor in 
Southern Africa, (University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 
1992), p.284. 
121. Interview with Ntate Mosalla. 
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their experiences of migrancy. After the extension of the 
railway line to Maseru in 1906 complaints from Basotho 
evangelists and other members of the elite about the behaviour 
of Basotho migrant workers started appearing in 
Leselinvana.1.22 Basotho migrants increasingly came to be 
called likoata (sing: koata). The word "koata" was associated 
with a particular type of behaviour and character. 
The meaning of "koata" came to preoccupy sections of the 
Basotho elite who saw the koata character as a disgrace to the 
"nation". One "educated" Mosotho in 1927 defined likoata as 
"people who behave like animals", but said that the word had 
been in circulation not for more than 30 years.1.23 Another 
"civilised" Mosotho wrote that "the songs that they [likoata] 
sing are full of abusive words and are completely useless"; 
and that "what is surprising is the power that it [the word 
#koata#] has on a person; it intoxicates, dehumanises and 
reduces a person to a senseless thing, it transforms him, it 
destroys his mind".1.24 For one informant who first went to 
the mines in 1925: "We were people called likoata", he said, 
"because we behaved ourselves badly".1.25 
The word "koata" appears in Adolphe Mabille and Hermann 
Dieterlen#s Sotho-English dictionary (first published in 
1911), but has no association with migrants. It is "khoari" 
which is defined as a "boy coming back from the gold 
mines". 126 Paroz#s revised edition of this dictionary 
(published in 1950) has an additional meaning to koata; that 
it is a "boy returning from the gold mines; man working in the 
mines". and bokoata as "manners of boys coming from the 
mines'', and associated the concept with the English word 
1.22 Leselinyana, 31 March 1914; 2 March 1917; 3 June 
1927; 27 April 1928. 
1.23 Ibid,, 2 June 1927. 
1.24 bid.-., 2 March 1917. 
125 Interview with Michael Mokenela, born 1908. 
1.2s A. Mabille, and H, Dieterlen, Sesuto-English 
Dictionary, (Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 1911), p.137. 
"Khoari" comes from "quarry" which was associated with diamond 
mining in Kimberley before deep-level mining. 
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"squad".1.27 
The word "koata" had been in circulation long before it came 
to the attention of "civilised" Basotho.1.2s Basotho 
migrants had been walking in groups or "squads" since the 
early years of migrancy. It is possible that the word was 
initially used by ordinary people, and was later appropriated 
by the middle-class elements in their effort to win for 
themselves a better position and privileges in the colonial 
set-up. The word was possibly used initially to refer to 
groups of recruits, but gradually became independent of its 
English root. The word is still in use today, now as a 
generic term for a particular behaviour and personality. 
Particular to the behaviour of likoata was their unruliness 
and abusiveness. They insulted people, including women and 
train officials; they sang, whistled, and shouted. What was 
initially a way of coping with going to the mines became an 
established form of behaviour which was also reinforced by 
certain stereotypes. Young migrants were also socialised into 
this behaviour, thus passing on the koata pattern of behaviour 
to other generations.129 A Sesotho novel published in the 
1950s has a section which brilliantly illustrates koata 
behaviour. Thunthung obtained a job at the Native Recruiting 
Corporation offices in Maseru as a cook (after being rejected 
for mine work on medical grounds) where he was subjected to 
harassment from likoata: 
Since this young man did not like abusive words, he was 
humiliated daily, to the extent that he tolerated this by 
just keeping quiet .... when the migrants arrived drunk 
from there in the locations, you would hear them shouting 
from a distance, saying: "Hey, dish, TJhepha [chef]!" One 
there would jump, saying something: "Hey, this one, 
TJhepha, has cooked his garbage again! ... " ... Another one 
would jump there, saying: "Hmm, what a beautiful TJhepha, 
1.27 R.A. Paraz, Southern Sotho-English Dictionary, 
(Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 1950), p.177. 
1.2a. At the turn of the century, one missionary-labour 
recruiter in Lesotho was known as "Ralikoata", i.e. 
"father/keeper of likoata. See Leselinyana, 15 November 1906. 
129 . Leselinvana, 3 August 1938. 
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I wish I could go to load trucks for him there in 
Johannesburg!" Sometimes Thuthung would dish out badly, 
angered by the insults that he was subject to, and one of 
them would say:" ... You will feed us whether you like it 
or not. It is because you have eaten all the meat, even 
gnawed the bones, leaving but rotten intestines ... you·re 
spoilt! What a cruel man! Where do you come from? Dish! 
Dish! TJhepha ! ... "130 
Koata behaviour was linked to the association by many Basotho 
of South Africa with violence, exploitation, oppression, 
suffering and hatred; or, as they metaphorically put it, with 
"cannibals". Crossing the Caledon River was seen as entering 
not only the world of "cannibals" but also the place of 
adventure. South Africa was seen as the "flatland" as a way of 
comparing it with the beautiful mountains of Lesotho; Basotho 
working in the mines were compared to rats, while those at 
home were seen as jovial monkeys. This is one of the central 
themes in the songs collected by Hugh Tracey, and later by 
David Coplan, Dunbar Moodie·s students, as well as in novels 
inspired by this experience.131 This theme is 
summarised in the song "Another Blanket": 
Mohokare,132 now I assume another blanket 
Now that I have crossed you. 
Wash me from the profanations I have had 
With a woman at home. 
Here I cross to the other side 
And I do not know what dangers may face me. 
well 
130 J.T. Khalala, Motwaitwai wa Lesotho, (APB, 
Johannesburg, 1956), p.57. 
131. H. Tracey, "Basutoland Recording Tour: November 19th 
to December 3rd, 1959", African Music Society Journal, vol. 2, 
no.2, 1959; Agency for Industrial Mission, Another Blanket, 
(Roodepoort, 1976), pp.11-13; D. B. Coplan, In the Time of 
Cannibals: The Word Music of South Africa·s Basotho Miirants, 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994); T.D. Moodie 
(with V. Ndatshe), Going to the Mines: Men, Mines and 
Migration, (University of California Press, Los Angeles, 
1994), p.13; R. Shanafelt, "The Heroic Ideal in Three Sotho 
Novellas of Labour Migration", African Studies, vol.47, no.l, 
1988; S.N. Majara, Liakhela, (Mazenod Book Centre, Lesotho, 
1972); S. Matlosa, Molahlehi, (Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 
1950). 
132. The Caledon River. 
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The song continued in another stanza: "In crossing the river I 
become a new 
home".l.33 
man \ Different from the one I was at 
Going to the mines was associated with going to war and 
cattle-raiding. This was because, as my informants also show, 
many Basotho men generally went to the mines to acquire 
bohali cattle; cattle also symbolised masculinity, and were 
used for the storage of wealth. The cattle metaphor is 
expressed vividly in one song-poem that Basotho migrant-
travellers used to sing about themselves: 
We the poor will die far away 
Our feet will grow and be swollen 
Where we search for a milch cow.l.34 
In this way, migrancy was rationalised, internalised and 
accepted. The bokoata attitude and mentality helped Basotho to 
confront the reality of migrancy and mine work in the face of 
their hardships. Chief Letlatsa Moshoeshoe of Maseru had a 
conversation with several missionaries in November 1904, at 
the time that Basotho were recovering from the 1903 drought. 
"Are the people going to work nicely?", he was asked: 
Answer: Yes, by thousands although they are complaining 
about the wage. 
Question: Are they living well, are they not dying much? 
Answer: They are dying. 
Question: Are they not afraid when they see that they are 
dying in great numbers? 
Answer: They keep on going because they are in want[ ... ] 
they want to come and help themselves.135 
Chiefs and Migrants 
Basotho chiefs were also a factor in the system of labour 
migrancy. They were motivated, on the one hand, by the threat 
133 Another Blanket, p.12. 
134 Christian Council of Lesotho, Merafo ea Afrika-Boroa 




S7/7/33, Letlatsa Moshoeshoe to AC (Maseru), 21 
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posed by the regular movement of their men to the labour 
centres, and, on the other, by the desire to improve their 
fortunes. Many of them accepted brandy, rifles and money from 
labour agents, as an inducement to urge their men to take mine 
contracts. Complaints that chiefs "sold" their people were 
raised with the South African Native Affairs Commission136 
and at the 1903 Basutoland National Council sitting. It was 
claimed that chiefs would make arrangements with labour agents 
or employers in return for a commission, without the consent 
of their people. The Resident Commissioner subsequently urged 
chiefs not to accept money but only "presents". There was 
also a special clause in the 1903 Bill denying chiefs any 
right to contract their people to labour agents.137 But in 
September 1906 the Assistant Commissioner of Maseru in his 
memorandum to the Resident Commissioner on the working of this 
Bill, revealed that: "I can make no definite charges, but it 
is an open secret that the Chiefs are bribed to a considerable 
extent by unscrupulous agents, and I have reason to suppose 
that liquor is at times supplied to them as an inducement for 
them to compel their people to go to an individual 
agent".138 A similar complaint came up 
1908 sitting of the National Council.139 
again during the 
And as late as 
March 1921 Umteteli wa Bantu published a letter insisting that 
many Basotho who are working on the Rand mines have a 
tendency to 
chiefs".140 
say that they have been sold by their 
But signs of resistance against chiefs who "sold" their men 
were apparent by 1912 if not earlier. One Mosotho wrote to 
Leselinyana in March of that year to report Chief JoelJs 
13s Chief Jonathan testified to the Commission that "the 
boys do not like to be sent by us, because they say we get 
money for them"; see Native Affairs Commission, vol.5, p.394. 
137 . SAB, SNA 196, NA 325\04, Ex~ract from Minutes of 
1903 BNC, 11 February 1904; E. Rosenthal, African Switzerland: 
Basutoland Today, (Juta, Cape Town, 1948), p.189. 
138 LNA, Maseru Letters Despatched (January 1906 to 
January 1908), AC to RC, 6 September 1906. 
139 . Report of Proceedings of the Basutoland National 
Council, 1908, p.20. 
140 . Umteteli wa Bantu, 12 March 1921. 
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attempts to force his men to the mines: 
The chief had summoned all the people under him [in Butha 
Buthe] to congregate in the morning, and they [the 
people] arrived between 6 [a.m] and 7 [a.m.J. 
When they were all there, the chief said: "I want to 
inform you about the work I spoke to you about. As you 
know, I have been to the Witwatersrand with fourteen men, 
and stayed there for one week and four days, and liked 
the job ... Now I want you to know that you are going to 
leave with this white man ... my brothers Molukuoa and 
Mohalenyana will accompany you. You have been turning 
down a lot of my job offers. today you will go. Those 
who are going, step forward; I want to see you[!)". No 
one responded ... 
Everyone was silent. He [the chief] then said: "Even 
if you are so quiet, in winter I will come in person to 
confiscate your farms to give them to those who have gone 
to the Witwatersrand ... ". 
We sat there until 3 and 4 
anything to drink ... The chief 
he said: "Go to your homes to 
blankets to sleep here". 
o~clock, without food nor 
was angry, but in the end 
fetch your provisions and 
We all dispersed, noone showed up until after two days; 
others arrived amid the tension, [the people being told] 
that those who refuse should leave [the village].141 
Chiefs also controlled the movement of their men to the labour 
centres for political and/or humanitarian reasons. Men could 
be summoned en masse from wage employment in times of war and 
other emergencies. About 4000 Basotho left for home in the 
period leading up to the Gun War in 1880.142 Chiefs could 
also ask for the return of a man or men from the mines because 
of his/their failure to support his/their family(ies). 
Sometimes they would prevent men from leaving. Chief 
Leshoboro Majara of Maseru prevented two men in July 1907 from 
going to join the Bechuanaland police force, because the wife 
of one was seriously ill, and the other because he "has also 
some matters here about which I need him very much".143 
Chiefs also played an important role in the repatriation of 
Basotho from their places of work. Relatives and families 
141 Leselinyana, 14 March 1912. 
142 On this "exodus", see Kimble, "Labour Migration in 
Basutoland", p.123. 
143. LNA, S7/4/4, Majara to AC (Maseru), 19 July 1907. 
116 
would approach the chief or the Assistant Commissioner with 
requests for the return of a particular individual. Common 
reasons included the man~s state of health and physical 
condition; family problems at home; the man~s failure to remit 
money to 
from home. 
support his family; or the man~s length of absence 
The Assistant Commissioner would then contact the 
NAD or the GNLB and ask them to trace the man in question. 
Sometimes members of the family, especially wives or mothers, 
would approach their chief or the Assistant Commissioner for 
permission to fetch a sick son or husband from his place of 
work. The NAD received complaints from compound managers that 
they were being inundated with letters from Basutoland 
officials asking for the repatriation of this or that 
individual thought to be in their compounds.i44 
By the 1920s a standard "Return of Native" form was in use in 
Lesotho, and this required the name of the worker; reason/s 
for the application for the repatriation; the suspected place 
of work; and his address in Lesotho (i.e. the name of his 
chief/sub-chief). The usual response to such forms was that 
the Mosotho in question had been traced and was preparing to 
leave; or would be remitting money, or that he could not be 
found.i4o Work of this kind was greatly facilitated by the 
opening of the Basutoland Agency in 1932 in Johannesburg (see 
Chapter Three), applications now being addressed to that 
office rather than to the Union authorities. As the next 
chapter 
reflected 
discusses, these applications 
tensions and struggles within 
tensions caused by the absence of migrants. 
for repatriations 
Basotho homesteads, 
i 44 LNA, S7/4/4, General Manager (Premier Mine) to PC 
Letsie, 23 August 1907; S7/7/53, SNA to GS, 19 March 1910; 
S7/7/40, Ntja Lerumo to Mabille, 2 September 1907; S7/7/68, AC 
(Maseru) to PC, 12 September 1913; S7/7/34, Api Lerotholi to 
Mabille, 14 February 1905; LNA, MFT 3/1/9, Mohlalefi Bereng to 
AC (Mafeteng), 12 August 1928. In fact most Basotho chiefs 
and individual families addressed their requests for 
repatriation Yi.a Mabille as long as he worked for the NAD and 
GNLB. 
i4o. LNA, MFT 2/1/18, has a copy of "return of Native" 
form, 18 February 1921; LNA, Leribe Collection, Box 29, AC 
(Leribe) to GS, 12 March 1923. 
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Migrancy, Patriarchy and the Rural Economy 
Controlling the movement of Basotho women was also essential 
to the migrant labour system. Women had to perform 
agricultural work to subsidise migrant earnings entering the 
rural households. 
Basotho women arrived on the Witwatersrand as early as 1911. 
This new generation of women, unlike its predecessor, was not 
comprised mainly of dissatisfied wives seeking refuge and work 
on the farms, but was linked to the decline of the Basotho 
economy and the ongoing effects of labour migrancy. These 
migrant women, condemned as matekatse (from ho teka; to wander 
about or prostitutes) by Basotho men and chiefs, came to 
specialise in commercial beer-brewing and prostitution. 146 
By the early 1920s, Basotho migrants were raising complaints 
about the increasing number of women from their country on the 
Rand. The problem, as men saw it, increased in the 1930s 
following the depression and drought in Lesotho. The number of 
absent women as a percentage of the total number of absentees 
in Lesotho rose from about 12 percent in 1911 to about 20 
percent (1921), 22 percent (1936) and 25 percent (1946). 
Absent women as a percentage of the total Basotho population 
were about one percent in 1911, three percent in 1921, and 
seven percent in 1936.147 The women most likely to leave 
Lesotho were widows, certain categories of single women, and 
neglected wives of men absent at the mines.148 
The mine and South African authorities tried to clamp down on 
these "undesirable" women whose shebeens (taverns) and 
brothels were patronised by African miners (see Chapter Four). 
146 P. Bonner, "JDesirable or undesirable Basotho 
womenJ? Liquor, Prostitution and the Migration of Basotho 
Women to the Rand, 1920-1945", in Walker, Women and Gender. 
147 1956 Population Census. 
148. See Chapter Seven. 
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Some of the matekatse in Benoni and Nancefield locations were 
said to be using taxis to visit 
parties" and the picking up 
the mine compounds for "tea 
of "husbands". The Union 
government blamed this influx of Basotho women on what it 
considered to be an indiscriminate issuing of passes in 
Lesotho to women wishing to visit or join their husbands in 
South Africa. A suggestion was then made by the Native Affairs 
Department to request the South African Railways not to issue 
tickets to women not in possession of written permission to 
leave Lesotho, but this was rejected on the ground that women 
from the Free State would be confused with matekatse. The 
Chamber of Commerce of the Free State border towns also 
opposed any measure which would affect the coming of Basotho 
women to its membersJ stores.149 
The Union government sought a solution through the 
repatriation of these Basotho women. Repatriations began 
around 1929, and in November 1930 a procedure was agreed upon 
with the Basutoland government: deportees were to be delivered 
to the Police Post nearest to the Basutoland border. Between 
1930 and June 1931, 13 males (who were mainly "criminals" or 
ex-convicts) and 189 females were repatriated to Lesotho. All 
the deported women appear to have arrived on the Rand after 
1913; 51 indicated that they arrived between 1923 and 1931. 
When the process of deportation was in full force in 1931, 
some matekatse turned to lawyers for their defence, others 
even producing "husbands". Some took "visiting" passes in 
Lesotho in order to return the Reef.150 But the NAD was 
determined: "There is no place in which these women can 
legally stay during the period of a visit and we certainly 
have no need of Basutoland women for work on the 
Witwatersrand, which is at present overstocked with native 
women from the Union''.151 Yet, as Chapter Seven will show, 
149 Bonner, "JDesirable or undesirableJ", pp.241-47; 
Umteteli, 5 March 1921; 12 March 1921; 10 December 1921. 
15 0_ SAB. NTS 7725, 143/333, DNL to SNA, 8 July 1931; NTS 
7725, 166/333, DNL to SNA, 24 February 1931; Bonner, 
"JDesirable or undesirableJ", p.247. 
151 SAB, NTS 7725, 166/333, DNL to SNA, 24 February 
1931. 
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these Basotho women deportees did not cease to sell beer and 
their bodies once back in Lesotho. 
Conclusion 
The shift of increasing numbers of Basotho migrants to the 
gold mines was the result of, on the one hand, the general 
decline of the Basotho economy, and, on the other, the efforts 
of the Chamber of Mines to expand the geographic area from 
which to recruit labour in order to keep the cost of African 
labour low. The strength of Basotho migrants initially lay in 
their manipulation of competition in the labour market. They 
chose an employer on the basis of the length of the contract, 
the wage scale, and the working conditions. Hence the diamond 
mines initially became the major employer of Basotho labour 
not only because of the relatively short contract that 
recruits could take, but also because of piece-work which gave 
miners more control over the labour process and pay; and the 
possibility of picking up a diamond and being rewarded was 
another attraction. But the vulnerability of the diamond 
mining industry to recessions, combined with the worsening 
socio-economic situation in Lesotho, gradually eroded the 
bargaining power of Basotho migrants and pushed them to rely 
on a single employer - the gold mines. 
The Basotho shift to the gold mines in the 1920s was 
accompanied by the standardisation of labour recruitment and 
migration in Lesotho. Basotho migrants, for their part, 
developed varied and complex responses to their experiences, 
which helped them to cope and deal with the dangers associated 
with oscillating between their homes and South African mines. 
The central place which labour migrancy assumed, and migration 
to the gold mines in particular, had long-term implications 
for Basotho and their country. It is to this issue that 




The impoverishment of most Basotho homesteads and the 
engendering of a nondiscretionary migratory labour system, 
resulted in a scramble for the meagre earnings of migrants. 
This struggle was not confined to homesteads, but also 
involved chiefs and the colonial state. This chapter outlines 
in detail the various ways in which these processes and 
dynamics were articulated in Basotho society. 
Remittances and Deferred Pay System 
Migrant labour became a source of capital for colonial Lesotho 
in all sorts of ways. These included cash advances to 
recruits served both to pay tax, and as a source of funds for 
family expenses; capitation fees by companies to labour 
agents; fees for labour recruiting licenses; remittances to 
relatives; deferred pay; cash and goods brought by returning 
migrants; and finally, compensation paid to recruits and 
relatives in cases of death, accidents, tuberculosis and 
phthisis. 
Yet as far as capitation fees were concerned, only those paid 
to a few labour agents like Stephens, for example, who 
invested much of his wealth in Lesotho, were significant. 
Otherwise they were lost to the country. In any event, the 
annual income from all licenses (including trading and hawking 
licenses) never exceeded L15 000 during the period covered in 
this study. It averaged L3 500 between 1904 and 1909, L5 500 
between 1909 and 1914, and increased from L9 172 in the fiscal 
year 1932-33 to Ll2 906 in 1933-34, and then only because of 
the introduction of the new Basutoland postage stamps.i 
In fact, by far and in a way the most important source of the 
i Pim, Financial and Economic Position, Appendix X. 
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country~s income were remittances from labour migrants to 
their relatives. Indeed, deferred pay continues to be vital 
to the economy of Lesotho to this very day, and 
exceeds the 
surprisingly 
country~s Gross Domestic 






migrants on the one hand, and chiefs - and later the post-
colonial government - on the other. Money could be remitted 
to relatives or be deferred through the facilities offered by 
the NRC, the Native Affairs Department and post offices, but 
the infrastructure for all of this had only been put in place 
over many years, mediated by a number of forces, struggles and 
interests. It is this process which is traced in what 
follows. 
The introduction of facilities for remitting earnings of 
Basotho migrants was partly due to Ernest Mabille. Early in 
1896, while he was working as the Chamber of Mines~ Rand 
Native Labour Association~s representative in Lesotho, Mabille 
raised the idea of establishing such a facility with the 
Resident Commissioner Lagden in February 1896: 
During the time I spent in Johannesburg, I have seen the 
great difficulty the Basutos have in saving their 
earnings. It is a fact that a considerable amount of 
their wages is lost, partly because they do not know 
where to keep their money or how to send it home, also 
because they are often robbed on their way home. They 
are afraid to get money orders in the ordinary P.O. [post 
office] as the officials treat them so roughly. I 
thought of proposing to Mr Grant [Chamber of Mines~ 
Native Labour Commissioner] to make an arrangement with 
you by which the Basutos could send their money by drafts 
to any of the magistrates. Do you not think this would 
be a great advantage to the Basutos though perhaps a 
little difficult to work? It would certainly bring a 
great deal more money to the country.2 
After relocating to Johannesburg in June to work as a 
missionary at the Simmer and Jack, Mabille was then asked by 
the Government Secretary, H. Sloley, to establish a private 
remittance and deposit agency for Basotho migrants. By July, 
Mabille had the scheme well worked out, sending out his first 
2 LNA, S7/7/18, Mabille to Lagden, 28 February 1896. 
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batch of remittances on the 19th of August to the Maseru post 
office. He also placed an advertisement in Leselinyana early 
in September, announcing his scheme and its charges. He 
recorded the transactions on three counterfoils; one copy kept 
by himself, the other given to the sender, and the third copy 
sent to the recipient with directions as to where to go to 
collect the money. Remittence charges to cover Mabille~s 
expenses and those of the postal services were ls.9d for 12, 
2s.6d for 15, 3s.3d for 17, and 4s for 110. Within six 
months of its operation, the scheme served all Basutoland 
districts, including Griqualand East and some parts of the 
Orange Free State. Although Mabille thought that instead of 
sending postal orders for each remittance it would be better 
to put all the remittances together and send them in his name 
to relevant Assistant Commissioners in Basutoland with a list 
of recipients, this was not accepted by the authorities, 
despite the inconvenience of handling so many individual 
vouchers, and the further problem of legal implications of 
misspelt Sotho names.3 



























Source: 1NA, S7/7/19, Mabille to GS, 6 January 1897. 
* sums sent "previously" to the Basutoland government. 
3 Ibid., Mabille to 1agden, 28 February 1896; S7/7/19, 
Mabille to GS, 6 January 1897; Leselinyana, 1 September 1896. 
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Considering the small number of Basotho employed on the Reef 
during this period, the October 1896 wage reduction, the post-
Jameson raid scare and the resultant mass exodus of labour 
from the Rand, as well as the effects of rinderpest on the 
mobility of labour, the L780.7s remitted (Table 3.1) was a 
noteworthy achievement. That Leribe accounted for almost 30 
percent of the total remitted shows that Mabille was able to 
use the contacts he had developed while running a parish in 
that district. Maseru undoubtedly came second because of its 
centrality in labour recruitment as the colonial headquarters, 
while the fact that Morija, the headquarters of the Paris 
Evangelical Missionary Society, featured, also shows that 
Mabille was able to call on contacts he still had there. 
Within two years, Mabille had sent over L40 000 in the above 
manner. But his problem was that the postal money orders were 
very expensive and contributed to the unattractiveness of his 
scheme. In September 1898 he proposed that bank notes be used 
for sums of L5 and more, and that postal vouchers only be 
employed for lesser amounts, explaining that charges for a 120 
bank note, for example, were 4d, compared to the 1s.6d charged 
for a 12.lOs postal order. However, the colonial government 
in Basutoland refused to stand security for a bank account for 
this purpose. Mabille managed to obtain assistance from two 
Paris Missionary Society colleagues, but even so, his other 
problem was that Assistant Commissioners were not taking his 
scheme seriously. Some of them delayed returning slips to 
him as proof for the senders.4 He wanted Lagden to act on 
this, because "you know how important this money business is, 
especially when you consider how suspicious these natives 
are".6 
In October 1898, taking advantage of the partial success of 
his two-year work and the relations he had developed with the 
authorities in the Transvaal and colonial Lesotho. Mabille 
4 LNA, S7/7/19, Mabille to GS, 6 January 1897; S7/7/20, 
Mabille to GS, 2 September 1898. 
5 LNA, S7/7/19, Mabille to Lagden, 28 October 1897. 
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suggested to the Government Secretary that his scheme be 
expanded to include tax collection. But this was not accepted. 
The Chamber of Mines, concerned that some individuals might be 
enriching themselves from migrants~ earnings, proposed the 
opening of a government-run remittance agency. When the Native 
Deposit and Remittence Agency was finally established by the 
Native Affairs Department in August 1902, Mabille was made the 
head. The Agency was also to operate like a bank. with 
migrants who saved their money being given bank books. The 
procedure for sending remittances was not very different from 
that used by Mabille; the charge was 2s.6d irrespective of the 
amount sent. By October 1902 the Basutoland government was 
receiving remittances from this Agency with Mabille~s 
signature on them. The Agency, though, was not popular among 
Basotho workers. Mabille toured the mine compounds to urge 
"his'· Basotho to use the scheme, and in 1904 the NAD was 
forced to request the Chamber to send a circular to its 
members asking them to popularise the scheme among their 
workers. Leselin~ana of October of that year also carried a 
translation on the circular as an advertisement.6 
None of this addressed the problems which many Basotho had 
with the Agency. There were occasionally unexplained 
discrepancies between the amount remitted and that received by 
relatives. And remittances were often delayed before they 
reached recipients. In one case the money sent by a Mosotho 
migrant to relatives in Morija took three months, and this at 
a time when Basotho preferred three-to-four months mine 
contracts!? The Government Secretary expressed his concern 
to the Acting Secretary of the NAD in April 1905: "The 
remitting Native, whose purpose in forwarding the money was 
6 Paragraph based on LNA, S7/7/20, Mabille to GS, 2 
September 1898; S7/7/30, SNA to RC, 3 October 1902; SNA to RC, 
13 February 1903; 37/7/33, PC to RC, 17 May 1904; SAB. CT 211, 
T76/14, SNA to Chamber of Mines, 12 September 1904; 
Leselinyana, October (the only issue of the month) 1904; CMAB., 
1902. 
7. LNA. S7/7/34, 
to GS, 8 May 1905; 
Accountant (NAD), 30 
October 1908. 
SNA to GS, 7 January 1904; S7/7/36, SNA 
S7/7/35, AC (Maseru) to Registrar and 
January 1906; S7/7/44, SNA to GS, 1 
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defeated by the delay, is naturally dissatisfied, and the 
incident is likely to militate against the progress of the 
Agency".s The NAD, for its part, accused the Assistant 
Commissioners of delays in informing relatives; while the 
Resident Commissioner, for the other, accused the NAD of 
delays in sending vouchers. In a desperate attempt to save 
the Agency, in September 1905 charges were reduced to ls for 
remittances below 15, and maintained at 2s.6d for 15 and 
above. Nonetheless, Basotho migrants continued to utilise the 
Agency to a far lesser degree than either Zulu or Cape Colony 
recruits; they accounted for only 17 percent of total 
remittance sent between July 1904 and April 1905, compared to 
44 percent for Natal and 33 percent for the Cape Colony.9 
An attempt to find a solution to the problems of the operation 
of the NAD Agency was sought in expanding the orientation of 
the facility. This became possible after the formation of the 
NRC, and particularly the establishment of the Voluntary 
Deferred Pay (VDP) scheme in January 1918 for recruits from 
British South Africa. It was now up to recruits, when 
attested, to indicate whether they wanted part of their pay to 
be deferred to Lesotho to await collect on their return. In a 
circular to its district superintendents and representatives, 
the NRC explained that the VDP scheme had been established 
because of ''representations having been made by many natives 
expressing a desire, to use their own words, to be saved from 
themselves".10 In Lesotho the scheme was to be co-ordinated 
by the NRC with the co-operation of the Resident Commissioner 
and his Assistant Commissioners. In Maseru the deferred money 
was to be paid out by the NRC agent, and in other districts by 
Assistant Commissioners. The VDP scheme was to be controlled 
by a Deferred Pay Board made up of three representatives from 
the Union government and three from the Chamber of Mines; and 
chaired by the Director of Native Labour.11 But by October 
1919 the Deferred Pay Board brought the Basutoland 
s LNA, S7/7/34, GS to SNA, 1 April 1905. 
9 LNA, S7/7/36, SNA to GS, 8 May 1905; ,CAR, 1905-06. 
10 LNA, S3/5/18/9, NRC Circular, 17 January 1918. 
11. Ibid. 
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authoritiesJ attention to the fact that Basotho migrants were 
not utilising the scheme to the same extent as other African 
miners. The 
endeavour will 
Government Secretary promised that "every 
be made to push the scheme but as you are no 
doubt aware the Basuto are slow to adopt any new scheme though 
I have no doubt the percentage of labourers availing 
themselves of the privilege will in time improve". 12 
Attesting officers were instructed to include the VDP scheme 
when explaining the terms of their contracts to Basotho 
recruits, but to no avail. 
Table 3.2: Number of Ba.sotho Recruited by the NRC during 1918-
21 and the Number and Percentage who availed themselves for 
the VDP 

















Source: SAB, GNLB 163, 434/14/26, DNL to GS. 4 August 1922. 
Table 3.2 shows that though the number of NRC recruits from 
Lesotho increased significantly between 
p·ercentage of those availing themselves 
1918 and 1921, the 
of the VDP scheme 
actually decreased. Recruits from the Cape Colony liked the 
scheme, with 35 percent of those recruited by the NRC in 1918 
making use of it. For Zululand, 71 percent and 72 percent of 
those recruited by the NRC in the months of August and 
September 1919 respectively, took advantage of the VDP; while 
the figures for Basutoland during each of these months was 
less than four percent.is 
The colonial authorities were not the only ones worried about 
the failure of VDP among Basotho migrants. Many chiefs were 
12 SAE, GNLB 163, 434/14/26, GS to DNL, 28 October 1919. 
is SAE, GNLB 163, 434/14/26, DNL to GS, 4 August 1922. 
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also concerned. In 1922 the Basutoland National Council passed 
a resolution urging the Resident Commissioner to make the 
deferment of pay compulsory for Basotho miners. Pitsos were 
later convened in the villages, where chiefs urged parents and 
families to encourage their sons and men to use the scheme. To 
try and win the support of the NRC and the Union government, 
chiefs argued that the making of VDP compulsory for Basotho 
migrants would reduce desertion. Support for the chiefsJ 
position came from missionaries and the Basutoland Chamber of 
Commerce (whose trade depended on this money).14 The 
Director of Native Labour was also sympathetic to the chiefs: 
"Far too much money is wasted here in the mine stores dotted 
along the Reef, and it would be far better, in the interests 
of health, efficiency and control, if the spending power of 
the native labourer during his contract could be reduced to, 
say, 10s a month and the balance of wages either remitted 
periodically to his home or await his arrival on return".15 
But, according to the Rand Daily Mail, "Sir Edward Garraway 
[the Resident Commissioner] said that whilst appreciating the 
unanimity of councillors desiring compulsion, it would be 
illegal and impossible to make deferred pay compulsory, as it 
would interfere with personal rights of people in their own 
land, and therefore he felt it useless to interfere or even 
recommend to the High Commissioner the introduction of a law 
compelling the Basutos to send even a portion of their 
earnings back to the territory".16 
At the 1929 National Council, the chiefs tried with little 
success to persuade the Resident Commissioner to reconsider 
his objections to the compulsory scheme. But with the onset 
of economic depression the following year, the context 
changed. In March 1931 the Resident Commissioner asked the 
Paramount Chief to send his representatives to the district 
headquarters to speak to recruits. This was done in June; but 
the Paramount requested the government to provide him with 
1 4 Litaba, 1929, pp.22-24; LNA, S3/5/18/9, GSJs circular 
to ACs, 11 September 1922. 
10 LNA, S3/5/18/9, Pritchard to GS, 1 September 1922. 
16 . Rand Daily Mail, 7 September 1922. 
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paid tax collectors, and again used the opportunity to push 
for a compulsory deferred pay scheme. The Assistant 
Commissioner for Qachas Nek then proposed a compromise whereby 
the scheme would be made compulsory for recruits under 21 as 
these were minors under Sesotho law, but the Resident 
Commissioner and the NRC opposed the idea. 1 7 The situation 
was summed up by the Chamber of Mines in 1930 to the South 
African Economic Commission: "In Basutoland, particularly, the 
Council chiefs have on several occasions recommended the 
Basutoland Administration to make the deferred pay system 
compulsory. The natives who are concerned, who earn the 
money, say ~No~ " . 1.a 
The Struggle over Migrants~ Earnings 
The arguments of Basotho chiefs and members of the elite for 
making deferred pay compulsory tended to be coded in moralist 
terms. Chiefs argued, according to the Resident Commissioner, 
that Basotho migrants spent their money "on women, drink and 
other extravagances".1.9 One Mosotho working in Durban wrote 
to the "Respected Father" (the Resident Commissioner) in 
support of the chiefs~ position: 
I have been at Premier Mine, Pretoria and Johannesburg 
and today I am here in Durban. It is not astonishing or 
wonderful that a man who has been away from home for all 
that period to have no penny in his purse? [sic] The 
things that cause extravagance of money are mainly 
kaffir-beer and things sold by Indians, such as oranges, 
bananas, monkey-nuts and drinks of different kinds ... 
Dances, tea-parties and concerts are things in which 
young men waste money.20 
On occasion, however, chiefly concerns were expressed more 
17 LNA, S3/5/18/9, RC to PC, 1 March 1931; PC to RC, 6 
June 1931; Litaba, 1929, pp.22-24. 
is. University of Cape Town Manuscripts, BC 630, "South 
African Native Commission: Minutes", par. 9073-9176. 
is. LNA, S3/5/18/9, RC to NRC Maseru Representative, 5 
May 1931. 
20. Ibid., Bethany Moketa to RC, 19 November 1928. 
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bluntly. In 1931 the Paramount claimed in a letter to the 
Resident Commissioner: 
... I am greatly surprised if this matter is not an 
important one in this nation, for these monies will help 
by being taken by people in need of tax, they will 
exchange their stock for these monies of these people, 
instead of it being wasted in the Union. And this is 
help to the Government and to the Chieftainship, and even 
to the traders of this country, because they will buy 
with these monies, at the shops. It is also help to the 
nation because those in difficulties will sell their 
stock for these monies.21 
But the great majority of Basotho migrants were not willing to 
allow chiefs access to their earnings. The General Manager of 
the Natal Coast Labour Recruiting Corporation explained to the 
Resident Commissioner in 1927: 
... I have been doing everything possible to insist upon 
Basutos returning home being paid on their arrival, by 
our agents or one of your Commissioners, but these boys 
have a very independent nature, and they very strongly 
object to these terms. They state they are not children, 
and have a right to spend their money how, and where they 
like.22 
This struggle was, however, temporarily resolved in favour of 
the chiefs during the 1932-33 drought when many Basotho 
migrants sent large sums of money to families and relatives at 
home. L86 732 was remitted in 1933 as compared to L34 820 and 
L41 018 in 1931 and 1932, respectively. L58 856 was on 
deferred pay in 1933 as compared to L28 645 (1930), L44 331 
(1931) and L50 446 (1932).23 
Yet arguably, the main 
migrants to deferred pay 
Basotho homesteads. In 
factor affecting the attitude of 
was linked to struggles within 
1909 the Resident Commissioner of 
Bechuanaland wrote to his counterpart in Basutoland regarding 
the complaint that Basotho in the police service in his 
Protectorate were not remitting money to their families: "I 
have seen requests from uncles, cousins and persons who 
21 Ibid., PC to RC, 19 May 1931. 
22 Ibid., Natal Coast LRC GM to RC, 12 February 1922. 
23 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, Appendix IX. 
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probably are no relations at all, for money from men who are 
earning their living in the police".24 This intra-homestead 
struggle became more pronounced in the course of the following 
decade, and was particularly acute during the 1932-33 drought. 
One Mosotho in Maseru wrote to the Assistant Commissioner in 
May 1933: 
regarding my brother 
long time - directly 
Up to this day he 
I beg to ask for assistance 
been in the Transvaal for a 
fatherJs death in 1923. 
returned to Basutoland, 
during his absence ... 





I make this request because I hear from those who were 
working with him that he spends money carelessly and has 
no clothing. His salary is L3 per month. 
Under the abovementioned reasons I beg to request that 
you will be kind enough as to ask the compound manager on 
my behalf that when this boy has paid his tax up to date, 
he should be forced to defer L2 every month and get Ll 
only so that when he is discharged all that money should 
be sent to the government at Maseru where he would 
receive it ... I make this request as I am now responsible 
for his living ... 
Owing to this prevalent depression I would not like him 
to return home at once but should work for a few months 
and then come home.25 
A case which was to lead to intense correspondence in 1934 was 
of one Mosotho ("Flag" Letsoela) from Leribe who was employed 
as an induna at the Comet Deep mine in the 
elder brother ("Potfol") wanted to take 
East Rand, whose 
control of his 
earnings. Potfol sent Flag~s two wives to the Comet Deep to 
demand money, but the younger brother sent the women back. 
Later, Potfol applied to the Assistant Commissioner for 




Basutoland Agency in Johannesburg intervened after 
produced slips and letters proving that he was 
his family. Potfol defended himself: 
states that 





... it is not true when he 
children. If he supports 
them to go to him? 
Secondly why his second wife ... returned to live with her 
24 LNA, S7/7/46, RC Bechuanaland to RC Basutoland, 12 
February 1909. 
2 5 LNA, Miscellaneous Native Letters (1933), Ngaka to AC 
(Maseru), 12 May 1933. 
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own parents if she is being supported by him[?] Thirdly 
why does his mother, daughter in law and daughter go 
about practically naked if he looks after them? How much 
money does he say he has sent to me if he says that I am 
cause of his inability to support his family[?] Three 
years ago he gave me L2 ... and again on July 1st last he 
gave me Ll. Are those amounts the cause of his inability 
to support his families? It would be a mistake for child 
(sic) to say that his father [my emphasis] causes him to 
be unable to support his wives only because he happens to 
give his father a knife for cutting nails ... 
. .. I have no pride above the law. I find sons of Seisa 
asking for three head of cattle for the bohali of Flag's 
son who married in his father's absence. Have I to pay 
these debts or not? I also find a man of Tumahole's who 
is asking for payment of a beast and 10 [sic] for 
doctoring Flag's daughter in law. Have I to pay these or 
not? I also find that Messrs Frasers, Namely, Mr. Field 
[sic] taking Flag's horse for a debt which Flag has not 
paid for a long time. His son was stopped by my wife 
from going to the Mines because his father does not 
support his [Flag's] children.2s 
What is probable is that Potfol, with no other source of 
income and using his position in the extended family, claimed 
and took the money that Flag was sending his family. Flag's 
wives probably tried to assert their claim, hence one of them 
had to return to her family. It is not surprising that Flag 
blamed Potfol for the remittances not reaching his family. 
As migrants· earnings started becoming decisive in the 
developmental cycle of Basotho households, conflict within the 
extended families also increased. The traditional distribution 
of power and privileges was manipulated to achieve certain 
ends; elder brothers made claims over their younger brothers· 
earnings, especially in cases where the parents were not 
alive. Uncles and fathers also made similar claims. While 
such efforts were intended to protect households from 
collapsing as the result of the loss of access to migrants· 
remittances, the tensions they caused frequently had the 
opposite effect. 
The interest of the South African authorities in the VDP and 
2s LNA, Leribe Collection, Box 29, Potfol to AC, 3 
September 1934. 
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remittance schemes was motivated by different factors. Claims 
that the scheme was established to save migrants from 
"themselves" and to "protect" them from "robbers", were 
clearly, just like the chiefs~ moralist discourse, intended to 
deflect attention from the real issues. In the first place, 
considerable importance was still attached to recruits 
spending part of their earnings in the Union, hence in 1931 
maximum VDP was fixed at 10s per fortnight. Also, interest 
from the Deferred Pay Fund came to play an important role in 
financing recreational programmes in the gold mine compounds. 
The authorities~ prime concern, however, centred around the 
long-term impact of the migrant labour system on the rural 
economies. In colonial Lesotho, as has been shown, the 
situation became more serious from the 1920s with rural 
production decreasing and dependence on migrants~ remittances 
increasing. Pim concluded his 1935 assessment of the position 
of labour migrancy in Lesotho: 
It is clear that the Territory could not under existing 
conditions dispense with the income from the mines, 
supplemented as it is by the earnings of some 30 000 men 
who have on the average received passes for agriculture 
and miscellaneous labour, and of a proportion of the 45 
000 who have gone abroad on visiting passes. Any serious 
restriction of the present opportunities for outside 
labour would cause severe distress, more especially if it 
coincided with unfavourable agricultural seasons or low 
prices for wool.27 
This provided the basis for a struggle over the control of the 
earnings of the migrants. This continued until the Leabua 
Jonathan government made the deferment of pay compulsory in 
1975, but even then, only after much resistance from Basotho 
migrants. 
Basutoland Johananneaburg Agent 
The refusal of the Basutoland government to make the deferment 
of pay compulsory was not primarily due to concern over 
27 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.37. 
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"personal rights" of Basotho men as the Resident Commissioner 
claimed. It was not the determination of the colonial 
government but that of Basotho migrants themselves which led 
to the failure of the chiefs~ campaign. Like the NRC, the 
Resident Commissioner was not prepared to risk upsetting the 
supply of labour with measures which would be unpopular with 
Basotho migrants, especially those which had the potential of 
creating unrest. What was of great concern to the colonial 
government, however, was the failure and refusal of Basotho 
migrants and makholoa to pay their tax dues. This was to lead 
to the establishment of a Basutoland Johannesburg Agent, 
though the scheme was initially presented as one which would 
look after the welfare of Basotho migrants. 
The idea of a Basutoland Agent was first put on the agenda of 
the colonial government by the ubiquitous Ernest Mabille after 
his brief visit to Johannesburg in February 1896 where he was 
inspired by the example of J.S. Marwick, the Natal 
Johannesburg agent responsible for the welfare of Zulu 
migrants. But Lagden at first ignored the proposal. 
Undeterred, within a few days of his arrival in Johannesburg 
in June to take up a missionary job, Mabille began back-stage 
manoeuvring. Marwick sent a telegram on the 22nd of June to 
the Natal Native Affairs Department: "E. Mabille a French 
gentleman formerly of Basutoland bearing a letter from Mr G. 
Lagden ... asks me to write for information of latter a 
memorandum showing objects of the office here and how they are 
carried. May his request be complied with".28 On the 24th 
of the same month, Mabille wrote to Sloley: "I thought the 
best way to explain what I mean would be to interview the 
Natal Agent, Mr Marwick, and ask him for details of the 
working of his Agency. His reply was that his Government 
would gladly supply the Basutoland authorities with official 
information if applied to".29 He did not reveal that 
Marwick had already contacted the Natal government to request 
2s Natal Archives Depot, SNA 1/1/223, 924/1896, Telegram 
to SNA, 22 June 1896. 
2s. LNA. S7/7/18, Mabille to GS, 24 June 1896. 
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such information. 
With Lagden and Sloley refusing to implement his plan, Mabille 
went ahead and established himself as a de facto Basutoland 
Agent. Through his savings agency and work in the NAD, his 
missionary visits to the mine compounds, as well as his 
involvement in labour recruitment, Mabille managed to build a 
reputation for himself as the "father" of Basotho migrants. He 
played an important role in helping Basotho parents and chiefs 
trace and repatriate their missing and sick sons and men. In 
April 1910 the NAD complained to the Government Secretary that 
"letters on official paper are frequently received from the 
Native Staff at Leribe addressed ... to H.E. Mabille ... one of 
the Inspectors of this Department, requesting his assistance 
on obtaining the return of natives, in conveying messages, and 
various other matters connected with native affairs, which it 
is peculiarly the province of this Department to deal 
with".30 What the NAD was not aware of was that Mabille was 
in fact encouraging this irregular practice in order to make 
himself indispensable to the Basutoland government. In 1906, 
after outlining to Sloley the twelve areas he thought such an 
Agent could cover, Mabille had written: 
I herewith enclose specimens of typical letters which I 
receive by every post requesting me to assist in tracing 
the whereabouts of husbands, sons or brothers who have 
abandoned their families or leave them destitute. I have 
also been often requested by Assistant Commissioners in 
the name of Chiefs or relatives to trace boys and prevail 
upon them to return home, to visit patients in Hospitals 
or prisoners in gaols, and it is evident that I cannot 
possibly be of any assistance in such cases unless I am 
officially appointed to do this kind of work.31 
When WNLA collapsed in British South Africa in 1906 and with 
Paramount Letsie convening 
Resident Commissioner in June 
emergency meetings with the 
and November of that year to 
discuss the activities of labour agents, Mabille took the 
opportunity in December to present Sloley with concrete 
30 LNA, S7/7/53, SNA to GS, 13 April 1910. 
31 LNA, S7/7/39, Mabille to Sloley, 29 December 1906. 
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suggestions as to how the AgentJs functions could be used to 
resolve the "anarchic state" of labour recruitment in Lesotho. 
He specifically blamed the crisis on unscrupulous agents and 
chiefs who conscripted their men to the mines: 
The great point with Natives generally and with Basutos 
particularly is to establish confidence. Those who have 
studied the ideosyncracies of the Basutos know that more 
perhaps than other tribes they are very suspicious and at 
the same time very credulous, that they believe in 
individuals more than in impersonal institutions however 
good they may be, and I venture to say that nothing would 
do more to bring Basutoland in line with other countries 
and districts and help to solve the important problem for 
the Rand of unskilled labour, than the establishment of 
an Agency in Johannesburg where they would have access to 
some one they know and trust for advice and 
protection.32 
Mabille then took his campaign to the press. The Rand Daily 
Mail had earlier suggested, in connection with the "anarchy" 
in Lesotho that "what is really needed to remedy the 
complaints is for the [Basutoland] Government to appoint a 
person in Johannesburg to hear and investigate all complaints, 
and to obtain justice for the Natives".33 By July 1907 
articles had appeared in the St..ar, Friend of the Free State, 
and Naledi ea Lesotho, all urging the Basutoland government to 
consider a Johannesburg Agent.34 
MabilleJs involvement in labour recruitment also gave him 
other connections and opportunities for his campaign. In July 
1907 his labour recruiting partner, C. McComb, met with the 
Transvaal minister responsible for native affairs to discuss 
labour questions, and to raise the issue of a Basutoland 
Agent. McCombe subsequently wrote to Sloley about this 
meeting and the wish of the Transvaal government to argue for 
a Basutoland office similar to those of the Cape Colony and 
Natal. His report closed with a postscript drawn word for 
32 Ibid. 
3 3 Daily Mail, 7 November 1906. 
34 These newspaper articles are 
S7/7/37, Mabille to Sloley, 17 April 1907; 
Sloley, 22 February 1907. 
attached to LNA, 
S7/7/39, Mabille to 
136 
word from Mabille~s December 1906 letter cited above.35 
Mabille combined his various strategies of making himself 
indispensable, campaigning in the press and rallying the 
Transvaal government behind him, with agitating for a 
Basutoland Agent among the chiefs. In July 1907 eleven chiefs 
petitioned the Resident Commissioner, requesting him to "find 
us a man who will look after our people who are working in the 
goldfields", and recommending Mabille for the position.36 
When Taberer visited Lesotho with Mabille later in August to 
introduce and popularise the GNLB, the chiefs again put 
forward their request for an Agent, referring to the NAD and 
the GNLB as "foreign". This process culminated in the issue 
being discussed at the January 1908 sitting of the National 
Council. Discussion centred on the GNLB which some chiefs did 
not think was best placed to play the role of an Agent. 
Although several chiefs suggested Mabille, others had no 
confidence in either him or Taberer: 
I visited the [GNLBJ compound [said councillor Horolong]. 
There were many people there enclosed in a ... fence to 
prevent them [from] running away. They said they were 
being sold ... When they came back here with complaints 
they are simply told that a native has no right to 
complain. I remarked to Mr Mabille that he did not tell 
our people would be badly treated. Mr Habille said it 
was law that a native should not reply or defend himself 
when he is being judged.37 
35 LNA, S7/7/39, McComb to Sloley, 31 July 1907. In 
March 1907, while recruiting labour for the Village Hain, 
Mabille had confided to Sloley: "The [Savings] Agency I am 
conducting in the meantime is simply a temporary means of 
making a living. Beside being insecure and subject to ups and 
downs according to the wants of the mines or the fancy of the 
boys, it does not offer me that sphere of usefulness to all 
the Basutos employed on the Rand which it is still my aim and 
ambition to secure. Hy action on their behalf. besides being 
restricted on account of being private is only confined to the 
two mines for which I am recruiting labour. I shall therefore 
be very glad if you will kindly keep in mind the matter of a 
Basutoland Agency being eventually started on the Rand". See 
LNA, S7/7/39, Mabille to Sloley, 22 March 1907. 
36 LNA, S4/4/4, petition to AC (Maseru), 19 July 1907. 
37 Report of the Proceedings of the Basutoland National 
Council, 1908, p.21. 
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Deadlock ensued, and there the matter rested for another two 
decades. by 
died.38. 
which time the indefatigable Mabille had 
There are three possible reasons why 1agden and Sloley blocked 
the issue of establishing a Basutoland Agent even though 
Natal, the Cape Colony, and southern Mozambique, all operated 
such an office. Firstly, the colonial government was 
reluctant to spend money on the welfare of Basotho migrants as 
the policy had always been to minimise costs and increase 
revenue. Secondly, as demonstrated during the 1908 National 
Council, Sloley was convinced that the NAD and the GN1B 
fulfilled the functions of such an Agent. And finally, Lagden 
and Sloley may well have regarded the whole project as nothing 
more than MabilleJs personal ambition and agenda; when the 
press and the chiefs joined the campaign, these officials had 
already been receiving letters and memoranda from Mabille on 
this issue for ten years. 
It was only when labour migrancy affected tax collection that 
the colonial government moved to open an office in 
Johannesburg. The first two decades of this century saw the 
streamlining of the system of taxation in Basutoland. The hut 
tax had been increased from 10s to 11 in 1898. In 1911 this 
tax was converted into poll tax; the new law now required that 
every Mosotho man of more than 18 years old should pay tax, 
and every man with more than one wife was required to pay for 
each additional wife but with the ceiling put at 13 to avoid 
antagonising the chiefs, all of whom had more than one wife. 
Chiefs, during the discussion of this tax increase at the 
National Council sitting, argued that the minimum age should 
be put at 21 instead of 18. The issue came up again in 1916 
with the new Resident Commissioner wanting to impose the 18-
year age limit. The intention here was to drive the youth to 
labour centres, but chiefs complained that many of the 18-year 
old boys were herdboys and should be exempted from the payment 
38 According to Stephen Gill, the curator of the PEMS 
Morija Archives, Mabille died in 1929 from cardiac failure. 
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of poll tax. By 1930 a compromise was in operation whereby 
18-year old boys at home were exempted from this tax, while 
those in wage employment were required to pay. This 
arrangement continued until May 1933 when a new law set the 
age limit at twenty-one.39 
In 1920 poll tax was increased from 11 
colonial government had initially wanted 
had to agree to 5s following protest 
Council. In 1927 an "education levy" of 
tax. Additionally, once the system of 
payers was put in place between 1911 and 
(20s) to 25s. The 
a 10s increase but 
from the National 
3s was added to this 
registration of tax 
1912, responsibility 
for the collection of tax was taken away from the chiefs, 
eventually being made over to paid tax collectors in 1928. 
Revenue from Native Tax grew from 169 601 (1909-10) to 197 722 
(1912-13) and 1141 719 (1928-29).40 
But despite increasing efficiency in collection, the problem 
of tax evasion continued to grow. This was due to both 
bokholoa and the increase in the number of Basotho migrants 
who took contracts which lasted longer than any one fiscal 
year. In 1915 the government asked the GNLB to help in 
tracing Basotho "tax defaulters" on the Rand. The system 
worked as follows: an Assistant Commissioner in Basutoland 
would send the GN1B a list of "defaulters" from his district, 
indicating the miner~s headman or chief and his employer on 
the Rand. The GNLB would, on its part, send a note to various 
compound managers asking them to trace "defaulters" thought to 
be on their mines. If the migrant was found, the mine 
officials would collect the L1 from him and send it to the 
GN1B offices to be forwarded to the relevant Assistant 
Commissioner in Lesotho. But the arrangement was short-lived. 
Within a year the GN1B officials were complaining that this 
practice was increasing the Bureau~s office work. and asked 
39 Kimble, "Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule", p.238; 
Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.55-58; Basutoland 
Proclamations and Notices, 1933, p.23. 
40. Kimble, "Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule", p.389; 
Pim. Financial and Economic Position, Appendix X. 
139 
the Basutoland administration to find other ways of collecting 
tax on the Rand. The sending of a Native Tax Collector to the 
Rand was then considered.4i 
It was only at the beginning of 1922 that a decision was taken 
to send the Collector but the project had to be suspended 
until November because of the Rand Revolt. The Collector was 
to spend six months on the Reef, tracing "defaulters" and 
collecting tax from them. The Paramount Chief even despatched 
his own representatives to the Rand to urge his people to co-
operate; other chiefs wrote letters to migrants from their 
districts instructing them to pay their tax at the 
Johannesburg Pass Office where the Collector was to be 
stationed. But many Basotho made a fool of the Collector, 
dodging him or playing him against the Union~s tax collectors. 
Possibly out of frustration, the Collector insisted on 
attempting to collect tax from makholoa and Basotho who now 
regarded themselves as South African citizens. Due to 
problems such as these, the Collector was withdrawn in 1923 
and a solution eventually found in establishing a permanent 
Basutoland Agent in Johannesburg.42 
In fact, a Basutoland Agent and five "native clerks" were only 
appointed in 1932 by which time tax evasion had assumed 
greater proportions because of the depression. Not 
surprisingly, there was resistance to Armstrong the 
Basutoland Johannesburg Officer - on the part of many Basotho 
workers. The Acting Resident Commissioner reported to the 




... in his [Armstrong] report he mentions that on the 
Simmer and Jack one Masopha a son of Chief Api, brother 
of Ramabanta refused to pay Tax and having some influence 
over the other Basuto there a good many others followed 
his example. Again at the City Deep one Selise Ntemere 
son of headman Ntemere chief Sempe [sic] also refused and 
41 SAE, GNLB 219, 209/15/91, GS to DNL, 12 November 
Acting DNL to GS, 8 August 1916. 
42 . Ibid. , Chief Pass Officer (CPO) to DNL. 24 November 
CPO to DNL, 6 October 1922; DNL to CPO, 30 November 
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persuaded others to do the same. The Mine Authorities 
very kindly supported Mr Armstrong altho~ of course they 
have nothing to do with Tax Collection and in each case 
these two men were discharged and are to be repatriated 
to Basutoland. Chief Masupha afterwards addressed the 
Basuto in these Compounds and when they saw what happened 
to these two people they agreed to pay.43 
As a result. the 1932 annual report was able to claim that 
"the collection was a great success, and when once the initial 
difficulties had been overcome the natives appeared to be keen 
to pay".44 Between April and July of this year L17 300 was 
collected, and L24 128 during the 1932-33 fiscal year. 
Table 3.3: Tax Collected from Baaotho by the Johannesburg 
Agency 
Fiscal Year L 
1932-33 24 128 
1933-34 26 500 
1934-35 33 146 
1935-36 34 303 
1936-37 34 477 
1937-38 38 634 
Source: CAR, 1937; 1938. 
Table 3.3 shows that though the total income from Native Tax 
in Lesotho declined in 1933-3445 due to the drought, tax 
collection in Johannesburg itself actually increased. 
These improvements in the collection of the Johannesburg tax 
were due to various strategies used by Armstrong. Besides the 
active support he received from the mine and Union 
authorities, Armstrong toured the compounds, addressing 
Basotho workers. He also attended mine activities like sports 
43 LNA, S8/2/2/28, Acting RC to PC, 15 April 1932. 
44 .cAR, 1932, p.32. 
45 Income from Native Tax had been declining since the 
depression; from 1141 719 (1928-29), 1136 237 (1929-30), 1125 
665 (1930-31), L116 783 (1931-32), reaching L90 017 (1933-34). 
See Pim, Financial and Economic Position, Appendix X. 
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and Moshoeshoe Festivals. At the same time, the personnel in 
the Office, staffed largely by chiefs, was also increased. By 
1939 the Office employed eleven tax collectors, many of whom 
Cat least for the seven from Lesotho) were linked to the 
chieftaincy. But resistance from at least some Basotho 
migrants did not cease. One Mosotho employed at Maraisburg 
complained to the Paramount about tax collectors who were 
invading their places of work. In 1936 some Mosotho complained 
that tax money was being deducted from their earnings through 
the intervention of the Johannesburg Office, and that they 
were being arrested if they objected.46 
Cash Advances and Desertion 
The colonial government was, however, still faced with the 
long-standing problem caused by desertions. Money advanced by 
labour agents for the payment of tax had to be refunded if 
recruits deserted on the way to the mines or from service. 
This became a growing source of tension between the colonial 
government and labour agents. 
Cash advances were important for the colonial government and 
labour agents. For the former, this money provided income for 
households and guaranteed the payment of tax by departing 
migrants. Labour agents, on their side, used cash advances to 
lure labourers and encourage families and chiefs to push their 
sons and men to the labour centres. As already noted, 
recruits were advanced cash for railfares. provisions. 
hut/poll taxes, and for miscellaneous purposes such as leaving 
families and relatives with money. Blankets and grain also 
4s Leselinyana, 31 January 1934; 22 July 1936; 6 
September 1939; 15 November 1933: Union of South Africa, 
Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and of 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, no. 17, 1936, 
G.P.S.1322; no.18, 1937, G.P.S.1255; no.24, 1948, G.P.S.2277; 
Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.58. 
served as advances in times of distress.47 
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In 1910 the 
maximum which could be advanced to recruits was fixed at 15 in 
South Africa and 12 in Lesotho. The reason for imposing a 
limit on advances was because competing labour agents would 
offer up to 125, thus putting the whole system at risk. With 
the establishment of the monopsony following the formation of 
the NRC, the pressure to offer large advances decreased.48 
The desertion of the recruits en route to the mines was 
primarily caused by the need for quick cash. 
the colonial government with labour agents in 
it was noted that "advances are the main 
desertions and impersonation". 49 A Mosotho 
need of money, or not willing to go to the 
approach a tout and take a contract using 
Depending on the district, the man would 
At a meeting of 
December 1920, 
cause of all 
man in urgent 
mines, would 
a false name. 
then disappear 
somewhere along the way, especially at entrainment points or 
when changing trains. In 1912, Mabille reported that one of 
his recruits "left the train at Bloemfontein with his 
blankets, etc, on the pretext of buying some food in that town 
and that he has not arrived at the New Comet".150 
The colonial government initially refunded the agents only for 
tax money paid for recruits who were rejected on medical 
grounds on arrival at the mines. It refused to refund monies 
when it came to cash advanced to deserters. At the same time, 
labour agents felt that the authorities were not making enough 
effort to recover deserters. This culminated in an exchange 
in 1916 between the NRC District Superintendent, Maitland 
Brown, and the Basutoland authorities on this issues. Brown 
wanted labour agents to be refunded tax advanced to deserters, 
47 Cattle, however, never featured as advances. For 
the case of Pondoland where cattle were used as advances to 
mine recruits, see W. Beinart, The Political Economy of 
Pondoland. 1860 to 1930, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1982), 
pp.54-62. 
48. Van der Horst, Native Labour, p.195. 
49. SAB, GNLB 291, 168/19/35, Minutes of the Government 
Secretary 1 s Meeting of Labour Agents, 2 December 1920. 
5o LNA, TY 1/3/8, Mabille to AC Maseru, 20 February 
1912. 
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and, citing a letter he received from the Basutoland Mounted 
Police Officer in Charge, demanded "protection": 
"Should a desertion be reported we are told that we must 
send an identifying witness with the Police before the 
arrest can be made as they so often arrest the wrong 
person; you will see that this is a very expensive method 
to us and rather than waste money by hiring horses for 
the witness we prefer to let the deserter go Scot free". 
Surely we are entitled to Police protection?5i 
On this point. the government eventually gave way, and agreed 
to refund labour agents the tax they had advanced to 
deserters. This culminated in a meeting with labour agents in 
December 1920 where a compromise was worked out. 
resolved 
It was 
... that a labourer who has been convicted for desertion 
and on expiry of his sentence or payment of fine has not 
refunded the amount of advances, shall be given the 
option of fulfilling his contract with the Agent who 
recruited him or any other, failing which he should be 
sent out to the Chief for collection of such advances; 
that labourers on attestation should be warned of the 
penal consequences of desertion, and that the name of the 
Labour Agent and the Mine to which he is recruited should 
be written on the pass issued to labourer; and that ... the 
Resident Commissioner be requested to review and if 
possible alter the ruling whereby the Government is 
responsible for the refund of tax paid to deserters, the 
meeting considering it an ordinary trade risk to be taken 
by the Labour Agent.52 
In addition, the system for recovering deserters was also to 
be improved. Police and chiefs were to be mobilised, and a 
list of deserters circulated in the country. All deserters 
were to be marked in red in the Tax Register column for the 
tax due to be paid. Labour agents, for their part, undertook 
to despatch their recruits as soon as possible to minimise 
chances of desertion. So successful was this meeting that 
labour agents further agreed 
refunding them tax paid 
Johannesburg.53 





to recruits rejected in 
LNA, S3/5/18/5, Brown to GS, 10 August 1916. 
SAB, GNLB 291, 168/18/35, Minutes, 2 December 





However, by 1922 this agreement was in crisis. Brown blaming 
the increasing rate of desertion on police "apathy" because 
the government was no longer refunding the tax paid to 
deserters. Between January 1921 and June 1922, 175 NRC 
Basotho recruits deserted, causing the Corporation to lose 
nearly 1800. Brown estimated that desertion figures for other 
labour agents during this period were about 525, entailing a 
loss of 12 500. Desertion rates continued to rise. especially 
between 1924 and 1925; in Maseru alone, 90 desertions were 
reported in January-November 1925, compared with 18 in 1924. 
The NRC then intensified its fight against desertion 
throughout the sub-region. Deserters arrested inside the 
Union were sent to the Rand for trial, while Bechuanaland and 
Lesotho tried their own cases. Fines in Bechuanaland went up 
to 15 or a two months prison term with hard labour; the common 
sentence in colonial Lesotho was a 110 fine or six months with 
hard labour. The Basutoland Mounted Police also intensified 
its work, and instructions issued that lists of deserters 
should be taken along on all patrols. Regular visits were to 
be paid to chiefs and relatives of wanted deserters, and 
police officers were to send monthly reports to the Officer in 
Charge in Maseru on deserters.54 
With little improvement in desertion rates, Stephens 
despairingly exclaimed: "It will simply mean that if 
desertions go on like this, that we shall have to go out of 
the business".55 The colonial government was powerless: "As 
the bulk of the desertions appear to be taking place in the 
Union, I am afraid there is little else to be done beyond 
taking the usual steps to have the deserters apprehended when 
notification of desertions has been made".56 With the NRC 
continuing to suffer from desertions, appeals were sent to the 
Resident Commissioner of Basutoland, but he did nothing except 
54 LNA, S3/5/18/7, B.M.P. Staff 
regarding "Labour Deserters", 1 December 
NRC circular no.13, 5 February 1925. 
55 LNA, S3/5/18/7, Stephens to GS, 
56. LNA, S3/3/1/10, GS to Stephens, 
Officer's circular 
1925; LNA, MH 3/1/5, 
30 November 1925. 
2 September 1927. 
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send circulars to Assistant Commissioners.57 
Basotho desertion from the mines was difficult to control for 
a whole variety of reasons. Not only did conditions on the 
mines themselves account for many of such desertions.Be but 
there were also other factors away from the 
production. 
point of 
For example, there was a flourishing traffic in pass books 
between the Rand and the labour supplying districts. In 1907 
Mabille complained to Leselinyana as follows: 
I regrettably hereby inform the [Paramount] Chief and 
chiefs and the whole nation about a disgraceful practice 
that spoils the name of Lesotho and Basotho, which must 
be attended to and stopped. I refer to this practice of 
helping people to desert by bringing and selling to the 
passes. Several sons of chiefs are also implicated, and 
I have their names which I cannot disclose here. Basotho 
seems to be the only ones involved in this traffic, and 
the Johannesburg pass authorities are now aware that this 
is a big business for Basotho of Moshoeshoe. Only in one 
week five people were arrested and are all the children 
of Lesotho. while others are still under surveillance and 
will soon be arrested too.59 
But this traffic continued to increase. The offices of 
Assistant Commissioners were broken into, and blank and 
stamped pass books stolen. Signatures were forged and the 
books sent to the Rand for sale. Basotho who wanted to desert 
would ask their relatives or friends in colonial Lesotho to 
arrange a pass for them. This also happened when employers 
57 LNA. S3/5/18/4, RC~s circular to ACs. 2 April 1931; 
S3/5/18/7, Brown to GS, 22 August 1922; RC to HC, 7 January 
1933. 
58. For colonial Zimbabwe, see the seminal article by C. 
van Onselen,"Worker Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern 
Rhodesia, 1900-1920", Journal of African History, vol.14, 
no.2, 1973. South African mines are discussed in Richardson, 
and van-Helten, "Labour in the South African gold mining 
industry", .in Marks and Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialisation 
and Social Change. See also R. Cohen, "Resistance and Hidden 
Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers", Review of 
African Political Economy, vol.19, 1980. 
59 . Leselinvana, 1 August 1907. 
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refused to release sick or injured miners.so or men who had 
emergencies to attend to at home.Si To acquire a pass, a 
relative/friend would either steal one, bribe, for example, a 
tout for an extra pass, or buy one from known dealers like one 
Theko Hamilton who was arrested in Johannesburg in January 
1916 for travelling under the name "Monamela Sam" and charged 
with "trespass", forgery, and "being in possession and making 
use of a pass belonging to another".62 
Conclusion 
The deepening of dependency on the earnings of Basotho 
migrants was accompanied by the sharpening of struggles within 
many homesteads, and between Basotho migrants on the one hand, 
and the chiefs and the colonial government on the other. These 
struggles centred around access to and the control of these 
earnings. The 
essential for 
wages of Basotho migrants were not only 
their families and relatives, but also, as tax, 
provided the colonial state with revenue. Hence it was so 
important that mechanisms were put in place to facilitate the 
so One Mosotho defended himself in June 1930: "I 
deserted because I was injured by a stone on my fingers" (Rex 
vs Lefosa, 12 June 1930); and another (March 1927) : "I was 
sick" (Rex vs Matsosa, 17 March 1927). For other cases, see 
LNA, CR Mafeteng (MFT) 1910-13, CR MFT February 17/27 to 
February 34/28, CR MFT August 202/30 to January 11/31. 
s1 See, for example, the case of Mashoela who "was 
working on the Jupiter Mine when he deserted [in January 
1916] for these reasons. He was attested here [at Peka] for 
the mines for four months and after working for two learned of 
the death of his father Makhoala. He then requested that he 
might be granted leave to visit Basutoland as he knew of the 
whereabouts of his father·s flocks, offering to pay wages in 
lieu of the two months further work. He wrote to the man who 
recruited him on the subject but received no reply. I [the 
Basutoland Mounted Police Officer in Charge] have ... 
interviewed Mashoela·s uncle Marata who bears out the 
statement that Mashoela alone knew of the deceased property 
and also the recruiter admits that Mashoela wrote asking him 
to arrange his release from the mine". See LNA, S7/7/75, 
Basutoland Mounted Police (BMP) Officer in Charge to BMP 
Commissioner (Maseru), 12 January 1916. 
s2 LNA, S7/7/75, Acting Chief Pass Officer to DNL, 7 
January 1916. 
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deferment of migrantsJ pay to their families, and to trace tax 
evaders and labour deserters. But these measures had to face 
up to the resistance of the migrants themselves. 
With so many Basotho now taking longer contracts and bokholoa 
on the increase, mine compounds assumed an increasingly 
important place in the lives of migrants, and it is to these 
experiences that the following chapters turn. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPOUNDS AS HOME AND GRAVE 
We entered the compounds with dilated nostrils, 
There we found dogs from many villages standing in a 
queue, 
Vultures queuing, children from small houses. 
Listen to the cruel clerk, men, 
He says we left our mothers behind, 
He calls a koata by his mother, 
His mother who does not even know him, 
In his heart the koata keeps on saying: "You too"!l. 
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The period 1890 to 1940 is important for understanding not 
only the history of labour migration and the deepening of 
dependence on migrants~ earnings in colonial Lesotho, but also 
the development and social history of the gold mine compounds. 
The efforts of the Randlords to reduce the cost of labour 
involved not only cutting down expenditure in procuring labour 
by establishing a recruiting monopsony, but also the central 
fact that little was spent on the housing, health and safety 
of African miners. Because the number of African employees 
was increasing even as wages were cut, mine managements 
struggled to find increasingly authoritarian ways of 
controlling the black labour force. More than the Pass Laws 
and Master and Servant measures which aimed at combating 
desertion from service, the compounds were used as a crucial 
1. K.E. Ntsane, "When we go to the Witwatersrand", in 
Mmusa-Pelo II, CA.P.B. Johannesburg, 1955), p.62. 
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instrument in this regard. By the mid-1920s, the mine owners 
were in a relatively comfortable position, with labour supply 
stabilised and costs kept in check. Now concerned with the 
long-term profitability of their mines, managements began to 
improve conditions in the compounds and to address questions 
of occupational safety and the recreation of African miners. 
But none of this was achieved without struggle, as managements 
often acted in response to initiatives taken by the miners 
themselves. Moreover, the early 1920s were a critical period 
in African urban history. The rapid African urbanisation that 
followed World War I was accompanied by the radicalisation of 
African politics. For the mines, the period 1918-20 was one 
of African labour unrest across the Reef. And the support 
that the Transvaal Native Congress gave to the mine workers, 
and the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Union in 1919, were both serious concerns for management. In 
all of these ways, the compounds were sites of struggle. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline certain of these 
processes and struggles. Part I will deal with the period 
1900-1920, and Part II with 1920-1940 (with specific reference 
to struggles around leisure and recreation in the compounds). 
Chapter Five will focus on religion in the mine compounds, 
while Chapter Six will examine collective violence by 
examining the case of the Premier Diamond mine compounds. 
I 
THE COMPOUNDS 
The institution of compounds was developed in the Kimberley 
diamond mines in the mid-1880s for the housing and control of 
150 
African migrant workers.2 To prevent diamond thefts, 
Kimberley compounds were "closed", with workers only allowed 
to leave the premises at the expiry of their contracts and 
only after a thorough search. On the Rand, the housing of 
African gold miners was unplanned and unsystematic before the 
South African War. Workers were housed in loosely arranged 
wooden and iron and, later, brick formations; and as these 
early compounds were not fenced. workers could move in and out 
without seeking permission. But after the war, with the gold 
mines faced with a serious labour "shortage", reducing 
desertion and "loafing" assumed a greater significance. In 
1903 the Chamber of Mines despatched a delegation to Kimberley 
to study the compound system there, and this culminated in the 
1904 Coloured Labour Compound Commission which presented 
recommendations relating to, among others, the number of 
workers to be allocated per dormitory, ventilation, and the 
type of windows and floors in dormitories. The Coloured 
Labourers Health Regulation Ordinance was passed the following 
year.3 
The importation and use of Chinese labour from 1904 allowed 
the Chamber to experiment with new compound structures. 
Workers were housed in rectangular and iron buildings 
resembling barracks. At the centre of this cluster of 
2 R. Turrell, "Kimberley: Labour and Compounds, 1871-
1888", .1n Marks, and Rathbone, <eds. ) , Industrialisation and 
Social Change in South Africa; I. Phimister, "Historians and 
the Big Hole: KimberleyJs Historiography Reviewed", South 
African Historical Journal, vol.20, 1988. See also C. van 
Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 
1900-1933, (Pluto Press, London, 1976), pp.128-32. 
3. Paragraph based on S. Moroney, "The Development of the 
Compound as a Mechanism of Worker Control, 1900-1912", South 
African Labour Bulletin, vol.4,. no.3, 1978; idem, "Mine 
married quarters: the differential stabilisation of the 
Witwatersrand workforce, 1900-1920", .in Marks and Rathbone, 
(eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change; Harries, Work. 
Culture and Identity, p.112; J. M. Smith, "JWorking in the 
GraveJ: The Development of a Health and Safety System on the 
Witwatersrand Gold Mines, 1900-1939", (MA, Rhodes University, 
1993), pp.66-102; The Transvaal Report of the Coloured Labour 
Compound Commission as Appointed to Inquire into the Cubic 
Amount of Air-Space in the Compounds of the Mines of the 
Witwatersrand, 1905. 
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dormitories for the accommodation of between 20 and 50 
workers. was a courtyard where a kitchen, washing facilities 
(if they existed), and the compound manager's office were 
placed. But the absence of the problem of theft on the gold 
mines - and pressure from the local trading community - led 
the Chamber to opt for "open" compounds whereby miners could 
come and go from, albeit with special passes from the compound 
authorities.4 
Central to the running of a compound was the compound manager. 
During this period, a compound was seen as a "tribe" and the 
compound manager as the "Supreme Chief". The popularity of 
the mine partly relied on the popularity of its compound 
manager whose paternalistic relations with the workforce. so 
it was believed, shaped their outlook of the mine and their 
work. Almost all gold mines had "native" names. some of 
which were inspired by their compound managers. Meyer and 
Charlton mine was known as "Mahleka" ("the one who likes 
laughing"); the Witwatersrand Gold Mine as "Mafuta" ("the fat 
one"); and the Government Areas mine as "Nkosi" ("the chief"). 
The majority of compound managers during this period had 
"native" nicknames, even where the mine carried a different 
name. Although Crown Mine, for example, was called 
"Mafenstere" ("the windows"), its compound manager in 1934 was 
known as "'Molokisi" ("the one who puts things in order or 
makes people happy") to Basotho workers.5 
Often enough, African miners associated a mine with its 
compound and authority with compound managers. In the Basotho 
press, the words merafo (mines) and kompone (compound) were 
4 Van Onselen, Chibaro, pp.128-32: Moroney, 
"Development of the Compound". See also V. L. Allen, Iha 
History of Black Mineworkers in South Africa. Volume I. The 
Techniques of Resistance, 1871-1948, <The Moor Press, 
Keighley, 1992), pp.237-63. 
5 J.K. McNamara, "The Development of a Labour 
Infrastructure: Migration Routes to the Witwatersrand Gold 
Mines and Compound Accommodation, 1889-1912", South African 
Labour Bulletin, vol.4, no.3, 1978, p.27; Moroney, "The 
Development of the Compound", p.38. 
152 
used interchangeably to refer to the mines.a One Mosotho 
wrote to Leselinyana in 1911: "I just arrived here at the mine 
called City Deep Compound, which was once under Mr Blisset, 
(Mkulu-ndaba,7 in SetebeleB), but now it is under Mr Cook 
CMboma in Setebele): this is Sezulu not Sexhosa, it means, a 
sjambok [whip]".9 This particular individual was writing to 
encourage his fellow countrymen way to the mines to join him, 
because Cook. although very strict, prohibited any 
maltreatment of workers. 
Mine officials promoted certain names to make mine work and 
mines popular, and to manage and control the workforce without 
coercion. They and the Native Affairs Department officials 
were aware of African nicknames of the mines, even circulating 
in 1906 and 1917 a list of Sesotho and Zulu/Xhosa names of 
Rand, Pretoria, Heidelberg, Rooiberg, Klerksdorp and Witbank 
gold, coal and diamond mines. In addition to the character 
and appearance of compound managers, these names were also 
inspired by the location of the mine, a memorable incident, 
the nature of the work and the working conditions, and the 
composition of the workforce. But names like "Dagafontein" 
<Daggafontein) and "Banchesi" (Bantjes Consolidated) were 
based on the original English name.10 Most names were 
s Even in A. Mabille, and H, Dieterlen, Sesuto-English 
Dictionary, (Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 1911), kompone is 
defined as "company, compound, mine" (p.155); and morafo as 
"digging, mine" (p.289). 
7 "Big news". 
s. From "Ndebele"; a reference used by Basotho to refer 
to the Nguni-speaking people. It dates to the 1820s, during 
the highly disputed period of "Mfecane", when the Basotho were 
subject to attacks which are being attributed to Shaka in 
popular history. 
9 . Leselinyana, 19 October 1911. 
10. Madder Deep Level= "Mapondweni" ("at the Pondos"): 
Van Ryn Deep= "Mazambane" ("the potatoes"); Angelo= "Nyoni 
Mhlope" ("a white bird"); Premier Diamond Mine = "Pikinini 
Kimbili" ("Little Kimberley"). Different mines could also 
carry the same name or more than one name; "Pinkinini 
Kimbeley" was also applied to Langlaagte Deep which was a gold 
mine, and New Gogh gold mine was known as "Jaji Goro" and 
"Mafuta". For the full lists, see LNA, S7/7/35, Assistant SNA 
to GS, 9 January 1906; S7/7/76, Acting DNL circular to labour 
supplying areas, 7 February 1917. 
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derived from Nguni languages (with Basotho simply adapting the 
name to their language),11 with a few mines carrying Sesotho 
names. 12 
Under the compound manager were the induna who were often 
chiefs or sons of chiefs from the rural areas. These men were 
appointed by the compound manager to ensure law and order and 
settle quarrels among the workers. As a privileged group, the 
indunas were given separate rooms, extra meat and beer, and 
earned more than other miners in the compounds. In addition, 
relatively highly-paid "policeboys" or compound police were 
appointed by the compound manager to carry out police duties 
in the compounds, though sharing rooms with their compound 
mates. Armed with knobkerries and sjamboks, they guarded the 
compound gates, patrolled and searched dormitories when 
necessary, controlled queues in the kitchen and washing rooms, 
and detained workers who contravened the mine rules. Each 
dormitory chose a sibonda who would liaise with compound 
authorities and 
mates.13 
settle petty squabbles among the room 
But compounds were more than merely institutions for the 
control and discipline of labour, as miners tried to make a 
living and live their lives against the odds. Arriving on the 
mine, a worker was initiated and socialised into a network of 
sometimes conflicting and contradictory relationships that 
linked him to compound and mine authorities, his room-mates, 
home-mates and work gang-mates. This process began at home as 
recruits travelled in home-boy groups, and took shape in the 
daily experiences on the mine, as well as in nearby slums and 
11. For an example, "Nkonyama" ( Robinson Deep) for the 
Nguni "Ngonyama" ("lion" - used as a symbol of royalty and 
bravery) , or "Mafopoka" (Crown Reef) for "Mavumbuka" ("the 
one who emerges/appears unexpectedly"). 
1.2_ City and Suburban= "Machechisa" ("the one who makes 
you crawl/creep/go backwards"), and the Nguni turned it to 
"Matshetshisa"; Randfontein Estate - "Mohlakeng" ("marshy 
place") or "~Malehlakana" ("the mother of marsh"). 
13_ McNamara, "The Development of Labour Infrastructure", 
p.26; Moroney, "The Development of the Compound", pp.34-39. 
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locations.14 For Basotho miners, relatives were the most 
important network because of the extended nature of the Sotho 
family structure. Cousins, fathers, brothers and uncles 
advised new recruits on the best choice of mine and type of 
job to take; what to expect on arrival; and how to respond. 
Stimela Jingoes, who took his first mine contract in 1916, 
learnt a lot about the mines from his father who was a miner 
himself. and knew about "hammer-boys" (and chose to be one at 
Langlaagte Mine) as "I knew about them through a cousin of 
mine who was earning about eleven pounds a month at that job", 
and "had been told by another cousin, Mokoena, JYou take care 
when you first go underground ... ".16 According to one 
informant: "In all those compounds, I arrive already with the 
knowledge that this one is my relative, he is of so and so, he 
is from such and such a place ... when one is now inside [the 
come across his relative faces, he 
was there".16 It was ngoaneso Ca 
compound], meeting new 
without knowing that he 
relative) who facilitated oneJs integration into the complex 
relations with the new "faces", community and authority. 
Chiefs on the Hines 
The movement of growing numbers of Basotho migrants to mines, 
the increasing phenomenon of bokholoa, and the permanent 
emigration of thousands of Basotho to South AfricaJs urban 
centres following the 1932-33 drought, all posed serious 
challenges to the chiefs. Almost from the start. the latter 
had played an important role in the lives of Basotho in the 
compounds and locations. One of the oldest roles assumed by 
14 T.D. Moodie, (with V. Ndatshe), Going for Gold: Men. 
Mines and Migration, (University of California Press, Los 
Angeles, 1994), pp.11-43. On these compound networks in the 
1970s, see J.K. McNamara, "Brothers and Workmates: Home Friend 
Networks in the Social Life of Black Migrant Workers in a Gold 
Mine Hotel", .in P. Mayer, (ed.), Black Villagers in an 
Industrial Society, (Oxford University Press, London, 1980). 
15. S.J. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief bv the People, 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1975), p.59. 
1s. Interview with Solomon Mokoaleli, born 1914. 
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chiefs was that of indunas and "policeboys" in the compounds. 
With regard to Basotho, this practice first came under 
scrutiny in 1907 following the outbreak of a "faction fight" 
involving Basotho at the Premier Diamond Mine. Ernest Mabille 
argued in his report that young Basotho chiefs who were 
employed there as indunas and "policeboys" were 
"irresponsible", and suggested that the mine should consider 
employing "elderly headmen from Basutoland responsible to the 
Compound Manager".l.7 
Although this suggestion 
resurrected after another 
was not implemented, it was later 
"disturbance" at the same mine in 
June 1910. During the 1910 Basutoland National Council 
sitting, Basotho chiefs blamed the cause of the "disturbance" 
on the use of Zulu "policeboys" over Basotho workers. They 
communicated their protest to the Government Native Labour 
Bureau, and an investigation was conducted. They suggested. 
with the support of the High Commissioner, that a "Mosotho of 
high rank" should be employed as an induna for Basotho <along 
the same lines suggested by Mabille three years earlier), and 
that if the scheme worked it could be tried on other 
mines.is It is not clear whether the suggestion was 
followed up, but a similar complaint occurred in 1919 when 
Chief Mojela was sent to investigate factors behind the "bad" 
conduct of Basotho on the Reef.l.9 It was also raised again 
during the National 
quickly dismissed by 
Council proceedings 
the then Resident 




argued that Basotho miners already had "enough" "policeboys" 
in proportion to their total number on the mines.20 
1.7 SAE, SNA 465, NA 1578/10, SNA to Imp. Sec .. 18 May 
1910. See Chapter Seven for a discussion of this "faction 
fight". 
1.a SAE, SNA 465, NA 1578/10. SNA to Imp. Sec., 18 May 
1910; SAE, NTS 2092, 216/280, BoyseJs report to GS, October 
1911 (undated). 
1.9 SAE. NTS 2092. 216/280, Imp. Sec. to Governor 
General, 30 April 1919. 
20. Litaba, 1938, p.316. For a different perspective, see 
a Mosotho miner who visited the Premier Mine in February 1922 
and was impressed by the number of Basotho employed there and 
the use of "leaders of the nation" to manage them and listen 
to their complaints. He wished that such a system could be 
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Chiefs' relations with mine officials, the GN1B and the Native 
Affairs Department, tended to be good. As the Director of the 
Native Recruiting Corporation, Taberer had developed good 
links and relations with chiefs in the labour supplying areas 
through his regular tours of those places. When Taberer died 
in June 1932, Paramount Griffith sent a wreath on behalf of 
the Basotho "nation", and instructed three Basotho chiefs who 
were employed as tax collectors in Johannesburg to attend the 
funeral. Some lower-ranking mine officers were also held in 
high esteem. When Knight Deep compound manager Jack Moseley 
passed away in 1916, Sotho, Pondo, Xhosa and Pedi chiefs 
arrived on the mine to convey their condolences. Moseley was 
well liked because he never allowed the beating of workers. 
Moreover, there were rewards attached to loyal service; the 
NRC assisted Griffith in 1916 to buy a Hudson motor car valued 
at 1550, and even railed it to 1esotho.21 
Chiefs also personally visited the mines. Such visits, which 
became regular from the 1910s, were supported by mineowners as 
they helped ensure a regular flow of labour and assisted with 
discipline on the mines, despite reservations expressed over 
the expense involved.22 The first formal Basotho chiefly 
visit to the mines was after the formation of the GN1B in 
1907, when two representatives of the Paramount Chief were 
sent to the Rand at the invitation of Taberer.23 In 1916 
Chief Jonathan sent Chief Peko to the Rand to raise 11000 for 
the payment of a fine, following his attack on his brother 
Joel.24 Peko only visited the Premier Mine because most 
implemented on other mines, as workers had complaints that 
they were afraid of raising with compound managers and their 
indunas because of fearing to be dismissed. See Umteteli, 4 
March 1922. 
21. 1NA, S7/7/75, NRC to PC. 7 January 1916; S8/2/2/28, 
PC to Armstrong, 27 June 1932; Leselinvana, 14 January 1916; 
22 June 1932. 
2 2 Jeeves, Migrant Labour, pp.162-63; SAB, GN1B 149, 
136/14/D.37, NRC to DN1, 7 July 1915. 
23 Report of the Proceedings of ENC. 1908. 
24 The dispute between Jonathan (the principal chief of 
1eribe) and Joel (the principal chief of Butha Buthe), both 
sons of Molapo (one of Moshoeshoe·s brothers), had been a 
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Basotho employed in the Transvaal were there.25 In June 
1918 a chief from Maseru visited the Rand to look for his 
daughter, and later applied for work as a "policeboy" at the 
Jupiter Compound.26 The following year, Chief Seeiso who 
was to succeed Griffith as Paramount Chief, visited the 
Premier Mine to collect his "tribal dues".27 In June 1926 
Chief Letsie Moshoeshoe was said to be on the Rand to meet 
"his friends" and was given temporary accommodation at the 
Nourse Mines.28 
Seeiso again visited the Rand two months after succeeding his 
father as Paramount Chief in October 1939. He was accompanied 
by the Deputy Resident Com.missioner, six "leading chiefs", two 
Basotho police officers, a Mosotho Catholic priest, and a 
number of attendants. He later met Basotho (including miners) 
at a "pitso" at Dougall Hall in Pretoria. For his formal 
inauguration in February 1940, 500 Basotho left the Rand in 
buses and cars to attend the ceremony.2s Among this group 
was "a special committee of mine Indunas who", according to 
the Rand Daily Mail, "will carry with them for presentation 
to their Chief a cheque of nearly 1200"; "[t]his money has 
been collected in less than three weeks from mine employees, 
the donation ranging from threepence to 2s.6d". During the 
ceremony "mine natives will form a separate procession and 
will march. led by a European official of the Basutoland 
Government".30 The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
band was expected to perform.31 
serious issue in Lesotho as early as the 1890s. This remained 
so until the death of Joel in 1919. See Machobane, Government 
and Change, pp.108-10. 
25 SAE. GNLB 149, 136/14/D.37, SNA to DNL, 24 October 
1916. 
2s Ibid., SNA to GS, 7 June 1918. 
27 Ibid., NAD Inspector (Rayton) to DNL, 18 November 
1919. 
2s Ibid .. temporary pass issued to L. Moshoeshoe, 22 
June 1926. 
29 Rand Daily Mail, 16 February 1940; 14 February 1940; 
s..t..aJ;:, 31 October 1939; 1 November 1939. 
30 Ibid., 16 February 1940. 
31 Ibid., 14 February 1940. 
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The procedure for a chief intending to visit the mines was to 
approach the local Assistant Commissioner who would then 
contact the NRC through its local representative. On arriving 
in Johannesburg, the chief reported at the GNLB offices where 
he was given a temporary pass. The NRC then gave him a letter 
of introduction to be handed to compound managers on the 
different mines where his people were.32 Outside the Rand 
itself, chiefs could go straight to the mines, merely 
requiring letters of introduction previously sought from 
Assistant Commissioners and the Resident Commissioner.33 So 
popular were these visits that some elements even tried their 
luck. In April 1913 a certain Mohale, pretending to be a 
chief, visited the Premier Mine to raise money for "a National 
Memorial to Chief Moshesh", but received no cooperation from 
Basotho workers as they did not trust him and questioned his 
credentials. In September 1916 one Lehlonono Mpiti visited 
Ferguson mine with his wife and met Basotho miners without the 
knowledge of the compound manager. 
message from the Paramount Chief, 
Claiming to bring them a 
he instructed them to 
remove and kill a clerk employed on the mine 
uncle, who was part of the gatherings, 
and push for his 
to be made a 
"policeboy". The uncle himself and other Basotho present 
protested, questioning MpitiJs credentials.34 
Chiefs played another crucial role. At the height of the 
African workersJ strikes across the Reef in July 1918, the NRC 
superintendent in Maseru, Maitland Brown, and the Resident 
Commissioner, asked the Paramount Chief to intervene and stop 
Basotho from participating in this activity. Chief Sekhonyane 
Bereng was subsequently despatched with haste to catch the 
next train from Maseru. Basotho on the mine met the chief and 
presented their grievances to him; he urged them to be 
32 SAE, GNLB 149. 136/14/D.37, Acting DNL to NRC, 2 July 
1915. 
33 In 1906 PC Letsie asked RC to give pass and letter of 
introduction to Chief Mojela who was going to Kimberley to 
"see how the people are working". See LNA, S7/3/22, Letsie to 
RC, 15 October 1906. 
34. LNA, S7/7/68, GS to SNA, 15 April 1913; Leselinvana, 
10 November 1916. 
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peaceful and promised redress.35 With nothing improving, 
the Transvaal Native Congress approached the director of the 
NRC, Taberer, in March 1919 to ask for a meeting to raise the 
grievances of the mine workers. But Taberer. believing that 
"the only persons that I can recognise as representing the 
natives on the mines must be their own Chiefs",36 sent an 
emergency telegraph to labour supplying areas asking for 
chiefs or their representatives to hurry to Johannesburg for a 
meeting. The telegraph was received in Lesotho on the 21st of 
March, and the following day Chief Mojela was on the train to 
Johannesburg. The meeting took place on the 2nd of April.37 
Mojela then moved around meeting Basotho, calling for calm. 
Basotho complained that Sekhonyane had also asked for calm and 
promised to address their grievances, but nothing happened. 
Mojela later reported to the Resident Commissioner that "as 
far as he was able to ascertain. all the trouble amongst the 
natives outside the mines originated at a Native 
Congress".38 
Diseases 
To minimise expenditure on African labour, the Randlords not 
only targeted 
black workers 1 
wages but also spent as little as possible on 
living conditions in the compounds. As a 
result, African miners died from preventable and curable viral 
diseases linked to poor diet and living and sanitation 
conditions, as well as occupational diseases. During the 
first three decades of this century c.93 000 black miners died 
from disease-related causes.39 
3 5 LNA, S3/19/5, Taberer to GS, 29 April 1919. 
36 Ibid., Taberer to GS, 27 March 1919. 
37 Ibid., RC to HC, 25 March 1919; GS to Taberer, 24 
April 1919; RC to HC, 16 April 1919; PC to RC, 14 April 1919; 
S3/19/6, "Minutes of meeting of Chiefs and Headmen, held at 
the offices of the NRC", 2 April 1919; .s.t..a.r.'., 4 April 1919. 
3 8 SAB, NTS 2092, 216/280, RC to HC, 16 April 1919. 
39. Smith, " 1 Working in the Grave 1 ", p.103. 
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African miners were aware of the dangers involved in their 
work and developed their own interpretation of mine diseases 
and accidents, and how their sick kinsmen and the dead should 
be treated. One informant remarked: "At the mines? Truly 
speaking, whites have long being aware of this ... when you are 
attested. when you leave, you are measured; a coffin already 
being prepared for you".40 
One of the earliest diseases to make its presence felt in the 
compounds was smallpox. It attacked mineworkers during 1893-94 
and again in 1897-99,41 but was stamped out by the beginning 
of this century, mainly through massive vaccination of both 
white and African miners. The outbreak of this disease was 
linked to the rapid expansion of the mine labour force due to 
the beginning of deep-level mining. Living conditions, always 
poor, deteriorated as overcrowding increased. However, 
vaccination campaigns both in the compounds and in the labour 
supplying 
Chapter 
areas, brought the epidemic under control. 









systematic construction of compounds after the South African 
War also helped in this regard. 
Scurvy, caused by vitamin C deficiency, was linked to poor 
diet and long hours of work on the mines. This, like with 
other diseases to be discussed later, was a consequence of the 
fact that the Randlords subordinated workers~ health to the 
imperatives of capital accumulation. Many returning migrants 
reached their homes suffering from scurvy, some dying on the 
way. One Mosotho miner died from scurvy in Ficksburg in 
November 1897 on his way back from the Rand; and his 
40 Interview with Solomon Mokoaleli. This fear and 
concern with illness and safety on the mines continues to this 
day, as the research of Palesa Molapo shows. See M.P. Molapo, 
"Job Stress, Health and Perceptions of Migrant Mineworkers", 
in J. Crush and W. James (eds.), Crossing the Boundaries: Mine 
Migrancy in a Democratic South Africa, <IDASA, Cape Town, 
1995). 
4 1 At Simmer and Jack in 1899, the Basotho compound was 
the most affected. See .cMAR, 1899, p.147. 
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belongings, including the L10.8s found on him, were sent to 
his home. In June 1899, the Chamber of Mines was contacted by 
the Superintendent of Native Affairs in the Cape Colony, 
concerned by the number of sick recruits from Transkei who 
were dying way home. The Chamber attempted to exonerate 
itself by claiming to be taking good care of its workers, 
despite the complete absence of any coherent approach to the 
housing and feeding of black workers. While member-companies 
were urged to issue vegetables to their African workers, 
little change occurred. Another Mosotho migrant worker died in 
Bloemfontein in July 1902 on his way from the Nourse Mine. 
This Mosotho was in the company of eleven Basotho, five of 
whom also suffering from scurvy; one later died, with another 
one in a critical state. This scandal led to an inquiry being 
conducted in that town and a complaint being addressed to the 
Chamber. Once again, however, the Chamber blandly denied that 
it was at fault.42 
From early 1902, at the time of the labour "shortage" crisis, 
proposals were made to ration sorghum-based beer to miners in 
order to combat scurvy. The Chamber of Mines claimed that such 
beer was the answer, despite medical opinion that the best 
solution for scurvy was the inclusion of vegetable and fresh 
meat in food rations. An investigation conducted around June 
1902 indicated that with one or two exceptions, no gold mine 
issued vegetables to its African workers. Meal mealie was the 
principal item of diet, indeed the only foodstuff supplied at 
Nigel Deep, and fresh meat was limited to between one-half and 
2 lb per week, except on the Robinson Propriety mine which 
supplied 3 lb. This was based on the convenient myth that the 
diet of Africans in the rural areas was solely meal mealie. 
By the end of 1902, scurvy accounted for five percent of total 
African deaths on the gold mines, or 229 deaths.43 
42 CT::l.AE, 1899, pp.119-33; SAB, SNA 45, NA 1481/1902, SNA 
to WNLA, 2 August 1902; SNA 16, NA 339/1902, Chamber of Mines 
to Commissioner for NA (Johannesburg), 16 June 1902; SNA 137, 
NA 1375/1903, Governor General to J. Chamberlain, 23 May 1903. 
43. SAB, SNA 22, NA 652/1902, Medical Officer of Health 
for the Transvaal to Lagden, 18 March 1902; "Report on replies 
to circular of February 10th. 1902 concerning scurvy and its 
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With no substantial improvements in diet, returning Basotho 
migrants continued to die on the way home, sparking an outcry 
from the Resident Magistrate of Winburg in 1903 when dozens of 
Basotho arrived at Winburg station suffering from scurvy and 
other diseases. Many of these men refused to be taken 
anywhere, preferring to die at their homes; those who agreed 
were taken to the local prison where they were treated as 
"destitute paupers" until they recovered. The NAD urged the 
Chamber of Mines to do something, as all of this negatively 
affected the image of the mines and labour supply. When the 
Chamber still demurred, the state was forced to intervene, and 
in 1904 it set up the Compound Commission. This was followed 
in 1905 by the Health Ordinance. Then, in 1911 the Native 
Labour Regulation Act addressed. among others. the question of 
diet in the compounds, setting minimum standards. From the 
1920s vegetable and fresh meat or fish rations were increased, 
and beans and bread also added. Prior to 1913 an average of 
30 per 1000 workers died from scurvy, but thereafter this 
figure dropped and remained low into the 1920s.44 
However, pneumonia was the major killer in the compounds until 
the 1920s. It accounted for about 40 percent of all deaths at 
the turn of the century. During the six months from 1 October 
1902 to 31 March 1903, 1 476 Africans lost their lives on the 
gold mines; 43 percent of these due to pneumonia, 14 percent 
to dysentery and diarrhoea, 12 percent to scurvy, six percent 
to typhoid fever, five percent to accidents, and 20 percent to 
other causes. One District Medical Officer on the Rand even 
exclaimed in March 1903 that "the death rate amongst natives 
prevention on the mines", 21 March 1902; Smith. "JWorking in 
the GraveJ", p.109. For discussion of Southern Rhodesian 
mines in much the same period. see van Onselen. Chibaro. 
pp.52-54; and I. Phimister, "African Labour Conditions and 
Health in the Southern Rhodesian Mining Industry, 1895-1953", 
.in idem and van Onselen, Studies in the History of African 
Mine Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, (Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1978), 
especially, pp.111-18. 
44. Smith, "JWorking in the GraveJ", pp.103-23; SAE, SNA 
188, NA 3159/03, SNA to Assistant Colonial Secretary (ORC), 29 
March 1904; Resident Magistrate (Winburg) to Colonial 
Secretary (ORC), 2 November 1903. 
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on the Rand is recognised to be now abnormally high". But he 
nonetheless blamed the incidence of pneumonia on African 
minersJ "carelessness and ignorance" for not taking "ordinary 
common-sense precautions against getting sudden chills when 
heated by exertion".45 Amongst the Africans miners most 
affected by pneumonia, were Shangaan and other recruits from 
Central Africa; 11.9 per 1000 of the latter and 98.4 per 1000 
of the former dying between July 1903 and June 1904.46 This 
led to the banning in 1913 of recruits from Central Africa. 
Significant improvements in health of the gold minesJ black 
labour force occurred after 1914 following the employment of 
Dr A.J. Orenstein by the Rand Mines Group in that year. This 
was no coincidence as the government ban on, and the 
repatriation of, recruits from Central Africa in 1913. had 
clearly indicated to the Randlords that if a stable labour 
supply was to be secured. something had to be done about the 
high mortality rate. Moreover, the reestablishment of a 
partial recruiting monopsony in British South Africa with the 
formation of the NRC in 1912 and the successful imposition of 
a maximum average wage that followed, had created space for 
focusing on the living conditions in the compounds. This 
process was to accelerate in the 1920s. 
Orenstein at last put a health infrastructure in place on the 
mines belonging to Rand Mines Group, even establishing a 
Department of Sanitation for the company. His two-pronged 
disease prevention strategy embraced, on the one hand. a 
general approach which involved improving hygiene and housing 
in the compounds. the diet of the workers, washing facilities, 
and waste disposal. On the other, it involved a strategy of 
targeting particular diseases. especially pneumonia, typhoid 
fever and scurvy. The improvement of minersJ housing included 
reducing overcrowding and erecting separate sleeping bunks. 
The food programme targeted scurvy, giving each worker an 
45 SAE, SNA 137, NA 1375/03. memo by the 
Medical Officer for Health on "Native Mortality on 





average of 4 000 calories per day. As far as ablution 
facilities were concerned, the plunge "mass" baths were blamed 
for skin infections and the spreading of typhoid fever, and 
were replaced by showers. Rooms were regularly disinfected 
and garbage removed; and a waterborne sewage replaced the 
bucket system which had been in use on the mines since the 
turn of the century. "Native" nurses were trained and the 
City Deep Native Hospital and the Crown Mines Central Native 
Hospital established to centralise and rationalise health 
services. On the mines themselves, workers were trained in 
"Safety First" and first aid teams established; by the mid-
1920s some 10 500 Africans constituted the latter teams across 
the Reef, having gone through a twelve-lesson syllabus 
covering topics such as bone fractures, artificial 
respiration, and shock treatment. Other mines implemented 
OrensteinJs programmes properties, although some retained the 
bucket system right up to the 1930s for "cost" reasons. Due 
to OrensteinJs efforts and the repatriation of Central 
Africans, the death rate from all diseases per 1000 declined 
from 20.8 in 1913 to 11.6 in 1923.47 
However, OrensteinJs programme did not eliminate one 
particular problem 
Basotho miners. This, 
the exceptionally high mortality 
as reflected in Table 4.1, become 
of 
the 
subject of an inquiry in 1928. Its findings attributed the 
high death rate to the BasothoJs lack of acclimatisation and 
immunisation; and that they lived a considerably more 
dissipated life than other natives", notably that they went 
"out more in search of pleasure which generally takes the form 
of alcohol consumption and promiscuous immorality".48 
47 Paragraph based on Umteteli, 20 September 1924; 
Smith, "JWorking in the GraveJ", p.140; M. Fraser, "The 
Introduction and Early Development of Health and Safety 
Measures in South African Mines in the 20th Century", 
unpublished paper presented at the International Mining 
History Congress, Bochum, September 1989. 
48. Cited in Smith, "JWorking in the GraveJ", p.147. 
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Table 4.1: Numbers of Deaths and Death Rate per 1000 from 
certain Causes among Basotho and Union African Gold Miners 
1926 
Cause Basotho Union 
deaths rate deaths rate 
Pneumonia 89 4.91 181 2.09 
Pulmonary TB 23 1. 27 40 0.46 
Other TB 15 0.83 16 0.17 
Accidents 57 3.15 216 2.49 
1927 
Pneumonia 88 5.75 203 2.37 
Pulmonary TB 20 1.07 33 0.39 
Other TB 23 1.22 18 0.21 
Accidents 45 2.40 236 2.76 
SQ:i.U:Qe: SAB, GNLB 137, 2828/13/104, Dr CluverJs Report on 
"Mortality among Basutos", 5 November 1928. 
Clearly the contact of Basotho miners with Basotho women in 
the locations cannot be taken seriously as a major cause of 
their comparatively high mortality. Instead, the real reasons 
are to be found in the labour process itself. Basotho in this 
period were struggling to assert themselves on the gold mines. 
having established themselves as the best "lashers" and were 
just beginning to "colonise" shaft-sinking. They took more 
risks and worked under more dangerous conditions than other 
fellow African miners. It was reported in 1928 that a 
comparatively high proportion of Basotho were employed on 
mines deeper than 2 500 feet.49 
The relative decline after the mid-1920s of diet- and 
sanitation-related diseases and pneumonia left tuberculosis 
49 SAB. GNLB 137, 2828/13/104. Dr CluverJs Report. 5 
November 1928. For every one African miner working in "A" 
Mines (that is, mines with a depth of less than 2 500 feet), 
there were in "B'' Mines ( that is, mines with a depth of more 
than 2 500 feet): with regards to recruits from the Cape 
Colony= 5.5; from Natal= 5.6; from the Free State= 8.4; 
from the Transvaal = 4.2; and from Lesotho= 17.1. This 
explains the high Basotho mortality from accidents in Table 
4 .1. 
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and silicosis as the major health challenges on the mines. As 
these occupational diseases have been extensively studied,5° 
suffice it here to single out their implications for Basotho 
miners. 
Silicosis (or miners phthisis), an incurable occupational 
disease caused by the inhaling of fine dust, was linked to 
blasting and the introduction of machine drills in the 1892 on 
the gold mines. It affected mostly white workers in the 
beginning. From 1897, Africans were allowed to operate 
machine drills, thus also becoming 
microscopic particles of free silica. 
vulnerable 
As the 




maximise profit, it was not until 1910 that the seriousness of 
silicosis on the mines was publicly acknowledged. Between that 
year and 1929, five government commissions and ten select 
committees sat to discuss the disease, and nine Acts were 
subsequently passed.51 Although Basotho miners were 
employed initially as surface workers and, later, as "lashers" 
they were also affected, hence some silicosis cases, as 
Chapter Seven shows, were spotted in Lesotho as early as the 
late 1890s. This disease is incurable and its problems 
continue up to this day on the mines. 
In fact, it was tuberculosis (TB), rather than silicosis, 
which was a source of greater concern to Lesotho, if not the 
50 R.M. Packard, White Plague, Black Labour: 
Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of Health and Disease 
in South Africa, (James Currey, London, 1989); idem, 
"Tuberculosis and the Development of Industrial Health 
Policies on the Witwatersrand. 1902-1932", Journal of Southern 
African Studies, vol.13, no.2, 1987; Smith, "Working in the 
Grave'", pp.124-68; E.N. Katz, "Silicosis of the Witwatersrand 
Gold Mines: Incidence, Prevalence and Compensation, 1902-
1978", South African Labour Bulletin, vol.4, no.9, March 1979; 
idem, The White Death: Silicosis on the Witwatersrand Gold 
Mines, 1886-1910, (Witwatersrand University Press, 
Johannesburg, 1994); Crush et al, South Africa's Labor Empire, 
pp.41-45; J.P. Leger, "Occupational diseases in South African 
mines - a neglected epidemic?", South African Medical Journal, 
vol.18, 15 February 1992. 
51 Smith, "'Working in the Grave'", p.130; Katz, 
"Silicosis of the Witwatersrand Gold Mines", p.71. 
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Rand itself, when it became the major killer on the mines in 
the 1920s. TB, caused by the inhaling of the tubercle 
bacilli, is infectious but not as virulent as smallpox. It is 
easily spread in overcrowded and squalid conditions. Packard 
has shown that the disease arrived with European settlement, 
eventually spreading to Africans in South Africa·s urban 
centres. The 
accompanied by 
development of diamond 
the emergence of compounds 
and gold mining, 
and towns. created 
the conditions for the propagation of this disease. The first 
commission on TB sat in 1912; and compensation for miners 
suffering from the disease began in 1916. 0 2 
A further problem, however, was that unlike with cases of 
pneumonia and scurvy, mine managements were more successful in 
shifting the burden of TB to the rural areas where miners 
suffering from the disease were repatriated. Between 1910 and 
1912, 7 500 African miners suffering from TB were discharged 
and sent home. More than this, African miners were not 
radiographed until the 1950s, as X-rays were thought to be 
"very expensive and "wholly unnecessary". 
refused to accept any responsibility for the 
the rural areas, a problem which had become 
1930s. 0 3 
The mineowners 
spread of TB to 
serious by the 
With regard to Basotho workers, an inquiry was precipitated by 
the remark of the Benoni Native Sub-Commissioner in December 
1925 to the effect that 50 of the TB cases that had come to 
his attention since April 1923 were Basotho workers aged 
eighteen years or older, with a mine experience of less than a 
year. He blamed this on the "standard of physical maturity" 
of the Basotho youth, and wanted the Director of Native Labour 
to limit their recruitment. Yet in the Germiston-Boksburg 
area, according to the Sub-Commissioner there, only 21 Basotho 
TB cases (with an average mine "stay" of fifteen months) were 
52 Packard, White Plague, Black Labour, p.40; 
"Tuberculosis and the Development of Industrial 
Policies"; Smith, "·Working in the Grave·", p.126. 
53. Smith, "·Working in the Grave·", p.135; Crush 





noted during 1924 and 1925. Similarly, in the Krugersdorp sub-
district, "very few" Basotho TB cases were reported. The sub-
Commissioner there attributed this to the different stope 
structures in mines on the West and East Rand. The former did 
not require much lashing because of its steep stopes, while 
the flat stopes in the East required a lot of lashing, and 
therefore more Basotho "lashers" and hard work. The bulk of 
TB cases that had been identified in both the Krugersdorp and 
Germiston-Boksburg areas were Shangaan.54 In 1924 and 1925, 
(Table 4.2) Shangaan miners accounted for over half of the 
compensated TB cases on all gold mines. Arguably, this was 
because of the centrality of Shangaan migrants to the cheap 
labour strategy of the mining houses, together with the fact 
that they stayed for longer periods on the mines than other 
migrant labourers. 
Table 4.2: Compensated TB Cases among Basotho, Shangaan, and 
Miners from the Cape Colony, 1924-25. 
Basotho Shangaan Cape Colony 
1924 1925 1924 1925 1924 1925 
Number 15 657 14 198 75 283 74 067 63 616 65 385 
employed 
% of total 8.71 8.03 41.86 41. 91 35.37 37.0 
employed 
Number 35 50 260 239 77 107 
.comp. 
% of total 8.31 11.16 61.76 53.35 18.29 23.88 
comp. 
Source: SAB, GNLB 259, 427/16/108, Native Sub-Commissioner 
(Krugersdorp) to DNL. 14 January 1926. 
The Basotho compensated cases in Table 4.2 came from 
Johannesburg and the East Rand. The City Deep Mine led with 
54 SAB. GNLB 259, 427/16/108, Native Sub-Commissioner 
(NSC) (Benoni) to DNL, 22 December 1925; NSC (Germiston-
Boksburg) to DNL, 5 January 1926; NSC (Krugersdorp) to DNL, 14 
January 1926; Smith, "~Working in the Grave~", pp.124-68; 
Packard, White Plague, Black Labour, p.90; QMAR, 1920, pp.68-
69. 
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five cases in 1924, and 13 cases in 1925. It was followed by 
Brakpan Mines, Crown Mines, Nourse Mines and Village Deep, 
each with three cases in 1924. The following year New State 
Areas came second with eight cases, followed by Van Ryn Deep 
with six cases, and Brakpan Mines with five cases. These low 
numbers were used by the mines to argue against the claim of 
the Benoni Sub-Commissioner. But the numbers clearly do not 
reflect the real situation in Benoni; the only mine in Benoni 
with recorded Basotho compensated cases in 1924 and 1925 was 
the Van Ryn Deep with two and six cases respectively. This 
suggests that most TB cases were not reported and therefore 
not compensated for. As miners were invariably repatriated if 
TB was detected, many of them returned home and did not 
present their claim. Other workers, when rejected by one 
mine, moved on to different mines to try their luck. Mine 
managements, as will be shown later, in any event created 
obstacles for Africans wishing to make their claims. Chapter 
Seven discusses the spread of TB to colonial Lesotho itself. 
and the problems which this caused. 
Mine Accidents 
Keeping the cost of labour low was not only reflected in high 
mortality rates from diseases, but also in neglect of 
occupational safety. Major accidents during the period 
covered by this thesis were those caused by rockfalls and 
rockbursts, explosives, trucks and tramways, the cage/skip 
that transported workers and ore between underground and the 
surface, and the high risk involved in shaft-sinking 
operations.55 Neglect, fatigue, lack of experience and 
training, poor supervision, and "high speed" to increase 
profitability, also contributed to accidents.56 As will be 
shown later, Leselinyana and, to a certain extent, Naledi ea 
55 Smith, "'Working in the Grave'", p.179. 
56 H.J. Simons, "Death in South African Mines", Africa 
South, vol.5, no.4, July-September 1961. 
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Lesotho and Mochochonono, all regularly published letters from 
Basotho miners describing accidents. Such reports narrated 
the incident, gave the names of the deceased (if Basotho) and 
of the village and the name of the chief where the deceased 
were from, and concluded by conveying condolences to the 
affected families. These reports are particularly valuable to 
scholars 
Basotho 
because they show the reaction and attitudes of 
miners to accidents, and how they perceived and 
understood them. 
Rockfalls and rockbursts were directly linked to deep-level 
mining and the temperature and humidity underground. The 
deeper the mines, the more likely were rockfalls and 
rockbursts. Together, they accounted for most of the deaths 
resulting from gold mine accidents; 26 percent of the total 
accidents in 1903, 32 percent in 1919, 38 percent in 1929, and 
42 percent in 1939. This rising trend was a result of both 
the expansion of the mining after the abandonment of the gold 
standard in 1932, and the fact that mines were getting 
deeper.67 Such accidents could result in many deaths, 
depending on the number of workers underground at the time of 
the rockburst or fall. The bodies of miners were frequently 
covered by tons of rocks for days or weeks. According to one 
informant: "Rocks would be removed ... Khele. so many rocks .. ! 
In the evening and the following day, people were still being 
retrieved".!58 After a rockfall accident at City Deep in 
February 1915, one Mosotho miner lamented: "Oh, what a loss 
even though God spared the nation, this accident befalling 
only two [miners]. The latter have not yet being found, and 
it looks like they will be retrieved after a long time because 
the rocks have fallen with everything; huge trees, thick 
irons, big pumps".159 
Between 1903 and 1919, death from explosives came second after 
rockfalls and rockbursts. These accidents could happen during 
!57 Smith, "~Working in the Grave~", p.180. 
es Interview with Phomolo Matsabisa, born 1914. 
69 Leselinvana, 19 February 1915. 
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charging, or result from unexploded explosives and poor 
supervision of blasting operations. 
Dynamite [wrote a Mosotho worker in 1911] has just killed 
one young Mosotho man while he was with his boss under 
the mine of Driefontein ... 
This young man was carrying a candle, as they are used 
underground, and the dynamite he was carrying caught the 
light, he tried to extinguish it, the boss then told him 
to drop it, he threw it to the floor, and stepped over 
it. His boss kept on saying: "Escape, leave it!": but he 
did not move; it then exploded, breaking his legs and 
arms, and killed him.so 
Another Mosotho exclaimed after an accident in August 1911 at 
the City Deep: "Such accidents are stirring to be watched; 
especially those of the dynamite, because they really damage a 
person. the new arrivals having difficulty of going 
underground after seeing the victim ... ".61. From the 1920s 
onwards, however, accidents due to explosives declined in 
number once a new type of explosive was introduced, and 
improvements were made to blasting methods.62 
The trucks used for transporting broken ore, known to Basotho 
workers as likokopane (Eng: "cocopan"), often collided with 
one another, sometimes the speed at which they travelled was 
badly controlled. Accidents from such causes were rarely 
fatal, though the transportation of workers between the 
surface and underground in the cage or skip also involved 
risk; the rope could break, or its controller make a serious 
mistake. Fatal accidents involving cages invariably involved 
a significant number of miners in any one incident. This was 
one of the aspects of life on the mines that new recruits were 
warned against; this formed a key part of their socialisation 
and initiation. Stimela JingoesJ experience on arrival at 
Langlaagte Block Bin 1916 is worth citing at length: 
I had been told by another cousin, Mokoena. "You take 
care when you first go underground. There will be old-
timers in the cage with you, the cage that takes you down 
so Ibid., 10 June 1911. 
61. Ibid., 7 December 1911. 
62 Smith, "JWorking in the GraveJ", p.187. 
to the level where 
try to frighten you. 
not to scare easily". 
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you will work, and they are sure to 
They will say a lot of things. Try 
I felt prepared for whatever underground held in store. 
The next morning a whole batch of us newcomers waited at 
the top of the shaft. At first we saw only a rope 
turning. and then suddenly the cage appeared from out of 
the mine. It opened. 
"Go on! Get in! Get in, you new ones!" 
Mokoena was right. There were old-timers waiting for us 
in the cage. The door closed, and a bell signalled that 
we were ready to lower away. That signal must have been 
rung in a certain way to inform the controller that there 
were new ones in the cage, for at once the cage shot 
straight up. It stopped dead. Then it fell like a 
stone. We gaped at each other, with eyes like pebbles, 
our stomachs heaving. 
"Speak, boy! Who's your love?" 
"If you don't tell, the rope will split .... " 
"We'll all die .... " 
"I'll tell you .... Stop .... " 
"Talk up!" 
"Who's your mother's lover?" 
"How many sheep did you steal at home?" 
"We don't want to die .... " 
"Oh God ... !" 
"Who's your lover?" 
"Yes! Yes I st o 1 e 
them .... Yes .... Please .... Please .... Stop .... " 
The questions came so fast, from all sides, that none of 
us could think straight. I clutched at the thought of 
Mokoena. 
" ... Try not to scare easily .... " 
I need to sta1•t talking, I told myself. If I close my 
mouth firml.v . ... How those others babbled .... They were 
confessing to the most dreadful deeds. The truth must be 
spoken: I was terrified. 
"You! You quiet youngster! You're cocky, eh?" 
"You think we're playing a game here? If we're not all 
killed here when the rope snaps, you'll be taught 
manners!" 
"Hol imo [ God J .... We' re dying .... " 
As the cage plunged down, it grew dark as night. At last 
it stopped. We were all panting, but we were alive, and 
from there we went to our various stations to work.63 
The nature of shaft-sinking and the speed with which the 
operation was executed also put workers at great risk. Simons 
wrote in 1961 at the time the Free State mines were expanding: 
"Relative neglect often occurs also in shaft-sinking and 
development. usually the most hazardous stage in mining. 
s 3 Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, p.64. 
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Partly for this reason the Orange Free State gold mines have 
an annual accident death rate of 3 to 4 per 1 000 workers. 
which is similar to the incidence on the Witwatersrand 50 
years ago".64 Yet Basotho miners. as we saw in Chapter Two. 
rationalised their concentration in this dangerous work by 
appealing to their heroic history. strength and capacity for 
hard work. 
Accidents in the skips, on trucks, rockfalls and rockbursts. 
even the collapse of shafts, were among the accidents most 
frequently reported by Basotho miners. It was common for 
miners to have experienced numerous accidents by the end of 
their mine careers. An example was one Moloantoa Sekaja: 
On 17 January 1917, an accident befell a young man called 
Moloantoa Sekaja ... A rock fell ... , as he was a foreman 
underground ... that rock broke his right hand. This was 
at one of the mines of Knights# Deep known as Robertson 
Shaft. That Moloantoa once broke his left arm while 
working at the Premier Mine. Now he is a cripple, as 
those arms, even though not amputated, will no longer do 
any heavy work. He has been here on the Rand for a very 
long time. At the moment, he is still at the hospital. 
May his family know this.65 
Accidents on any one mine also tended to be frequent than the 
majority of mine reports admitted. For example, on the 23rd 
of May 1917 a Pedi was run over by a truck at 11.15 a.mat a 
work site called Number Three at the Premier Mine. At 11. 45 
a.m. falling debris closed part of Number Four, slightly 
injuring two Pedi and a Mosotho. At 4 p.m. Number One also 
experienced a rockfall, killing a Pedi and a Mosotho, and 
seriously injuring four other miners. At 4.40 p.m. a Mosotho 
was struck by a lump of rock at Number Four, injuring him on 
the leg. The following day another Mosotho was struck by a 
truck on the thigh, tearing off his skin.ss 
Although mortality from accidents decreased from the 1920s 
onwards, the number of injuries increased. This was largely 
64 Simons, "Death in South African Mines", p.42. 
s 5 Leselinyana, 16 February 1917. 
ss Ibid,, 8 June 1917. 
174 
due to measures taken by Orenstein to reduce the number of 
fatal accidents. By means of Prevention of Accidents 
Committee, first established in 1913, and its four sub-
committees, research related to health and safety was 
undertaken. Safety measures were popularised through the 
organisation of competitions among workers and between mines, 
and first aid schools and underground rescue teams were set 
up. The medium for such campaigns included posters and 
advertisements in fanakalo, the mine lingua franca, and 
films.67 However. the death of 177 workers in the Kinross 
mine disaster in 1986, and of 104 miners at Vaal Reefs in May 
1995, clearly indicate that occupational safety still remains 
a crucial issue on the gold mines. Even in the 1990s, an 
average of 1.5 per 1000 workers die annually from gold mine 
accidents, and a further 26 per 1000 suffer injuries.ss 
The response of Basotho workers to mine accidents usually 
assumed two forms. In some instances they resorted to strike 
action, refusing to work until the cause of the accident was 
attended to. This was the case at the Main Reef Mine in 
February 1911 when eight Basotho and two whites died in a skip 
accident. Ten days later a similar accident killed another 
miner. The following day Basotho miners refused to go out 
shift, and the compound manager called in the NAD inspector to 
intervene. Represented by Chief Foso Majara, the Basotho 
workers indicated that they were unwilling to work until the 
skip was repaired. Majara even selected a group of men to 
verify that the repairs had been done. When the mine engineer 
eventually arrived and demonstrated that the repair had at 
last been done, the Basotho miners agreed to return to work 
the following day.es 
e 7 Simons, "Death in the South African Mines", p.50; 
Chamber of Mines, Campaign Against Mining Accidents; 1913-
1..9.5.3, <Public Relations Department, Johannesburg, 1953). 
ss. Cape Times, 22 May 1995, 18 May 1995; J. Leger, "From 
Hlobane to Kinross: Disasters and the Struggle for Health and 
Safety on the Mines", South African Review, vol. 4, ( Rav an 
Press, Johannesburg, 1987). 
se. Naledi, 1 January 1911. 
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The second response, actually the most common one. was linked 
to the koata strategy (discussed in Chapter Two) of likening 
labour migrancy to a cattle-raiding expedition and war. Mine 
accidents were seen as an integral aspect of mine work. In 
1911, a Mosotho miner at City Deep encouraged his countrymen 
to come to the mines: "But do not be afraid, my fellow 
brothers, money is little [here], they [cattle] are not 
captured with ease. Rise up, let us help our elders. We are 
really tired of simply saying: ~Father, I have fallen for so 
and so~s daughter~. Join so that we may drive them [the 
cattle]!"7o After a serious mine accident in 1928 which 
killed three miners and injured another seven (including five 
Basotho), one Mosotho concluded his letter: "It is really true 
that the cattle are captured with great risk".71 This 
comparison of mine work to cattle-raiding not only reflected 
the role of bohali in pushing men out to the mines. but also 
made it easier for at least some Basotho to continue going to 
the mines, and in large numbers, despite the dangers that were 
involved. 
Similarly, Christian converts used biblical equivalents of the 
cattle-raiding metaphor. After an explosion of dynamite at 
the Premier Diamond Mine in October 1912 had killed two miners 
and injured another three, one Mosotho worker commented in his 
report: "We on the mine live daily on the verge of death, 
there is nowhere where people are not dying on this earth, 
even Jesus Christ said: ~Sufficient unto the day is the evil 
thereof~- Matthew 6:34".72 "Evil" was translated as 
"risk"/"danger" in the Sesotho bible that this miner quoted. 
When two Basotho miners were trapped under rubble following a 
rockfall accident at the City Deep, their parents were 
consoled as follows: "Let us mourn with the parents of these 
children. who thought their children were here to work, while 
God was expecting them to leave because their time had 
arrived". 7 3 In January 1917, a falling rock smashed the face 
70 Leselinyana, 19 October 1911. 
7i Ibid., 9 March 1928. 
7 2_ Ibid,, 5 December 1912. 
7 3 Ibid,, 19 February 1915. 
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of a Mosotho, and this was accepted: "This young man, even 
though he is now injured, it is acceptable, because he was not 
lying on his stomach in the field nor did he collapse on his 
way from beer-drinking; he was just fulfilling this law: Jin 
the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat breadJ (Gen.3:19)".74 
The problem, of course, with such attitudes, both in 
cattle-raiding and biblical variations, was that while 
their 
they 
may have helped Basotho to cope with dangers on the mines, 
they limited the possibilities of them taking more militant 
action against poor working conditions. Strikes caused by 
accidents were infrequent, and even then, often turned on the 
question of repairs and not fundamental issues of mine safety. 
All too often, this rationalisation, though a useful survival 
strategy, led to docility and passivity. Parents and 
relatives were called upon to understand and accept the fate 
of their sons, fathers and husbands. They were consoled, 
asked to look upon God, or see their son/father/husband as a 
hero-warrior. 
Compensation 
After the turn of the century, the mining companies began to 
compensate their workers for accidents, TB (from 1916) and 
silicosis (from 1912). Ad hoc compensation for accidents 
began in 1903 after considerable pressure from the NAD, but 
payments were first codified a year later after much 
deliberation, as some mining companies had been unwilling to 
meet their obligations. Under the 1904 Agreement, 110 was to 
be paid to the family of a miner who died from an accident; 
L10 to the miner who sufferec "permanent total disablement"; 
and L5 for "permanent partial disablement". Beneficiaries 
were defined as wives, children under age. and parents who 
could prove that they depended on the deceased at the time of 
7 4 Ibid., 16 February 1917. 
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his death. The mine concerned was to pay the money to the NAD 
which in turn would forward it to the beneficiaries. In the 
case of permanent disability, the compensation was to be paid 
to the miner in the presence of a NAD inspector. This 
agreement was subsequently incorporated into the 1911 Native 
Regulation Act. The amount of compensation somewhat 
increased; between 11 and 120 for permanent or partial 
disablement resulting in loss of work; and 135 to 150 in the 
case of death or permanent total disability. 7 5 Total 
compensation was, however, less than or at best equivalent to 
what a miner could earn in a one nine-month or twelve-month 
contract, and therefore only enough to sustain a worker for a 
short period, never mind really compensate him for injury and 
loss. And though a total of 
to miners between March and 
11 500 of compensation was paid 
June 1905, more went to white 
employees than Africans (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Compensation in L to Black (B} and White (W) Miners 
Compared. 
DEATH INJURY 
Number 1 Number 1 
B w B w B w B w 
1911 764 86 7585 41355 477 2810 2633 84463 
1920 413 27 12966 13720 1655 2148 14453 72549 
1930 508 30 16015 17383 3409 3166 19402 96009 
1938 578 38 23529 16596 7342 6051 40660 136582 
Source: Smith, J, " ~ , " Working in the Grave , p.183. 
African miners were anyway excluded from the benefits of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1914. While this Act made 
provision for the sum of 1144 to be paid as compensation to 
workers earning 14 a month or less if they suffered total 
incapacitation, African miners were limited to 150 by the 1911 
Regulation. Amendments to the Compensation Act in 1934 and 
75_ SAE, GOV 899. 50/39, SNA to HC, 15 June 1905; 1NA, 
S7/7/34, SNA to RC, 22 February 1905; S7/7/32, SNA to RC, 18 
February 1904; QM.AR, 1905, pp.27-29; Smith, "~Working in the 
Grave'", pp.182-85. 
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again in 1941 extended the scheme to Africans, but even then 
excluded them from pension benefits. African workers were 
given a lump sum of L150 or slightly more, depending on an 
individualJs earnings, while white, Indian and Coloured 
workers had the right to a pension equivalent to 55 percent of 
their normal earnings.76 
Over and beyond discriminatory compensation practices, mine 
and government authorities from the start tried to minimise 
the amount paid to Africans by cutting down on the numbers who 
could qualify for compensation. In April 1913 the Director of 
Native Labour sent a circular to labour supplying areas: 
It having being held that before any compensation may be 
paid the fact, even in the case of a wife, a child, or a 
parent, that the beneficiary has been dependent upon the 
deceased must be established, it is necessary in each 
case where such information is called for that I should 
be informed of the exact degree of dependency of the 
individual to whom it is suggested that compensation 
should be paid.77 
Many African miners were, however. ignorant of their right to 
compensation for death or serious injury. A Mosotho worker 
wrote to Leselinyana in 1921 suggesting that such rights 
should be publicised. Indeed, they should be read out to 
recruits when they signed their contracts: 
The most troubling thing is this: Whites or white people. 
when they are victims of an accident, they are often 
paid, there are even laws that relate to diseases that 
affect them and compensation; but for us. black men, 
there is nothing, even when we die from accidents we do 
not know what compensation for each person is. 
Whites know quite well what theirs is ... they also know 
what their orphans and widows will get. Oh sirs. please 
attend to this matter, talk to recruiters, that before we 
cross [the Caledon River] we are well informed. we be 
told about our rights the moment we are informed about 
our pay.78 
More than 15 years later, one of the issues raised with the 
7 6 Simons, "Death in the South African Mines", p.51; 
Smith, "~Working in the GraveJ", p.185. 
77 LNA. S7/7/67, DNL circular, 18 April 1913. 
78. Leselinvana, 11 November 1921. 
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Resident Commissioner and the NRC and discussed by the 
Basutoland National Council in 1937. was the continuing 
Basotho ignorance on the part of migrants of their right to 
compensation, especially those who only discovered the full 
extent of their illness at home once they had been 
repatriated. Nor was the problem made any easier by the 
deliberately difficult bureaucratic and medical procedures of 
proof which compensation required. Basotho chiefs were 
informed that when their men died at home from silicosis or 
TB, their lungs had to be 
confirmation of the cause before 
released.79 
sent to Johannesburg for 
any compensation could be 
Even where compensation was obtained, the sums were so small 
that they were soon exhausted. Thus my informant exclaimed: 
"These compensations have no use; a mere L50!"80 One Mosotho 
miner disabled at the Simmer Deep in 1915 and paid 150 
compensation. approached the Resident Commissioner 15 years 
later: 
In 1915 I was at work in Johannesburg where I 
accidentally lost my two eyes, and I was given L50 
compensation which was a great help to me, it lasted me 
ten years and then got finished. Sir now I am in 
difficulties, I have six children and their mother ... it 
is real misery regarding food and clothing for them. 
Owing to this difficulty, on the 21st December 1929, I 
was guided to Johannesburg to see the workers, when I 
arrived there, the workers were very much pleased to see 
me, if there was any permission.si 
For once, the NRC acted on this matter quickly, because it was 
"impossible for us to permit him to visit the Rand personally 
for the purpose of collecting money".82 There was official 
concern that this might raise the miners~s awareness of the 
problems of the compensation system. 
Other incapacitated Basotho workers forced matters and were 
79 Litaba, 1937, pp.229-34. 
so. Interview with Solomon Mosunyana, born 1913. 
si LNA. S3/5/18/3, Moholo Senyaki to RC, 17 August 1930. 
s2 Ibid., NRC District Superintendent to GS, 7 May 1930. 
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allowed to take light mine jobs. This was the case of one 
informant who was crippled by a loose rock while employed at 
remained at the mine the Witwatersrand Mine in 1936: 
hospital. After recovering I was 
.. I 
taken to Moselekazi [WANLA 
compound] ... there were all tribes there of injured and 
seriously ill people ... We stayed there until all was fixed ... 
each person was sent home".83 But "I continued to go to seek 
work. They were even saying I should not be compensated 
because I will still continue coming to work ... They had given 
me a job I could do without hurting myself". But not happy 
with the pay at the Witwatersrand Mine, he insisted on being 
sent to another mine, and was referred to the WANLA compound: 
When I arrived at Moselekazi, there is an office of one 
white man called "RaBasotho". I went there and stated my 
appeal. .. he said: "If you will agree to go underground, 
it is fine. But I will write a letter that they should 
know that you are injured when they send you underground. 
because that leg is crippled." He then gave me that 
letter ... I arrived there [on the new mine] in the 
evening and slept in the compound.84 
He was accepted on that mine, and taken underground to monitor 
fire and smoke. 
Of course, when injured Basotho workers insisted on returning 
to the mines, because compensation payments were so small, 
mine managements then tried to exploit this by attempting to 
claim back such compensation as they had paid out. But one 
concern, shared by NAD officials. was that problems around 
compensation should ~ot spark unrest. Another problem was that 
some widows. many of them quite young, on receiving the 
compensation, used the money to flee to the Rand where they 
joined the ranks of matekatse. This disturbed the chiefs, and 
at the 1937 Basutoland National Council it was decided that 
compensation should be governed by the Lerotholi Law of 
inheritance. The compensation money was to belong to the 
whole family of the deceased, including his parents. This 
meant that widows no longer had the right to spend it without 
83 Interview with Mokopoi Mokopoi, born 1914. 
84 Ibid. 
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consulting their in-laws.85 
The Sick and Deceased 
There is no doubt that the mining companies repatriated sick 
miners in order to transfer the cost of caring for the sick 
from themselves to families in the rural areas. But at the 
same time, at least for some Basotho, the miners themselves 
insisted on being repatriated, preferring to die at home. It 
was also not uncommon for Basotho chiefs to apply for the 
return of their "boys" on hearing that they were sick. Miners 
commonly wrote letters to chiefs and families reporting the 
illness of a countryman. In February 1905. for example, Chief 
Api Lerotholi wrote to Ernest Mabille asking him to repatriate 
eight Basotho working at Knights Central who had been sick for 
some months. He appealed to Mabille to do everything possible 
as he was prepared to refund him for the cost incurred. The 
Resident Commissioner and districtsJ correspondence files in 
the government archives in Lesotho are full of requests of 
this nature addressed to the mines, labour agents and NAD 
officials. The usual procedure was for a concerned father, 
wife or any member of the family, to approach the local chief 
or Assistant Commissioner, or even the Paramount Chief and the 








authorities would claim 
not sick but just 
The return of the sick was one of the major issues raised at 
the first sitting of the National Council in 1903. Chiefs 
wanted the sick to be returned in the company of one of their 
s 5 Litaba, 1937, p.229. 
es Paragraph based on LNA, S7/7/34, A. Lerotholi to E. 
Mabille, 14 February 1905; S7/4/4. Compound Manager (Premier 
Mine) to RC, 23 August 1907; S7/1/3/25, Pesa to AC (Mafeteng), 
1 May 1910; LNA, AC Maseru, Letters Out (unnumbered), AC to 
DNL, 7 February 1911; LNA, MF 3/1/9, Chief Bereng to AC 
(Mafeteng), 12 August 1928. 
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kinsmen in order to minimise the chance of death on the way. 
The head of the NAD, Godfrey Lagden, responded: 
The case of men who are very ill and fearing death 
desiring to return home though in bad condition has 
presented many difficulties. Both the Doctors and 
Medical Attendants and even the friends of the sick men 
have at times failed to deter them from leaving when they 
ought not to leave. The superstitious dislike of dying 
and being buried away from home has not been overcome and 
it is doubtful whether for a long time it can be 
overcome. The various Mines have been approached by me 
upon the subject of allowing in such cases a friend to 
accompany a sick man. That however will not obliterate 
the risks of death on the road to those who start in 
extremes. I do not think it can now be alleged that any 
man dies from lack of reasonable attention.87 
The issue of the treatment of the dead in the compounds was 
also disputed. As early as January 1899, in response to 
protests from white residents, the Johannesburg City Council 
complained to the Chamber of Mines about the way the corpses 
of African miners were being transported. "The corpses are in 
most cases nearly uncovered and are generally transported on 
open carts",88 the City Council observed. The Chamber agreed 
that in future corpses would no longer to be conveyed along 
public roads; that graves would be dug deeper; and that, where 
possible, "the natives [would be] buried on the most isolated 
portion of the [mine] property"_se In April of the same 
year, however, the City Council proposed that a crematorium 
for Africans be created: "This is rendered more important by 
the fact that the present burial ground will shortly be filled 
up and the Town Council has no other available space at its 
disposal".eo But the Chamber opposed the idea on the 
grounds that this would interfere with Africans~ "tribal 
customs··. and not least because it might lead to a mass exodus 
of African labour. 
With the death toll of African miners from disease and 
e 7 SAB, SNA 196, 325/04, Lagden to Imp. Sec .. 16 
February 1904. 
88 .GMAR, 1899. p.135. 
se Ibid., p.136. 
eo Ibid., p.137. 
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accidents extremely high at the turn of the century, the 
Chamber was obliged to approach municipal councils along the 
Reef to consider establishing cemeteries for black workers. 
This process began in 1904, and by 1905 the Johannesburg and 
Springs councils had adopted guidelines which were forwarded 
to the government for approval. In November 1906 regulations 
permitting the creation of cemeteries on mine property were 
gazetted. Inter alia, they specified that the site should not 
affect existing ones, and that Chinese and African labourers 
were to be buried at separate sites; bodies could neither be 
cremated nor exhumed; graves were to be a minimum depth of 4 
feet; and corpses were to be covered soon after being laid in 
the grave. Finally, death registers were to be kept by each 
mine. stating the name, "race" and "nationality", address of 
the deceased, and the cause of death. It was taken for granted 
that the corpses would be buried without coffins.Si 
But among the issues raised with Buckle>s Native Grievances 
Commission in 1913, was the complaint that the mines were not 
supplying the deceased African employees with coffins. 
Graves, moreover, were shallow. As far as the latter 
complaint was concerned, Buckle recommended that mine 
cemeteries should be respected and fenced. But he rejected 
the demand for coffins because the "native custom" of using 
blankets had to be "respected". According to him. only a 
"minority" of Africans required coffins.92 
The demand for coffins was continually raised with the 
government and the Chamber, but was invariably dismissed out 
of respect for "native custom". Yet when African families 
objected in 1913 to autopsies being conducted on the bodies of 
their deceased, following the establishment of the South 
African Institute for Medical Research, their complaints were 
dismissed "in the interest of research".93 It was not 
considered that this also interfered with "native custom". 
9 1 Ibid., 1899, pp.135-37: 1905, p.27. 
92 Report of the Native Grievances Inguiry, 1913-14, 
U.G.37, p.14. 
93. Q1AR, 1913, p.21. 
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despite the fact that Africans believed the dead or their 
organs could be used by witches in their craft.94 What is 
clear, therefore, is that the reason why African miners were 
not offered coffins was because of the costs that the mines 
would incur, and not some concern with "native custom". This 
struggle around the provision of coffins· was only resolved by 
the amendment of the Compensation Act in 1941 which required 
the mines to contribute towards funeral costs. However, what 
became an issue then was the repatriation of the deceased 
rather than burying them on the mines.95 
Nor were Basotho miners satisfied with the manner in which 
their dead were treated. According to one informant: "You are 
just buried - the Johannesburg way, not according to our 
custom".96 After an accident, bodies were taken to the mine 
morgue, while 
boys" released 
graves were prepared by hired diggers or "home-
from duty. The burial was conducted after a 
day or so by "home-boys" released for that purpose. This 
contrasted sharply with the respect accorded the dead in 
colonial Lesotho itself. 
During the period under review, Basotho in Lesotho buried 
their dead near kraals, in fields, on mountains, or in huts, 
94 In 1893 in Kimberley, one Mosotho reacted against 
what he thought to be the mutilation of the bodies: 
There was one person of the Nguaketsi who was sick for 14 
days and died on the fifteenth. The same day that he 
passed away I requested the owners of the Compound to 
allow me to bury him, and they agreed, asking me to come 
the following day. The following morning I went there at 
7 oJclock and found the deceased still there. I waited 
until 8 oJclock. At 8 p.m. I saw some black men working 
here walk past me. I asked them where they were going 
to. They were carrying a bucket. They were going to the 
morgue. Then when I peeped through a small opening on 
the door, I saw them piercing that corpse on the chest. 
even draining the blood. They did not cut out any flesh 
from the body. I used to hear in the past that whites 
flay people, I did not believe it but today I now do. 
CLeselinvana, 1 March 1893). 
95. M. Knight, "The Mines Death Benefit Scheme", South 
African Labour Bulletin, vol.9, no.4, 1984. 
ss. Interview with Solomon Mosunyane. 
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despite the existence of cemeteries near mission stations for 
the burial of converts and the missionaries themselves. A 
corpse would be placed in the grave in a squatting position 
and facing the east, although by the 1930s this practice was 
disappearing as more and more people adopted the practice of 
laying bodies in a vertical position. The deceased was buried 
with the implements thats/he had used in life, and dressed in 
a blanket or suit with a hat or .d.Q.ek. This reflected the 
belief thats/he was going to live in another life. The dead 
body, therefore, was part of the society, death being seen as 
a rite of passage from one form of life to another. The use of 
coffins in Lesotho had widely spread by the 1930s though 
blankets were still being used by those who could not afford 
coffins.97 
On the mines burial practices were subordinated to the 
impersonal demands of capital accumulation. According to one 
informant: "Nothing was done! That is why you will find the 
Shangaan putting together their shoes, different type of 
clothes ... [to] put on top of the grave there".98 With a 
coffin costing some Ll.5s.6d or L3 in the mid-1910s, depending 
on the quality of wood and make, Basotho workers helped each 
other and struggled to find space for treating their dead in 
accordance with custom. The fate of one Mosotho who fell sick 
at the Premier Mine was described in the following terms: 
He was sent to the Native Hospital, he remained there. 
but not mentioning the pain in his chest. He was now 
breathing with difficulty. On 28 March 1917, at 3.30 
p.m., he passed away. On the 29th, at 5.30, he was 
buried. Before he was buried. the son of a chief. Phate 
Letsie, with his counsellors, arranged to get a coffin 
for the deceased. When they had agreed, they informed 
the [Basotho] nation, asking for contributions. The 
response was good; so and so 1&ke. [three-penny piece]. 
so and so sixpence, and so forth. When put together, 
totalled L10.1s.8d. 
A coffin was purchased for L3. Ll was used to serve food 
to those who attended the funeral. The balance was 
L6.ls.8d.es 
97 Ashton, Basuto, pp.101-12. 
es Interview with Mokopoi Mokopoi. 
99 · Leselinyana, 29 May 1917. 
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One of the Basotho chiefs at the Jagersfontein diamond mine 
called a pitso in March 1917 where it was agreed that a fund 
be established to purchase coffins in the case of death and to 
help the sick return home; each Mosotho was to contribute 3d 
every month. In another instance, at the West Rand 
Consolidated Mine in February 1912, Basotho workers led by the 
son of a chief managed to raise enough money from their 
kinsmen to purchase a coffin and clothes for deceased miners. 
Collections were also made in order to send money to the 
family of the deceased at home.100 Basotho miners were not 
alone in this practice; other people also established mutual 
aid associations.101 
The role of the church, especially the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society once it had established itself on the Reef 
in 1922, was also important. Following a skip accident at 
Randfontein Estates in June 1939: 
23 people were retrieved as corpses, plus one white 
person; all 24 casualties. From these corpses the 
evangelist of the Church of France [the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society], Elias 'Moleli, tried this servant of 
God to look for the Christians without finding a single 
one. It was sad to see that among those many, none had 
accepted God . 
. .. The corpses were then taken to the cemetery. 
big yard. Arriving, they were put down. 
'Moleli, of the Church of France and a 
priest ... prayed for the corpses.102 
It is a 
Mr Elias 
Wesleyan 
The time and day of funerals all affected attendance which was 
likely to be higher if the cause of death had been a "faction 
fight"103 or a serious accident. Numbers fluctuated, from 
as low as seven and 11 people; while during one funeral in 
Springs, 33 women and 57 men attended.104 During one 
particular funeral at the Knights Deep Mine in March 1917, 14 
100 Leselinvana, February 1912: 2 April 1917: 18 May 
1917; 29 May 1917; 9 February 1917. 
1o1 For the existence of such associations among Pedi 
miners, see Delius, "Sabatakgomo", p.586; and for the Southern 
Rhodesian gold mines, see van Onselen, Chibaro, p.198. 
102 Leselinvana, 19 July 1939. 
103 See Chapter Six. 
104 Leselinyana, 29 May 1917; 19 July 1939. 
white boy.3 and aeven girls approached tho3e attending 
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inquire about the cause of death and stayed for the wh0 l,2 
service_ C. Rampa, a Mosotho miner and a regular c ontributo r 
to Leselinya.na., attributed it to the World War which he 
thought was haunting whites and making them 
death.105 
more aware - ..: U .J.. 
The NAD sent the belongings, especially money, o f the deceased 
their families, but regarded clo the.3 as no t back to 
"saleable". Basotho 
system . "Home-boys", 
miners, however, developed their own 
friends or relatives, would take the 
belongings of the dead to their families. Those who were 
literate wrote letters to inform the families directly, or 
indirectly through Sesotho newspapers. If noone was in a 
position to write, the family was informed when the belongings 
were taken home. At the Knights Deep, Rampa regularly sent 
·the belongings of the · deceased to their families via Maitland 
Brown cf the NRC in Maseru. He would write to the family 
concerned, even sending a copy of the letter to the Sesotho 
newspapers, urging them to fetch the belongings of their 
child. In one instance he appealed to a certain family to 
respond and not aband child. However, there was always the 
danger of people falsely claiming to be relatives of the 
deceased, wanting to be given the belongings. There was no 
system of monitoring this; 
of those concerned.106 
everything depended on the honesty 
105 Ibid., 6 April 1917. 
ios Ibid,, 9 February 1917; 8 Dec ember 1916 . 
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"DESECRATION OF THE SABBATH"? LEISURE IN THE COMPOUNDS. 
The 1920s and 1930s saw the rapid development o f black 
urbanisation, as well as the emergence o f an urban black petty 
bourgeoisie on the Witwatersrand. This was linked to the 
dec line of rural economies in the years f o llowing the 1913 
Land Act. It waa also in this period wher: the white 
government grudgingly accepted the fac t o f black u rbanisation, 
and passed the Native Urban Areas Act of 19~3 whi c h was 
intended to control this process. 
The permanent settlement o f Africans on the Rand dates fr om 
the very beginning of mining dev elopment. They s ettled in the 
alums which had proliferated and spread acro as Johannesburg 
before and especially after World War I. Places 3uc h as 
Fordsburg, Ferreirastown, Marshalltown, City and Suburban, Old 
and New Doornfontein, Ophir, Jeppe, Vrededorp, Prospect 
Township, and George Gogh, were all affected. Black locations 
first emerged after the South African War as a result o f 
attempts b y the state to purge Johannesburg suburbs o f African 
slums. Klipspruit was established in 1903, Alexandra in 1905 , 
and the free-hold areas o f Western Native Township 
( Sophiatown, Newc lare and Martindale ) in 1919, and the Eastern 
Native Township in 1925, were all established as dumping 
gr ounds f o r African urban dwellers.107 
Nonetheless , inner city slums and locations c ame to be centrea 
of a rich urban culture. By the 1920s a particular f o rm o f 
music and dance called marabi had emerged as a principal f orm 
o f working c lass e ntertainment . Parallel to this was tha 
"dance hal l " cul tu1'e o f all-n i ght "concerts" and "tea 
mee t i n gs" with Ame::.'ican-style jazz bands, patronised largely 
io 7 D. B, Coplan, In Township Tonight: S0uth Africa's 
Black City Mu3ic and Theatre, ( Longma n, London, 1985) , pp.90-
102; S . M. P::s.rnel l. "Johannesburg S lums and Racial Segregation 
in South African Cities, 1910-1937'', ( Ph.D, University o f 
Witwatersrand, 1993), especially pp . 79-140 
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by the African middle- class. The central spac~s o f marabi 
culture were the ahebeens ( tavern3 ) which b egan ta appear 
after 1397 following measures whic h prohibited the sale of 
liquor to Afric ans. The illicit sale of l i quor to Africans 
was initially dc,minated by white shebeen owners who pu1'chased 
spirits from bottle stores at a p rice of ls. Sci per bottle and 
reso ld them at 10s per bottle.108 
the number of African women on the Reef increased 
dramatic ally in the 1920s, many o f them, without empl oyment 
opportunit ies, opted to brew sorghum-based African beer. By 
the 1930s their shebeens, which also provided sexual services, 
had re:placed white-owned ones. Some powerful and easily-made 
drinks like "khali", "shimeya", "skokiaan" and "babaton" 
became popular; their manufacture was based on yeast, golden 
ayrup, stale bread, figs, sugar and raiains, and sometimes 
methylated spirits, tobacco or bluestone, and c arbide. The 
advantage was that such beverages were cheap to make and 
fermented more quickly than traditional beer which required at 
least a day. Also, drinkers could become intoxicated without 
having to drink the beverage in great quantities, as was the 
c ase with African beer. However, the survival of the shebeens 
was threatE:ned by the passage of the Slum Act of 1934 which 
led to attempts to clear J ohannesburg suburbs of Afri c ans, and 
resettle them in the locations. The establishment of municipal 
beer-halls after 1938 was another threat.ice 
.1.os C.M. Rogerson, and D.M, Hart, "The Surv ival of the 
Jinformal SectorJ : The Shebeens of Black Johannesburg", 
Geojournal, vol.12 , no.2, 1986; E. !(oc h, "JWithout the Visible 
Means of Subsistence J: Slumyard Culture in Johannesburg, 1918-
1940", .in B. Bozzoli, ( ed. ), Town and C:0untrvside in 
Transvaal: Car,itali,3t Penetration and Popula1' Re.s~,onse.s, 
( Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1983 ) . 
.1.o 9 Coplan, In TownshiD Tonight, pp.98-1 02; C.M. 
Rogerson, and D.M. Hart. "The Survival of the Jinformal 
SectorJ: The Shebeens of Black Johannesburg", Geojournal. 
vol.12, no.2, 1:38(3; C.M. Rogerson, "Humanizing Industrial 
Geography : Factory Canteens and Worker Feeding on the 
Witwatersrand'', South African Geographical Journal , vol .70, 
110. l, 1988 ; idem, "Drinking, Apartheid, and the Removal o f 
Beerhalls in Johannesburg, 1938-1962", .in J. Crush, and C. 
Ambler, ( eds.), Liguor and Labor in Southern Africa, 
(University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1~92); Koch, 
130 
The principal clients o f the shebeen3 during the period in 
question wel'e migrant workers from mine compound.3 who could 
obtain special passes on weekends t o visit other mines , slums 
and l ocations. Basotho shebeena also emerged and developed 
their own fo rm of music and dance, thanks to the number -~ f 
matekatse on the Rand. The Basotho 1am1.1.o dance and f ocho 
music played on concert i nas wi th t he accompaniment of home-
made drums , were the equivalent o f marabi. Th is music was 
cent r ed around the matekatse , whose dance movements involved 
the lifting and flaring of skirts. One part o f Newclare 
location where large numbers of Basotho had been settling 
permanently since the turn of the century, became popularly 
known as "Seteketekeng" ("place of staggering" ) because of the 
kind of entertainment that was taking place there.1.11. 
Sunday and the Miners 
Leisure in the compounds was contested, with management and 
workers each battling to control and influenc e its content. 
From the companies· perspec tive, cont ro lling leisure t ime in 
the compounds helped keep workers from the reach o f industrial 
or political "agitators", as well as away from the locations 
where they engaged in beer-dr inking ( and the associated 
difficulties of Saint Monday ) . Fo r African miners, far fr om 
their h omes and largely iso lated in compounds, leisure time 
was spent in reaffirming one . s self and dealing with the 
alienating e ffects of mine work. 
Key figures in the struggle to contro l the leisure time of 
African miners and Africans in the l ocat ion s were white 
liberals, especial ly the Ameri c an Board o f Foreign Mission 
(ABM ) mi.ssionaries. A number of stndies have demonstra ted how 
.. . Without the Visible Means 
1.1.0. "Ho re famo" : "to 
displaying the genitals". 
p.98. 
o f Subsiste nce · ", pp.158-62. 
open nostrils; t o raise garments , 
See Coplan, In Township Tonight, 
11.1._ Coplan, In Township 
"Alcohol in Southern African 
and Labor, p.29. 
Tonight, p . 98 ; Ambler and Crush, 
Labor Histo ry", in their Liguor 
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after World War I, especially in the aftermath of militant 
working class action during 1918-1920 and the growing 
radicalisation of the Transvaal Native Congress, white 
liberals developed a programme aimed at winning over the 
African petty bourgeoisie. Inter-racial forums. in the form 
of the Gamma Sigma Club established in 1918 and the Joint 
Councils of the 1920s, were initiated for the exchange of 
views on racial issues. This culminated in the opening in 
1924 on Jeppe Street of a Bantu Menjs Social Centre, which 
came to play an important role in the promotion of sport among 
Africans. Parallel to this was the establishment of the 
Chamber of Mines newspaper Umteteli wa Bantu in 1920 and later 
the missionary-run Bantu World, both designed in part to 
counter the Transvaal Native Congress.ii2 
Time and work shifts on the mines were structured in such a 
way that Sundays were the only days when miners could have 
leisure time. The Transvaal Sunday Observance Law of 1894 
required that Sunday, Christmas, Good Friday and Dingaanjs 
Day, be observed as holidays; although an amendment in 1898 
allowed the mines to utilise such days for repairs and other 
work necessary for the running of the mine. Any work on 
Sunday had to be arranged in such a way that miners on shift 
were able to attend church services either in the morning or 
evening.i13 
Sunday as the most frequent mine holiday assumed a particular 
meaning for miners in the compounds. The day not only 
provided African miners with time for rest but also the 
112 Paragraph based on B. Hirson, "Tuskegee. The Joint 
Councils, and the All African Convention", Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies Collected Papers, vol.10. no.26, 1981; T. 
Couzens, "~Moralizing leisure time~: The transatlantic 
connection and black Johannesburg, 1918-1936", .io Marks and 
Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change; A.G. Cobley, 
Class and Consciousness: The Black Petty Bourgeoisie in South 
Africa, 1924-1950, <Greenwood, New York, 1990); P. Bonner, 
"The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920: the radicalisation 
of the black petty bourgeoisie on the Rand", .io Marks and 
Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change. 
11s. CMAR, 1894, pp.118-23; 1896, pp.31-32; 1903, p.44; 
1911, pp.53-65. 
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opportunity to engage in different activities. The Anglican 
missionary, Latimer Fuller, described what a Sunday looked 
like in one of the compounds he visited shortly after the turn 
of the century: 
Everywhere in this great courtyard you see groups of men. 
Here half a dozen lying in the sun, wrapped up in their 
brown blankets asleep. There three or four sit smoking 
round a fire burning in an old tin; you watch them a 
moment and can hardly believe your eyes; they smoke 
cigars with the lighted end in their mouths; why, I donJt 
know, probably because they find it nice and warm! There 
again by the door of one of the rooms a couple are hard 
at work; they have a flat stone, a bit of iron for a 
hammer and a quantity of horsehair and brass wire. They 
are making bangles such as are universally worn by men, 
women and children. A little further on seven or eight 
have made a square of little cup-like holes in the ground 
and are playing a most complicated game with little 
stones. Another group have another fire, but they are 
cooking their Sunday meat by hanging it in gruesome 
chunks all round and on the embers; when it is 
sufficiently charred, they will eat it.114 
The "complicated" game that Fuller referred to was tchouba, 
introduced into the compounds by the Shangaan; Basotho miners 
would play their morabaraba on a board with pebbles. On 
diamond mines such as the Premier Mine where the workers had 
to purchase their food at the compound stores, some miners 
spent Sundays 
selling cheap 
supplementing their income by cooking and 
food. The Swiss missionary Creux visited the 
Premier Mine on one Sunday in March 1907, and after meeting 
his contacts: " we went to a big and immense courtyard by 
going through the dormitories and corridors where there were 
tobacco. meat, fruits, etc. on sale. What a mess and 
disorder! Hundreds of Bapedis were dancing to the sound of 
drums ... " 115 
The informal sector in the compounds was an important area for 
supplementing oneJs meagre wage. Barbers, tailors, knitters, 
114 L. Fuller. The Romance of a South African Mission: 
Being an Account of the Native Mission of the Community of the 
Resurrection, Mirfield, in the Transvaal, (Richard Jackson, 
Leeds, 1907), p.17. 
115 Bulletin de la Mission Suisse en Afrique du Sud, 
1907, p.160. 
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food peddlers and hawkers, all supplied workers with services 
and goods at cheaper rates and great convenience. Some 
miners grouped themselves into the magodisana or mutual aid 
associations. whereby each member contributed a given sum each 
month to the common pool, the money going to the member 
leaving the mine. These associations helped miners to save 
money to take home at the expiry of their contracts. As in 
gold mines, these mutual aid the Southern Rhodesian 
associations, including burial societies, were informed by 
concerns over destitution, sickness and death.iis The scope 
and function of, say, magodisana and burial societies, was 
flexible and indeed broader than is suggested in the name. 
What was established for magodisana purposes could also carry 
out the functions of a burial society. But the functioning of 
these associations relied on the honesty of their members, 
especially those chosen to keep the monthly contributions. The 
Chamber of Mines issued a circular in 1927 instructing 
compound mangers not to accept the keeping of the funds of 




among miners at 
had disappeared 
Kimberley where several 
with their associationsJ 
Gambling was another way in which workers hoped to supplement 
their wages. Card-playing was the most common, and regularly 
took place in compounds and the many gambling dens along the 
Reef.iis At the Premier Mine in the 1920s, one could win 
up to 117 a day from the cards. But those who lost found it 
hard to accept. In one case in 1911 at Driefontein Hill mine: 
11e See, van Onselen, Chibaro, pp.198-204. 
i1 7 .c.MAR, 1927, P.38. One Mosotho wrote to Leselinyana: 
"Here in Dutoitspan mine, Beaconsfield. we see a lot a lot of 
trouble. Money "Societies" are being formed. But those who 
keep the money abuse and steal it. On Monday when we were 
about to sleep a fight broke out between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. 
What will bring Basotho back to line? That is why we are 
expelled from work. We are always implicated during fights". 
See the issue for 2 October 1913. 
iis_ Transvaal Leader, 25 March 1909; G.F. Williams,~ 
Diamond Hines of South Africa: Some Account of their Rise and 
Development, (Macmillan, London, 1902), pp.407-49. 
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A young Zulu man [wrote a Mosotho worker at this mine] 
has just brutally killed a Shangaan. These people were 
playing cards for money, then afterwards the Shangaan 
wanted to leave. but the Zulu [known as Sekei] refused ... 
It was in the evening, and in the end the Shangaan 
decided to leave without an agreement. Sekei then 
extinguished the light and grappled the innocent 
Shangaan. cutting the latter·s sinew of the leg with a 
knife, killing him instantly.1.1.e 
Sekei was later arrested together with his Mosotho accomplice. 
Another case was of two Basotho (Ngaka and Sella) at the 
Premier Mine in which the compound police intervened when 
Sella approached Ngaka one night to demand his money back, 
threatening to kill the latter when he refused. The two men 
were advised to share the money lest the compound manager was 
informed_1.20 
Many miners were anyway robbed of their money by the gangs 
which infested and patrolled certain parts of the Reef at 
night.1.21. Concern with security outside the mines was a 
recurring theme in letters written by Basotho miners to 
Leselinyana. 122 One instance was of a Mosotho who wrote to 
this newspaper in 1913 from his hospital bed: 
We were from Ferreira, then we saw them [the "Malaita" 
gang] ... and they started telling us to take out our 
money. Then my companion, Samuel Sepitla, said that he 
did not have their money. Then they started attacking; I 
tried to tell Samuel to run. but he refused as he had no 
speed. They grappled him, and I escaped. I saw someone 
fall, I thought it was Samuel, but it was one of the 
malaeta who killed him. 
The police appeared, then those thugs fled. As to Samuel 
he is in hospital in intensive care as he was stabbed 
with a knife which is still stuck in him. We understand 
1.1.9 Leselinyana, 17 June 1911. 
1.2o Ibid., 8 April 1927. 
1.21. For the Malaita gang, see C. van Onselen, "The 
Regiment of the Hills - Umkosi Wezintaba: the Witwatersrand·s 
lumpenproletariat army, 1890-1920", Past and Present: A 
Journal of Historical Studies, no.80, 1978; on Pondo gangs, 
see W. Beinart, "Migrancy, Crime and Faction Fighting: the 
Role of the Isitshozi in the Development of Ethnic 
Organisations in the Compounds", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, vol. 16, no.1, 1990. 
1.22 . See. for example, Leselinyana, 2 October 1913; 27 
March 1913; 1 May 1913; 15 September 1937. 





In the 1940s some Basotho, initially out of self-defense. 
formed the "MaRussia" gang. However, the latter later 
developed its own momentum, playing a role in influencing the 
.famQ. and focho culture, and even contributing to the notoriety 
of Basotho on the Reef.124 
Despite such incidents, Basotho and other African miners were 
not deterred from visiting their friends and relatives in 
other compounds, locations and slums, as the link between 
compounds, and between compounds and locations, provided them 
with an avenue for leisure. Ironically, even the mining house 
historian, A.P. Cartwright, recognised this dimension when he 
wrote in defence of the gold mines: 
To dispel this illusion [that miners are locked up in the 
compounds] they [the critics] ought to see the mines on 
Sundays, which are "visiting days". There the Reef 
trains and roads are crowded with mine employees dressed 
in their best and way to visit others mines. Every 
representative of the fifty tribes who are employed in 
the mines has dozens of "brothers" - men from his own 
kraal, men from the same district. men who live under the 
same headman. He visits them all. There are hours of 
conversation and interchange of "home news". Not a 
single calf is born, a snake killed or a good rain 
recorded in the far-off village but these men hear of it 
through this intelligence service.125 
An essential part of these weekend visits was beer-drinking, 
not only for maintaining and asserting home-boy and work-mate 
networks, but also for helping workers briefly forget the 
isolation, alienation and danger associated with living and 
working in the compounds and on the mines. In the mid-1940s. 
123 Ibid., 1 May 1913. 
124 J. Guy and M. Thabane, "The Ma-Rashea: A 
Participant's Perspective", in B. Bozzoli, (ed.), Class. 
Community and Conflict: South African Perspectives, (Ravan 
Press, Johannesburg, 1987); P. Bonner, "The Russians on the 
Reef, 1947-1957: Urbanisation, Gang Warfare and Ethnic 
Mobilisation", in Bonner et al, (eds.), Apartheid's Genesis, 
1935-1962, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1993). 
125_ A.P. Cartwright, The Gold Miners, (Purnell and Sons, 
Cape Town, 1962), p.220. 
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the Chamber of Mines, concerned about the number of weekend 
robberies and accidents in which African miners became 
involved during their visits, established information bureaux 
in the compounds to advise workers on train schedules and 
fares. help with small money change, and to distribute slips 
with ticket prices on them and maps of railway stations. This 
latter measure was also intended to stop corrupt train and 
station officials from misinforming miners about train fares 
and destinations.i2s Out of sheer self-interest, the mining 
companies wanted to make sure that their men returned safe for 
work. 
Beer-drinking in particular was central to leisure in the 
compounds. Mine managements had initially supplied workers 
with liquor in an attempt to attract labour, but by the mid-
1890s, with the need for increased productivity due to the 
imperatives of deep-level mining, it was already clear that 
the long-term profitability of the industry depended on sober, 
disciplined and efficient labour. The industry could no 
longer tolerate the same degree of drunkenness and 
absenteeism. Randlords then put pressure on the Kruger 
government to take action. This was done after the Jameson 
Raid, and as part of new Pass Law regulations, the sale of 
liquor to Africans was prohibited. But the interest that the 
Kruger state and certain foreign and national businessmen had 
in the liquor industry made the suppression of illicit sales 
difficult. After the South African War, MilnerJs efforts in 
the form of Ordinance no.32 of 1902 were equally unsuccessful, 
as liquor dens continued to flourish. Some compound and mine 
managers themselves turned a blind eye to the "illicit alcohol 
trade" in order to protect the popularity of their mines. The 
1918 liquor commission, the 1926 Select Committee, and the 
1930-32 Native Economic Commission, all expressed 
i 2 s Chamber of Mines , _T~b~e"--~N~a~t-i ..... v .,.e....._""""W"""'o ... r_k ... e .... r ..,s..._""""o .... n...___..t~h ...... e
Witwatersrand Gold Mines, <Public Relations Department, 
Johannesburg, 1947), p.9. 
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disappointment with the failure of the Liquor Ordinance.1.27 
One factor affecting efforts to impose sobriety on the 
workforce was that the 1902 Ordinance had allowed mine owners 
to brew African sorghum beer, albeit with less than three 
percent alcohol content. From 1903 this African beer was 
rationed to workers twice a day to combat scurvy, management 
believing that it was nutritious. as well as low in alcohol 
content. At the same time, the mining companies were also 
well aware of the role that alcohol played in popularising the 
mines and attracting labour, and never monitored the beer too 
closely. This left African workers more or less free to 
doctor sorghum beer with brown sugar and golden syrup in order 
to increase its alcohol strength. "Khali" was brewed in the 
compounds, especially by Shangaan miners. With the connivance 
of "policeboys", indunas and cooks, the "khali" trade 
flourished. A report in 1910 noted that most mines experienced 
between one and 15 percent absenteeism due to alcohol. And 
between 1913 and 1917 the gold mining industry lost 132 360 
shifts (or almost two percent of the total workforce employed 
monthly), due to drunkenness.1.2s 
Following the 1913 labour unrest on the mines, the Director of 
Native Labour banned the importation of golden syrup into the 
compounds. But this scarcely affected the traffic; the 
lifting of the ban in 1916 was partly an acknowledgement of 
this. The flourishing of marabi and shebeens in the 1920s and 
1930s, and the emergence of East Rand locations in Boksburg, 
Benoni and Brakpan, further aggravated drinking on the mines. 
The period Saturday to Tuesday became a difficult one for mine 
officials concerned about the many workers unfit for work on 
1.27 C. van Onselen, "Randlords and rotgut, 1886-1903: an 
essay on the role of alcohol in the development of European 
imperialism and southern African capitalism, with specific 
reference to black mineworkers in the Transvaal Republic", 
History Workshop, no.2, 1976; J. Baker, "Prohibition and 
Illicit Liquor on the Witwatersrand, 1902-1932", in Crush and 
Ambler, Liquor and Labor. 
1.2s Baker, "Prohibition and Illicit Liquor", especially 
pp.141-45, 149-55. 
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Monday because of drunkenness or from injuries sustained in 
the locations and on weekend trains. Moreover, some miners 
would end up in prison for liquor-related offenses, while 
others remained in the locations to join the matekatse, and 
had no intention of returning to the compounds. Benoni~s 
Indian Bazaar and Brakpan 1 s Power Street were the equivalents 
of the Johannesburg slums and locations in the East Rand; the 
Boksburg municipality even fenced off its location in an 
attempt to prevent mine workers from entering the area.12e 
Sport and Recreation 
Dancing was one of the oldest forms of entertainment in the 
compounds. African miners brought their recreational 
activities from home and organised themselves into dance 
groups to perform on Sundays and other holidays. Though there 
were no conspicuously dominant dances like the Mbeni and 
Kalela ones found on the mines of Southern Rhodesian and the 
Central African Copperbelt,130 Hugh Tracey estimated in the 
1950s that over 30 percent of the total African workforce in 
the compounds entertained itself with dances.131 Both 
missionaries and some mine managements regarded these 
particular activities as "war dances", associating them with 
"savage" rituals. In October 1914, at the height of the 
recently introduced wartime measure of Martial Law, the 
Director of Native Labour issued a circular asking the 
Department~s inspectors to inform compound managers in their 
respective districts that special passes issued to miners 
12s Paragraph based on CMAR, 1913, pp.23-26; T.D. 
Moodie, "Alcohol and Resistance on the South African Gold 
Mines, 1903-1962" . .in Crush and Ambler. Liguor and Labor; 
Baker, "Prohibition and Illicit Liquor"; and Harries, Work, 
Culture and Identity, p.197. 
130 See, van Onselen, Chibaro, pp.186-89: and B.K, 
Matongo, "Popular culture in a colonial society: Another look 
at Mbeni and Kalela dances on the Copperbelt, 1930-64", .in 
S.N. Chipungu, <ed.>, Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of 
Zambians under Colonial Rule, 1890-1964, (Macmillan, London, 
1992). 
131 . H. Tracey, African Dances of the Witwatersrand Gold 
Mines, <African Music Society, Johannesburg, 1958), p.11. 
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"should be carefully restricted and that organised native 
dances in compounds should not be permitted".132 
For their part, missionaries, convinced that theirs was a 
civilising mission, targeted "war dances" as an "evil" to be 
eliminated. Dexter Taylor of the American Board wrote in 1926 
about the Chopi and Shangaan dances in the compounds: "The 
weird music of the crude African xylophone, the marvellous 
rhythm. the display of physical energy rising at times almost 
to dervish madness is a sight to be remembered. Efforts have 
been made by the Church Council to have them suppressed as a 
desecration of the Sabbath, but to suppress them before a 
better form of social and rhythmical expression has been 
provided would be folly".133 
Taylor was responding to the condemnation of Sunday sport 
programmes in the compounds and locations by Sabbateranian 
groupings.134 Among those strongly 
were the Dutch Reformed Church and 
whom were convinced that such 
opposed to Sunday sport 
the Methodists, both of 
activities diverted the 
attention of Africans from the church and undermined the 
sacredness of the Sabbath. American Board missionaries, 
part, thought that the prime target of their programmes should 
be those Africans who were outside the reach of the church and 
thus exposed on a daily basis to the "evil" temptations of the 
Rand. All of them tended to see Africans as infants or as 
human species in a primitive stage of development needing 
moral, spiritual and intellectual guidance.135 One convert 
wrote in April 1932 to the Bantu World: "There is no objection 
to war dances, provided they are staged by the enlightened 
132 SAB. GNLB 192, 1329/14, DNL circular to Inspectors, 
28 October 1914. 
133 Taylor, "The Rand as a Mission Field". 
International Review of Missions, vol.25, October 1926, p.654. 
134. For similar movements in England, see E.P. Thompson, 
The Making of the English Working Class, (Penguin Books, 
London, 1963) pp.442-52. The Sabbaterian movement denounced 
"profane" dances as part of its struggle for the establishment 
of industrial discipline and a capitalist work ethic. 
135 Umteteli, 14 September 1929; 5 October 1929; 12 
October 1929. 
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Bantu. When they are staged by the uncivilized. it is a sign 
of retrogression. because finding his performance so 
patronised, he has no inducement to progress".l.36 
Unlike the missionaries, the more sophisticated of the mine 
authorities merely tried to contain dances. and as far as 
possible transform them into recreational devices for the 
control of labour. At the third annual meeting of the 
Transvaal Compound Managers Association in September 1921. it 
was reported that "the ... entertainment of Natives ... [was] 
given serious thought".l.37 Dance groups were encouraged, 
and by 1921 competitions were being organised among Mozambican 
workers as they were regarded as the best dancers. as well as 
being the most numerous on the mines. Competitions went 
through three stages: starting with the eliminations in each 
of the three Rand districts, the winners continuing to the 
semi-finals and finals. The teams were divided into three 
categories: namely, the "Manyambanes", the "Matshangaan", and 
the "Batshopi". White umpires used four criteria: (a) the 
rendering of the music; (b) the general appearance of the 
dancers; (c) the precision of movement of the dancers: and Cd) 
the regularity of the dancing line.l.38 
Prizes were distributed by the Portuguese Curator. and 
included a shield for the winning "tribe", which was held for 
a year; a flag kept permanently by the winning team: flags for 
the losing finalists; and a bronze medal for each member of 
the winning team. These competitions were temporarily 
discontinued in the mid-1920s because, according to the then 
Acting Director of Native Labour. "there were indications that 
teams defeated at dancing were likely to test their 
capabilities in a more serious direction".l.39 
Basotho dancers, however, were not "privileged" in the same 
way as Mozambicans were. even though their mohobelo dance, 
1926. 
1. 3 s Bantu World, 16 April 1932. 
1.37 Umteteli, 1 October 1921. 
l.38 Ibid., 10 October 1921; 5 March 1921. 
l.39 SAB, GNLB 368, 88/26/110, Acting DNL to SNA, 17 June 
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taken from home where it was used for amusement and 
recreation, was also performed in the compounds. An American 
missionary visiting a compound in 1918 ··saw a perspiring line 
of Basutos, 
through a 
almost naked, writhing, stamping 
snake-like dance".l.40 Unlike the 
and grunting 
Mozambicans, 
Basotho dancers did not wear "traditional dress" or carry the 
Sotho cowhide shield. By the late 1940s, their preferred 
uniform was khaki or black trousers, a headdress, shoes, and a 
short black ostrich feather. The upper part of the body was 
not covered in order to display masculinity and physical 
strength in line with the koata ideology of mine work. 
However, the mokorotlo dance which was performed in Lesotho 
during important political ceremonies, weddings or letsema 
parties, or when a chief was going for lebollo, was absent 
from the mines.l.41. 
As Sunday dances attracted a number of European visitors, the 
Tourist Office approached the NAD in March 1926 to consider 
utilising such activities for tourism purposes. The 
activities were to be organised on the Reef, in Zululand and 
in Basutoland (but the latter two were later dropped as they 
had no hotel facilities to lodge tourists). The Acting 
Director of Labour, aware that "there are serious objections 
to public entertainment of this nature on that day 
[Sunday]", 1.42 suggested that the activity be organised 
during the week. The idea was that these dance shows would 
take place every three years. The Chamber of Mines was asked 
to release between 500 and 1000 Mozambican dancers from their 
duties for the event because no African group from inside 
South Africa and employed on the mines had 
dancers.l.43 The Chamber declined, arguing that: 
recognised 
1. 4 o R.E. Phillips, The Bantu are Coming: Phases of South 
Africa's Race Problem, (Students' Christian Association, 
Stellenbosch, 1930), p.138. 
1. 4 1. Ashton, Basuto, p.96; Tracey, African Dances, pp.11-
12. 
1. 42 SAB, GNLB 386, 88/26/110, Acting DNL to SNA, 17 June 
1926. 
1. 4 3 The Acting Director of Native labour wrote: "I think 
one can definitely put on one side any idea of organizing a 
Dance of Union Natives on the Witwatersrand. The only Union 
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In the first place, there are not so many as 500 to 1,000 
trained dancers amongst the East Coast natives employed 
on the Mines; secondly, the Mine natives themselves are 
usually unwilling to participate in combined dances of 
this description. The individual dancing teams have high 
opinions of their own abilities. and efforts to bring 
them together for a combined dance would probably result 
in failure.1.44 
A compromise was eventually found by organising underground 
tours for tourists which romanticised African labour; and 
which by the 1930s included "native" dances. This process 
culminated in the erection of dance arenas for audiences of up 
to 2 500 people. From 1946 tourist excursions in Chamber of 
MinesJ coaches also included visits to the compounds and the 
surface works of certain mines.1.45 
As part of their programme to combat "war dances" and 
influence the outlook of the workers, American Board 
missionaries encouraged the playing of various 
Rev. Bridgman, while preparing Ray Phillips in 
sports. The 
1918 for his 
job as a social worker in the compounds, laid down the basic 
framework: 
... during long hours of leisure these young fellows 
[referring to a group of Basotho dancers] have nothing to 
do but get into trouble. If we have anything in the way 
of Christian social service activities to project into 
this situation which will give these young fellows 
something clean and wholesome to think about and talk 
about during these hours. we shall be rendering a 
Christian service. We must capture the physical and 
Natives indulging in dances to any extent are the Zulus. who 
are scattered about mainly in domestic service on the 
Witwatersrand and it would be quite impossible to organize 
them or get them together for the purpose. It occurred to me 
that the Chamber of Mines might be disposed to assist in the 
arrangement of something on a fairly large scale in connection 
with natives from Portuguese East Africa. who are the only 
natives who indulge in dancing on the Mines". See SAB, GNLB 
386, 88/26/110, DNL. to SNA. 17 June 1926. 
1.44 SAE. GNLB 368, 88/26/110, General Manager (Chamber 
of Mines) to SNA. 3 June 1926. 
1.45 C. Rasool, and L, Witz, ,uSouth Africa: A World in 
One Country": Moments in International Tourist Encounters with 
Wildlife, the Primitive and the Modern", unpublished Seminar 
Paper, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 
September 1994. 
mental life of 
week. besides 
seventh.J.46 









Phillips was to introduce volleyball. football, athletics, 
and, more bizarrely, games like "Hunt the Thimble" and "Who's 
got the Ring?", but he met with little success.J.47 
However, in giving the impression that the only forms of 
recreation in the compounds before the ABM's work were 
gambling, "war dances" and beer-drinking, Phillips was 
mistaken. Cricket and football were the oldest and the most 
popular European 
of the influence 
sports in the compounds. 
of mine officials who 
Cricket, because 
were predominantly 
English, was more popular among the miners than soccer, which 






only took place 
was 
once 
because of a boycott by mine-based teams. The problem was 
that the competition was open to all African cricket teams on 
the Rand, and mine teams wanted the activity to be for them 
only, as the Cup had been donated by the NRC. Taberer 
intervened, convening a meeting in October 1920 to resolve the 
conflict, but when the NRC made it clear that it wanted to see 
all teams participating in the competition, the gathering 
broke up.l.49 
As with the dance groups, the mine authorities played an 
important role in these competitions, making speeches and 
giving out medals to the winning teams. Cricket teams like 
14s Phillips, The Bantu are Coming, p.139. 
147 Ibid., pp.138-41. 
148 This was to remain the highest Cup for Africans 
until 1976. See R. Archer and A. Bouillon, The South African 
Game: Sport and Racism, CZed Press, London, 1982), p.92. 
140 Paragraph based on Umteteli, 16 October 1920; 25 
December 1920; 3 September 1921; 6 December 1924; 26 April 
1930; Archer, and Bouillon, The South African Game, pp.112-
51; C.M. Badenhorts. '"Teach the Native to Play·: Social 
Control and Organized Black Sport on the Witwatersrand. 1920-
1939". Geo.journal, vol. 12, no. 2, 1986; T. Couzens, "An 
Introduction to the History of Football in South Africa", in 
Bozzoli, Town and Countryside in the Transvaal. 
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"Fight Forever", "Orientals", "Fear Not" and "Wit Deep" appear 
to have been amongst the strongest on the mines in the 1920s. 
The "Stone Breakers" was one of the leading teams in the 
locations. But cricket was played mainly by Xhosa miners from 
the Cape Colony, and this partly explains why UmteteliJs 
cricket reports were generally written in Xhosa and not in 
Sotho-Tswana or English.J.50 
The majority of Basotho miners, however, preferred football. 
This sport was also promoted by compound managers. For 
example, at the City Deep in April 1923, a match was organised 
between the Chopi and the Shangaans who had never played 
football before.l.5J. At the Knights Mine, Basotho workers 
formed the "Basutoland Star Football Club" in 1923, which, 
though not among the leading teams, performed well, even 
winning the label "Maja-lipere" (horse-eaters). However, the 
Witwatersrand District Native Football Association had been 
coordinating soccer activities in the compounds and 
administering the NRC Challenge Cup as early as 1920. The Rand 
was divided into sub-districts, and the competition arranged 
along lines similar to those of the dances groups. The 1920 
Cup was won by the "Caledonians" of Village Deep who beat the 
"Transvaal Champions" at the Crown Mines sport field. By the 
1930s the "Natalians" of Simmer and Jack were the strongest 
team on the mines, even beating the location-based ''Pretoria 
Callies" 5-0 to win the 1932 Cup. In colonial Lesotho itself, 
the promotion of soccer culminated in the introduction of the 
Basutoland Football Cup in 1932.J.52 
Ethnic affiliation appears to have 
role in the formation of sport teams. 
played an insignificant 
My informant who was a 
i 5o Umteteli, 16 October 1920: 25 December 1920: 3 
September 1921; 6 December 1924; 26 April 1930. 
i 5 i The Bantu World described the event for its 
readers: "Arrayed in their usual war dance apparel, the two 
teams were an interesting sight. Some of the players have 
such strong toes that they would easily make three-inches-deep 
excavations on the ground in an attempt to kick the ball". 
See the issue for 23 April 1923. 
J.52 Umteteli, 25 December 1920; 2 October 1920: 
Leselinyana, 27 April 1923; 2 November 1932. 
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great lover of soccer claimed that skill rather ethnicity was 
the key in the choice of players.153 For example. a 
Mosotho was captain of one of the main soccer teams, the 
"Herbanies". at the New State Areas in 1937. and most of his 
fellow players were from different ethnic groups. Conflict 
among supporters, apparently more rife among the Xhosa with 
their cricket teams, was. however, not uncommon. Certainly 
football was no exception. In December 1914 there was a 
serious outbreak of violence between Shangaan and Xhosa 
supporters after a football match at the Crown Mines. The 
conflict engulfed nearby compounds, causing a compound manager 
to intervene and kill one Xhosa with his revolver.154 
The Chamber of Mines, motivated partly by the American 
missionaries and mostly by the sporting activities already 
established in the compounds, began systematically to 
introduce more recreational activities in the 1920s. It was 
believed that compound sports would "civilise" and educate the 
"natives" and keep them away from the locations. In 1928, the 
Chamber employed a social worker, P.C. van Haght, to find the 
best recreational activity for some 6 000 workers on a large 
mine. Van Haght, himself supervised by the American Board, 
embarked "on outdoor activities under the bright lights of 
specially installed lamps, and aided by a giant, highly 
amplified gramophone", and had "at his disposal material for 
active and quiet games, mass singing and instrumental music, 
dramatics, the cinema, Night Schools, Bible Classes, religious 
meetings, etc.". He even "occasionally [imported] a drama or 
boxing match from outside".155 
By the mid-1930s, tennis and golf were also becoming popular 
on the mines. At Daggafontein mine. for example, cricket and 
soccer were the only major sports until golf and tennis were 
introduced in 1937. A number of Basotho miners had taken the 
initiative in playing tennis long before facilities were 
153 Interview with Mokopoi Mokopoi. 
154 Leselinyana, 29 January 1915~ 12 August 1937. 
155 Phillips, The Bantu are Coming, p.151. See also 
.GtlAR, 1928, p.143. 
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provided. "Initially, [wrote one enthusiastic Mosotho from 
DaggafonteinJ, we began in the compound, where we were 
learning to play it with well-shaped planks, hitting it [the 
ball] even though there were no poles or net, but only a small 
white line. Today we play it in [a beautiful court]; all is 
well organised''.156 On this mine. tennis was dominated by 
Basotho players. 
A decade later, soccer, cricket, tennis and rugby were all 
major sports on the gold mines, with cricket largely played in 
summer, and soccer in winter. There were now 57 cricket teams 
on 33 mines, with 39 playing fields. There was a total of 
about 595 tennis players in the compounds. with 50 tennis 
courts on 31 mines. Rugby, a late comer, was played on 18 
mines. The mine authorities provided sports players with 
balls, jerseys, money for equipment and other related 
facilities. By this time, too, a few mines had established 
libraries and distributed newspapers to those miners who could 
read. Writing paper and envelopes were given to those who 
wished to write letters home. About 20 mines now had nearly 40 
recreation halls between them. Nearly 90 music bands, 
supplied with instruments by the authorities, could be found 
on the mines: and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
brass band itself toured compounds on weekends. Loudspeakers 
were also installed in the compounds to broadcast radio 
programmes and gramophone music.157 
Basotho miners had still another avenue for leisure. As part 
of their struggle to legitimise themselves, in 1919 Basotho 
chiefs in colonial Lesotho had declared the 12th of March, the 
day that Moshoeshoe accepted British protection in 1868, as 
"Moshoeshoe Day". Moshoeshoe Festivals to celebrate this day 
began to occur on the Rand in 1928. Celebrations took place 
on the first Sunday after the 12th of March as the day was not 
a holiday in South Africa. But it was only in the 1930s, 
156 Leselinyana, 27 October 1937. 
157 Paragraph based on Mochochonono, 22 
June 1946; 6 July 1946; 13 July 1946; 20 July 
1946; Chamber of Mines, Native Workers, p.8. 
June 1946; 29 
1946; 27 July 
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following the major drought discussed in Chapter Two, and the 
consequent Basotho diaspora, that the commemoration of the day 
on the Rand became more organised. A committee made up of 
chiefs was put in place, its activities financed by the 
Chamber of Mines and the Basutoland government through the 
Johannesburg Agency. The organisation for the day was 
coordinated with location municipalities, mine officials. 
representatives from Basutoland, and the Johannesburg Agency. 
The Festival held in March 1935 in a hall at the Western 
Native Township was opened with a sermon by a Paris 
Evangelical Society missionary who spoke of Moshoeshoe as a 




The main speaker for the day was D.M Wilson of the 
Johannesburg Agency who was introduced as the 
the Basotho, and who spoke about Basotho workers 
on the Rand and the work of his office. Among those present 
at the celebration held in Pimville in 1939, were the location 
superintendent and the police, the latter of course to keep 
law and order. But these Moshoeshoe occasions were attended 
more by the Basotho elites <such as chiefs and traders) and 
missionary converts than ordinary Basotho miners.l.58 
Basotho miners who were Christian converts developed their own 
particular way of spending their leisure time. As the next 
chapter will show, missionary societies targeted Rand mines 
and the locations as "universities of crime". The ABM was 
especially concerned about all-night "concerts" and "dance 
halls" in the locations which, according to Taylor. "make the 
heathen war dance on Sunday afternoon look like a Sunday 
school picnic".l.59 
Christian mine converts met on Sundays for church services and 
later divided into groups for the evangelising of other miners 





Paragraph based on Umteteli, 22 March 1930; 15 
16 March 1935; 23 March 1935; Mochochonono, 17 
7 January 1939, 29 March 1933: Basutoland News, 12 
l.58. Taylor, "Rand as Mission Field", p.656. 
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compound-based choirs. Depending on the relations between 
different missionary societies, such choral groups would meet 
in a hall to celebrate a Christian festival like Christmas. 
While other miners in the compounds bought bullocks. sheep and 
goats, and prepared beer to celebrate their Christmas,1so 
converts bought tea, sugar, milk, cakes and bread for their 
"tea meetings" and "concerts" which were dominated by choral 
music, prayer and sermons. A distinctive church-music culture 
emerged which involved using body gestures to illustrate 
moods, meanings and certain phrases in choral songs and hymns. 
Arms could be raised to point to the imaginary star of 
Bethlehem, or hands put on heads to express a state of sin. A 
Swiss missionary described one 
following terms: 
of these choirs in the 
Before starting, time is spent in putting this one a 
little to the right, that one to the back. Then they 
cough, the key energetically given in "So-mi-do-do" .. . 
The conductor, overwhelmed by his music, gestulates .. . 
illustrating the words, pronounced with conviction by the 
members of the choir, with gestures, while others [in the 
choir] close their blissful eyes, lifting their heads, 
singing with pleasure.1s1 
Moshoeshoe Festivals were themselves an important occasion for 
Christian Basotho who, in the company of female converts from 
the locations and in competition with fellow Christians. 
displayed their new and colourful clothes. Particular forms of 
dress, walking styles, evangelical work, bible reading and 
singing, were all at the core of the leisure activities of 
this generation of mine converts. 
Films 
The struggle to confine African workers to the mines (during 
weekends and holidays) without "closing" the compound, was 
ieo Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, p.196; 
Interview with Solomon Mokoaleli. 
161 Bulletin de la Mission, March-April 1940, p.37. 
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also launched on another front. As early as 1913, individuals 
were approaching mining companies to erect cinemas or 
"bioscopes" on the mine property. Under section 69 of Act 35 
of 1908, application for "surface right" or the permission to 
use the mine land for other purposes other than mining, had to 
be addressed to the Mining Commissioner. Mine managers could 
offer sites but only with the approval of the Commissioner and 
the Director of Native Labour. As there was no clear 
guideline for the operation of "bioscopes" on the mines except 
Act 35, the Mining Commissioner, in granting permission, did 
so on three conditions: firstly, that the permit could be 
cancelled should the government "not approve of the character 
of the entertainment or the class of films being shown"; 
secondly, that the authorities "may at any time investigate 
the class of entertainment which is being carried on or the 
conditions under which [mine] employees are admitted"; and 
finally, that the permit could be withdrawn with one month's 
notice without offering any reason or compensation.162 
Responsibility for ensuring that these conditions were adhered 
to and the censuring of films, was left to the Native Affairs 
Department. These conditions were motivated by, among others, 
the fear that the existence of cinemas would facilitate trade 
in and the sale of liquor, as well as the contravention of the 
Trading on Mining Ground Regulation Act which forbade the 
running of business on mining property. But mine, Native 
Affairs and South African Police officials were all in favour 
of the project on the grounds that it would popularise mine 
work. educate mine workers and keep them away from 
locations.163 
A major problem for the authorities was the question of 
censorship. It was believed that "the majority of the Natives 
[who were to watch the films] would be those fresh from the 
1s2 SAB, GNLB 277, 335/17/370, Mining Commissioner to 
Native Commissioner (Witwatersrand), 5 February 1913. 
163 Ibid., Mining Commissioner to Native Commissioner 
<Witwatersrand), 27 March 1917; NAD Inspector (Roodepoort) to 
DNL. 2 April 1913. For a general study, see K. Tomaselli, The 
Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, 
(Radix, Sandton {Johannesburg}, 1989), pp.54-80. 
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kraal and incapable of distinguishing between fact and 
fiction. It would be essential to cut out any films dealing 
with sexual matters or those which in any way lower the status 
of white women or men".1.64 The South African Police 
District Commandant for the East Rand <Boksburg) suggested 
that a Film Censorship Board be formed, consisting of three or 
four missionaries, and one Native Affairs official. The 
Native Affairs Inspector for Benoni also supported the view 
that films should be allowed only if there was "strict" 
censorship, but felt that the censoring committee should 
include one compound manager seconded by the Compound Managers 
Association and one Inspector of the Native Affairs. After 
some deliberation, the three main actors (the SAP, NAD and the 
Mining Commissioner) agreed on a central committee to be made 
up of the Deputy Commissioner of Police for Johannesburg, a 
NAD inspector. and a compound manager. In the event. actual 
censoring of films was left to the SAP.1.65 
Among the first individuals to be offered surface rights for 
the purpose of establishing a "bioscope" was a local comedian, 
,J. Smith, who regularly visited the compounds to give his 
shows. Smith was given permission in September 1913 but his 
scheme failed when a compound manager indicated that he knew 
the comedian, and that his experience with him was that he 
treated his African audiences so badly that in some instances 
he had to intervene. By the 1920s, Phillips of the ABM, was 
showing films in the compounds for the NRc.1se 
There were generally three categories of films: those showed 
to whites and not "suitable" for anyone black;l.67 those 
"suitable" for blacks (that is Indians and Coloureds) except 
1.s 4 SAE. GNLB 277, 335/17/370, SAP Inspect.or !East Rand) 
to Mining Commissioner, 19 September 1919. 
165 Ibid .. NAD Inspector (Benoni) to DNL, 14 October 
1919; SAP Commissioner to SNA, 24 November 1919; NAD Inspector 
(Johannesburg) to DNL, 25 June 1920; SAP Commissioner to SNA, 
31 December 1919; SAP Commissioner to SNA, 14 January 1920. 
166 . Umteteli, 2 October 1920; Phillips, The Bantu are 
Coming, p.141. 
1. 67 "Blacks" here refers to Africans, Indians and 
Coloureds. 
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Africans; and those "suitable" for the latter. In censoring 
films, Phillips would cut what he regarded as "low-grade, 
suggestive stuff that seemed to be gleaned from the gutters of 
the world; the worst products of English, American and 
continental studios".l.68 He concentrated his attacks on 
films that showed sex and whites in a state of undress. 
violence and crime. His fight against such films led him in 
1921 to fight for the withdrawal of two films. "Intolerance" 
and "The Daughter of the Gods", at the Good Hope cinema on 
Commissioner street which. in theory, was for Coloureds but 
in practice was also patronised by Africans. In June 1922 
Phillips addressed a memorandum to the Director of Native 
Labour complaining about the Good Hope which had just shown 
two other films that he did not approve of for "his natives". 
It was a fight which he continued well into the 1930s, 
constantly demanding tighter censorship. Over the same 
period, he succeeded in having commercial cinemas pushed away 
from the mines.1.se 
The Chamber of Mines itself made deliberate use of films. In 
collaboration with African Film Production, films were 
produced for the purpose of labour recruitment and the 
glorification of mine work. A film "W.N.L.A. in Portuguese 
East Africa", produced in 1920, showed the recruitment and 
movement of Shangaan recruits to the mines. In 1925 the NRC 
head, Taberer, directed a documentary "From Blanket to 
Civilization" which depicted Cape Colony recruits progressing 
from their "primitive" societies to "civilisation" on the 
mines. Though this film was initially produced for the 
Wembley Film Exhibition, it became such a success that a copy 
was presented to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
in Foreign Parts in London. Phillips also used this film 
during his 1926 fund-raising campaign in the United States of 
America to counter "propaganda" in the "native" press. In 
December 1928. "From Blanket to Civilization" was shown at 
168 Phillips, The Bantu are Coming, p.141. 
1.se SAB. GNLB 277, 335/17/370, Phillips to DNL, 12 June 
1922; Phillips, "The African and the Cinema", Race Relations, 
vol.5, no.3, August 1938. 
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the International Labour Organisation offices in Geneva. 
"From Kraal to Mine". a 1930 series filmed in Nat.al/Zululand, 
the Ciskei, Basutoland, the Northern Transvaal and Pondoland, 
also dealt with themes that juxtaposed "barbarism" with 
"civilisation", or village with mine life. These films were 
not only shown in the compounds but also in the rural areas. 
WANLA and NRC film vans would drive to remote villages to 
present film shows with the assistance of interpreters. 
Taberer showed one such film to a packed hall in Maseru during 
his visit there in June 1926.i?o 
Films also played an important role in health and safety 
programmes in the compounds. "The Dust that Kills", produced 
in 1921 under the directorship of Dr Orenstein himself, aimed 
at educating workers about miners' phthisis. ''The Golden 
Harvest of the Union'', produced during the same period, dealt 
with the prevention of the spread of diseases. This film was 
even awarded a bronze medal at the 1939 Biennial Exhibition in 
Venice. There were other "safety" but comical films in 
fanakalo, the mine lingua franca, with actors drawn from the 
mine workforce, and intended solely for mine audiences. One 
of these was the 1942 production "Pas Op Wena" <You Watch 
Out!), which dealt with trucks and tramways.i7i 
Though the reaction of Africans workers to circus and 
comedians· shows were not to the satisfaction of compound 
managers,i72 audience reaction to films produced better 
results. Certainly this explains the Chamber of Mines· 
involvement and willingness to spend money on such a scheme. 
Phillips usually showed four kinds of films; animal, travel 
170 T. Gutsche. The History and Social Significance of 
Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895-1940, <H. Timmins, Cape 
Town. 1972), pp.355, 378-81; Umteteli, 10 July 1926. 
17 1_ Other examples were "Pas Op Lo Dopi (Look out for 
Detonators), and "Pas Op Lo Sandla" (Look after your Hands). 
See Gutsche, History and Social Significance, p.379; and 
Chamber of Mines, Campaign Against Mining Accidents, p.18. 
172 The experience of many compound managers, it was 
reported in 1919, was "that only the educated and semi-
educated natives attended those shows". See SAE, GNLB 277, 
335/17/370, NAD Inspector (Benoni) to DNL, 14 October 1919. 
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and adventure films; comedies, especially of the Charlie 
Chaplin, Larry Semon and Buster Keaton types: safety films; 
and religious films supplied by the Religious Films of South 
Africa Ltd .• which were shown on Sundays with the help of two 
or three interpreters.173 
By the end of the 1920s, PhillipsJ enterprise had expanded to 
60 centres outside the mines, including police barracks, 
orphanages, goals, reformatories, hospitals, locations and 
municipal compounds, across the Reef. After the Rand shows, 
the films were then railed to NatalJs sugar plantations and 
DurbanJs locations, then to Pietermaritzburg, and finally back 
to Pretoria. The last leg covered Rhodesian copper, coal and 
gold mines. It took over twelve months for a film to complete 
this process, being shown to an estimated audience of between 
a quarter and a half-million African men and women.174 
But by the 1930s, Africans had become sophisticated consumers 
of films, and this put Phillips in a dilemma. The major 
challenge came from the "talkie" (talking) films introduced to 
South African cinemas some years previously: 
The commercial talkie film [lamented Phillips in 1938] 
has gained a foothold in the consciousness of the South 
African Bantu which can only be supplanted by more and 
better films of an entertaining and amusing nature. The 
huge audience of the gold mines are to-day highly 
critical of programmes offered them. If the single-reel 
topical or educational picture is not quickly followed by 
a comedy or feature in which there is considerable action 
and interest, shouts of "Take it off!" are heard. and the 
crowd begins to thin. Single reels of an educational 
nature are tolerated at the start of the programme, and 
the substitution of the same amount of material showing 
Native actors speaking SiXhosa or SeSutho might be well 
received. But these reels would have to be of 
professional quality, with perfect voice 
synchronisation.175 
What was "supplanted" were, however. his films. as the degree 
173 Phillips, TI1e Bantu are Coming, p.144. 
174 Ibid., pp.146-51; Standard Encyclopedia of Southern 
Africa. vol.4 (pp.498-503), vol.3 (pp.233-38). 
175_ Phillips, "African and the Cinema", p.61. 
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of censorship also affected the film narrative: "Most films 
depicting action. animals and actual circumstances appealed to 
natives", noted Thelma Gutsche, "but drama proper, rendered 
aseptic by sever censorship, interested them very little, 
particularly as audience, despite the sound-film, persisting 
on chattering loudly throughout the performance".176 
A decade later, the "talkies", especially "westerns". were 
the most popular films in the compounds. "Westerns" were 
followed in popularity by action-packed films with actors such 
as George Raft. Coming third were the Chamber·s fanakalo 
safety movies with "momparas" (dim-witted people) putting the 
audience into stitches of laughter for doing "everything" 
obviously wrong and stupid.177 A hundred performances were 
now being shown weekly in the compounds to an audience of 1 
500 on average and, in one instance, of 7 000; in general, 
over 50 percent of the miners attended the shows which lasted 
for about an hour.178 
Mine managements certainly derived some benefit from the film 
shows which occupied the leisure time of the workers. But as 
performances were spread across the week, the larger part of 
any weekend remained "free" on most mines, still leaving 
workers time to visit the locations and their friends. 
Conclusion 
The Randlords· efforts to minimise expenditure on labour in 
order to cut production costs resulted in neglect of workers· 
living conditions, health and occupational safety. It was 
with the intervention of the state, and also due to concerns 
with the long-term productivity of the gold mining industry. 
176 Gutsche. History and Social Significance, p.379. 
177 Umteteli, 5 March 1921; Standard Encyclopedia, 
vol.3; Mining Survey, vol.1, no.2, July 1946. 
178 Phillips, The Bantu are Coming; Mining Survey, 
vol.1, no.2, July 1946. 
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that the mineowners eventually addressed the high morbidity 
and mortality of their workers. Parallel to this process was 
the introduction by mine managements of recreational 
facilities in the compounds for African workers. The 
intention was to keep African miners away from the slums and 
locations where they drank beer, interacted with matekatse, 
and became exposed to political and labour activists. 
These measures did not succeed as African miners accepted new 
reactional facilities without parting with those aspects of 
their life which they valued most. Beer-drinking and 
frequenting the locations remained at the centre of recreation 
and entertainment for most African miners. To some extent. at 
least. they transformed the compounds, an institution for 
social control, into their homes. African miners also cared 




RELIGION AND CONVERSION 
Chri2tianity influenced and attracted an important proportion 
of African miners in the compounds. Some brought this 
religion from their homes in the rural areas and propagated it 
in the compounds; while others were converted on the mines and 
took the new religion to their homes. Thus Christianity was 
more than simply an instrument of control in the hands of 
mine managements. 
Although recent research is at last beginning to reveal the 
multi-layered nature of Christianity in the mine compounds,i 
much work remains to be done on the work of missionary 
societies, independent churches and itinerant African lay 
by preachers in the locations and compounds. This chapter, 
using the case of Basotho miners and the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society (PEMS), attempts to investigate aspects of 
these phenomena. 
African Initiatives 
Religious work which was conducted in the compounds by African 
miners without the mediation of missionaries was itself 
extremely important. Individual African converts in the 
mining areas tried in all manner of ways to group together 
fellow Christians in their compounds for prayer and religious 
services. They even attempted to make their own converts. 
Many of them wrote letters to missionary newspapers 
i See especially the studies by Harries. Work, Culture 
and Identity, pp.61-62, 213-21; and B. Kennedy, "Missionaries, 
Black Converts, and Separatists on the Rand, 1886-1910: From 
Accommodation to Resistance", Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, vol. 20, no. 2, 1992. 
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celebrating progress in their work, be it in Kimberley, 
Koffyfontein or Johannesburg, but lamenting the absence of 
assistance from white missionaries. 2 
Membership of such groups transcended ethnic and language 
barriers. Many Africans could speak more than one language and 
could act as interpreters whenever necessary. At the turn of 
the century, the Swiss missionary, Ernest Creux, often visited 
his Shangaan contact at the Premier Diamond Mine, Yohanes 
Makoubele. who headed a school there which he ran with the 
help of six miners. Members of this group were drawn from the 
Basotho, Bapedi and Bakgatla peoples, and encompassed 
Anglican, Lutheran and Wesleyan denominations. This group 
also held church services together. At Knights Deep, Basotho 
and Shangaan workers held their 1916 Christmas service 
together, despite fears and expectations of a "faction fight" 
between different groups in the compounds. Nor did 
initiatives by Africans cease with the proliferation of 
missionary societies on the Rand. They continued to act as 
pioneers and a driving force for the propagation of the gospel 
in the compounds. As late as 1928, religious work at the 
Premier Mine was headed by Africans in the absence of formal 
missionary presence. Close contact was established and 
maintained with the French and Swiss missionaries and the 
Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), however. At the Dutoitspan Mine 
in 1937, Basotho Christians were still meeting own, and had 
made arrangements with Xhosa converts to hold their services 
together. 
Typically, a Christian arriving in a compound would first look 
for his church, but if one did not exist, he would either join 
established groups or set up his own. Still others erected 
their own proselytisation machinery. Take, for example, one 
Thomas Lutseke. who was employed as an assistant engine driver 
on a mine near Germiston. He used his hut for Sunday 
services, and even as a school for children and adults. From 
2 Leselinyana, 15 July 1893; 1 October 1893; 1 August 
1893: 14 January 1911; 3 June 1911. 
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his own savings and collections from his congregation, he 
built an iron church in the location. and was later helped by 
the Anglicans to add the roof. He later gave up his mine job 
to work full-time for the Anglicans. in the process reducing 
his monthly salary by a third, to 12. There were, equally, 
other African converts employed as full-time evangelists by 
the missionaries, who rebelled and left to set up their own 
churches. One of these was a Shangaan miner. James Ngonyama. 
who was converted at the City and Suburban mine in 1896 by the 
South African Compounds and Interior Mission CSACM). The 
SACM engaged him as one of its first African evangelists, but 
by 1913 he had left the missionary society to run his own 
"Gazilandi Socide" which operated both on the Reef and in 
southern Mozambique.3 
Yet the overall tendency was for these groups to gradually 
come under the hegemony of missionary societies. There are 
three possible reasons for this trend. Firstly, most 






legitimate institutions for the propagation of 
Many of those who initiated church groups 
did so with the hope of establishing formal 
missionaries in the near future. Many 
regarded themselves as religious activists 
belonging to a particular denomination. It is not surprising 
that some of them wrote to missionary newspapers calling for 
support. Missionaries were often invited by these independent 
groups in the compounds to conduct Christmas and Easter 
services, baptisms, or Holy Communion, as participants felt 
that none of their companions had the religious sanction to do 
3 This and the preceding paragraph based on 
Leselinyana, 22 January 191; 22 January 1917; 28 February 
1928; 27 April 1928; 18 December 1935; 19 May 1937; Bulletin 
de la Mission Suisse Romande, (henceforth Bulletin) 1908, 
p.150; L. Fuller, The Romance of a South African Mission: 
Being an Account of the Native Mission of the Community of the 
Resurrection, Mirfield, in the Transvaal, (Richard Jackson. 
Leeds, 1907); H. Bennet, Romance and Reality; The Story of a 
Missionary on the Rand Being a Seguel to "The Romance of a 
South African Mission", (Richard Jackson, Leeds, 1920), p.21; 
Africa~s Golden Harvests, (henceforth AGH), December 1913. 
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so. Ordinary religious feasts and festivals, after-service 
money collections, literacy classes, and mutual support in the 
case of accident or death, could, however, be conducted 
without the assistance of white missionaries. Secondly. 
missionaries in their evangelical efforts in the compounds, 
targeted such groups and worked hard to win over their 
leadership. Thirdly, the problem of resources and facilities 
often undermined the viability of these independent groups. 
They needed venues, reading and writing material, plates for 
the Holy Communion and other items, all of which required 
relatively large sums of money not readily raised from sources 
other than collections from the miners themselves. In the 
mid-1890s, it cost the SACM more than L473 to build its hall 
and cottage on its City and Suburban site. The pump and well 
at its New Primrose site cost L135, and the installation of 
electricity at its Simmer and Deep cottage and hall cost over 
L40. In addition to this, some mines charged rent and 
electricity.4 
Obtaining permission and appropriate venues in the compounds 
required good relations with the mine authorities, especially 
compound managers. Africans, of course, did not even qualify 
for surface rights on the land leased to the mines. More than 
this, Africans had to carry special or travelling passes 
signed by their employers. In some cases, the SACM made 
special appeals on behalf of its African evangelists.5 
Contact with missionary societies, therefore, gave African 
independent groups crucial privileges and facilities, 
including access to chapels and churches, as well as a much 
broader community of brothers. 
None of this supports the view that African Christian converts 
and evangelists were putting forward, as Larnin Sanneh has 
suggested. a gospel and world view essentially different from 
4 Paragraph based on AGH, December 1913; March 1914; 
August 1914; SAE, GNLB 383, 13/14, Baker to NAD, 6 June 1916. 
5_ SAE. GNLB 383, 13/14, Baker to NAD, 6 June 1916; SNA 
to Native Commissioner (Germiston), 15 December 1931. 
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that propagated by the missionaries.a As the latter remained 
firmly opposed to African ontology and religion, dismissing 
them as heathenism and paganism, and discouraged African 
aocial practices such as polygamy and beer-drinking, not 
surprisingly their compound converts, even when acting 
"independently", were socialised into this view of the world. 
Missionary Societies 
missionary societies Rand as an Although 
important and strategic site, 
regarded the 
they initially focused their 
attention on African slum-dwellers, neglecting those in the 
compounds. This was partly due to their belief that urban 
Africans were more "civilised" than their counterparts in the 
compounds, and partly 
relatively easier as 
locations, compared to 
to the fact that evangelising 
they were permanently settled 





Mission and, especially, the Wesleyans, did begin work in the 
compounds soon after the discovery of gold, their work was 
restricted by suspicious mine managements to Sunday visits. 
The American Board entered the scene in 1894, but focused on 
Zulu migrants who at that time were concentrated in jobs 
outside the mines.7 
for short periods. And even when the South African 
It was only in 1896 when Albert Baker established his SACM 
that systematic missionary work in the compounds could begin 
to take place. Concerned that "something should be done for 
the heathen who were being demoralised by strong drink and 
8 Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary ImPact 
on Culture, cOrbis Books, New York, 1989>. For the debate on 
this. see especially M.R. Waldman, et al, "Translatability: A 
Discussion'', Journal of Religion in Africa, vol.12, no.2, 
1992. 
7 J. du Plessis. A History of Christian Missions in 
South Africa, (Longman, Green and Co., London, 1911), pp.303-
99. See also J.D. Taylor, Christianity and the Natives of 
South Africa: A Year-Book of South African Missions, CLovedale 
Institution Press. 1928). 
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cardplaying, and other vices of civilization",s Baker managed 
to obtain a building site at the City and Suburban Gold Mine. 
It served as a base not only for his proselytizing activities 
on the City and Suburban, but also for the neighbouring 
Jubilee and Salisbury mines. He was joined in the same year 
by Ernest Mabille (whom he placed at the Simmer and Jack) and 
a certain Angus Black of Boksburg. Within two years, BakerJs 
Compound Mission had expanded its activities to four other 
mines, establishing halls, schools and cottages. Nearby 
compounds and hospitals were visited regularly.s 
Baker developed a model for mission work in the compounds. He 
located his buildings, normally comprising a cottage for the 
missionary/evangelist himself, and a hall for Sunday services 
and daily literacy classes, on mine property, near the 
compounds themselves. As soon as he had produced African 
evangelists from his converts, they assisted him and his white 
colleagues. He believed that Africans converted on the Rand 
would take the new religion to their families. This area. 
then, to his way of thinking, was the most strategic point in 
the country. as it was there that Africans from different 
regions were mostly concentrated. This was a philosophy which 
came to be shared by other missionary societies. Regarding 
the Rand as the "university of crime", missionaries saw their 
work there in two ways. On the one hand, it served to 
''.conserve" and "protect" Christian converts from temptations 
such as beer-drinking and provide them with an alternative 
community. On the other, the work of the mission was to win 
8 A.W. Baker, Grace Triumphant: The Life Story of a 
Caroenter, Lawyer and Missionary in South Africa from 1856 to 
1.a3.a (The Author, Glasgow, 1939), p.101. 
9 . Baker, Grace Triumphant, pp.101-14; Bulletin, 1896-97, 
pp.219-20: SAE. RAD 160, 4025-4062. E.H. MabilleJs "Claim for 
Compensation"; D.P. Kunene, Thomas Mofolo and the Emergence of 
Written Sesotho Prose, (Ravan Press. Johannesburg, 1989), 
p.33; Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, p.213. The SACM 
disappeared from the scene when it merged with the Free 
Methodist Mission of America in 1936. See G.B.A. Gerdener, 
Recent Developments in the South African Mission Field, (N.G. 
Kerk-Uitgewers, Cape Town, 1958), p.46. 
"heathen" Africans over to the Lord.:1.0 
In 1903. the Anglicans established their Rand Native Mission 
under Latimer Fuller and Herbert Bennet, and by the end of the 
year. had a presence of sorts in 43 compounds. By 1906, when 
their operations covered more than 70 centres on the Reef. 
they had erected 27 churches, many of them on the mines. When 
Nama Jaques of the Swiss Mission arrived in Johannesburg in 
1904 to begin his societyJs work among Shangaan migrants in 
the compounds, he contacted Ernest Mabille who by then was 
working for the Department of Native Affairs. Mabille 
introduced him to mine managers and helped him to obtain a 
site for a church at the Village Main Mine. a central point 
on the Reef. The society eventually spread from Village Main 
to Germiston in the east and Krugersdorp in the west.ii 
Systematic work among Basotho miners, discussed in detail 
later, was initiated by the PEMS in 1922. Within a year, 
nearly 30 missionary societies, representing nine 
denominations and seven nationalities. were operating along 
the Reef, compared with just over 10 in 1912. As early as 
1904 c.18 000 Africans in the Witwatersrand area were, in one 
way or another, associated with Christian churches, and by 
1926, over one quarter of all Africans in South Africa (about 
1 million) were said to be Christian. A generation later, in 
1946, the number had slightly more than doubled to 53 
percent.:1.2 
Different strategies were employed when proselytizing in the 
compounds, depending on the denominational doctrine of the 
missionary society, its target group, and the number of its 
personnel. The Anglicans and Wesleyans, for example, directed 
:1.o For an example, see Taylor, Christianity and the 
Natives of South Africa, pp.181-86. 
:1.:1. Bulletin, 1904, p.38; 1905, p.86; Leselinvana, 1 
November 1929; Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, p.213. 
:1. 2 Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, p.213; D. 
Gaitskell, "Devout Domesticity? A Century of African WomenJs 
Christianity in South Africa", in Walker, (ed.), Women and 
Gender, p.253. See also Gaitskell, "Female Mission 
Initiatives: Black and White Women in Three Witwatersrand 
Churches, 1903-1939", (Ph.D, University of London, 1981), p.6. 
their work to all Africans in 
their sermons often had to 
sometimes three different 
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the compounds. Consequently, 
be translated into two and 
languages. By contrast, the 
American Board missionaries and the Swedish mission targeted 
the Zulu of Natal: the Berlin mission Sotho-speakers from the 
Orange Free State and the Northern Transvaal: the African 
Methodist Episcopal (AME) church the Shangaan of Inhambane: 
and the Swiss the Shangaan of the Lorenzo Marques district and 
the northern and eastern Transvaal. Shangaan migrants formed a 
major component of the SACM~s congregation, but the society 
targeted all Africans, and used evangelists from different 
language groups, as well as white missionaries who spoke 
African languages. In one instance, one W. Allister, employed 
by Baker at the Nigel Gold Mine site, was dismissed in 1899 
and replaced by an African evangelist for failing to learn a 
single African language during his three-year stint. While 
missionaries soon attached great significance to the use of 
indigenous languages in the propagation of the Christian 
gospel, the first languages used in the compounds were mainly 
English and Dutch. However, the SACM, with Baker speaking Zulu 
and Ernest Mabille Sesotho, soon extended the repertoire of 
missionary languages. The Anglican Rand Mission was also 
quick to realise this advantage. Bennet was sent to Natal to 
learn Zulu. and Fuller worked hard to improve his rudimentary 
knowledge of Sesotho. The Swiss, for their part, introduced 
the use of Tsonga.i3 
The advantage of knowing African languages not only enabled 
missionaries to reach their audience. Knowledge of the 
relevant language also gave them access to the world-view of 
their target groups. This enabled them to try to put their 
message across in a manner that would appeal to particular 
African audiences. Those societies that had no clear language 
strategy often found themselves at the mercy of translators 
who sensationalised their sermons, adding images and metaphors 
that the translators thought were appropriate: 
i 3 Fuller, The Romance of a South African Mission, p.10. 
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A zealous visitor from England [wrote Bennet] once asked 
if he might preach to those "dear black souls" [in the 
compounds]. A good interpreter was found for him and the 
visitor made an eloquent discourse. But the interpreter. 
knowing the people whom he was addressing and their 
besetting sins. turned all the preacher·s unctuous 
phrases about "love", and "excuse for ignorance", into 
the strongest denunciations of wrath upon evil doers and 
warnings to his hearers about the danger of disregarding 
the manifold calls which God had vouchsafed to them. 
When the interpreter was told afterwards that this device 
of his had been noticed, he said that he knew the 
preacher wished to help the people and, therefore, he had 
felt bound to interpret his pious wish rather than his 
unwise words ... but there are many instances at the 
present time of most disastrous teaching receiving the 
authority of influential European preachers, just because 
they do not understand the interpreter's words and so 
cannot tell whether the sermons are being correctly 
translated or not.i4 
In the compounds themselves, missionaries used a variety of 
tactics to make their message heard. In the early years of the 
SACM. Baker characteristically stood in compound courtyards. 
playing hymns with his Mason and Hamlyn harmonium to attract 
an audience. Once enough people had gathered, he began 
preaching. As the SACM built more cottages and halls at 
different centres across the Reef and employed more white 
missionaries and African evangelists, its methods became more 
sophisticated. A two-pronged approach was developed; on the 
one hand, missionaries and evangelists based on the mines 
visited the compounds daily, while. on the other. volunteer 
l~y preachers met on Sundays at about 8 a.m. for prayer, after 
which they split up into groups of about twenty to forty to 
preach from morning till evening at different compounds. The 
different mines were grouped together according to the number 
of mission personnel in the area and the location of the 
cottage and hall. In 1898 around Boksburg. for example, the 
New Comet, Cason. Cinderella, and Blue Sky mines, belonged to 
one sector: while the Crown Reef, Crown Deep. Langlaagte 
Estate. and Langlaagte Deep mines, formed another sector. By 
the 1920s, too. some of the older tactics had been superseded 
by more sophisticated methods. These included the use of 
i 4 Bennett, Romance and Reality, p.33. 
visui'il i'iids and diagrams drawn on the ground in the court.yard. 
Leaflets with concise messages were also regularly handed out 
to workers, because it was hoped that they would eventually be 
taken home to be read to relatives there. Where the Salvation 
Army typically used brass bands, the Anglicans marched in 
procession into compound courtyards led by missionaries clad 
in cassocks and surplices, and hoisting a wooden cross and 
chanting hymns to gain the attention of miners. The American 
Board, as we saw in the previous chapter, later developed the 
use of sports and films.15 
Compound courtyards were important spaces for open-air 
services. As the doors of the dormitories faced the courtyard 
in order to give workers easy access to this space, 
missionaries knew that by centring their approach on this 
area, they could also reach those who were still inside. On 
Sundays in summer, as we saw, this space was occupied by 
workers engaged in a variety of activities. and these men were 
all seen as a potential audience by the churches. However, 
this space, as discussed below, was contested by different 
churches, including zionist sects and African dance groups. In 
winter. missionary visits concentrated on the dormitories 
because workers stayed inside, huddled 








But such underground 
hours for hymn-singing and 
been visits appear to have 
very rare, and were probably discouraged by the mine 
authorities. By the 1940s, compound courtyards had lost their 
centrality for mission work, as more and more churches shifted 
their focus to the locations and improved their infrastructure 
on the mines.17 
15 Paragraph based on Fuller, The Romance of the South 
African Mission, p.17; AGH, May 1914; August 1914; December 
1913: June 1924; April 1921; July 1923; April 1917; du 
Plessis, History of Christian Missions, p.380. 
is Leselinyana, 1 November 1906. 
17 Bulletin, March 1943, p.195. 
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Literacy 
There is a need to look at the schools that the missionaries 
attempted to set up in the compounds. While the symbolic and 
practical significance of literacy for Africans has been 
demonstrated elsewhere, 1 13 







In fact, assume that attitudes were the same at all times. 
African attitudes towards literacy responded to changes and 
phases in colonial contact and conquest. Wars of 
dispossession, to take an obvious example, were followed by a 
reaction against missionaries and their programmes. For some 
Africans, an initial fascination with the written word began 
to wear thin, and in some areas school attendance declined, as 
the church was seen as an agent of colonialism. Yet once 
colonial rule was established, Africans· attitudes changed 
again, as literacy was regarded as a means 
mobility.is 
of social 
The status of literacy classes varied for the greater part of 
the period under review. Classes were generally held after 
supper, between 5.30 p.m. and 8 p.m., and were commonly 
conducted by volunteers whose 
Standard 4. To set up a 




invited. Often, compound managers were persuaded to put 
pupils in the same dormitory. But one problem. common on 
mines with inadequate missionary facilities, was to find a 
literate miner to conduct the lessons. Moreover. it could take 
an evangelist months to win an audience with a busy compound 
manager, and even longer to get interested "boys" moved to the 
same dormitory. School attendance varied, depending on the 
strategy used by the society concerned, as well as on 
is For a recent study, see Harries, Work. Culture and 
Identity, pp.217-18. 
is R. Elphick, "Africans and the Christian Campaign in 
Southern Africa", .in H. Lamar, and L. Thompson, (eds. ) , The 
Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa 
Compared, (Yale University Press, London, 1981), pp.291-92. 
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evangelical work more broadly. While the maximum number 
attending PEMS schools averaged 15 per class in the 1930s. the 
American Board had up to thirty pupils in some of its schools 
ten years earlier. There were also a number of schools which 
had been initiated by concerned miners independently of any 
mission programmes. In one compound in 1924. two Basotho 
workers were paying one of their dormitory mates ls per month 
to teach them to read and write. Others took the new 
discovery with them to their homes, opening night schools for 
their kinspeople.20 
Lessons focused primarily on reading and writing skills, 
although, during the mid-1930s, PEMS schools also imparted 
agricultural knowledge. It was hoped that this would encourage 
Basotho migrants to return to their home when their mine 
contracts expired, so as to avoid becoming morally and 
culturally "contaminated" by urban influences. Lessons were 
run with the aid of blackboards or wall charts, with slates 
and pencils being used by the pupils for writing. The bible 
was used for reading. Lessons for newly arrived recruits 
focused on basic reading and writing skills, while advanced 
pupils practised what they had learnt. For some societies, 
classes were rounded off by hymn singing and prayer. It took 
two to three months for an average worker to gain basic 
literacy skills.21 
However, there were three obstacles in the way of successful 
literacy campaigns in the compounds. Firstly, there was no 
proper space in the compounds which could be used for classes; 
the atmosphere inside the dormitories was rarely conducive to 
study. Well-to-do societies such as the SACM were able to 
build special halls for school, but this was not something the 
financially-strapped PEMS could do. Secondly, the number of 
2o Paragraph based on Phillips, The Bantu are Coming, 
p.138; Bulletin, March 1943, p.196; Fuller, Romance of a South 
African Mission, p.21; AGH, July 1923; June 1924. 
21 Journal des Missions Evangeliques, (henceforth .JME>, 
1928, p.89; Leselinvana, 18 December 1925; 28 November 1930; 
18 July 1934; 10 February 1928; 12 October 1932; Mochochonono, 
5 September 1934. 
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teachers was seriously inadequate, and the fees charged were 
disproportionately high. The PEMS charged between 1s and 1s.6d 
in the 1930s, and the SACM 2s for school fees. These fees were 
more than what the average African worker earned per shift. 
and probably put off many of those who might otherwise have 
been interested. At the same time. teachers were supposed to 
be paid from these fees. So, where pupils delayed in paying 
or simply left after a few lessons. as many workers did, this 
meant that the teacher went unpaid. Somewhat unfairly in 
these circumstances, the collapse of many PEMS schools in the 
compounds was blamed on "lazy" teachers. Teachers would leave 
on the expiry of their mine contracts. and there would then be 
the problem of finding a replacement, which commonly took 
months.22 
The third problem, perhaps the most serious one, was that 
missionary societies saw literacy classes as an instrument of 
conversion. This could mean, of course, that if conversion 
generally was failing, such schools were also likely to 
suffer. The PEMS was convinced that, according to one of its 
Rand missionaries, "the most real advantage of these schools 
for those who participate in them, is to provide them with an 
effective shelter against all temptations that they are 
subject to [on the Rand]".23 Similarly, at SACM schools, 
miners attended day and night classes where "they would be 
taught to read and write, and, after careful testing, would be 
baptised". 24 Pupils were expected not only to accept 
conversion, but had also to abstain from alcohol. Yet 
interest in literacy appears to have been one of the principal 
factors that attracted miners to the church, not the other way 
around. Bennet noted during his visits to the compounds that 
some miners were so interested in learning to read and write, 
and understand the English language, that they were even 
prepared to pay for instruction. There were also others who 
22 Paragraph based 
February 1928; 12 October 
1925; JME, 1928, pp.84-90. 
23 J.t:1E, 1928, p.89. 
24. AGH, June 1911. 
on Leselinvana, 18 July 1934; 10 
1932; 25 November 1930; 18 December 
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arrival at the mines would ask to be put in the dormitories of 
"those of the school". The SACM school at Nourse Deep in 1915 
was said to be "too small for the pupils and congregation, and 
they are clamouring for enlargement and offering to pay part 
of the cost".25 
Missionaries, without exception, exploited this opportunity, 
and required all their pupils to attend prayer meetings and 
church services. They treated schooling as an inherently 
Christian affair. Quantities of books, especially the bible, 
were sold by missionary societies on the mines. Although 
supplies of cheap bibles in the 1900s mostly came from the 
Foreign Bible Society, some missionary societies had their own 
printing presses. The PEMS, for example, had the Morija Book 
Depot which published Leselinyana and other interesting 
material which literate miners could read to their friends in 
the dormitories. In 1927 alone, the PEMS sold books to the 
value of over 1400, including 156 bibles. The SACM~s printing 
press at New Primrose published its newspaper _r_z-w-1~-L-e~n-t_o_k~o_z_o, 
and supplied the society with leaflets which were regularly 
distributed in the compounds.26 
By the end of the 1920s there were night schools in every 
compound, from where they were spreading to the locations. 
Mine officials belatedly began to experiment with 
systematising the workings of these schools by employing paid 
teachers who were to extend the syllabus to cover "subjects 
designed for the refinement of Native home life".27 By the 
1940s mineowners were taking a more active interest in the 
social welfare of their African workers. and provided 
classrooms, benches, chalks and blackboards from the Deferred 
Pay Interest Fund. Although missionary societies continued to 
play a role, it was slowly diminishing as some mines employed 
their own teaching staff. Arithmetic was now being taught in 
addition to reading and writing, and some classes went up to 
25 Ibid., March 1915. 
26 Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, p.217; Mill, 
March 1914; .JME, 1928, p.89. 
27 . Umteteli, 7 December 1929. 
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Literacy held out practical advantages to African miners. 
Knowing to read and write was a source of power and influence 
in the compounds. At best, literate workers stood a chance of 
obtaining white-collar jobs outside the mines, or clerical and 
other better-paying jobs within the system. These latter 
carried the additional advantage of being able to stay in 
married quarters instead of single-sex compounds. And at the 
very least, in the dormitories scribes were hired at ls a time 
to write letters.2B Because it was the dream of many 
workers to get such jobs, competition and jealousy were 
common. Stimela Jingoes, for example, was forced to abandon 
his training as a teacher in Morija in 1915, and later left to 
work at Langlaagte Block B mine. The compound manager felt 
that he was too young to go underground and offered him a 
"desk job", but his Mosotho induna was jealous. He used 
various methods to prevent Jingoes from obtaining the job, and 
succeeded in having him sent underground.so One of my 
informants had the opposite experience; he went to look for a 
job at Kimberley some time after World War II, and was singled 
out from a crowd waiting outside the mine. Then "[t]hey gave 
me a pen, book, a small box. [and] a desk". but he could not 
write: "I was so hurt when I remembered how my father tried to 
send me to school, being so ignorant, I preferred to look 
after the animals [as a herdboy]".3J. The association of 
literacy by miners with "desk", "pen" or "book", suggests that 
literacy was thought to provide a comfortable and better-
paying .job (you can sit) which was physically not demanding 
(comparing a pen and a book to the hard and dangerous work 
underground). 
2a Leselinyana, 18 July 1934; 10 February 1928; 12 
October 1932; 25 November 1930; 18 December 1925; 
Mochochonono, 14 September 1946. 
2 9 Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, pp.216-18; S. 
Moroney. "Mine Married Quarters: The Differential 
Stabilisation of the Witwatersrand Workforce, 1900-1920", in 
Marks, and Rathbone, (eds.), Industrialisation and Social 
Change, pp.264-67. 
30 Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, p.63. 
31. Interview with Samuel Mokoaleli. 
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Relations with Mine Authorities 
It should not be taken for granted that mine authorities 
happily embraced missionaries, seeing their work as important 
for instilling workers with an industrial ethic and work 
discipline. In the beginning, managers were hostile, their 
attitude only changing once they saw what religion could 
deliver for them. Unlike in Kimberley where De Beers supplied 
its workers in the compounds with bibles printed in different 
languages, missionaries on the Rand had their time cut out to 
convince mine and compound managers of the usefulness of the 
gospel. In line with thinking elsewhere in the country when 
it came to "educated natives", mine authorities initially 
thought that Christian, literate workers would develop 
political aspirations and ideas about collective bargaining. 
Some even feared that their workers would refuse to work on 
Sundays. One compound manager told Bennet that: 
... if I find any nigger going to Church, I shall know 
that he is not giving all his time and attention to his 
work, and his work will be increased. And if your native 
preacher attempts to enter the compound to visit the 
Church boys, I shall put him in the stocks [detention 
room]. 32 
Mine "policeboys" in some instances were instructed to keep 
missionaries and their evangelists out off the compounds. On 
one mine, a compound manager who found workers in a dormitory 
busy learning how to read, seized and tore up their books, 
threatening to punish them if he caught them again. Indunas 
and "policeboys", if opposed to Christianity, would also 
frustrate the work of lay preachers and evangelists. In one 
particular compound, a visiting chief ordered the sjamboking 
of one of his people who insisted on preaching in the 
courtyard after being ordered to stop.33 
32 Bennet. Romance and Reality, p.59. 
33 Ibid,, pp.58, 60. 
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Most missionaries reacted to this hostility with patience and 
determination. They regularly challenged and engaged mine 
authorities in discussion and debate. Baker did his best to 
convince compound mangers to allow his evangelists access to 
their compounds. He even developed a five-point programme 
which he used to establish his credentials. It is a programme 
which can be seen as an attempt to place his work in the 
context of capital-labour relations on the mines: In it, he 
promised to teach only African languages; that his literacy 
lessons would be confined to reading and writing only for the 
purpose of knowing the bible and communicating in writing with 
the missionaries; that abstinence from drugs and alcohol would 
be a condition for membership; that confession of "sins" would 
be a necessary condition for repentance and spiritual growth: 
and finally, that there would be no missionary interference in 
disputes related to wages and working conditions. To further 
allay suspicion, he even agreed to the inclusion in his 
building site contract of a clause giving the mine authorities 
the power to evict him on one-monthJs notice if they were 
dissatisfied with his work.34 
The enforcement of "sin" confession occasionally produced 
noteworthy results. One Barnabas confessed to Baker that he 
had stolen a pair of Wellington boots belonging to his 
compound manager, and went back to the mine where he worked 
for nothing to pay off the cost of replacing them.35 In 1911 
the SACM summed up its progress: "Since this work began over 
2,500 converts have been tested and baptised among these 
miners. and 1300 of stolen money has been paid back to 
employees as a result of the encouragement which is given to 
converts to make public confessions of sin".36 Not 
surprisingly, the compound manger of the City and Suburban 
praised Baker in 1920 as a man who "taught religion and no 
nonsense", and that not least he "is a good 
34 AGH, August 1914. 
36 . Ibid. 
3 6 Ibid., June 1911. 
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disciplinarian''.3 7 The Anglicans, too, managed to convince 
the mine authorities that they taught their converts to obey 
the law and observe the work ethic.38 
Some mine managements took the initiative themselves to find 
out just what the implications were of the spread of 
Christianity. One mine official at the Crown Mines Company 
paid BakerJs school a surprise visit, and was so impressed 
that he offered to install electricity in the building. When 
the Swiss began their work at Village Main the mine manager 
dropped in for a cup of coffee and look around. He later 
occasionally attended the societyJs open-air services and even 
offered them the use of a dormitory for educational and 
religious instruction until 
completed. After 1906, the 
shift in company attitudes. 
L200 church and paid 
the societyJs own hall was 
Anglicans also began to notice a 
One mine company built them a 
the salary for an African 
catechist/teacher for twelve months. And when the company was 
satisfied that it was getting its moneyJs worth, the practice 
was continued. By 1912, the Anglicans were receiving an 
annual grant of 1655 from various mining companies, and by the 
1920s the Chamber of Mines was making an annual donation of 
L6000 to American Board missionaries for their weekly film 
shows.38 
third 
These ad hoc developments were formalised at the 
annual meeting of the Transvaal Compound Mangers 








religious services in 
are now 
Native 
Compounds''.40 In addition to providing building sites and a 
degree of financial assistance, some mine managements were 
sufficiently impressed by the general conduct and reliability 
a 7 SAB. GNLB 383. 13/14. Compound Manager <C&S) to Chief 
Pass Officer, 11 February 1920. 
38 . Bennet, Romance and Reality, p.59. 
39 . Mill, August 1914; Bulletin, 1904, pp.272-74; Bennet, 
Romanr.e and Reality, pp.68-69; Harries, Work, Culture and 
Identity, p.215; Taylor, "The Rand as a Mission Field", p.68. 
40 . Umteteli, 1 October 1921. It was during this same 
meeting that the decision regarding mine recreational 
programmes was taken. 
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of converts to arrange for them to be put in separate 
dormitories according to denominations. On a few mines, 
converts were even "ganged" together under white foremen.41 
Mine officials nonetheless experienced three major problems 
with missionary work in the compounds. The first 
related to the conduct of the missionaries themselves. 
problem 
Their 
singing frequently disturbed workers on night shift who were 
trying to sleep. Secondly, it was not uncommon for compound 
managers to have to intervene and arbitrate in conflicts 
between societies in their compounds. 
sometimes necessitated calling the police. 
These conflicts 
Competition and 
conflict among societies working among Shangaan miners was 
particularly rife because of the numerical preponderance of 
this group on the mines. On various occasions, the SACM. 
..... 
..::iWlSS, African Methodist Episcopal church and the American 
Board, all tried to come together but with little success. 
The main problem was the partitioning of their area to avoid 
their scramble for the Shangaan which resulted in considerable 
duplication and the squandering of resources. It was only in 
the 1940s that they managed to organise joint evangelical 
campaigns. Often, different groups and denominations found 
themselves competing for audiences in the compound courtyard, 
each trying to outbid the other with hymns and preaching, all 
of which caused much noise and disorder. Sometimes this 
culminated in open physical confrontation, causing their 
listeners to move away and go back to their rooms. Often 
enough, preachers would attack one another in sermons in each 
other's presence, each trying to convince the audience whom to 
listen. Converts housed in particular dormitories frequently 
prevented other denominations from visiting them. Squabbles 
and fights in dormitories were common where different 
denominations were housed together, and compound managers 
could find themselves faced with the problem of providing 
separate dormitories for up to fifteen different sects and 
41 Bennet. Romance and Reality, p.67. 
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denominations.42 
A fairly typical example was the case of one particular group 
who 
thought it had a call to evangelise not the heathens, but 
another group of Christians. They knew the number of 
[the latter·s] dormitory, went to stand in front of the 
door, and as the door was locked they started chanting 
and announcing the ·true· Gospel; they accused the other 
of eating pork and smoking, this being proof of their 
paganism. The Christians who were being attacked could 
no longer tolerate this and came out of their dormitory 
with sticks to disperse this group.43 
It was not unknown for converts and evangelists to ask their 
missionaries to give them permission to fight back if they 
were provoked by other groups of Christians. Attempts to 
neutralise this competition were discussed at meetings of the 
South African General Missionary Conference in 1904, 1906, 
1911, 1912, 1921 and 1925. By 1940, ten societies were 
working together in the compounds, undertaking joint visits 
and sharing platforms.44 But separatist sects such as the 
Zion Apostolic New Jerusalem Church,45 remained outside 
these arrangements, and continued to contest space in the 
compounds. 
hearing: 
Such preachers would do almost anything to gain a 
"They throw themselves on the ground", wrote one 
Swiss missionary, "lying backs, they repeatedly make 
utterances to their fellow brothers, or rise unexpectedly and 
accompany their preaching with big jumps, reminding one of war 
dances and especially jumps of pagan divines".46 
The third problem facing mine 
granting of building sites to 
authorities related to 
these societies. A 
the 
mine 
42 Paragraph based on AGH, June/July 1918; Taylor, "Rand 
as a Mission Field", p.70; Bulletin, 1905, pp.83-84; 1924-25, 
pp.113-14; March 1943, p.195; Bennet, Romance and Reality, 
p.30. 
4 3 Bulletin, 1924-25, p.113. 
44 Ibid,, March 1943, p.195 
45 This church claimed 217 members at the Van Ryn 
Estate mine in 1935. See SAE, GNLB 383, 13/14, Native 
Commissioner (Benoni) to DNL, 17 June 1935. 
46 . Bulletin, 1924-25, p.113. 
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official would be reluctant to do this as, according to one 
American missionary, "he knows it may open the way to 
innumerable applications from other bodies". 47 All too 
often. ten or more church buildings would be concentrated on 
one site, with followers finding it difficult to explain and 
justify their differences. Sometimes it took societies two 
years or more to have their application for a site processed; 
they would be shuffled between the compound manager, the NAD, 
the Director of Native Labour and the City Council. When and 
if permission was eventually granted, the society concerned 
would then be instructed on whether to use bricks or wood for 
the building, depending on the location of the mine. 
Mineowners might later decide on a development project that 
required the use of the space that had been allocated to the 
churches, and this could lead to the demolition of church 
buildings as happened at Randfontein in the 1930s. It took 
two years before the affected societies were compensated with 
another site. As zionist churches found it difficult enough in 
the locations to obtain permission and official recognition, 
and in any case usually could not afford the cost of building 
and churches; they faced insuperable obstacles in the 
compounds, with the result that they operated without the 
knowledge of compound managers.48 
The Paris Evangelical Missionary Society and Basotho Miners 
Although the PEMS was not the first missionary society to 
visit Basotho miners. it was, however, Ernest Mabille and 
later the PEMS itself who initiated systematic work. 
The PEMS began its work in what was to became Lesotho in 1833, 
and was followed by the Catholics in 1862 and the Anglicans in 
47 Taylor. "The Rand as a Mission Field", p.653. 
48 With the exception of the direct quotation, paragraph 
based on Leselinyana, 25 September 1935, 24 May 1939; JME., 
1934, vol.l, p.355; 1942-45, p.132; P. Falk, Growth of the 
Church in Africa, (Zondervan Publishing House, Michigan, 
1979), p.182; B.G.M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa, 
!Oxford University Press, London, 1948), pp.80-87. 
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1876. Despite Basotho reaction against missionaries during 
and after wars with the Boers and the British in the 1850s and 
the Cape colonial administration in the 1870s, the PEMS 
managed to style itself as the "Church of Moshoeshoe" or. 
rather, a "national" church. This myth was seriously and 
successfully challenged on the ground by the Catholics with 
their tolerance of Basotho traditional practices and of the 
chieftaincy. In 1912 Griffith became the first Sotho 
Paramount Chief to convert to Catholicism, and by 1936 
Catholic church membership had outstripped that of the PEMS. 
Much of the Catholic progress against the PEMS occurred in the 
1920s, when over half of the church membership of the three 
major denominations were women. But most Basotho were still 
"heathen" for the greater part of the period under review.49 
The PEMS~ movement to the Rand was not simply due to concern 
about Basotho migrants in the compounds, but was also a 
reflection of the crisis and challenges it was facing in 
colonial Lesotho. Its hope of maintaining a monopoly over the 
evangelisation of the Basotho was not only challenged by the 
Catholics, but also had to deal with apostolic break-away 
groups from within its ranks. The most significant of these 
movements was that led by the PEMS evangelist, Walter Matita. 
Dismissed from his duties in 1922 for making messianic claims, 
Matita set up his own "Church of Moshoeshoe". Other apostolic 
or zionist sects were already in operation in the country, 
introduced from the urban areas mainly by returning miners. 
The other challenge to the PEMS came from a radical political 
organisation Lekhotla La Bafo, Council of Commoners, founded 
in 1919, which attacked missionaries as agents of colonialism 
49 Paragraph based on J.M. Mohapeloa, From Mission to 
Church: Fifty Years of the Work of the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society and the Lesotho Evangelical Church, 1933-
1.9.8.3, <Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 1985), pp.2-3; S.J. Gill, A 
Short History of Lesotho; From the Late Stone Age until the 
1993 Elections, (Morija Museum and Archives, Morija, 1993), 
p.173; Kennedy, "Missionaries, Black Converts", p.199. For 
figures on the religious and denominational affiliation of the 
Basotho, see Basutoland Census, 1911; 1936; and 1946. 
and destroyers of the Basotho social fabric.so 
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Arguably. 
then, the PEMs· expansion to the Rand was intended to give it 
access to the category of Basotho <i.e. the men) that was the 
most difficult to win in colonial Lesotho itself. It was also 
a reaction to the qualitative changes that the migrant labour 
system was by then undergoing.Bi 
When the PEMS finally moved part of its operations to the 
Witwatersrand in 1922, it was able to build on what Ernest 




already achieved in the 
with Baker·s Compound 
Mission came to a halt with the outbreak of the South African 
War in 1899, once peace returned he was employed in the Pass 
Office of the Native Affairs Department. His new work 
involved visiting mine compounds, and he was able to use those 
opportunities to locate and meet hundreds of Basotho workers. 
He spent his Sundays riding on his bicycle, carrying books for 
sale, to these compounds, especially that belonging to the 
Johannesburg municipality where many Basotho worked in 
preference to the mines. When the Swiss missionaries opened 
their church at Village Main, he arranged with them to share 
this venue; the Swiss using the church in the mornings and 
afternoons for Shangaan converts. and Mabille taking over to 
preach to "his" Basotho in the early evenings. He continued 
this work until 1916 when he left for France as one of the 
commanding officers of the Native Labour Contingent. Even 
there. he never abandoned "his" Basotho; he would sometimes 
take up to 200 of them to a local church and translate the 
service from French for them. Mabille was readmitted to the 
PEMS on his return from France, having demonstrated his 
commitment to Basotho for decades. and returned to colonial 
Lesotho. He entrusted his work at Village Main to the care of 
his Mosotho assistant. His departure from the Rand coincided 
so M-L. Martin, The Biblical Concept of Messianism and 
Messianism in Southern Africa, <Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 
1964), pp.118-19; Gill, Short History, pp.173-78; B. Edgar. 
Prophets with Honour: A Documentary History of Lekhotla la 
B.afQ., (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1988), p.16. 
Bi. See Chapters Two and Three. 
with the arrival of Bertrand Moreillon, charged 
conducting an inquiry on behalf of the PEMS.52 
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with 
When Moreillon arrived in Johannesburg at the height of the 
Rand Revolt in February 1922. his mission was not to initiate 
PEMS work, but rather to investigate whether such work was 
necessary, given the existence of so many missionary societies 
in the area. Basotho labourers on the Rand had been pleading 
for some time with the synod in Lesotho for 
or a missionary, and whether or not 
PEMS missionaries 
this was at the 
instigation of Ernest Mabille, the latter·s departure for 
France certainly intensified these demands. In June 1916, the 
Reverend Jacottet was despatched from Lesotho to the Rand, 
where he met those Basotho making the call. After some 
discussion, it was decided that the Basotho on the Rand would 
fall under the DRC. Many Basotho converts were not happy with 
the decision, as they associated the Dutch with the Orange 
Free State which had taken much of their fertile land in the 
wars of the mid-1860s. This partly explains why the DRC failed 
to make much headway among Basotho miners.53 
Moreillon received a cold reception from Basotho converts, 
some of them even refusing to have anything to do with him. 
Because of the PEMs· shaky financial situation, his station at 
Griqualand East had been handed over to the Glasgow Missionary 
Society before his coming to the Rand, and influential Basotho 
saw this as a betrayal of their opposition to incorporation 
into South Africa. As late as 1934. some were still asking 
what the PEMS was doing on the Rand, when the Basotho were 
fighting against the Union government. To such people, anyone 
52 Paragraph based on J..t:1.E, 1929, p.560; Leselinvana. 27 
June 1934; B. Moreillon, "My First Three Weeks on the Rand", 
Basutoland Witness <fill), vol.4, no.2. March-April 1950, pp.19-
:21; E. Labarthe, "Mission Work in Johannesburg", E.W. no.62, 
July 1962, p.2; V. Ellenberger, A Century of Mission Work in 
Basutoland, 1833-1933, (Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 1938), 
pp.352-57, is PEMs· official history of the beginning of its 
work on the Rand, but does not acknowledge the pioneering work 
of Ernest Mabille. possibly because of his expulsion from the 
church. 
5 3 . Leselinyana, 16 September 1927; 27 June 1934. 
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who supported the PEMS' mission on the Rand was regarded as a 
traitor! Moreillon nonetheless managed to conduct his inquiry 
and was later reinforced in his conclusions by Ernest 
Mabille's brother, Louis. Both of them strongly argued for 
the establishment of the PEMS on the Rand. Louis Mabille was 
so optimistic that he hoped their work on the Reef would then 
spread to the Premier Mine, Jagersfontein and as far as 
Kimberley. He felt that the PEMS needed to seize this 
opportunity which promised to expand the number of converts as 
well as increase the proportion of men in its ranks. 
Moreover, unless this step was taken, existing PEMS converts 
would continue to be exposed to "bad" influences on the Rand, 
to the extent that some of them were even being won over to 
other churches! As far as money was concerned, Mabille 
suggested that the work could be financed from the coffers of 
the PEMS' branch in Lesotho, by contributions from the miners 
themselves, and from collections to be held annually in all 
PEMS churches. Paris' only responsibility would be to pay the 
salary of the white missionary, as the DRC and the Swiss had 
promised to put their facilities at the disposal of the PEMS. 
The project was sanctioned, and Moreillon spent the next two-
and-a-half years before getting it off the ground, handing it 
over in 1924 to Rene Ellenberger.54 
Like Moreillon, Ellenberger travelled by train or on foot 
across the Rand, from East to West and back again, in order to 
reach Basotho migrant workers in the compounds. His primary 
task was to prepare ground for the establishment of permanent 
PEMS mission, and this he did by studying the methods used by 
other missionary societies. He met the Director of Native 
Labour and the NRC on his arrival, and was given letters of 
introduction to all the compound managers. Nor was his work 
limited to the estimated 14 800 Basotho workers in the gold 
mine compounds by the mid-1920s; it also extended to those 
5 4 Paragraph based on Leselinvana, 27 June 1934; South 
African Library, Archives of the PEMS (APEMS), Mf. 730, L. 
Mabille's report on "Evangelising Basotho working in the 
mines", 23 October 1922; Mf.759, R. Ellenberger to an unnamed 
friend, 4 August 1925; Mochochonono, 10 October 1934. 
Basotho labourers in the 
~41 
compounds of the Johannesburg 
municipality and SA Railways. His instructions were to work 
only among Basotho from colonial Lesotho, and specifically 
only among those living in the compounds. This certainly 
helped to overcome the problem of language encountered by 
other mission societies, but did nothing to alleviate the 
major problem of the huge distances between different parts of 
the Rand. From Springs to Randfontein the train took more 
than three hours to pass 53 stations, and even then he often 
had to walk for over 30 minutes from the station before 
reaching the nearest compounds. Not surprisingly, Ellenberger 
was soon pleading for a car. In 1926, when the first annual 
collection for the Rand mission was conducted in all PEMS 
churches in colonial Lesotho, Ellenberger rushed there from 
the Rand to address congregations and meetings from all over 
the country about the plight of Basotho workers in the 
compounds and on the Reef. He moved the emotions of his 
audiences, especially the parents among them, when he 
sensationally described how Basotho labourers were daily 
subjected to "evil" and "bad" temptations on the Rand. Only 
the PEMS could "protect" and "save" these "children" of 
Lesotho. So moving were his speeches that enough money was 
raised to purchase him a bicycle and to employ another 
evangelist.55 
The first evangelist, Saul Tumisi, himself an ex-miner. was 
deployed in 1925 at State Mines in Springs on the East Rand. 
This particular area was an obvious choice. as Basotho workers 
were concentrated there and in Johannesburg itself. Between 
them. the City Deep, Crown Mines. and State Mines. employed 
over 3 000 Basotho miners. But. due to the problem of 
accommodation. Tumisi had to stay with Ellenberger, and 
commute to State Mines, sometimes having to sleep with miners 
in the compounds. The second evangelist, Elias ~Moleli. 
arrived a year later and was deployed on the West Rand at 
Randfontein. A third evangelist, Bethuel Seotsanyane, 
55 Paragraph based on J.ME, 1924. pp.206-07; 1926, 
pp.285, 558; Leselinvana, 11 July 1934. 
followed in July 1927 and was placed in the house which had 
finally been built for Tumisi on the East Rand. The latter was 
redeployed to the centre of Johannesburg. These three 
evangelists were allowed to bring their wives. but had to 
leave their children behind as the Rand, they were told, was 
not a good place for children. By the end of Ellenberger·s 
service in 1927, the PEMS had four centres, three of which 
were run by evangelists and one by a volunteer: 14 schools run 
by volunteers; and 132 catechumens. Books to the value of 
over L400, 
compounds.56 
including 156 bibles, had been sold in the 
Ellenberger was replaced by Louis Mabille. For that matter. 
both Moreillon and Ellenberger had been asked to head the work 
of the Rand mission when they were retiring from their PEMS 
work in Lesotho to settle in Johannesburg. The former was 
relocating to Johannesburg for the education of his children, 
while Ellenberger wanted to finish his father·s book on the 
history of Basotho. Louis Mabille, for his part, was still a 
full-time PEMS missionary. Because the process of setting up a 
permanent mission was not qualitatively different from what 
Moreillon and Ellenberger had been doing. Mabille continued to 
use the strategy of using evangelists and volunteers. 
However, as will be shown later, progress on the ground did 
not match his optimism. Initially, though, he was better off 
than his predecessors, as the Mor i~i a Book Depot had bought him 
a car. and the placing of a fourth evangelist in Benoni in 
1929 strengthened the overall position of the PEMS on the East 
Rand. Each Sunday the PEMS missionary and his evangelists 
would visit compounds in their respective sectors. Permission 
to enter was sought from the compound manager, and indunas or 
"policeboys", and sometimes resident Basotho chiefs, were used 
to locate Basotho workers in the compounds. Often, evangelists 
would move from room to room, inviting Basotho miners to 
attend the service. Afterwards. the evangelist or missionary 
6 6 Paragraph based on JME, 1925, pp.396-97, 558; 1927, 
pp.373-74; Leselinvana, 11 July 1934; APEMS, Mf.759, R. 
Ellenberger to an unnamed friend, 19 April 1925; Mf.750, R. 
Ellenberger to an unnamed friend, 17 December 1924. 
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would ask if any of those present wished to give his life to 
God. and indeed if there were any such, their names were taken 
down for follow-up discussions. Most services were followed 
by the sale of books, especially the bible. During the week. 
as miners were either on shifts work or asleep, PEMS work was 
focused on visiting hospitals. Parallel to this. those 
already converted met daily for evening prayers, and for 
mutual spiritual support, guidance and defence against "evil" 
temptations. Each evangelist had groups such as these 
operating in several compounds, although sometimes, as 
discussed earlier, a number of such groups were independent of 
the formal control of missionaries. The fourth area of work 
were literacy classes discussed above.57 
The work of the PEMS cannot be adequately understood without 
looking at the role played by its evangelists and volunteers. 
The strategy of working through Basotho evangelists had been 
used in Lesotho since the 1860s. At the same time, white 
missionaries were very cautious in their selection of 
evangelists as they did not think that Basotho would have the 






monitored. Although the PEMS was committed to transforming 
itself into a "native" church, and did produce its first 
Mosotho minister in 1891, the achievement of this goal was 
delayed by a combination of paternalism and racism which 
obliged Basotho ministers to work under the supervision of 
white missionaries. Another indication of such attitudes was 
the policy which stopped evangelists from bringing their 
children to the Rand before the 1930s. By contrast, Louis 
Mabille had the luxury of finding schools for his children in 
Johannesburg. For that matter, decisions around the activities 
and objectives of the Society continued to be taken for 
decades by a whites-only annual Conference of missionaries, 
and the process of transforming the PEMS into a "native" 
57 Paragraph based on Baker, Grace Triumphant, p.101; 
Coplan, In Township Tonight, p.46; JME, 1928, pp.84-90, 145; 
1942-45, pp.129-32; Phillips, The Bantu are Coming, pp.141-51. 
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church was only completed in 1964 when the Lesotho Evangelical 
Church replaced it. 
The process of selecting evangelists for the Rand does not 
appear to have been as thorough as it was in colonial Lesotho. 
Tumisi, the first evangelist, was an ex-miner. and did not 
follow any formal theological training as was the case with 
evangelists in Lesotho. At the same time. it would seem that 
he was the most trusted and skilled, as he was deployed in 
Johannesburg, an area which was more complex than the rural 
areas and where many missionary societies were represented. 
But with white missionaries experiencing what they regarded as 
"bad" conduct of some evangelists (and volunteers), 
evangelists came to be recruited via the Bible School and the 
Leloaleng Industrial School in 
that young men were more 
Lesotho. Because of the belief 
easily tempted, middle-aged 
candidates were 
machinery of 
preferred. Evangelists were regarded as the 
the mission, with white missionaries 
concentrating on coordinating and monitoring their activities. 
African evangelists were the ones who conducted most of the 
visits, spoke to and counselled miners about their personal 
problems, and it was also not uncommon for one of them to be 
invited to perform a small funeral service for a dead miner. 
Like the missionary, they received letters from workers· 
families in Lesotho, asking them to help locate "lost" sons, 
brothers, fathers or husbands. And again like white 
missionaries, their families, especially their wives, also had 
evangelical responsibilities. Bethual Seotsanyane was assisted 
in 1938 by his son and daughter in running a school he had 
established in Brakpan, while his wife worked among the women 
in the locations.58 
5 8 This and the preceding paragraph based on 
Leselinvana, 6 April 1938; 1 August 1934; 25 February 1927; 
11 July 1934; 6 April 1938; JME, 1928, pp.84-90; 1934, p.352; 
M. Malefane, "The Work of the Lord among Basuto People", EN, 
vol.3, no.1, January-February 1949, p.5; APEMS. Mf.783, L. 
Mabille to an unnamed friend, 19 December 1928; V. 
Ellenberger, Landmarks in the Story of the French Protestant 
Church in Basutoland During the First Hundred Years of its 
Existence, 1833-1933, (Sesuto Book Depot, Morija, 1933), 
pp.14-15, 27; Mohapeloa, From Mission to Church, pp.41, 47. 
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Non-salaried volunteers were no less significant. Most of 
them were literate, and some had even been to the Bible School 
in Morija. Still others were sent by the synod in Lesotho; in 
1929 Mabille received six such volunteers. But probably the 
most important of all were those in full-time employment who 
dedicated their Sundays to evangelical work. In 1934 there 
were four such men in addition to the five evangelists. One 
was a clerk at Croesus near Langlaagte, another was a railway 
officer at Crown Mine, yet another was a tailor in Germiston, 
and indeed only the one at Sub-Nigel, south of Springs, was an 
ordinary miner. The fifth evangelist, David Patose, worked as 
a volunteer under Tumisi for five years at Geldenhuis near 
Germiston, before being accepted as an evangelist in 1932.59 
Besides these formally recognised volunteers. there were 
baholo (elders), enthusiastic and energetic converts, who paid 
visits to the compounds own or accompanied evangelists or the 
missionary in their work. They were regarded as senior 
members of the church, and acted as assistants and advisors to 
evangelists and the missionary. As in colonial Lesotho, they 
commanded respect and had influence; they could sway support 
for or against particular evangelists. Indeed, they were so 
important that they were even allowed to send representatives 
to the monthly meetings held between the missionary and his 
evangelists.BO 
Younger volunteers organised themselves into groups of 
bahlanka (young men). There were three aspects to the 
activities of the bahlanka; one activity involved visiting the 
compounds, preaching from dormitory to dormitory, laying 
emphasis on such themes as punishment for and deliverance from 
sin, and the "lost sheep". Their second activity involved 
constituting themselves into units for the study of the bible, 
5 9 J.ME, 1929, pp.222-27; Leselinyana, 18 July 1934; 12 
October 1932. 
so Ellenberger, Century of Mission Work, p.182; JME, 
1942-45, pp.131-32. 
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such as the Almanaka based at Croesus in the mid-1930s. And 
lastly, and most entertainingly, they organised themselves 
into choirs. These choirs had spread from PEMS schools in 
colonial Lesotho in the late 1920s to the locations and the 
compounds, where they comprised ex-students who had come to 
the Rand for one reason or another. The "Rambling Vagabonds" 
and the "Basutoland Shooting Choir" were reported to be among 
the most popular Basotho choirs in Sophiatown in 1921. Such 
choirs were invited by Basotho of some standing to hold 
concerts for the miners. When the PEMS opened its new church 
at the State Mine in July 1935, choirs from Brakpan and from 
the Swiss mission, were invited to perform. Amongst the most 
well-known Basotho choirs in the compounds during the 1930s 
were the "Dinare," and the "Roaring Tigers" (nicknamed 
"Majapere" by non-Sotho workers) of the State Mine near 
Brakpan. By then, the "Tigers" had been around for about a 
decade and were so popular that they were invited in one 
instance to perform in Vereeninging for Basotho audience. 
These choirs did not restrict their choice of songs to hymns. 
It appears that ~1at brought them a following were the popular 
secular songs that they were associated with; in 1936 "Miss 
Moipato, Ngoan·a Malorne'' (Lady Moipato, my cousin sister) 
threatened to replace "Chuchumakhala"61 as the most popular 
Sesotho choir song in the compounds and locations. Concerts 
provided a platform for competing choirs, during which members 
of the audience would bid with their money for such and such 
a person or group to sing a particular song. One such concert 
took place in a hall at Village Deep in March 1926 where the 
"Roaring Tigers" and the "Racoons" were performing at the 
invitation of one E. Malimabe. L11.18s.10d was raised in 
addition to the money collected from the sale of entrance 
tickets. In December 1936, the "Tigers" were preparing 
themselves for a competition at Springs Hall where they were 
going to face the "Nightingales" of Sub-Nigel. These occasions 
also attracted the attention of the tax collectors of the 
Basutoland Johannesburg Agency, although sometimes for 
s1 A name applied to a steam engine train. 
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relatively benign purposes. In cne instance in 1937, a 
concert was organised by the Agency in order to reach Basotho 
miners and promote its official image_s2 
In the course of the 1930s. the bahlanka formalised their 
structures in their respective compounds. The size of these 
bahlanka groups ranged between 16 to 30 members. This process 
culminated in a two-day meeting in March 1938 at Cleveland 
where 45 bahlanka delegates from Brakpan, Nigel, Driefontein, 
Village Main and Cleveland itself, met to discuss a common 
approach and the coordination of their activities. A nine-
person committee was elected to serve as an umbrella body of 
the affiliates. The new body had its own funds, with each 
affiliate contributing 10s annually. Members and non-members 
were allowed to borrow money from this central fund. The 
group resolved to have its own badge to distinguish its 
members from non-members, and each member was to abstain from 
alcohol. The group and its affiliates committed themselves to 
working with evangelists.63 
Officially, the missionary met with his evangelists and baholo 
representatives once a month, while the evangelists met 
regularly with volunteers and baholo in their respective 
sectors. The missionary monitored his evangelists, issuing 
reprimands where necessary. He also handled all matters 
relating to relations with other missionary societies and the 
South African authorities. At the bottom of this hierarchy 
were ordinary church members. But this relationship, with the 
missionary at its apex, and evangelists and volunteers at the 
bottom, proved to be riddled with tensions and contradictions. 
Competition between evangelists, and between baholo and their 
evangelists was sufficiently common to cause tension. 
62 This and the preceding paragraph based on VX, In 
Township Tonight, pp.37, 71-76; J.ME, 1942-45, pp.131-32; 
Leselinyana, 12 October 1938; 1 June 1938; 23 February 1917; 
14 August 1935; 5 February 1936; 16 February 1938; 13 March 
1935; 18 March 1921; 26 March 1926; 3 November 1937; 3 March 
1937; 12 May 1937; 12 October 1932; 25 May 1938; Mochochonono, 
12 September 1934; 13 March 1937; 7 August 1937. 
63 . Leselinvana, 1 June 1938. 
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Mochochonono published a series of anonymous letters in 1934 
and again in 1937. attacking the baholo and evangelists. 
accusing them of behaving like chiefs and indunas. When 
Ellenberger temporarily replaced Louis Mabille who had retired 
earlier in 1936 due to health problems. all of his time was 
taken up with such allegations: and indeed he became so 
disillusioned that he even refused to be thanked during his 
farewell function.64 
By the time of Mabille·s retirement. little significant 
progress had been made. His optimism had been shattered by 
the lack of interest on the part of most Basotho on the Rand. 
Mabille had hoped that the dramatic increase in the number of 
Basotho workers on the mines from 1930 onwards. would lead to 
a significant increase in PEMs· church membership. but this 
did not happen. While the number of Basotho in the compounds 
climbed from about 20 000 in 1930 to over 30 000 in 1933, and 
indeed this trend continued in subsequent years following 
South Africa·s abandonment of the gold standard in 1934, the 
proportion of men in PEMS churches did not increase 
significantly. A significant drop in the number of "heathens" 
in colonial Lesotho itself only occurred in the 1940s. and 
even then, much of the increase in the number of Christians 
was due to the Catholic successes. One of my informants. who 
worked at New Modderfontein near Benoni in the mid-1930s, was 
often the only person from his compound to attend Sunday 
services at the Wesleyan chapel behind the mine premises.BB 
Oechsner de Coninck, who replaced Ellenberger in December 
1936, was unfortunate that his term coincided with the most 
serious set of crises that the Rand mission had faced since 
its inception. The first crisis occurred in 1938 when Coninck 
tried to expel evangelist Tumisi, who. by then, had been 
labouring for the Society for more than ten years. The 
problem began with gossiping and conflicting allegations 
64 Mochochonono, 12 September 1934; 10 October 1934; 28 
November 1934; 3 March 1937; 27 March 1937. 
65 Interview with Solomon Mosunyane. See also JME. 1934, 
vol.2, pp.640-41. 
between Coninck·s wife on the one hand, and Tumisi·s wife on 
the other. Coninck sided with his wife. 
accusations against Tumisi, and expelled him. 
fabricated 
He did not 
know, however, how to explain this to Tumisi·s congregation at 
Village Main, so he instructed Tumisi to say that he was 
voluntarily resigning his work because he was incompetent. 
This, however, the evangelist refused to do. Tumisi·s 
congregation then protested against the decision. some even 
staging a walk-out on the Sunday that a new evangelist was 
introduced. Mochochonono carried a number of letters. 
including one from Tumisi himself, lashing out at Coninck·s 
decision. The crisis continued for almost a year, but Tumisi 
was never reinstated.BB 
Coninck was neither fluent in Sesotho nor skilled in handling 
crisis situations. His lack of fluency was a major barrier, 
as Basotho were known to be very proud of their language,6 7 
and his brusque handling of conflicts created enemies in the 
PEMS congregation. He nonetheless began the process of 
spreading PEMS beyond the confines of the Reef, in 1938 he and 
David Patose, evangelist at Geldenhuise, visited Basotho 
workers at Springfield Colliers near Vereeninging. Yet church 
membership in 1941 was a mere 2 390 out of an estimated figure 
of 60 000 Basotho working on the Reef. And although the 
number of evangelists grew from seven in 1938 to 12 in 1942. 
the number of centres stagnated, up from 14 in 1943 to only 15 
six years later. The six chapels already in existence in 1938 
did not expand at all over the next four years. Coninck 
increased the role of baholo and bahlanka significantly. 
always seeking their assistance during his visits, but it 




Mochochonono, 3 January 1938: 15 January 1938: 28 May 
June 1938; ~ July 1838: Leselinvana, 12 December 
67 Basotho were said to be a "self-centred and a proud 
nation even though they may be far from their country; far out 
on the Rand they still exercise such pride. and feel that the 
Church of Basutoland is their Alma Mater. They do not want 
their sermons to be preached in any other language save 
Sotho"; see J.E. Selikane, "The Church of Basutoland on the 
Rand", mi, vol.3, no.1, January-February 1949, p.10. 
:so 
subsequent years by a combination of accelerated African 
urbanisation and the disintegration of agricultural production 
in rural Lesotho. 
By 1962 the PEMS on the Rand was divided intc four parishes 
stretching from the East to the West Rand. and from Pretoria 
in the north to Welkom in the Orange Free State. Its focus 
had shifted away from the compounds to the locations; miners 
were now expected to attend services in the latter areas. and 
each evangelist now had a bicycle. But this reorientation 
represented more than the process of African urbanisation; it 
was rather a result of the relative failure of mission work in 
the compounds.68 
Explaining the failure 
But why was the PEMS mission on the Rand failing? The central 
objective factor was the difficult financial situation that 
had faced the Society since 1914. As already noted, the Rand 
mission was supposed to be financed from the coffers of the 
Lesotho branch of the Society. as well as regular collections 
and donations from member-miners on the Rand. The salaries of 
evangelists and, in theory. the cost of building the chapels 
and accommodation for evangelists, were all supposed to be 
met from Lesotho funds. There was never enough money, 
however. The chronic financial problem was reflected at the 
level of staffing and logistics: the Society depending on the 
DRC and, especially, the Swiss mission for chapels and other 
necessities. even after the building of their first church at 
Village Main in 1933. Louis Mabille. for example. stayed for 
ss This and the preceding paragraph based on 
Leselinvana, 25 May 1938; JME, 1937, pp.182-84; 1940-41, 
pp.158-59: 1942-45. pp.129-32; Labarthe, "Mission Work". pp.2-
5. JME, 1937, pp.182-84; 1942-45, pp.129-32; Leselinvana, 25 
May 1938, G. Mabille, "Missionary Work on the Rand", EN, 
vol.3, no.l, January-February 1949, pp.4-5; and Malefane, "The 
Work of the Lord", pp.4-7. 
'.::51 
some time at a house belonging to the head of the Swiss 
Mission in Johannesburg. Tumisi and Ellenberger held 
communion services at Randfontein in 1927, using a chapel and 
plates belonging to the Swiss. David Patose held his services 
under a tree outside the mine for years before the r . .::,WlSS 
invited him to share their chapel. When the PEMS began its 
work in 1922 the staff of the Swiss Mission consisted of 14 
evangelists. over 100 volunteers. a white missionary and an 
African pastor, while the PEMS by contrast, only managed to 
muster 12 evangelists as late as 1942. The DRC staff. in the 
mid-1930s in the sector covered by Tumisi alone with his 
volunteers. was made up of four evangelists. two pastors and a 
number of volunteers.es 
The survival of the Society depended on collections and fund-
raising. Annual collections in Lesotho for the Rand 
mission, were usually preceded by a heavy campaign in 
Leselinyana, in the form of big headlines, frontpage reports 
on progress, and 
mission to "save" 
advertisements urging 
their "children" from 
Basotho to help the 
evil. In July and 
August 1934, this newspaper even ran a twelve-part series on 
the history of the "Basotho on the Gold Mines" which was 
mainly focused on PEMs· work on the Rand. A lot of publicity 
for the collections took place in the churches themselves, 
especially when Ellenberger or Mabille, for example, were 
visiting. Though these collections averaged 1400 during their 
first few years. they began to fall away as the country·s 
economic crisis worsened, reaching 1196.12s.7d in 1934. The 
number of evangelists employed, four between 1925 and 1929 and 
a fifth one in 1932, was directly linked to the funds 
available. A lodging place for an evangelist cost 1200 in 
1929, and the building of a chapel on State Mine in 1935 
amounted to 1372. including 184 from the pockets of the miner-
members themselves. Additional purchases, such as benches and 
s 9 Falk. The Grnwth of the Church, p.171; JME, 1929, 
pp.222-27; Leselinvana, 11 July 1934; 25 February 1927; 
Mochochonono, 18 June 1938; APEMS. Mf.730. L. Mabille report 
on "Evangelising Basotho workers", 23 October 1922; Mf.759, R. 
Ellenberger to an unnamed friend, 4 August 1925. 
f) h, 'l ~,_.,._ _ _, 
pulpits, depended on donations from miner-members and further 
fund-raising. The shortage of staff meant that a few people 
had to cover great distances, and above all, there was the 
problem + o ... the relatively short length of stay of individual 
miners in the compounds, which created the problem of 
continuity and follow-up, especially as many miners rarely 
returned to the same mine after the expiry of their 
contracts. 70 
Besides these financial and logistical difficulties, there was 
an ideological problem linked to the approach of the PEMS, a 
problem that had cost the Society dearly in colonial Lesotho 
itself. The PEMS, as we saw, had presented itself as a 
"Church of Basotho/Moshoeshoe". wanting not only to give 
itself a monopoly over the evangelisation of the Basotho but 
also historical legitimacy. Even though this had lost ground 
to the Catholics and. to a certain extent, separatist churches 
as well. the PEMS transferred it to the Rand. On the eve of 
MoshoeshoeJs Day in 1928, Louis Mabille was said to have been 
addressed as "Moshoeshoe" by Basotho miners at Geldenhuis 
Deep. But for all that MabilleJs sermons invoked the good 
works of Moshoeshoe, there was always a powerful undercurrent 
of criticism of the Basotho way of life. The PEMS saw itself 
as Jesus going after his lost flock of sheep. Sermons in the 
compounds would compare the migration of Basotho and their 
e~entual return home, to a soul leaving the body for heaven 
after death. More than this, PEMS operatives, including 
evangelists and African ministers. were convinced that theirs 
was the "correct" Word. What was life to Basotho, a way of 
life that had significant historical, socio-economic and 
cultural foundations, was seen as a moral and cultural 
disorder that needed to be cured by the gospel. This arrogant 
approach led to intolerance and antagonism towards Basotho 
practices, all of which were dismissed as bad or wrong.71 
70 JME. 1930, pp.308-09; Leselinyana, 27 January 1928; 
11 February 1927; 21 August 1935; 31 January 1934. 
71 . Leselinyana, 16 March 1928; 12 October 1932; 13 March 
1928. 
George Mabille, the son of Louis Mabille, offered a typical 
explanation for the failure of the Rand mission: 
Out of over 200 000 Basutos from Basutoland living in the 
Transvaal [he wrote in 1950], we hardly minister to 30 
000, whereas in Basutoland out of five Basutos, one 
belongs to the Church. "Why so many lost for the 
kingdom?" will you ask. Because evil and sin are 
prevalent in those quick grown urban areas. Strong 
drink pulls down both the brains and bodies of 
thousands. Immorality and prostitution break dcwn many 
families, which, in most cases. were only built up 
yesterday. Crime, burglaries and faction fighting are 
notorious at Johannesburg and it makes our heart bleed to 
realize that, in many cases. Basutos of Basutoland are 
involved ... To those who have chosen to serve the Devil, 
church and religion have but a meaning of distrust.72 
No less stark were the conversion narratives that the 
missionaries chose to believe, record and publish: 
Jakobo was a young miner at City Deep out from 
Basutoland. He was coming from a heathen family and 
except from school which he attended at the age of 
fourteen and fifteen years. he never bothered about the 
name of Jesus. One Sunday he was allowed to leave the 
Compound and he went with a comrade to visit. at a 
location of Orlando, Basuto prostitutes and Skokian 
queens. At night, half dizzy with drink. he was on his 
way back to the compound having lost the precious money 
he foolishly had carried about with him. Suddenly in the 
pitch darkness he saw a lovely man clad in white 
garments, standing in front of him on the pavement and 
pointing towards green pastures in the rear ground. His 
face was filled with love and he addressed him softly 
saying: "Would you like to follow the good shepherd to 
these wonderful green pastures?" Jakobo answered in a 
whisper, as he felt scared: "Yes Sir, I would ... " Jesus 
then pointed towards our Village Main Church alongside. 
for it was the Lord Jesus, who was addressing Jakobo and 
said: "Go to your pastor, he will show you the way".73 
Recurrent themes in the plot of such conversion narratives are 
the locations, beer. the way to salvation, and the reaction 
from one·s kinsmen and dormitory mates. The latter theme 
shows that missionaries and their converts were aware that 
conversion meant cutting old social bonds and replacing them 
72 G. Mabille, "Spiritual Gold Digging on the Rand", W, 
vol.4, no.2, March-April 1950, p.22. 
73 . Ibid. 
with Christian brotherhood. Both the missionaries and their 
converts needed such stories; the latter wanted to dramatise 
and rationalise the change they were undergoing, and the 
former by presenting themselves as saviours (in the form of 
Jesus or angels appearing at the conclusion of the narrative), 
wanted to shift the cause of the failure of their work on to 
drunkenness in the compounds and locations. One "Coffee" 
told Bennet that while he was in hospital recovering from an 
accident, he had a dream in which he was turned back at the 
gates of heaven by an African preacher: "Go back to earth 
again", he was told, "and give up drink and heathen customs. 
join the class and prepare to be a Christ.ian". 7 4 
Evidence of missionary intolerance and arrogance significantly 
influenced the attitude of many Basotho migrants. One Mosotho 
complained in Leselinvana that PEMS evangelists were guick to 
attack and condemn "wrong-doers". Often, he continued. "they 
have the habit of coming to the compound, make a very big 
noise in their evangelisation. stopping at the door [of 
dormitories] while those working night shift were still 
asleep". That is why, he explained. some compound managers 
refused to allow missionary societies access to their 
compounds. He thought that evangelists needed to respect 
people more, and know the times when miners took their break, 
meals or changed shifts.75 
What the PEMS neglected to take into consideration. was the 
significance that miners in the compounds attached to their 
holidays, as well as the positive role that beer-drinking and 
dances, and even prostitutes, played in the lives of Basotho 
migrants. The determination of African miners to maintain 
Sunday as a holiday was early remarked by H.O. Buckle in his 
1913 report on Native Grievances.76 One PEMS minister 
ruefully observed that "though these Basuto workers on the 
Rand get so interested in the Word of God, they take it that 
p.7. 
74 Bennett, Romance and RPality, p.31. 
75 Leselinvana, 5 July 1939. 
76 Report of the Native Grievances Inquiry. 1913-14, 
the usefulness of the Gospel is only to dispel their sorrows 
and to comfort and console them in times of need and 
difficulty. On days of happiness and sunshine they do not 
bother to go to Sunday services: they would rather go to 
location beer-halls or visit friends on a Sunday than go to 
church''.77 Undeterred. missionaries would try to begin their 
Sunday visits around 10h00, before workers left for the 
locations or took up their drinking sessions from where they 
had left off the previous Saturday night. But this tactic did 
not work. M1ile there were many Basotho who wanted to join 
the church, they did not want to part with their beer. 
Certainly there were 
this problem. Nor 
many people who dropped out because 
was it uncommon for drunk miners to 
of 
be 
among those present at church services; some would be drowsy 
or even black-out and collapse in front of the messenger of 
God. 7 8 
A further problem that confronted the PEMS was that of the new 
generation of converts trying to appropriate Christianity for 
their own ends. Towards the end of the 1930s ceremonial 
feasts known as tafole ea bafu (table of the dead) began to 
take place in some PEMS stations in Lesotho. This practice 
was condemned as "ancestor worship" by the Church leadership, 
as it essentially involved paying homage to dead relatives. 
The other problem concerned the concerts which took place in 
PEMS chapels across the Reef and at other centres. Louis 
Mabille was approached by some members in 
concert. ostensibly to raise money for 
1929 to organise a 
the building of a 
church. but he dismissed the proposal on "moral" grounds. A 
77 Selikane. "Church of Basutoland". p.10. 
78 Mohapeloa, From Mi,3Bion, p.18; JME. 1929, p.227. The 
PEMS had a serious problem of drinking within its churches in 
Lesotho, and this reached a crisis point in the 1930s with 
some evangelists even attending their services drunk. Calls 
were made to extend the branches of the PEMS temperance 
organisation. the Blue Cross (founded in 1885), to all parts 
of the country. The PEMS was under pressure to give in lest 
it lost a lot of its members. See T. Verdier. "L~alcoholisme 
au Lessouto", J.ME, vol.1, 1930; and E. Mphatsoe, "The Blue 
Cross Association in Basutoland", BW, vol.8. no.3. July-
September 1954. 
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year later, he expelled one of his volunteers for having 
organised a fund-raising party at which beer had been on 
sale. The problem became more serious in the 1340s when 
evangelists. baholo and bahlanka, played a leading role in 
organising such concerts. Coninck completely mishandled the 
crisis and was recalled to Lesotho in 1946. 7 9 His 
replacement was George Mabille, summoned from Ivory Coast as 
an emergency measure. Mabille·s first move was to impose a 
total ban on concerts, but the "rebels" refused to obey his 
order. Tensions continued to mount. and the explosion finally 
occurred when Mabille was assaulted during his sermon by 
members of the congregation at Orlando. This was soon 
afterwards followed by a bloody fight at one of the PEMs· big 
annual services at Village Main. The services of evangelists 
who were regarded as puppets of the white leadership of the 
Church, were deliberately disrupted, and some even had to flee 
for their lives. An evangelist at Orlando had to hold one of 
his services under the protection of 20 policemen, and the 
situation as a whole was partially brought under control only 
with the arrest of some of the "rebels". This case shows that 
the "rebels" represented a new generation of mission converts 
who wanted to adapt the church culture to the demands of urban 
life, and who were opposed to strict white supervision.so 
Beer. women (and matekat,;;e) and dance. as we saw in Chapter 
Four, were more than simply forms of entertainment for Basotho 
workers. They expressed and confirmed group and kinship 
solidarity and continuity with home. and were avenues for 
escaping the dehumanising and alienating conditions of mine 
work and compound life. In the locations and slums, miners 
visited marabi shebeens; the majority of likoata preferring 
urban Sotho shebeens where they enjoyed themselves with .f.am.Q 
and focho dances and music. One Mosotho PEMS pastor lamented 
79 For his earlier 
the case of Tumisi above. 
mishandling of another incident, see 
eo Paragraph based on G. Mabille. Un 
Une Equipe: Temoinage a Michael Malefane 
George Mabille, (Paris, The Author, 
Mohapeloa, From Mission, p.18; .JME, 1929, 
Noire et un Blanc -





Men do not go to church on Sundays but join one drinking 
circle after another to the accompaniment of the piercing 
ululation of the women. Their language takes on hard 
tones and is associated with a fierce blood-thirsty 
nation. They pride themselves in singing church hymns 
over pots of beer; they take verses from the Holy Bible 
and twist them to serve their own ends. "Abide with me" 
becomes a prostitutionJs plea.si 
But underlying Basotho migrantsJ need for relaxation was a 
marked attachment to their own independent view of the world. 
One PEMS missionary was later to note that: 
[t]here are still vast realms of thought to conquer in 
evangelizing the Basuto on the Rand, - they still bear 
their fore-fathersJ beliefs of old; witchcraft, ancestral 
spirits, and the like. If an accident befalls a young man 
in the shafts under-ground, he believes that his great-
grand-fathers are angry with him, and are to be appeased. 
Such men, the mission on the Rand has tried to win over, 
but apparently in vain.82 
It was a way of looking at things which was not easily 
compatible with Christian beliefs. Charms were used by 
Basotho migrants for protection against sorcerers and 
misfortune and to control the external world by bringing luck 
their owners. Diviners were routinely consulted in order to 
"strengthened" individuals for the long road to the mines, or 
to bring luck to those who wanted to become foremen or 
compound policemen. Diviners were often to be found in and 
outside mine compounds,83 and indeed several leading PEMS 
members actually left the Church to become diviners. One 
Mosotho evangelist was to confess that "even our own 
Christians are attracted by queer. strange ways".84 
ai E.A. Makhele, "The Tragedy of Basuto Life on the 
Rand", llli, vol. 7, no.4, October-December 1953, p.55. 
s2 Selikane, "Church of Basutoland", p.11. 
133 Ashton. Basuto, pp. 282-316: H. Dieterlen, "La 
Medecine et les Medecines au Lessouto··. Les Cahiers 
Missionaires, no.17, 1930, especially p.24. 
84 . Malebane, "Work of the Lord", p.6: see Dieterlen. "La 
Medecine et les Medecins", and F. Laydevant, "La Sorcellerie 
en Basutoland". Etudes Missionaires, vol.7, no.2. 1937. Of 
course, the persistence of superstition alongside Christianity 
was and is not unknown in Europe and North America. 
Ev·en many of those who had been ccnv:?.rted in ~e3othc i '::self. 
including ex-students from Morija. did their best to evade and 
dodge the missionary and his evangelists on the Rand. This 
resistance. whether by those who were alI'eady convert.a or by 
"heathens", was not restricted to simply not coming t.) 
meetings or services: it could take the form of sabotaging 
services or meetings actually in progress.35 An evangelist 
described the reaction of Basotho miners when they were 
visited in their rooms: "Right here [in the room]. words of 
contempt and mockery are thrown at this servant of the Lord ... 
Eventually some ask him: JWho are you, what do you want here7J 
He does not answer and carries on".86 
One of my informants admitted to holding such an attitude 
while on the Rand. Workers did not understand what 
missionaries were doing there because they themselves were 
there for only one thing - to work: you will hear 
somebody say JThis man is here with his things of 
missionaries. We are not for missionaries. man: we are here 
only for work!~ When we say this we then sing our 
mohobelo". 87 
When, for ezample, an evangelist or missionary had gathered 
his group at a courtyard corner, his problems had barely 
begun. In the words of one evangelist who experienced it all 
before: 
... a passer-by shouts his war song, as he goes past the 
group. Some of our people ask him to keep silent and off 
he goes. He is soon followed by another who sings his 
own praises .... They persuade him to lower his voice. 
Here come two fellows cursing each other. They restrain 
them. Some are playing Bantu chess [morabaraba]. others 
dance. The evangelist preaches in the very midst of 
noise. clapping of hands and curses.as 
Such behavicur. especially the playing c1f drums and other 
,3 5 JtlE. 1928, p.88; Leselinvana. 1 August 1893; 1 August 
1934: 8 August 1934. 
'36 Malef ane. "Work of the Lord", p. 5: 
87 Interview with Samuel Mokoaleli. 
·'3 8 Malef ane. "Work of the Lord". p. 6. 
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noisy instruments. were often deliberately aimed at disrupting 
meetings or services: "We were announcing our meeting by 
moving about the courtyard of the compound, singing hymns. 
with our group of christians [Coninck once lamented]; but 
young heathens, armed with their drums, also moved about the 
courtyard. causing a big disturbance; on this day we preached 
in vain".88 Nor were the PEMS missionaries the only ones 
sub.ject to such hostilities from 
Converts were occasionally attacked. 
mine-dance groups.so 
One of BakerJs early 
converts was harassed by his dormitory mates for no longer 
participating in and financially contributing towards beer-
drinking sessions. His books were torn up. his slate smashed, 
and attempts made to prevent him from attending Sunday 
services. but he managed to force his way out.Bi 
Conclusion 
The propagation of Christianity in the mine compounds during 
the period under review was undertaken not only by the 
missionary societies, but also independently by African lay 
preachers. Missionary work among Basotho gold miners was 
largely due to the efforts of the Mabille brothers, Ernest and 
Louis. But the conservatism of the PEMS, and its intolerance 
of the Basotho way of life, resulted in tensions within the 
church. The PEMS, like other missionary societies. shifted 
its focus to the locations after World War II in response to 
the failure of the work in the mine compounds. as well as the 
increase in the number of urban-based Africans. 
89 J.ME, 1942-45, p.132. 
9 ° For the experience of the Anglicans, see Bennet, 
Romance and Reality, p.33. 
91 . Baker. Grace Triumphant, p.106. 
CHAPTER SIX 
"FACTION FIGHTS": "FIXED BAYONETS" AGAINST STICKS AND 
STONES 
Collective violence. referred tc as "faction fights" because 
of their ethnic character, were common in the gold mine 
oompounds as early as the late 1880s. and their prevalence has 
continued well into the 1990s. A correspondent of the .s..t.ar 
reported in August 1889 that "faction fights" were now 
"becoming common [on the Rand] where strong drink, kerries, 
and sticks are within easy reach", and recommended the 
erection of closed compounds as one way of dealing with the 
problem.1 This tendency by outside observers to associate 
"faction fights" with beer-drinking and "sticks" was to be 
inherited by historians and other social scientists. leading 
to the neglect of many important factors behind and around 
such clashes. 
Those historians who have recently turned their attention to 
the study of collective violence in Rand mine compounds, have 
helped to shed additional light on the causes. importance and 
8ignificance of this phenomenon.2 Their studies have 
attempted to understand the symbolic significance of "faction 
fights··, seeing them as expressions of ethnic solidarity and 
masculinity among African workers, at the same time relating 
this to the rural experiences of these miners. In one way or 
another. they draw on Robert GordonJs study of "tribal fights" 
in a Namibian compound.3 But none of them systematically 
1 ~- 21 August 1889. 
2 Amongst the most recent studies are those by W. 
Beinart, "Political and Collective Violence in Southern 
i\frican Historiography", and T .D. Moodie. "Ethnic Violence on 
South African Gold Mines, both in ,Journal of Southern African 
Studies, vol.18, no.3, September 1992: T.D. Moodie Cwith 
Ndatshe Vivienne), Going for Gold, pp.180-210; Harries, Work. 
Culture and Identity, pp.121-26. 
3 R. Gordon, in his "Celebration of Ethnicity: A JTribal 
Fight J in a Namibian Mine Compound", .in B. M. du Toi t, (ed. ) , 
Ethnicity in Modern Africa, CWestview Press, USA, 1978), uses 
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incorporate in their perspectives and arguments the important. 
studies conducted by labour historians in the 1970s on black 
mineworkers· protests.4 One result of this is that little 
attempt is made to distinguish "faction fights" from 
"disturbances", "riots" or "strikes": acts of inter-ethnic 
confrontation among African workers are treated as ''faction 
fighting''. William Beinart, for example, has even gone to the 
extent of arguing that for the men who were involved in 
"faction fights", "the emphasis was on violence as display and 
sport",5 while Dunbar Moodie suggests that prior to the 1970s 
the "rules for faction fighting on the mines seem to have been 
derived from the mores of cattle-herding boys'',s hence the 
frequent use of stones and sticks and the relatively low 
casualty toll. For Patrick Harries, "faction fights" were the 
"ritual enactment of violence" and were "less about death than 
display".7 He also claims that these fights were 
"practically extinct" by 1913, due to the suppression of the 
sale of liquor to Africans, and the passage of the Prevention 
of Crime Ordinance which outlawed the carrying of "dangerous 
weapons", as well as the general tightening of control over 
the compounds. "Faction fights" were then largely replaced by 
"tribal dancing" which "served to produce a more peaceful 
factionalism" . 13 
what he calls a "symbolic interactionist perspective". See 
especially p.214. 
4 See, for example, those by P. Warwick, "Black 
Industrial Protest on the Witwatersrand, 1901-02", in E. 
Webster, Ced.), Essays in Southern African Labour History, 
<Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1978); S. Moroney, "Mine Worker 
Protest on the Witwatersrand, 1901-1912'', South African Labour 
Bulletin, vol.3, no.5, 1977; P. Bonner, "The 1920 Black 
Mineworkers· Strike: a preliminary account", in B. Bozzoli, 
Ced.), Labour. Township and Protest Studies in the Social 
History of the Witwatersrand, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 
1979); I. Phimister, and C. van Onselen, "The Political 
Economy of Tribal Animosity: A Case Study of the 1929 Bulawayo 
Location ·Faction Fight·". Journal of Southern African 
Studies, vol.6. no.l. 1979; T. Ranger, "Faction Fighting, Race 
Consciousness and Worker Consciousness: A Note on the 
Jagersfontein Riots of 1914''. South African Labour Bulletin, 
vol.4, no.5, 1978. 
5 Beinart. "Political and Collective Violence", p.479. 
s Moodie. "Ethnic Violence", p.596. 
7 Harries, Work. Culture and Identity, p.122. 
e Ibid., p.212. 
Arguably, such approaches depoliticise what in many instances 
were militant worker actions against mine managements. and by 
using the case of Basotho workers. this chapter will argue 
that "fAction fights" were more complex than these most recent 
studies allow. Without denying or minimising the ethnic 
dimensions of many "faction fights". it will be suggested. 
with the use of the case of three "faction fights" at the 
Premier Diamond Mine. that most fights were influenced by 
working and living conditions. and by wage disputes. In all 
of this, the context of particular fights is crucial. as it 
demonstrates the impact of social, political and economic 
change incidence and content. 
Basotho and Faction Fights 
Many "faction fights" took place during mine holidays on 
Sundays, Christmas, Boxing day, and New Year~s Day, because, 
as we saw in Chapter Four, it was during these days that 
compound workers engaged in various leisure activities such as 
beer-drinking, gambling, sports, and dancing competitions. As 
early as 1896 mine officials were trying, together with the 
police. to devise ways of ensuring that fights did not occur 
in the compounds. In 1912 the Chamber of Mines was approached 
by the Commissioner of Police to urge its members to ask their 
compound managers and their assistants not to take leave 
during that period in order to ensure that "disturbances" did 
not take place during "native festivities". 9 
The first recorded Basotho involvement in "faction fights" on 
the Rand dates from 1889. In August of that year. Zulu 
:.-mrJ.:ers. after a "beer-drinking festival". provoked 
"Matchlozas" (Xhosa) labourers who in turn scught the 
assistance of Basotho migrants. But the first serious 
"fact ion fight" in which Basotho miners were invol 0.red was at 
the Premier Diamond Mine in 1907. By 1910. the records reveal 
9 Standard and Diggers News, 31 December 1896; .Q:1AE, 
1912, p.394. 
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that Basotho workers were involved in over six "fights" and 
"riots" in different mining areas on the Rand and in the 
Orange Free State in that year alone. And it was then that 
Basotho chiefs, the Basutoland government. and the Native 
Affairs Department all took an interest in Basotho involvement 
in "faction fights". The problem continued in the 1920s and 
reached its peak in the mid-1930s.io Looking back some 
years later. Eric Rosenthal was able to remind his readers of 
a "time ... when Johannesburg newspapers every Monday morning 
were full of accounts of fights. usually with casualties. 
between members of hostile tribes in the compounds, and almost 
invariably the Basuto was to the fore" . .ll. 
Basotho chiefs, organised in the Basutoland National Council, 
had their own particular understanding of the causes of 
"faction fights". At first, they tended to link lintoa 
(fights or strikes) on the mines to the use of Zulu 
"policeboys" over Basotho migrants, when the latter were in 
the majority in certain compounds. On this basis, they 
requested the Chamber of Mines, through the Resident 
Commissioner and the NAD, to appoint only Basotho indunas and 
"policeboys" where Basotho were employed. Some chiefs even 
felt it necessary to ensure that, as in the past, each group 
of Basotho recruits left with a responsible chief to look 
after their interests at the mines.l.2 
However, as far as the chiefs were concerned, the nature of 
the problem began to change in the course of the 1920s with 
the arrival of matekatse on the Reef, as well as the general 
increase in labour unrest. Gradually the problem of lintoa 
merged with that of matekatse, and the solution to lintoa was 
now seen as linked to the repatriation of these "undesirable" 
Ba.sot.ho women. By the 1930s, lintoa had disappeared when 
1.0 .s.t.ar_, 12 August 1889; Basutoland, Proceedings of the 
Basutoland National Council, <henceforth EliC), 1910; 
Mochochonono, 29 May 1937. 
11 E. Rosenthal, African Switzerland: Basutoland of 
Today, (Juta and Co. Ltd., Cape Town, 1948), p.194. 
12 BN..C. 1910; Report of Proceedings of the BNC, 1908, 
p.21. 
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"faction fights" were being referred to. and instead 
meferefere rriots or anarchy) became the usual term employed. 
For the Sesotho press and Basotho chiefs, the problem was now 
one of the boitshoaro (conduct and behaviour) of Basotho en 
the Reef. The problem was now triangular: at the apex were 
matekatse with beer and prostitution; while in opposite 
2orners were "faction fights" in the compounds, and fights 
between Basotho gangs in the locations.13 The solution was 
sought in despatching special envoys to the Reef to 
"reprimand" Basotho men and women. 
The first official visit from colonial Lesotho to the Rand to 
inquire into the causes of lintoa and communicate the position 
of the Basutoland National Council to South African officials, 
was undertaken in 1911 by George Boyse, a colonial government 
official. In all, Boyse visited the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association and the Government Native Labour Bureau 
compounds, and twelve different compounds on several mines. 
He produced a report, covering the numbers and distribution of 
Basotho employed on those mines and their conditions of 
service. which was used by the Basutoland government to call 
for certain changes and improvements in the working and living 
conditions of Basotho miners.14 But the NAD defended the 
mines, and the suggestion that only Basotho be appointed as 
indunas and "policeboys" in compounds where Basotho workers 
were in the majority was not accepted.15 
Soon after the failure of Boyse~s visit, Basotho workers were 
1nvolved in another big "fight" at the Premier Mine in 
November 1913. In May of the following year, the Paramount 
Chief sent his brother, Teko, with a message that, according 
to one report, "was delivered by him in private to a number of 
13 BN.G, 1910; Mochochnnono, 29 May' 1937: 19 June 1937. 
14 SAB, NTS 2092, 216/280, Boyse· report to RC, October 
1911 (undated l. 
15_ SAB. NTS 2092, 216/280, memorandum of NAD Inspector 
(Rayton) on "Treatment of Basuto Natives at the Premier Mine", 
14 July 1911. 
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the most prominent members of the tribe" on the mine.is The 
1918-19 labour unrest on the Reef added another factor to 
lintoa. As shown in Chapter Four. the Paramount Chief 
despatched deputations in July 1918 and March 1919 to 
intervene as strikes were seen as nothing more than the 
problem of conduct. 
In December 1928 Chief Mukuati Letsie also payed a visit; he 
went "round all the locations and mines visiting my people and 
to see how they are treated and 
that "from Randfontein to 
the like", but was not happy 
Springs", and "especially 
Randfontein and Benoni locations", the Basotho "go and contact 
with the free Native women", and that "Basuto Boys from the 
mines involved disappointing characters in the locations ... and 
even go as 
the NAD to 
far as the blood-shedding [sic]".J.7 He wanted 
refuse permission for Basotho workers in the 
compounds to visit locations, but this was not accepted on the 
grounds that "a procedure that had been adopted in connection 
with restricting the movements of these natives so as to keep 
them out of the Locations was ruled by the Courts to be 
illegal and steps are being taken to amend the Law so that 
other measures to this end may 
situation failed to improve to the 
in June 1936 Chief Sempe Nkoebe was 
be adopted".J.8 But the 
chiefs· satisfaction, and 
on the Reef "to convey a 
message of reprimand from the Paramount Chief to the Basuto 
labourers working on the mines''. According to Mochochonono, 
the Paramount Chief wanted, "the Basuto along the Reef [to] be 
informed to behave properly and avoid participating in 
unnecessary fights··.is The Paramount·s letter. earlier 
published at length by the .s..t.ar. expressed disapproval of: 
... your bad behaviour resulting in uncalled for public 
violence and damage to other people·s properties .... I say 
to you that behaviour of this nature spoils the good name 
is SAB. GNLB 149. 136/14/D.37. NAD Inspector <Rayton) to 
DNL, 15 May 1914. 
i 7 SAE. GNLB 374, 149/28/110, Letsie to Chief Native 
Commissioner <Witwatersrand), 23 December 1928. 
1.8_ Ibid .. Chief Native Commissioner (Witwatersrand) to 
Letsie, 19 January 1929. 
19 . Hochochonono, 13 June 1936: 20 June 1936. 
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of Chief Moshesh which has since been regarded with 
respect ... Over and above that you are spoiling the very 
name of Basutos as a whole which has hitherto remained 
respectable among others, and by doing so you are likely 
to deprive your own people of the little bread they were 
earning by working in the mines on account of your public 
violence.20 
The letter went on to urge Basotho men to take their 
complaints to the mine and Union authorities or to the 
Paramount Chief himself. The names of those "misbehaving" 
were to be sent to the Paramount Chief for punishment return 
to home. But Sempe left before the completion of his mission, 
because of the lack of cooperation from most Basotho miners 
and matekatse. 2 1. 
While such fragmentary evidence as there is suggests that the 
question of "faction fights" in the 1930s was qualitatively 
different from that of the beginning of the century, not least 
because of black urbanisation, the matter cannot be pursued 
here. Instead. the remainder of this chapter gives a closer 
look at the "faction fights" that took place at the Premier 
Mine in 1907, 1910 and 1913, and in doing so hopes to advance 
scholarly understanding of this phenomenon. 
Premier Diamond Mine. 
The Premier Mine started operating in January 1905, and in 
June of the same year what was then the world~s largest 
diamond, later called the Great Star of Africa, was found on 
the mine. In November 1907 the Star of Africa was given to 
King Edward VII as a birthday present. to add to his "Crown 
Jewels"! The mine continued to grow, closing down briefly 
during World War I and in 1930s during the depression. but was 
the largest diamond mine in the world in the 1960s. Little is 
known about the men who worked on thi3 mine: the annual 
reports of the Premier <Transvaal) Diamond Mining Company Ltd. 
20 .s..t..a.r. 15 May 1936. 
21. SAB. NTS 2569, 887/295, Imp. Sec. to SNA, 6 July 
1936; Mochochonono, 18 July 1936. 
itself are notoriously unhelpful. Besides the occasional 
paragraph and some statistics on white and African labour. the 
bulk of the content of the reports is devoted to dividends and 
developmental work on the mine.22 
The case of the Premier Mine in this study of Basotho 
involvement in "faction fighting" is .justified by two factors. 
Firstly, as shown in Chapter Two, the mine was for the most 
part of the period 1910-20 the largest single employer of 
Basotho on the Rand. And, secondly, the first serious ''faction 
fight" that involved Basotho miners took place on this mine in 
1907. 
"Squabbles Over a Pot of Mealie Pap". 
At the time of the outbreak of the "fight" in 1907 the Premier 
Mine employed 9 495 Africans. of whom 2 900 were Basotho. 4 
175 Bapedi, 1 200 Shangaan, 345 Zulu, 481 Nyasaland "boys" 
<Malawians), and 394 "miscellaneous". They were housed in 
three compounds, Number l, Number 1 Extension. and Number 2. 
The two former compounds were for underground workers. and the 
latter was for surface employees. 
On Sunday the 1st of September 1907 at 10 a.m .. a fight broke 
out at the mine between the "British Basuto" and the 
"Transvaal Basuto" (Pedi). According to the Rand Daily Mail, 
there had been minor "disturbances" before then, not least a 
fortnight previously when Basotho workers had a difference" 
with the "Central African natives". "The affair", however, 
was comparatively unimportant". By comparison, the Sunday 
fight was the first serious "disturbance". It began with a 
''limited and short skirmish between British Basuto and the 
Transvaal Basuto plus all others with sticks and stones and 
22 Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa, vols. 3 and 
9; Premier rTransvaal> Diamond Mining Company Ltd.: Annual 
Reports (PDMAR), 1907-16 have some labour data but this is 
omitted in all subsequent reports. 
kaffir pots and any missiles that were }vrndy". 23 
Approximately 4 500 Africans were involved. The "quarrel" 
origin8ted in Compound No.l Extension and spread to Number 1. 
other ethnic groups also taking sides. The Shangaan. reported 
the Pretoria Acting Resident Magistrate. "appear to have been 
reluctant participators. and the Zulus took up a position of 
armed neutrality".24 
The Assistant compound manager, Mitchell. arrived on the scene 
af the fight with one of his constables. but. claimed the 
Daily Mail, "was knocked out three times, and once had to use 
his revolver to get away". Mitchell, however, managed to 
separate the warring groups - confining them to two separate 
compounds - with the help of the local police force made up of 
a sergeant and four men. Twenty constables arrived later that 
morning, and in the afternoon 50 more constables came by 
"special train" from Pretoria. "In addition to this". 
reported the Daily Mail, "there are a small number of ordinary 
mine guards and a corps of special recruits from the mine 
[white] employees."25 One hundred and thirty of these were 
sworn in the following day at 8 a.mas "special constables". 
"I did this", declared the Acting Inspector W.A.S. Ray in 
justification of his move. "in order to place Europeans under 
some control and in swearing each man I particularly warned 
him that no shots were to be fired unless orders were given ... 
and that any man who fired without ordera would be held 
responsible".26 The situation was eventually brought under 
control, despite a small "disturbance" in the canteen later in 
the evening. 
But on Monday at about 6 a.m .. fighting resumed. The Dailv 
t13.il reported that the "boys who had turned out to work had 
23 Rand Daily Mail, (henceforth Daily Mail). 3 September 
1907. 
24 LNA. S7/7/40. Pretoria Acting Resident Magistrate. 
"Report as to Disturbance at the Premier Mine on the 1st and 
2nd September. 1907", 6 2,eptember 1907. 
25 Dailv Mail. 3 September 1907. 
2s. LNA. S?/7/40, Acting Inspector to DNL. 3 September 
1907. 
rapidly divided into two regiments and had appropriated all 
pick hRndles. shovels and sticks in the mine According to 
this same newspaper. the Basotho were, "clad in distinctive 
reel blankets". and the Bapedi in "their usual motley dark 
kaffir dress". By 6.30 a.m. the two groups had again been 
separated. and the police had positioned themselves between 
them. However, "the reds were dancing a war 
appeared to be thirsting for the fray". At 10 
dance, and 
a.m. a few 
workers were persuaded to resume work which had earlier been 
suspended, and by 11 a.m. all was normal. Compared to the day 
before when 19 Africans had been injured by the cuts of the 
police>s bayonets, the casualties of the Monday "fight" were 
34 injuries, three of which were serious, as well as one death 
resulting from a gun fired by one of the special constables. 
After this, observed the Daily Mail, "the Transvaal natives 
were more submissive. but the Basutos proper expressed 
themselves willing to fight the police and afterwards stated 
that they had been harder used by the latter than their 
enemies, on which grounds some agitators have suggested 
sending a petition to the Crown".27 
All the Basotho miners then refused to go out night shift, 
despite the fact that the Bapedi had worked the day shift, 
and, continued the Daily Mail, "remained in the compound, 
whence their singing rose like the noise from a huge beehive, 
changing into a pandemonium of singing and shouting clearly 
audible all over the village [the nearby white residential 
area]". 2 8 What the Daily Mail did not report was that 
Basotho workers were angered by the shooting of two of their 
compatriots, one of whom lay dying. Some miners were 
sufficiently upset by this to approach the compound manager 
and demand that they be released to return home to Lesotho. 
Indeed. the entire contingent of 600 Basotho who had been on 
the mine for three months left on Tuesday under police 
2 7 Daily Mail, 4 September 1907. 
28 Ibid. 
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escort.29 The following morning 16 Shangaan, Bapedi and 
Basotho were then arrested, and taken to Pretoria for trial as 
"ringleaders". As a result, Bapedi miners turned out for 
their day ahift armed with every available weapon. but 
pickhandles and iron rods with bolts at the end were in the 
ma.j or i ty". 30 And when it was the turn of Basotho labourers. 
einl :: 150 went to work, while some 1 500 "trooped up to the 
office [of the 
are unwilling 
Manager] and asked to leave the mine as 
to stay unless they can fight".3l The 
they 
150 
Basotho miners who had gone to work were later returned to the 
compound, their place being taken by Nyasaland "boys" whose 
peaceful movement from their compound to the mine nonetheless 
gave a 
area.32 
scare to the "ladies" in the white residential 
The four Basotho sub-chiefs employed on the mine as 
"policeboys" tried to intervene but in vain; one of them, 
George, even hid four Bapedi in his room. It was only when the 
manager of the mine promised them that they would be allowed 
to leave at the rate of 400 a week. that the Basotho miners 
returned to work on Wednesday night. This incident was taken 
so seriously by the mine that the Assistant compound manager, 
Mitchell, even 
Chief.33 
went to Lesotho to meet the Paramount 
According to the filar., the fight " originated through two 
natives having a squabble in No.1 Compound over a pot of 
mealie pap .. 34. while for the Dail:£ t1ail the fight " arose, it , 
appears, from a quarrel between two umfaans [juveniles] as to 
who should be first to fill his bucket at a tank''.35 The two 
newspapers had the same analysis as to the fundamental cause 
2s LNA. S7/7/40, Pretoria Acting Resident Magistrate. 
"Report as to Disturbance at the Premier Mine on the 1st and 
2nd September. 1907", 6 September 1907. 
3 0 Daily Mail, 4 September 1907. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Reoort of the Proceedings of ENC, 1908; LNA, S7/7/40, 
Acting Resident Magistrate~s "Report as to Disturbance at the 
Premier Mine on the 1st and 2nd of September. 1907", 6 
September 1907. 
34. .s.t..ar.. 3 September 1907. 
35. Dail:£ Mail, 3 September 1907. 
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of the conflict, however. "Some months ago". noted the Daily 
tlail, "the British Basuto were in a large minority, but lately 
their numbers have been materially augmented";36 they had, 
said the St.ar., "lately flocked in to the mine in increasing 
numbers''. 37 Testimony given before the Acting Magistrate of 
Pretoria supported the claim that the "fight" was sparked off 
by a squabble between a Mosotho and a Mopedi at the water tap. 
but the magistrate realised that much more was at stake. He 
summed up his findings as follows: "Shortly the true cause of 
the disturbance in the first instance appears to have been 
tribal feeling coupled with labour jealousy arising out of 
competition over piece work", while at the same time the 
Basotho also "consider themselves a superior race on the 
ground that they have never been conquered and are better 
educated than the others".38 
"Getting The Boys to Turn out to Work at Midnight" 
The Daily Mail of Sunday 31st of May 1910 reported a "riot" at 
the Premier Mine which had led to African workers stoning mine 
officials and the summoning to the scene of the police. The 
"disturbance" was caused by the mine officials~ attempt "to 
get the boys to turn out to work at [Sunday] midnight". This 
order had been disobeyed, and "the natives by way of showing 
their disapproval conunenced to create the disturbance". Soon 
afterwards "there developed preliminaries to a faction fight 
between the British and Transvaal Basutos [Bapedi]".38 
Tension later subsided and everyone went back to work. 
However, there were "fresh troubles" the following day. 
because of a "fight" between the "British Basuto" and the 
"Transvaal Basuto". Once again, work came to a complete 
standstill. Matters escalated after an attempt by the 
36 Ibid,, 4 September 1907. 
37 .s.t.ar., 3 September 1907. 
38 LNA, S7/7/40, Acting Resident Magistrate~s "Report as 
to Disturbance at the Premier Mine on the 1st and 2nd of 
September. 1907'', 6 September 1907. 
39_ Daily Mail, 31 May 1910. 
fighting workers to break through a police barrier, and in the 
ensuing carnage, eight Africans lost their lives and 40 were 
injured. On Tuesday 150 police reinforcements arrived, but by 
then all was quiet. Mine officials toyed with the idea that 
the "Moshesh boys" should do an extra afternoon or night 
shift, but "the angry aspect of the crowd induced the 
management to think better of their proposition··- Later at 
night (at 10 p.m.) 30 members of the Premier Rifle Club40 
were sworn in as "special constables", and on Wednesday 
morning, the Bapedi turned out for their shift at 5 a.m .. 
still armed with pickhandles and "heavy sticks", but under 
police guard, and the watchful gaze of "heavy-eyed civilians" 
and "other persons". Shangaan workers later followed suit 
once they had been promised that the Basotho would not be 
allowed out of their compound while they were on duty. 
Despite the fact that 12 Bapedi and Basotho "ringleaders" were 
arrested later that same day, all the Basotho miners went 
night shift.41. 
The Daily Mail attributed the "riot" to the fact that on the 
day of the funeral of King Edward VII, mine officials had 
released the workers four hours before the end of the shift. 
but the miners took this to be a "concession without loss of 
pay As it happened. the only group affected by this were 
the "Moshesh boys" who were quick to revolt "against the 
management~s inconsistency and refused to work".42 And. 
declared the newspaper, "the tribal instinct was uppermost 
when they [other groups] saw [Moshesh] boys refusing to work. 
and what at first was a mere local trouble developed into 
faction trouble between the various groups".43 Compared to 
the 1907 "disturbance" which had cost the mine "several 
40 This Club. the 25 November 1913 Daily Mail was to 
comment, "are a very strong corps, most of the white workers 
on the mine belong to it. It contains, too. a number of 
expert shots". 
4 1. Daily Mail, 3 June 1910. 
4 2 Ibid., 1 June 1910. 
4 3 Ibid,, 3 June 1910. 
thousand pounds", the 1910 "riot" was even more expensive, 
costing the company 110 000 each day it lasted.44 
The Basutoland National Council discussed this issue during 
its 1910 sitting, and blamed the cause of the "fight" on the 
employment of Zulu "policeboys" over Basotho workers. The 
chiefs communicated their protest to the Government Native 
Labour Bureau, and an investigation was conducted. 
Director of Native Labour, Edward Wilson, 
The Acting 
blamed the 
"disturbance" on the Basotho>s warlike propensities and 
arrogant demeanour", but argued that "these troubles can 
hardly be said to be of frequent occurrence'' since Basotho 
workers. despite their increasing number on the Rand and their 
concentration at the Premier Mine, had only been involved in 
two "fights" (in 1907 and 1910) at the latter mine and "two 
insignificant >emeutes> on the Reef". As far as the 
employment of the Basotho as mine police was concerned, he 
referred to the inquiry conducted by Ernest Mabille after the 
1907 "disturbance", and which had shown that young Basotho 
chiefs were already employed in such positions but that they 
"were too irresponsible", meaning that they were not effective 
in their control of Basotho workers on the mine.45 
Nonetheless. chiefs, supported by the High Commissioner. 
suggested that a "Mosotho of high rank" be employed as an 
induna for the Basotho, and that if such a scheme worked on 
the Premier, it should be extended to other mines.46 
The inquiry conducted by Boyse in 1911 on behalf of the 
Basutoland government, showed that the Premier Mine was losing 
popularity among the Basotho. Their numbers had dropped from 4 
000 in June 1910 to about 2 000 in July 1911. Workers 
complained to Boyse that they spent most of their pay on the 
mine as they had to purchase food from the mine stores and 
cook for themselves. The mine had a butcher. as well as meal. 
SNA. 
44 Ibid. 
45 SAE. SNA 465, NA 1578/10, Acting Assistant DNL to 
7 June 1910. The Bulletin de la Mission. 1907, pp.320-
refers to Mabille>s visit of the Premier Mine. 
46. SAB, SNA 465, NA 1578/10, SNA to DNL, 18 May 1910. 
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general goods, and coffee shops where the workers could buy 
"well cooked meat. excellent white bread. cakes, coffee. 
sausages, sardines, sweets, cigarettes, and numerous other 
tempting articles".47 All the profit from these shops went 
to the mine. Another problem that Boyse noted was the high 
mortality rate at the mine among African workers principally 
due to pneumonia, the high incidence of which he attributed to 
the fact that workers had to sleep on cement floors in the 
compounds. 
The NAD Inspector for Rayton strongly disagreed. He dismissed 
Boyse's claims, arguing instead that Basotho workers were 
attracted to the gold mines because of improving working 
conditions there, rather than because of anything wrong at the 
Premier. The Inspector insisted that the real reason Basotho 
workers were leaving was because their 
pride has been greatly wounded by the loss of prestige 
which they suffered as a result of the riot at the 
Premier Mine in June, 1910... In the latter connection 
it is significant that a gradual decrease in their 
[Basotho] numbers has taken place since that date. They 
then found themselves pitted against all the other tribes 
combined and their pride was consequently humbled. They 
do not themselves refer to their humiliation at that time 
but I am convinced that they keenly appreciate it .... 
He also rejected the miners' grievance over company stores, on 
the dubious grounds that workers constituted themselves into 
"'messes' of eight or more" for cooking arrangements. And as 
for the high mortality rate, he argued that the management was 
aware of the problem caused by sleeping on the floor. "but the 
question has hitherto however always been shelved on account 
of the great cost of erecting bunks throughout the 
compounds".48 
In all of this. neither the question of the workers' forfeited 
pay. nor the point that the actual "fight" was caused by the 
47 SAE, NTS 2092. 216/280, Boyse's report to RC, October 
1911 (undated). 
4 8 Ibid .. NAD Inspector <Rayton) to DNL. 2 November 
1911. 
275 
order that night shift workers. mostly Easotho. turn out on a 
Sunday. were considered. Basotho chiefs. for their part. were 
concerned primarily with securing supervisory positions on the 
mine for themselves and their sons. What the workers thought 
or felt. or how they lived. was not an issue. 
"The Natives, Shangaan and Moshesh. were now United in a 
Looting Game". 
The Daily Mail of 25 November 1913 reported the outbreak of 
another "disturbance" at the Premier on Sunday some time after 
4 p.m .. A Shangaan and a "Moshesh" were caught drinking and 
gambling at No.6 Compound and were arrested by the white Head 
Guard with the help of Shangaan "policeboys". A dispute arose 
between one of the "policeboys" and the "Moshesh", leading to 
the Shangaan assaulting the Mosotho worker. Both of them were 
then taken by the Head Guard and locked up in the "stocks". 
the compound detention rooms, but other "Moshesh boys" 
approached the compound manager and demanded that the 
"policeboy" be handed over to them. The compound manager 
refused and Basotho miners began looting the Shangaan 
dormitories. burning and destroying their belongings. By 7 
p.m. all was quiet, but things began to change again after 8 
p.m. with "stone-throwing" at No.6, the offices and windows of 
the compound being damaged.49 
By this time. a small contingent of police, led by a Sergeant 
McLean, had arrived, and, according to the Daily Mail, were 
confronted by a scene in which ''the Shangaans and about 500 
Moshesh boys, who also share their compound, were lining up 
and preparing for a faction fight". McLean and his five 
constables approached the warring "factions", but "the 
natives. however. charged them with sticks and stones. and in 
self-defence the order was given to fire a volley, which 
resulted in one native being killed and one injured".50 A 
49 Daily Mail, 25 May 1913. 
50 Ibid. 
later Daily Mail report of the same incident revealed that ''it 
was not until the word went around that the natives intended 
breaking out of the Compound. attacking white employees and 
looting their houses that Sergeant McLean and his five men 
determined on drastic measures. and the Sergeant gave orders 
to shoot". In the 
inv·-:-i 1 ved had grown 
Africans: "the use 
later l'eport ,:, f the incident. the number 
from Borne 500 to between ':) 000 and 5 000 .__; 
of firearms " it was concluded. "brou~ht . 
the natives quickly to their senses".51. 
But the fight was far from over. More "trouble" broke out at 
No.l Compound. Basotho workers began looting the mine store 
there while McLean was occupied at No.6. It held a safe 
containing LBOO which the Basotho tried to open using the 
"most scientific manner". not excluding "heavy hammers" and 
chisels. "Some [white] mine employees", continued the Daily 
Ma.il. "came to reinforce the police" who belatedly made their 
way to the scene, and "a volley fired over the heads of the 
3afe wreckers dispersed them··. By then, however, other 
African miners were looting the butchery, the coffee shop and 
the cook-house, taking stock amounting to 
natives, Shangaan and Moshesh". exclaimed 
were now united in the looting game". 
13 000. "The 
the Dailv Mail, 
When the police 
finally appeared, they were greeted with "a fusillade of 
stones [which] was kept up on the compound offices. the police 
and the guard being obliged to take shelter in the Compound 
Manager's office··. and a cry was raised to break out and 
attack the whites in the township". It was at this time that 
"a volley was fired into the [looting] mob". but "the natives 
paid no attention to this and retaliated". However. "a second 
volley and a few independent shots scattered them. and it was 
found that a further two nativeB had been killed and fifteen 
wc1unded. making a total of three killed and sixteen wounded". 
This shooting "had a sobering effect. on the rioter..3": and when 
Inspector Lloyd arrived at 1 a.m. with 50 constables from 
Pretoria armed with rifles and staves. order had been 
5 1. Ibid. This refers to a later edition in the same 
day. 
restored. Members of the Rifle Club patrolled the streets of 
Cullinan until Monday morning. 
went back to work. 52 
Lessons from the Premier Mine 
The following day the workers 
It is true that Basotho migrants began. as the .s.t..ar. reported. 
"flocking" to the Premier Mine around 1907. posing a threat to 
the "Transvaal Basutos" who were a major source of labour for 
this mine. More than two thousand Shangaans were later 
recruited from Mozambique in 1909 following an outbreak of 
malaria in the Northern Transvaal which had affected the Pedi 
recruitment. It was from this period that the proportion of 
Basotho and Shangaan workers on the mine increased at the 
expense of the Pedi. Moreover, although the Premier Mine 
remained the single 







satisfy the total labour requirements of the mine. Faced with 
the problem of securing enough labour, the Premier Mine opened 
a recruiting agency in the Cape Colony in 1921 but with little 
positive results. By this time, Basotho workers were in a 
comfortable majority at the mine: one Mosotho miner who 
visited it in February 1922 was impressed: "Premier Mine is 
the mine where Basotho are really in great numbers". where the 
of the nation are used to control Basotho "leaders 
miners".54 As this remark suggests. the fact that Premier 
Mine had finally implemented the system of control first put 
forward in 1910 by Basotho chiefs and the High Commissioner. 
may go a considerable way towards explaining why serious 
conflict never occurred at this mine after 1913. 
52 Ibid 
5 3 P. Delius, "Sebatakgomo: Migrant Organization. the 
ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt", '-1ournal of Southern 
African Studies. vol.15, no.4, 1989, p.582. 
54 . PDMAR, 1907, p.10, and 1909, p.11; The South African 
Mining and Engineering Year Book, 1920-21. p.103, and 1921-22. 
p.30; Daily Mail, 2 June 1910. For the impressed Mosotho, see 
Umteteli, 4 March 1922. 
The September 1907 conflict had started as a fight between a 
Mosotho and a Mopedi. A subsequent inquiry claimed that the 
Basotho had been waiting for a fight; 500 dangerous weapons 
were found hidden in their rooms. As far as the magistrate 
conducting the inquiry was concerned. the entire episode could 
he reduced to one of ethnic hatred and jea]ousy. The 
newspapers, of course, sensationalised the conflict. 
emphasising African "savagery". By contrast. a report by the 
Acting Inspector of the local police force was more 
thoughtful. In trying to reach the basis of the conflict. the 
inspector attributed the fighting to two fundamental factors; 
firstly, that the Basotho undermined the Bapedi. referring to 
them as the "Mahowa" ("Ma-Aoa"),55 meaning low people; and 
secondly, a wage reduction.BB 
While there is no doubt that the use of derogatory and 
belittling terms could be a source of conflict among miners -
Moodie also noted that the divide between Africans who 
practised circumcision and those who did not. could result in 
exchanges culminating in violence57 in this instance the 
question of wages was crucial. Some weeks before the outbreak 
of the 1907 conflict, the minimum wage on the mine was reduced 
from 3s-2s.10d per day to 2s.6d; and from 4d per truck loaded 
to 3d. This was of particular significance because the 
Basotho. when initially competing for hegemony and favours on 
the mine, had once proposed to the management that they be 
paid 2d per truck, hoping in this way to displace the Bapedi 
and Shangaan workers largely employed in this contract work. 
Though the management had declined the offer at the time, 
Bapedi workers had neither forgotten nor forgiven the earlier 
incident. and not surprisingly blamed the 1907 wage reduction 
on the Basotho labourers· earlier conspiracy". This 
55 "Aoa" is a Pedi word for "no". 
56 LNA. S7,7/40, Acting NAD Inspector 1Raytonl to DNL, 3 
September 1907. 
5 7 . Circumcision as a rite of passage implied that those 
who did not undergo it were not yet "men" but "boys". This 
was so with the Xhosa who belittled the Pando and Zulu who did 
not practise this ritual. See especially, Moodie, Going for 
G.o.hL P. 187. 
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certainly explains the extraordinary tension between the two 
groups. Even the magistrate who was otherwise quick to 
attribute the fight to "jealousy", acknowledged that a 
contributory cause of the conflict was the struggle to 
"control" contract work in loading. When all of this is 
considered, therefore. to simply reduce this conflict to 
primordial ethnic hatred or stereotypes surely misses the 
most critical point: the management's use of competition 
between Bapedi and Basotho to cut down on wages. 
The 1910 conflict was caused by the management's attempt to 









"faction fight" between 
is possible that the 
1907, were used as scab 
examples of how a strike 
Basotho and Bapedi. Here 
Bapedi, like the Nyasaland 
labour. Certainly there are 
could end up as a "faction 
fight" in cases where one ethnic group was used as scabs 
against another striking group. In 1914, to take only one 
prominent case, there was a strike by 
Jagersfontein mine over the death of 
Basotho workers at the 
a Mosotho miner. His 
countrymen were unhappy with the management's explanation of 
the tragedy, and decided to stop work. When the strike began, 
however. "the Thembus did not fall in with us [Basotho] and 
attempted to go to work", testified one Mosotho later, " 
... the brother of the deceased went to stop them and we all 
followed, it was here [that] the fight with the Thembu 
started".58 And when "scab" labour was combined with the 
matter of Sunday work as it was in 1910, the resulting mixture 
was frequently explosive. The chairman of the Native 
Grievances Inquiry, H.O. Buckle, noted in his 1913 report that 
African workers complained bitterly about being forced to work 
on Sundays.59 This day of rest. as Chapter Four showed, 
gave workers vital space and time in which to deal with the 
stress and alienation associated with mine work and isolation 
from home. 
5 s SAE, 
inquest held in 
59 . Report 
p.64. 
GG 50/395, 1542. Lintsa·s testimony at the 
Mohales Hoek, 15 January 1914. 
of the Native Grievances Inquiry. 1913-14, 
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The 1913 conflict is best viewed as a culmination of the 
conflicts that had been taking place at the Premier Mine. and 
more broadly as part of the labour unrest on the Rand which 
led to the establishment of the Native Grievances commission 
of inquiry. Buckle·s report is important in that it tried to 
look at 1913 in relation to previous years. not!ng that the 
different ethnic groups "acted absolutely together" on almost 
all the mines where industrial conflict took place. He was 
worried that "during the last dozen years. tribal faction 
fights have markedly decreased": compared to the past when 
"inter-tribal jealousies ... have rendered it possible, in the 
last resort, to protect Europeans by utilising one tribe 
against another''. The recent protests, for Buckle, were all 
the more disturbing because of the growing political 
mobilisation and consciousness among Africans in the form of 
increasing "agitation" in the "native press". and the 
formation of the South African Native Congress.so More than 
this. the 1913 labour unrest, according to Phil Bonner, was 
related to the hardships that Africans in most rural areas 
were undergoing due to a serious drought in the region.s1 
In colonial Lesotho, many cattle perished and large quantities 
of grain had to be imported from South Africa. The attack by 
Basotho workers on mine stores doubtless reflected not only 
their complaint that they spent most of their money there, but 
also mounting pressure to remit funds to their starving 
families at home. 
What these cases show is that analyses of "faction fighting" 
should not be limited to their immediate causes. A whole 
number of developments took place on the mines. which. as they 
accumulated, resulted in actions that could spark off a 
violent incident. 
so Ibid , pp.64-65. 
61 Bonner. "1920 Black Mineworkers· Strike", p.280. 
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Explaining Faction Fights. 
There is no doubt that ethnicity was a factor in many of these 
"fights". Jeff Guy and Motlatsi Thabane found a strong sense 
of ethnic consciousness among their informants,62 and 
St.imela Jingoes himself admitted that he "never mixed much 
with men of other tribes while I was in the compounds, simply 
because I was afraid of them, not knowing their languages. 
Each group usually kept pretty much to itself".63 But there 
was no inherent hatred between different ethnic groups. 
Tensions were linked to local conditions, such as differences 
in treatment and the distribution of favours by mine 
managements, and the numerical balance and strength between 
ethnic groups in the compounds. Hence "Basutos" could fight 
against the "Mxosas" at the Koffyfontein Mine in January 1910, 
yet be in alliance with them against the Zulu and Swazi in 
December of the same year at the Canson Gold Mine.64 
The "celebration", if not reification of ethnicity by Gordon 
and a number of other historians in recent years, arguably has 
led to the neglect of other forms of relationships that kept 
workers together in the compounds. Besides home-boy and work-
mate networks, mine workers in the compounds grouped 
themselves in church groups and sporting clubs as shown in 
Chapters Four and Five. Divisions within church groups were 
more denominational than ethnic, and the organisation of 
sports clubs was informed more by skill, interest and talent, 
rather than ethnic affiliation. More than this, violent 
conflicts took place in the compounds among Christian 
converts. and between supporters of different sporting clubs. 
not to mention gambling as a further source of violence. Nor 
was brutality against fellow relatives and home-boys uncommon: 
the Sunday Times reported in December 1908 that one Shangaan 
worker stabbed his own brother on Christmas Day at the 
6 2 Guy and Thabane, "Basotho Miners". pp.242-43. 
63 Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, p.66. 
64 VAB, CO 620, 2385/1, Detached Assistant Resident 
Magisistrate <Koffyfonteinl report on the Koffyfontein 
"disturbance", 28 January 1910; Union of South Africa, Native 
Affairs Annual Report, 1910. 
Robinson Central Deep, and that another Shangaan stabbed a 
fellow Shangaan "whom he had asked for a Christmas box 
[present]" at the Langlaagte Deep.65 
Certainly Stimela Jingoes noted that "it was seldom, in the 
compounds, that one found the Basotho on good terms with one 
another. One would find, in a room housing thirty to fifty 
Basotho. men from several chiefdoms, and they brought their 
quarrels with them from their homes. quarrels that usually 
started because of disagreements between their chiefs''.66 
And even Moodie. for all of his insistence elsewhere that 
"faction fighting" represented ritualised violence, 
acknowledges the shortcomings of relying solely on ethnicity 
to analyse "faction fights".67 The Basotho were not an 
homogenous group. Besides those who lived in Herschel and 
Matatiele, who also saw themselves as Basotho, there were 
others in Quthing and Butha Buthe who spoke Nguni-related 
languages. More than one of my informants associated 
themselves with the Xhosa, singing their songs with them on 
the trains way to the mines. In such cases, their families 
had Xhosa ancestry and still spoke the language.BB 
Stones and sticks were also used by the Africans workers 
during "faction fighting" not because of some herdboy 
influence, but because of their being regarded as deadly 
weapons.69 One of the informants of Guy and Thabane 
exclaimed: "No, a white man cannot do harmful things to me -
not when I am surrounded by so many stones". 7 0 It was also 
seen how miners at the Premier Mine in 1913 forced the mine 
guards to the compound managers office with a volley of 
65 Sunday Times, 27 December 1908. 
66 Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief. p.66. 
e 7 Moodie. Going for Gold, pp.182-83. 
ss For example. interview with Michael Mokenela. born 
1908: he first went to the mines in 1925. 
69 Other dangerous weapons were also 
investigation in Mafeteng in February 1913 found 
used: an 
46 Basotho 
East Rand migrants returning from the Premier Mine and the 
Proprietary Mines with mine explosives in their possession. 
See LNA, S7/7/67, SNA to GS, 18 February 1913. 
7 0_ Guy and Thabane, "Basotho Miners". p.253. 
3tones. A 3imilar incident took place at the City and 
Suburban in July of the same year. when the African workers. 
acc:Jrding to Buckle, "hunted the compound manager out of the 
. ::ompound with stones". injuring other mine officials . The 
pol~ce were called in but the miners stood against them with 
stones: "the resistance was only quelled by calling in a 
company of soldiers, whose fixed bayonets appeared to cow the 
natives and who succeeded in arresting the leaders in each 
compound".71. 
Moreover. African workers had no particular attachment to 
stones and sticks. The use of more dangerous weapons was 
common as the case of the Premier demonstrated. And instead 
of eliminating the use of "dangerous weapons as Harries 
suggests, the passing of the Prevention of Crime Ordinance led 
to an increase in the use of knives in the mine compounds as 
this weapon was easy to hide and handle. After a knife-
stabbing incident in one compound in June 1911, one 
wrote: "People. knives are finishing people 
because the carrying of sticks 
Mosotho 
here in 
is now Johannesburg, 
prohibited".72 One French missionary lamented in 1929 that 
one of their catechumens was in prison for stabbing one of his 
room-mates. The use of knives in the compounds became serious 
in the 1930s to such an extent that the Randfontein 
municipality launched the "Boxing Gloves Instead of Knives" 
campaign in March 1937 in its African township. 73 
A significant contributory factor in the incidence of violence 
on the mines was the organisation of white miners into Rifle 
Clubs. As in other settler societies in the region, white 
workers were used as vigilantes and "special constables" 
during clashes between the mine managements and African 
7 1. Native Grievances Inquiry, p.64. 
72 Leselinvana, 17 June 1911. See also SAB, GG 50/254, 
1540. "Regulation as to the Sale and Possession of Dangerous 
Weapons", 25 July 1906. 
73 Daily Mail, 31 March 1937; Jl1E, 1929, p.227. 
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workers.74. This practice appears to have been most common 
in more isolated small towns like Cullinan. The case of the 
Premier Mine discussed above. showed that after the 1907 
"fight" white miners were armed and given shooting lessons 
under the auspices of the Rifle Club, the members of which 
patrolled the white residential area and supplied "special 
constables" during emergencies. Certainly the Acting 
Magistrate of Pretoria did not think that there was any danger 
to the whites in the town, and refused to support a call for 
an increase in the size of the Cullinan police force, because 
he was confident that the "position could be made absolutely 
safe by enlisting the Mine Guards as special constables and 
keeping a stand of arms for their use in case of 
emergency".75 A "faction fight" between Xhosa and Basotho 
workers at the Koffyfontein Mine in January 1910 led the 
Assistant Magistrate there to "enrol a number of armed 
volunteers to guard the town"; he later asked for "about 
thirty rifles [to] be placed at my disposal for use in such an 
emergency. These rifles might be kept at the gaol or in the 
magazine and issued if required to responsible persons''.76 
The mine and NAD officials were, moreover. concerned about the 
attitude of African workers during "faction fighting". 
Buckle's report and reports of the Premier Mine 1907, 1910 and 
1913 "riots" had special sections dealing with this subject. 
The Rayton NAD Inspector commented in March 1914 that: "Recent 
7 4 Writing on Northern Rhodesian settler society, C. 
Luchembe, observed: " ... the white settler population as a 
whole was considered as a force that could easily be mobilised 
and armed. As early as 1903, the Kalama Rifle Club Service 
was formed to ·train all able-bodied men in the Civil Service 
at Kalamo in the use of firearms, and it was the rule of the 
Club that services of all members be offered to the Government 
in the event of a native uprising'"; see his "Ethnic 
Stereotypes, violence and labour in early colonial Zambia. 
1889-1924", .in Chipungu, (ed.), Guardians in their Time, p.33. 
See also van Onselen, Chibaro, p.150: and Phimister, Wangi 
Kolia, p.135. 
75 SAB. S3/5/17/4. Magistrate to Acting Attorney-
General, 27 December 1913. 
76 VAB. CO 620, 2385/1, Under Colonial Secretary to 
Detached Assistant Resident Magistrate (Koffyfontein), 11 
February 1910. 
events [at the Premier Mine] would seem to indicate the fact 
that the British Basuto is ever ready to come to open revolt 
on the slightest provocation, whether imaginary or otherwise. 
and on such occasions all attempts made by the Europeans in 
authority to reason with them are met with jeers and insults. 
thus it would appear that the prevailing thought in their 
minds at such times is not to have their grievances amicably 
settled but that the opportunity is looked upon as a 
favourable one for them to openly show their utter disregard 
for all authority or discipline''.77 Hence the increased use 
of police violence was justified as "necessary". 7 8 And the 
role of the police was not that restrained, as guns were, at 
least during the period under review, frequently used. 
Control over the use of dangerous weapons was also made 
difficult by the arming of white civilians and miners in 
handling conflicts on the mines. 
The attitude of Basotho workers themselves was also another 
factor contributing to their involvement in "faction 
fighting". Basotho were concerned not to be associated with 
South Africa·s African groups. Boyse noted after his 1911 
visit of the Rand compounds that though there were showers in 
many of those compounds. "the Basuto. as they object to 
exposing their persons before other tribes, do not avail 
themselves of this mode of washing but prefer to wash from 
buckets". 7 9 
Linked to this was the Basotho·a refusal to be incorporated in 
the Union of South Africa (a delegation even going to London 
in 1908). Basotho. at least up to 1910, never stopped 
threatening to retake their land conquered by the Orange Free 
77 SAE. GG 50/427, 50/437. NAD Inspector (Rayton) to 
DNL, 16 March 1914. 
7 3. The Magistrate of Pretoria concluded his inquiry: "In 
my opinion the action taken by Sergeant Maclean was necessary 
in the protection of life and property and was therefore 
justified''. See LNA, S3/5/17/4, Magiatrate to Acting Attorney-
General. ~7 December 1913. 
79_ SAE, NTS 2092, 216/280, Boyse·s report to RC, October 
1911 <undated). 
'.::86 
State in the mid-1860a. After the walkout of the Basotho at 
the Vereeninging Estate in 1901. the Inspector of the Mines 
reported that "these Natives retort that they are all armed i:-1 
Basuto Land and although we have taken the arms from Boers. 
they the Basutues are fully armed and intend having part of 
the country back again".80 The Sunday Times of September 
1~06 was concerned about the pride the Basotho had in that 
they were never conquered by whites. and that ''it is a Basuto 
dream to some day seize the mines at Kimberley and exploit 
them in the interest of the nation" . 131. According to Guy and 
Thabane, being a Mosotho for some of their informants meant 
"coming from a country which resisted the attacks of the 
Boers. and which had not been incorporated into the Union of 
South Africa. Of coming from a British colony. and therefore 
with a history very different from that of black South 
Africa". '32 
This Basotho nationalist pride led to the problem of boitsoaro 
(conduct) which was also linked to the koata strategy that 
Basotho developed to deal with the experience of migrancy. 
Complaints about the boitsoaro of Basotho migrants appeared at 
the same 
trains.83 
time with the outcry against likoata in the 
One Mosotho wrote to Leselinvana in 1912 about 
the conversation he overheard between a Mosotho and other 
groups at the Koffyfontein mine. vfuen asked whether they were 
also rude and abusive at home. the Mosotho responded:"Even 
when you see us like this, when you accompany us to our home. 
you will be surprised that when we cross the Caledon [River], 
entering Lesotho. all this that you see here remains behind 
where we come from, and we conduct ourselves like Basotho. 
obeying the law".84 
so SAE. SNA 1. NA <Pret) 68/01. Inspector of Mines 
cGermiston) to Chief Inspector of Mines. 14 September 1901. 
31 Sunday Times, 23 September 1906. 
82 Guy and Thabane, "Basotho Miners". p.242. 
83 See Chapter Two and Appendix II. 
84 Leselinvana, 11 July 1912. 
The concern with boitsoaro of Basotho on the mines also 
extended to Kimberley. In 1926. one Mosotho complained to 
Leselinvana about this, making warnings that the Paramount 
Chief was to repeat in his 1936 letter: that Basotho were very 
abusive, troublesome. and always on the look-out for a fight, 
and that he was worried that this was not going to affect 
their recruitment for mine work. After one "fight" in 
Kimberley in 1936, the local Magistrate commented during the 
inquiry that if he had powers he would recommend the limiting 
of the number of Basotho recruited for mine work. This image 
and notoriety, compounded with the presence of matekatse, 
affected the participation of Basotho in justifiable strike 
action. When the Xhosa attacked the mine cook and police over 
fpod on one mine. Basotho stood aloof, making sure that it was 
noted that they were not part of the "fight".85 
There is a need, therefore, to distinguish a "riot" from a 
"faction fight" or "disturbance". These words. though 
sometimes used interchangeably. suggested some degree of 
difference in the incidents concerned. There were fights that 
resulted from beer-drinking sessions: this was more so before 
the prohibition of the sale of liquor to Africans in 1896 and 
the erection of well-guarded compounds. The arrival of 
matekat3e in the 1920s, the Basotho diaspora of the 1930s and 
bokholoa. 
fights. 
introduced new elements to the nature of these 
Many of these fights came to originate from the 
locations. sometimes having been caused by a quarrel over 
matekatse. Basotho also saw the locations as "their" place. 
contesting this space with other compounded miners and 
pre'1ent ing them from interacting with "their" matekatse. :3s 
The emer'gence of Basotho gangs. especially the "Marashea", in 
35 Leselinvana, 24 September 1926: 1 May 1935; 9 July 
1936: 1 November 1939. 
36 . P. Bonner. "Backs to the Fence: Law, Liquor. and the 
Search for Social Control in an East Rand Town, 1929-1942", .in 
J. Crush, and C. Ambler, reds.), Liguor and Labor in Southern 
Africa, (University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1992), 
pp.286-87. 
the 1940s. finally established "faction fights" as a tolerable 
part of the Basotho migrant culture and experience. 87 
Other fights resulted from sectarian interests and 
competition. as when "new ethnic groups arrived en masse on 
the mine. There were also fights that resulted from 
comi;laint.s against boss-boys. focd. shifts, white violence. 
and so forth. The management also manipulated ethnic 
stereotypes to concentrate certain groups in certain jcbs -
like Basotho in lashing and the Shangaan in drilling: and 
changes in this division of labour could provoke conflict 
between the groups concerned. 
But these "riots" were easily suppressed, the leaders taken 
away for trial and the workers resuming their work. The 
common charge for the leaders was "public violence": in 
February 1936. 54 Basotho were arrested for their role in the 
stoning of the offices of No.2 Compound at the Brakpan Mine. 
and two of them, described as "ringleaders", were sentenced to 
three months with hard labour. However, there were a few 
instances where these "riots" led to victories for the 
workers. although the "troubles" of 1913 led to some 
improvements in the conditions in the compounds following 
Buckle· s recommendations. 8 13 
Conclusion 
"Faction fighting" was not a form of sport or recreation; and 
our understanding of this phenomenon should not be restricted 
37 Baaothc, gangs came to be referred to as "liakhela" ~ 
and this word is used interchangeably to refer to those who 
pmrticipate in "faction fights". This has been one of the 
subJeots that has interested Basotho novelists; see, for 
example. S.N. Majara, Liakhela, CMazenod Book Centre. Lesotho. 
1972 i. 
:3s Daily Mail, 29 February 1936; Bonner, "1920 Black 
Mineworkers···, p.275, refers to some of the victories of the 
1913 strikes. 
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to ethnici t:,r. Any analysis of "faction fighting" on the mines 
should go beyond the reification of ethnicity and consider 
racial and class struggles that were and continue to be an 
important factor on the mines. "Faction fights" were a 
reflection of the low level of the development of class 
consciousness and solidarity among the African miners largely 
due to the migrant labour system, and were linked to 
conflicting survival strategies employed by different African 
groups on the mines. "Faction fights" were aloo linked to the 
control-strategy used by the management (segregating the 
workArs, distributing favours and making appointments. on the 
basis of ethnicity) to ensure the docility and stability of 
labour. 
This perspective allows one to explain why before the 1930s -
with the exception of 1913 and 1920 - African workers rarely 
focused their attacks on the structures of power on the mines. 
These workers would attack the "native" police or cooks, 
instead of those who were responsible for the repression and 
the unpalatable food in the compounds. 
The case of the Premier Mine has also shown the complex 
context surrounding particular "faction fights". The active 
role of the police; the arming of white miners. and the ready 
employment of rifles in dealing with "rioters"; concern with 
confining the "disturbance" to the mine to prevent it from 
spreading to the white community; and recourse to the term 
"faction fighting" as an excuse to avoid addressing the 
grievances of the workers, all were factors common to the 
1907. 1910 and 1913 "faction fights" on that mine. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISEASES, BEERSHOPS AND BROTHELS. 
It is mainly since the discovery of the diamond fields 
that these baneful effects of contact with the Europeans 
have made themselves felt with the Basuto ... It is in 
this environment that the youth of the whole of this part 
of Africa and more especially thousands of Basuto, have 
sought to initiate themselves to the ways and customs of 
civilized existence. At first, they were attracted to it 
by the lure of very high wages; then it became the 
fashion, the vogue became general ... It is thence that a 
large number of them have brought back habits of theft, 
the taste of brandy and, quite recently, that smallpox 
which has caused so many deaths in this country. And I 
make no mention of yet more hideous diseases, the names 
of which were as yet unknown to the Basuto a few years 
ago. - Louis Samuel Duvoisin, 1885.89 
The regular movement of thousands of Basotho men between their 
homes and South Africa·s labour centres, together with the 
economic decline of Basutoland itself, transformed many 
aspects of Basotho society. Not least of these changes were 
hitherto unknown diseases and epidemics brought back by 
returning migrants and spread to children. wives and 
relatives. 
changed. 
Moreover. the position of Basotho women also 
As shown in Chapter One. the prolonged absence of 
Basotho men to the mines affected the agricultural division of 
89 R.C. Germond, Ced.) Chronicles of Basutoland: A 
runnina commentary on the events of the years 1630-1902 by the 
French protestant missionaries in Southern Africa, cSesuto 
Book Depot, Morija, 1967), p.541. 
labour and the labour process itself. The workload of women 
increased as they had to undertake tasks in the agricultural 
cycle which were formerly performed by men. It was also in 
this context that homesteads headed by women emerged as a 
result of husbands and sons abandoning their families to opt 
for bokhnloa. In response to the prolonged absence of their 
men and the collapse of the rural economy, many Basotho women 
resorted to various survival strategies which included bee1'-
brewing and prostitution. This chapter, by focusing on 
diseases. commercial beer-brewing and sex in Lesotho. will try 
to show how profound were the effects of labour migrancy on 
Basutoland and its people. 
I 
DISEASES AND EPIDEMICS. 
Epidemics 
Among the major health challenges during the first few years 
of British rule in Lesotho were viral epidemics and diseases 
which flourish under poor sanitation conditions. By the 1920s 
and 1930a they in turn had been replaced by mine occupational 
diseases. To contextualise the study of this transition. some 
understanding of the health system and sanitation conditions 
in colonial Lesotho during this time is necessary. 
The development of the modern health system in Lesotho went 
through three phases. In the pre-colonial period, medical 
services were provided by Basotho healers. The first European 
medical doctor arrived in 1844 and a second one came in 1864. 
Both were missionaries who extended their duties to include 
medical work. Following British intervention in 1868. and 
latterly Cape Colony rule from 1871, a colonial medical 
officer was appointed for Maseru and another one for Leribe in 
1875. But the concern of the colonial medical officers was 
with the police and other colonial officials. vJhen Britain 
took over again in 1884 after the civil war, there was only 
one medical officer operating in Maseru, although a French 
missionary, Dr Casalis, was working in the south. The British 
authorities introduced a new health system, appointing medical 
officers for each district and establishing medical 
dispensaries. By 1893 there were five government medical 
officers in the country. In 1894 the system was reorganised 
with the appointment of a Principal Medical Officer who was 
stationed in Maseru. The first modern hospital was opened in 
1902 immediately after the South African War, and by 1923 f,:n1r 
hospitals were in operation. The passage of the Medical. 
Dental and Pharmacy Proclamation in 1921, both authorised 
private medical practice and recognised Basotho healers. In 
1935. each district had its own hospital, by which time there 
were 19 medical officers and two private doctors servicing the 
country.so 
But while elements of the health service increased in number 
over the same period, sanitation conditions actually 
deteriorated. Broadly speaking. this was a consequence of 
overpopulation; internal migration to government Camps. soon 
to become towns; the impact of labour migrancy; and last but 
not least, government negligence. Although pipes were used to 
draw water from outlying springs to central reservoirs 
supplying white households in the Camps, Basotho living in 
these towns or in villages had to fetch their own water from 
streams. As the number of people grew, so more and more people 
settled next to the streams themselves. 
this affected the cleanliness of the water. 
Not surprisingly. 
Indeed enteric 
fever invariably attacked villages during the rainy months of 
February. March and April. It was not until the late 1920s 
that the gove1'nment began replacing the "pit" system in the 
so Paragraph based on N.M. Macfarlene. A Record 0£ 
Medical Work and of the Medical Service in Basutoland. 
cCourant P. and P. Company, Ladybt'and, 1934); idem, "Some 
Observations on 28 YearsJ Medical Practice in an African 
Native Territory". South African Medical Record, vol.21. 
no.21, 1923: J.M. Varel, Traditional Medicine in Lesotho: A 
study in perspectives of its integration into primary health 
care with emphasis on management of nemopsychiatric disorders. 
cA.N, Research Programme. Antwerp. 1985). 
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Camps with the bucket system for sewage disposal. and started 
·.::ligging "communal pit latrines" for Basotho town.speople. But 
the problem of flies and the generally filthy state of these 
communal latrines discouraged many people from using them. 
Instead, they continued to resort to the fields. as was the 
practice in villages. The situation was so bad that not even 
Maseru train station had latrine facilities.Bi 
There were also butcheries, bakeries and "eating houses" 
dotted about the Camps to service migrant workers and other 
Basotho townsfolk. Each Camp had three or four such 
establishments 
Medical and 






[establishments] would fall short of the standard required in 
European townships".93 The minimum health requirements 
referred to were cleanliness and the use of fly-proof 
compartments for meat in butcheries. In fact. concern over 
flies led to the installation of fly-traps in 1937 in some 
government establishments in Maseru, reducing flies by 75 
percent in surrounding neighbourhoods. "Unfortunately", it 
was reported. "the cost of erecting ~Barber~ traps is too high 
for universal use among the native peasants".94 A 
description of one neighbourhood in Mohales Hoek in 1927 
graphically described the extent of the menace: 
Opposite the 
populated by 
community as a 
can be smelt. 
[main] road [to Quthing] is a donga 
trees and this is used by the native 
sewage system and at times an awful stench 
On the left is a native recruiting office and at the back 
a native eating house, living rooms and bakery. 
Behind these are unfinished stables but used now and 
again for horses. The premises are in a filthy 
condition. 
There are an abundance of flies especially in the so-
called bakery and native eating house where porridge and 
bones and meat are freely left uncovered for flies.95 
91 Basutoland, Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 
(henceforth fil:1.S.E). 1928. 
9 2 Ibid., 1928: 1935: 1936: 1937. 
s3 Ibid., 1936. p.14. 
94 Ibid., 1937, p.13. 
95 LNA. S3/26/3/2, AC Ct1afeteng) to GS, 12 January 1927. 
:~94 
These were places that were freguenterl by migrant workers and 
prc,st1tutes. 
The first seric,us epidemic during British rule ~as an outbreak 
of smallpox in 1883. The epidemic attacked Kolo near Morija 
in December 1883. and was introduced by a mig1'ant returning 
from Kimberley where smallpox was rife. A second outbreak 
occurred in Molomo. also near Morija, and was again due to 
migrants returning from Kimberley. From January 1884 onwards, 
the epidemic began spreading to the north. and by March was 
creating havoc in the Berea district where the effects of the 
civil war had been particularly hard felt.BB 
As the epidemic was well underway before the arrival of the 
first British Resident Commissioner, vaccination of the 
affected population was carried out by the French missionary, 
Dr Casalis. The appointment of Dr Reed as the medical officer 
for Maseru after the arrival of Colonel Clark in March, laid 
the basis for government intervention in the crisis.97 But 
the overwhelming majority of Basotho, with the memory of 
their recent war against the Cape Colony still fresh in their 
minds, saw vaccination as a white plot against the people. 
"Some malicious persons", wrote Dr Casalis. "also preach that 
under the pretext of preventive inoculation against smallpox. 
white doctors want nothing but to put the germs of the 
cowardice of Europeans under the epidermis of the blacks. 
Even on our [mission] stations we find individuals who prefer 
to go to scarify themselves ... and rub themselves with some 
black substance ... ".98 In some cases Dr Reed was ambushed. 
and prevented from entering villages to carry ciut 
vacci11ations. Many corpses were left unattended as villagers 
es Friend, 10 January 1884. 
s 7 South African Library, CSAL), APEMS. Mf. no.334, Dr 
Casalis to Director of PEMS. 9 February 1884; Dr Casalis to 
Director of PEMS. 15 March 1884. 
98 Ibid .. Dr Casalis to Director of PEMS, 9 February 
1884. 
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were afraid of becoming infected. 9 9 
until 1886. 
The epidemic lasted 
But the regular arrival of returning migrants made control of 
the smallpox outbreak very difficult. The medical officer of 
Leribe conceded in 1893 after referring to the vaccination 
campaign that was taking place: "But the constant arrival of 
natives from Johannesburg is an ever-present source of 
danger".1.00 Hence Dr Casalis was to rejoice during the 1884 
out.break: "We understand that the epidemic is in decline in 
Kimberley: this is not bad luck because it is that place which 
constantly send us the newly contaminated".1.01. 
Another smallpox outbreak occurred in 1893, however. It was 
introduced by migrants returning from the Rand, where smallpox 
had been a problem since the previous year. The epidemic 
entered through Leribe, and spread to Berea and Maseru, 
reaching the southern districts in 1894 and Qachas Nek a year 
later. This time. the response of most Basotho to vaccination 
was very different, partly because migrants leaving the 
country had been required to carry vaccination certificates in 
addition to their passes. By 1896 two-thirds of the 
population had been vaccinated, and the epidemic began to 
disappear in the course of 1897. However, another outbreak 
occurred on the Rand in June 1898. and spread to Cape Town and 
Port Elizabeth. By September the deadly epidemic was again in 
the northern part of colonial Lesotho. putting doctors back to 
hectic work. In one three-day period alone, c.2000 people 
were vaccinated. Although small-scale outbreaks of smallpox 
occurred between 1910 and 1915. and again between 1921 and 
1933, there were no further epidemics of the disease.1.02 
es Ibid.: Friend, 17 January 1884: 31 January 1884; 7 
February 1884; "Further Correspondence Respecting the Cape 
Colony and Adjacent Territories. 1884-85". 
ioo. QAE, 1893-94, p.20. 
1.01.. SAL, APEMS. Mf. no.334. Dr Casalis to Director of 
PEMS, 9 February 1884. 
1.o2. CAB. 1890-1933; Friend, 24 June 1898; 23 Sept.ember 
1898; 27 September 1898. 
Smallpox attacks normally led ta the taking of guarantine 
measures and the establishment c,f fumigation cent1'es in the 
Orange Free State border towns. Some of the routes normally 
;~rsed by rnigra.:1ts to employment cent1·e2 wt=:re also clcsed. 
Vaccination certificates replaced passes as the most importan7 
travel documents. But as migrants were medically re-examined 
arrival at WNLA compounds on the Witwatersrand, many of them 
were ~.race ina ted more than once regardless of whether they had 
vaccination certificates. Labour recruiters and Basutoland 
officials. at the receiving end of complaints from Easotho 
recruits who were victims of double vaccinations that often 
led to pain and swelling, attempted to discourage the practice 
as it tended to make people lose confidence in the 
vaccinations carried out in Basutoland.103 
Other serious epidemic diseases made their presence felt in 
colonial Lesotho after the turn of the century. The first of 
these was Bubonic Plague which entered South Africa in early 
1901. finally reaching the Orange Free State in February 1916 
and colonial Lesotho itself early in 1917. A "detention camp" 
was then erected in Maseru for returning migrants. A second 
epidemic to hit the country arrived in August 1917 in the form 
of a louse-borne typhus fever which attacked Basutoland from 
the Cape Colony through Quthing. Mohales Hoek, and Qachas Nek. 
The epidemic reached Teyateyaneng in the north in 1920-21. and 
remained in the country until 1924. The disease was virulent. 
decimating 50 percent of the people in some villages. Its 
effects were compounded by the Spanish "Flu" pandemic which 
entered the country in October 1918 and caused havoc until it 
began to wane in December. During this period. labour 
recruitment by the Chamber' ·.Jf Mines was suspended.104 
10 2 Friend. 7 February 1884; VAB, CO 170. 3419/03. Col. 
Sec. !ORC) telegram to GS, 8 May 1903: LNA, S7/7/64, SNA to 
13S. 20 August 1920: Leselinvana, 19 September 1912. 
104 S. Marks. and N. l'mderson, "Typhus and soc1a.l 
control in South Africa. 1917-50" . .in R. Macleod, and M. 
Lewis, !eds.). Disease, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on 
Western Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion, 
(Routledge, London, 1988); s::.t:1.8.B, 1918; .GAE, 1917-18; H. 
Phillips. "South Africa~s Worst Demographic Disaster: The 
Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918'', South African Historical 
Clearly, the movement of Basotho men back and forwards between 
thsir country and South 44.fr ica mad.e colonial Lesotho 
particularly vulnerable to epidemics that broke out on the 
mines and other labour centres. 
The relative decline in colonial Lesotho of viral epidemics 
and ii2eases that flourished under poor sanitation conditions 
was accompanied by an increase in cases of TB and syphilis. 
From 1906 the Basutoland government identified the latter two 
diseases as the colony·s most serious health challenges. 
Venereal Diseases 
Epidemics, though virulent, appeared but lost much of their 
force once people had been vaccinated, or their immune system 
had adjusted. This was not the case, however, with venereal 
diseases. These diseases continued to be a serious problem in 
Basutoland until after the Second World War when effective 
medication was introduced. Venereal syphilis and gonorrhoea, 
first introduced with white settlement, were intimately linked 
to labour migration, and were especially prevalent on the 
diamond and gold mines.105 
Venereal syphilis is sexually transmitted and has three 
stages; namely, the primary, secondary and tertiary. The 
primary stage. appearing some 21 days after the infection, is 
identified by the appearance of a hard chancre at the point of 
the infection which later forms an ulcer. In endemic syphilis 
there is no chancre; nor is it sexually transmitted. The 
symptoms of the secondary stage. which appear some two months 
Journal. vol.20. 1988; idem. "The Local State and Public 
Health Reform in South Africa: Bloemfontein and the 
Consequences of the Spanish "Flu" Epidemic of 1918", Journal 
of Southern African Studies, vol.13, no.2. 1987. 
105 S.L. Kark, "The Social Pathology of Syphilis in 
Africans··, South African Medical Journal, vol.23, 1949; K . 
.Jochelson. "Tracking down the Treponema: Patterns of Syphilis 
in South Africa, 1880-1940", History Workshop Paper, 
University of Witwatersrand, February 1990. 
after the primary stage, are the lesions that can appear 
anywhere on the body. The tertiary stage. which often takes 
two to ten years to manifest itself, is identified by 
cardiovascular. neurological and visceral complications. 
There is also congenital or hereditary syphilis which happens 
when a syphilis-positive mother spreads the virus to the 
foetus through the placenta. Gonorrhoea is another type of 
venereal disease. Its symptoms, appearing three to five days 
after the infection, differ from those of syphilis, however. 
For men the disease is identified with semen leakages; for 
women with arthritis and rash, and pelvic complications which 
can result in sterility. 
The first cases of what was known locally as "mocaula"l.06 
were spotted in Basutoland as early as 1887. At first. 
colonial medical officers were not sure whether "mocaula" was 
syphilis. 
"syphilis" 
Nor is the historian helped by the fact that 
in colonial reports was sometimes used 
interchangeably with "venereal disease" until the turn of the 
century. When medical dispensaries opened in 1887. it was 
noted that syphilis and digestive problems accounted for most 
of the cases treated. In Leribe. ten percent of the 3 101 
cases treated at the dispensary between its opening in July 
1890 and June 1891 were cases of "mocaula".1.0 7 
But the medical officers were confused by "mocaula" in at 
least two respects. Firstly, they found it difficult to 
classify the disease. A physician from Wepener in the Orange 
1.06 The Sotho word "mokaola". used today to refer to 
venereal syphilis, is also applied to a poiaonous weed 
Xanthium Spinosum which was often a source of dispute between 
the Free State and Basutoland authorities. In the Sotho 
vocabulary Mokaola referred to the secondary phase of 
syphilis. which are identified with the appearance of rash; 
while Jmnto referred to the tertiary stage. But many Basotho 
were not aware that the symptoms in the tertiary and secondary 
belonged to the 2.ame disease. See Anon, "(Syphilis), Mokaola, 
JMoto", 1946 (?l. 
1.0 7 _ "Further Correspondence Respecting the Cape Colony 
and Adjacent Territories, 1886"; .GAR, 1887-88; 1888-89; 1890-
91. 
Free State, visiting Mafeteng in 1889, tried to define the 
~:lisease: 
... the term mokaola as used by the natives embraces 
papular, pustular, and tubercular eruptions in all their 
varieties or stages, mucous patches. condylomata. 
gurnrnatous ulcerations ... The term, therefore, includes a 
great variety of simple skin diseases. but the lar~e 
majority of cases of mokoala that have come under my 
notice I regard as syphilides. and have always found them 
to yield rapidly to anti-syphilitic treatment.108 
The second area of confusion, linked to the first one, was due 
to the officials· ignorance of endemic syphilis, which was 
only recognised in the 1930s, and yaws whose destructive 
effects were only understood in the 1820s_1os Dr 
Macfarlene who served in colonial Lesotho from 1893 and became 
the Principal Medical Officer in the 1920s, wrote in 19~3: 
Syphilis was at one time, as in most South African native 
territories, a great scourge. It is well in hand now, 
but when I first came to the country its ravages were 
great. Destructive lesions, especially about the throat 
and nose, were frequent, and many died from the disease. 
I think syphilis is as prevalent now as it was then, but 
it has become much less virulent. One seldom sees the 
gross lesions of thirty years ago, and then only in 
neglected cases. Whether it is that a certain immunity 
has been established, or is it that vigorous treatment 
and a better knowledge of personal hygiene has anything 
to do with it, I am not prepared to say. Congenital 
syphilis is very common, and late manifestations of it -
such as arthritis and synovitis - constantly turn up. In 
my experience all these years, including thousands of 
cases, I have only seen two chancres of the genital 
organs. The disease seems to be spread by cooking and 
drinking utensils, and also through bedding and clothing. 
Another peculiarity of syphilis amongst our natives is 
thRt cranial and nervous manifestations of the disease 
are practically unknown. or so rare as to be notable. 
This may be accounted for by i.ts recent introduction into 
the country. The people are positive that it was unknown 
until within the last eighty years - that is to say, with 
the opening up of the interior of South Africa by 
Europeans. That is as it may be. but there is no doubt 
that the opening of the diamond and gold mines in 
Kimberley and Johannesburg had much to do with the spread 
of the disease. and the rapid syphilization of the 
1oe :'-:AR, 1888-89. p. 8. 
1os Jochelson, "Tracking down the Treponema", p.33. 
majority of those who went to work in those places. The 
native name for the disease is "makaola". meaning the 
thing that cuts off, having reference, I presume, to its 
phagedaenicllO manifestations.111 
The absence of both the chancre and the tertiary-stage 
symptoms in the cases that Macfarlene saw. supports the 
conclusions reached by Megan Vaughan and Karen Jochelson in 
their studies of syphilis in other parts of Southern, Central 
and East Africa, namely, that most of the cases diagnosed as 
venereal syphilis prior to the 1930s were actually endemic 
syphilis or yaws.112 This can also be inferred from the 
Basutoland Annual Reports for the years prior to the end of 
the last century, which generally attributed "mocaula" to 
personal hygiene and gonorrhoea to "immorality". It was also 
reported in the 1890-91 annual report that "mocaula", typical 
of yaws. affected children more than adults. ~1at Macfarlene·s 
comment actually shows, therefore, is that yaws and endemic 
syphilis, as in Uganda. for example, began retreating in the 
1920s, even as venereal syphilis advanced. Table 7.1 shows 
that though the number of secondary stage-cases dominated up 
to the 1930s, their proportion in the overall total was 
declining as tertiary and congenital cases increased. 
11.0 Phagedaena is an eating ulcer. ar a spreading 
erosion occurring in ulcer or sore. 
111. Macfarlene, "Some Observations". p.494. 
1.1. 2 Ll'ochelson, "Tracking down the Treponema"; M. 
Vaughan, "Syphilis in colonial East and Central Africa: the 
social construction of an epidemic", .in T. Ranger, and P. 
Slack. <eds.), Epidemics and ideas: Essays on the historical 
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The figures cited in medical and sanitation reports only 
referred to cases treated at government dispensaries. More 
than this, it was generally men who presented themselves for 
treatment, as women only came forward when the disease was 
well advanced.113 The general reluctance by women to seek 
treatment turned on patriarchy and taboos 
strangers viewing a Mosotho woman's vagina.114 
relating to 
Many cases 
were in any event taken to Basotho doctors for treatment 
113 Af::1.SR, 1937. 
1.1 4 It was reported in 1928 that: "Tl1e number of cases 
of women seen whose condition is one of incurable misery, 
though not fatal, caused by the fact that so many relatives 
must be consulted before medical advice can be sought at the 
time of parturition ... "; see Al:1.SE, 1928, p.8. 
instead of government hospitals.115 Aware that their 
figures did not reflect the real si tua t ic,n. colonial medical 
officers tried to undertake their own research in 1935 by 
interviewing patients visiting the dispensaries. and came to 
the conclusion that about one percent of the Basothc, 
population was syphilis-positive.iie 
Some years earlier, though, with venereal syphilis on the. 
increase, the Basutoland government had begun to take 
preventative steps. In 1921 a system of free treatment for 
cases of syphilis was introduced, and country-wide depots were 
established for the distribution of anti-syphilitic 
medication. In 1929 an injection was added to the treatment, 
in order to reinforce the orally taken medication, but this 
was resisted by most Basotho until an explanatory campaign was 
successfully waged by officials in 1935. In that year, 
epidemic and infectious diseases accounted for 23 percent of 
all cases treated, about 54 percent of which were syphilis; in 
1937 the figures were 21 percent for infectious diseases. 
about 56 percent of which were syphilis.117 
Table 7.2: Number of Cases of Gonorrhoea Treated, 1925-1936. 
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One of the treatments involved 
powder of a plant called~; 
1.16 AM.S.E, 1935. 
rubbing the chancre 
see Ashton, Basuto, 
117 CAR, 1921-22; 1923-24; 1925; 1936. 
303 
Gonorrhoea was also rife. especially among women. The 1927 
Annual Medical and Sanitary report noted that ''gonorrhoea is a 
much more serious disease amongst our Natives and its effects 
are seen in the sterility of many of the women";l.1.3 while 
the 1935 Report again observed that "there is no appreciable 
reduction in the incidence of Gonorrhoea largely because the 
Basuto refuse to accept its infectious nature".1.1.9 
Although the increase in the number of cases treated in 1923 
and 1929 was directly linked to measures taken against 
prostitutes (as the next section will show), the campaign 
yielded valuable data. On analysing the figures. officials 
were able to link the incidence of the disease to variations 
in economic conditions. During the period of relative 
prosperity between 1927 and 1930, cases of syphilis totalled 
414 and of gonorrhoea 950. During the depression of 1931 to 
1934, however. the annual figure was 129 for syphilis and 771 
for gonorrhoea. 
Similarly, in the relatively prosperous years of 1935 to 1937. 
the annual figure for syphilis was 330 and 1 454 for 
gonorrhoea. The explanation for such variation in the number 
of cases, it was argued, was that when crops were "good" and 
the country prospering, Basotho migrants spent more of their 
earnings at brothels and shebeens where they caught the 
disease. But during times of economic depression, with their 
families starving, Basotho men tended to remit more money to 
their wives. children and parents.1.20 Certainly there was 
some truth in this, particularly when it is remembered that 
the amount of money deferred and remitted by Basotho migrants 
increased during the 1933-34 depression.1.21. But there were 
also other factors at work, not least of which were the 
repatriation of matekatae from the Reef in the 1930s. the 
imposition of quotas on mine recruits in 1931. and changing 
attitudes towards western medical treatment. 
1.1.:3 AtlS.E, 1927, p.8. 
1.1.9 Ibid., 1935. p.10. 
1.2o Ibid, 1937, p.7. 
1.21. See Chapters Two and Three. 
J0-1 
The relatively high incidence of venereal syphilis among 
Basotho workers in the gold mines was a major concern of both 
the Native Affairs Department and Basutoland authorities. In 
the 1930s. some 25 percent of all Basotho mine candidates 
screened in Basutoland were rejected. with another five 
percent suffering the same fate in Johannesburg.122 Many 
Basotho men arriving on the mines tested positive. and were 
taken to the syphilis hospital in Rietfontein by the Native 
Affairs Department, from where they were repatriated once 
discharged. In 1929, however, the Department decided to 
discontinue paying for the cost of treatment which was 
estimated at 12 to L3, including the railfare and an "escort" 
to the hospital, per individual treated. Instead the cost had 
to be carried by labour agents.123 The South African Native 
Economic Commission noted in 1932 that "there is ... little 
doubt that the Basutos are much more heavily syphilized than 
the Union labour on the mines".124 Indeed, this had been 
one of the findings that had emerged from Dr Cluver·s 1928 
inquiry into the exceptionally high mortality of Basotho on 
the gold mines. 
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Dr Cluver attributed the comparatively high incidence of 
syphilis among Basotho migrants to their interaction with 
matekatse in the Reef locations and slums: "He [a Mosotho 
miner] goes out more in search of pleasure which generally 
takes the form of alcohol consumption and promis~uous 
immorality''.125 The Report concluded that the 1nc1dence of 
.syphilis in Lesotho was likely to be very high, as samples he 
used were of recruits who had been passed as medically fit 
both in colonial Lesotho and at the WNLA 
.Johannesburg. 
compound in 
Of course. just why Basotho miners compared to, say, Shangaan 
workers, turned to township women in such numbers, was not 
part of Cluver~s report. Not surprisingly, it was silent when 
it came to considering the cultural and historical dimensions 
of the problems. Perhaps the first point which needs to be 
made is that the Basotho~s interaction with matekatse was also 
used to account for their non-participation in "mine 
marriages" and homosexual relations in the compounds. Though 
cases of sodomy were tried in the criminal courts of colonial 
Lesotho as early as the 1890s,12s the British Agent for the 
High Commissioner Territories, reporting on homosexuality in 
the compounds in 1939, commented that the Basotho "apparently 
do not approve of this type of entertainment. and prefer their 
women, which accounts, I think, for the large number of Basuto 
women on the Reef".127 Certainly, the observation of the 
British Agent was confirmed by my informants who dismissed 
"mine marriages as an "affair" of the Shangaan.1.2s 
According to Moodie and Harries, homosexual practices in the 
gold mine compounds emerged largely after the South African 
War, following the systematic construction of single-sex 
compounds and the passage of the 1903 Immorality Ordinance. 
125 SAB, GNLB 137, 2828/13/104. Dr Cluver·s Report, 5 
November 1928. 
129 One in 1896 in Leribe. and another in 1901 in the 
same district. 
127_ Cited in. Bonner, "Backs to the Fence", p.285. 
12s See, for example, interviews with, Phomolo 
Matsabisa. born. 1914; Solomon Mokoaleli. 
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Shangaan workers were the first to introduce the practice. 
although by 1916 other groups, including the Pondo. Xhosa and 
Zulu, all participated. The kind of sexual intercourse 
involved. however. was not sodomy but the penetration of the 
penis between the thighs, as anal penetration was generally 
not approved of by the groups involved. Moodie and Harries 
trace this to similar practices between adolescent males and 
females in the rural areas. known as iagisa among the 
Shangaan, ukumestha to the Zulu, and hlobongo to the Pando. 
This practice had customary sanction. and was a way of 
controlling pre-marital sex. Moodie also learnt from his 
informants that Pando workers disliked contact with matekatse 
because they feared they would catch venereal diseases.129 
When homosexuality emerged in the compounds. then. the 
Shangaan, Pando and Zulu were the groups that practised it. It 
was the high incidence of "mine marriages" among those groups 
which, at least for the Pando, limited contact with matekatse, 
and which partly explains the low incidence of syphilis among 
them during these years. 
Yet the Basotho abhorrence of "mine marriages" cannot be 
traced solely to the availability of matekatse, as such women 
only became a factor from the 1920s onwards. Hugh Ashton's 
anthropological study of Basotho in the 1930s showed that 
'' ... relations between boys and girls used to be entirely 
innocent. Premarital intercourse, even in the restricted form 
of ukumetsha practised by the Zulus, was and still is 
forbidden".1.30 This shows that it was the absence of 
ukumetsha among Basotho rather than the availability or 
otherwLse of matekatse which made imitating Shangaan practices 
an impossibility for most if not all Basotho migrants. All 
that the arrival of matekatae in the 1320s did was to provide 
Basotho men with an alternative to other women. All of these 
129 Moodie, Going for Gold, pp.119-58: Harries, Work. 
Culture and Identity, pp.200-08. 
130_ Ashton. Basuto, p.39. 
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factors need to be taken into account when attempting to 
explain the high incidence of syphilis amcng Basotho miners 
during these years. 
There is no doubt that syphilis. fc,r all the di2,gnost. ic 
confusion characteristic of the early years, had a major 
impact on the health of a growing number of people in Lesotho. 
Returning men spread it to their wives and relatives, who in 
turn infected other Basctho. This became even more serious in 
the 1920s and 1930s when, as Section Two will show. 
prostitution became rife in the country.131 
Tuberculosis CTB) 
TB. caused by the contraction of tubercle bacilli primarily 
through inhalation, is not a highly infectious disease; and 
its propagation depends on the intensity of contact between 
the host and other people. Pulmonary TB, by far the most 
conunon form of this disease. 132 and sometimes referred to 
as "phthisis" in early reports, <and not to be confu.sed with 
minerJs phthisis or silicosis),123 was identified in 
colonial Lesotho among returning migrants as early as 1889. 
Douglas Fraser told the Transvaal Labour Commission in 1903 
that "pulmonary complaints seem to be on the increase [among 
Basotho]. owing perhaps to the use of European dress, and work 
in towns and mines''.134 It was also noted in the 1905-0G 
report for Maseru that: 
Phthisis is becoming more common in the district. so much 
so that the natives who are otherwise indifferent to 
disease are beginning to be alarmed at its spread. 
Hitherto it has not been indigenous to this part, and the 
cases seen were boys who had been working on the mines 
and in Johannesburg, but now it 1s attacking others who 
have never left the country.125 
l31 A1:1SE~ 1935. 
122 This form of TB is characterised by the development 




This disease is discussed in Chapter Four. 
Tranavaal Labour Commiaaion, p.~19. 
CAR, 1905-06, p.55. 
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This observation was supported by Dr Macfarlane·s claim that 
TB cases had been rare in Basutoland before the 1880s. These 
views were supported by the conclusions of an examination of 
2.50 000 Basotho between 1900 and 1307 which showed that TB 
was now on the increase and spreading to people who had never 
been to the mines. During the same period Dr Casalis started 
spotting TB cases among children_J.36 And Le3elinvana 
reported in 1913 that a group of doctors was due to conduct a 
TB survey in the near future, at the reguest of the Principal 
Medical Officer because ·· ... it is said that Basotho in 
Johannesburg die in numbers more than other groups dying on 
the mines. _ . " . 1.37 
It was not until the 1920s, however. that the Basutoland 
government stirred itself, and then only after still more 
reports on the high incidence of TB among Basotho migrants on 
the gold mines. As the mine authorities insisted 011 
repatriating TB cases. arrangements were made in August 1923 
to work out a follow-up programme. Among its provisions were 
the following: the names, addresses. medical history and other 
related details of all Basotho TB cases were to be sent to the 
Principal Medical Officer; each repatriatee was to be given an 
identity card to be presented on examination; a list of all TB 
cases in every district in Lesotho was to be compiled and sent 
to headquarters in Maseru; the Principal Medical Officer was 
to send regular reports on repatriatees to the Chamber of 
Mines; the Native Recruiting Corporation was to pay the 
Basutoland government 2s.6d per examination; but the TB 
patients themselves were to be treated free of charge in 
dispensaries and hospitals_l.38 
Despite these measures, in 1330 a Dr Allan conducted a 
tuberct1lin test in Basutoland. and found that the proportion 
J.36 South African Institute for Medical Research. TB in 
South African Natives with Special Reference to the Disease 
amongst the Mine Labourers on the Witwatersrand. 1932. pp.203-
04, 227-28. 
1 2 7 Leselinyana, 20 May 1913. 
i3s_ LNA, S3/17/1/7, NRC to P.M.O., 12 August 1323. 
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of thoae testing positive was higher among females between the 
ages of 10 and 20 years old. and among males between the ages 
of 20 years and older. Mine recruita were drawn from the 
latter age group. By the 1930s. therefore. TB was well 
grounded in Basotho soil. and was carried by women and 
children who had never been to the labour centres. 
Table 7.4: TB Cases Among Cases Treated in Hospitals, 1927-
1937. 
Year Total No. of Total % of all 0/ of lo 
Patients Pulmonary no. of TB to Pul. TB 
TB all total to total 
forms patients patients 
of TB 
1926 39 711 269 - - 6" • I 
1927 41 936 159 - - ".11:: . .._,.._, 
1928 46 5J5 370 460 .98 .79 
1929 41 695 263 495 1.18 .63 
1930 42 304 295 521 1. 23 .69 
1931 38 7 '1'7 01 261 389 .95 .S7 
19J2 44 368 390 5J9 1. 21 .87 
1933 40 373 318 509 1 0,~ .~U .79 
192,4 43 051 254 44Ei 1.03 .59 
1935 45 455 549 012 1. 78 1.21 
1936 54 015 496 811 1. 50 .9 
1937 
,.,,..., 
264 423 812 1.12 .59 I.:, 
Source: Annual Medical and Sanitary Report, 1936: 1937. 
Table 7.4 shows that pulmonary TB constituted the bulk of all 
TB cases treated in hospitals and dispensaries in colonial 
Lesotho. The dramatic increase in the number of TB cases in 
1935 was attributed to the 1932-33 drought, as it was argued. 
like syphilis, that depression/"prosperity" explained 
variations in the numbers obliged to seek medical treatment. 
Hence it was concluded from Table 7.4 that: 
From the above it can fairly be deduced that, among the 
Basuto, tuberculosis is very definitely influenced by 
economic conditions and nutrition. If the efforts which 
are being made by Government and other agencies to 
stimulate the Basuto to improve their diets are 
successful, one can look forward with confidence to a 
310 
marked improvement in the tuberculosis incidence among 
the Basuto.l.39 
This kind of thinking was informed by the belief that TB was 
rife because of the weak immune system of the majority of 
Basotho who needed a proper diet to .strengthen themselves. As 
in the case of syphilis, though, no mention was made of the 
problems caused by the repatriation of TB cases by the mine 
authorities. 
II 
BROTHELS AND CANTEENS 
Two of the most critical effects of labour migrancy on the 
supplying areas were the psychological and economic 
implications the phenomenon had for women. Basotho women 
responded in various ways to the absence of their men and the 
decline of the economy. Some followed their husbands and 
brothers, joining the ranks of matekatae, while others 
remained at home. Judy Kimble and Phil Bonner have pioneered 
the study of these various responses, but no effort was made 
to look at the strategies of the women remaining at 
home.l.40 And whE:n scholarly attention was given to the 
latter category of women, focus was on the period post-
1940s.141 
1.3s AMSE, 1937, p.10 
1.40 Bonner, "'Desirable or Undesirable Basotho Women?'"; 
J. Kimble, '"Runaway Wives'? Basotho women, chief3. and the 
colonial state. c.1890-1920'', Centre for African Studies 
Seminar Faper. School of Oriental and African Studies, 
(University af London), 17 June 1933. 
1. 4 1. See, especially, J. Gay, "Wage Employment of Rural 
Basotho Wcmen: A Case Study'', South African Labour Bulletin. 
vol.6. no.4. 1980; E. Gordon, "An Analysis of the Impact of 
Labor Migration on the Lives of Women in Lesotho··. Journal of 
Development Studies. vol.17, no.3, 1981; C. Murray, Families 
Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho. (Ravan 
Press, Johannesburg, 1981); A.D. Spiegel, "Rural 
Differentiation and the Diffusion of Migrant Labour 
Remittances in Lesotho", .in P. Mayer, Ced.), Black Villagers 
in an Industrial Society, (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 
1980). 
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Women and the Household 
A aignificant nwnber of Basotho women became invclved in 
commer,:: ial t"?e:>brswing and pros ti tut.ion. They either moved to 
~outh African urban centres, or migrated to Lesotho's major 
towns. In both cases, beer-brewing and prostitution came to 
play an important role as a key source of income. 
Women were treated as minors in the Basotho patriarchal 
society under discussion. Their access to the means of 
production, especially land. was mediated by their 
relationship with men as husbands or fathers, and. in the case 
of widows, sons. They were nonetheless a vital source cf 
labour for agricultural production. and performed a wide range 
of househ9ld duties. not least of which was the brewing of 
beer. Their role as bearers and rearers of children. supplied 
men with additional labour, bohali, and male heirs. At the 
same time. their upbringing and socialisation emphasised their 
gender; girls were taught to cover their person as soon as 
they started crawling. while boys could go naked until they 
were about si~-years old. Female children were taught to sit 
"properly", and in every way were prepared for womanhood. 
which principally meant being a wife and mother. As minors. 
they had no role in the public domain. being denied any 
participation in the political affairs of the country. The 
only time they could enter the chiefs~ courts. the khotla, 
where village matters were discussed and court cases heard and 
tried by married men. was as witnesses er the accused in a 
case, or when bringing food and beer. 
A number of anthropological studies have provided us with some 
insight into the impact of labour migrancy on Basotho family 
and marriage systems in recent decades.142 Basotho society 
itself tolerated certain practices which, 
might affect the stability of marriages. 
if unregulated, 
One such practice 
142 Murray. Families Divided: A.D. Spiegel. "Polygyny 
as Myth: Towards Understanding Extramarital Relations in 
Lesotho". in Spiegel and P.A. McAllister. (eds.). Tradition 
and Transition in Southern Africa, (African Studies, 50th 
Anniversary Volume. vol.50, no.1 and 2. 1991). 
•I "4 •• 
,_,_t ....... 
was a particular farm of concubinage called bonvatsi (nyatsi: 
"lc,ver": pl: linvatsi). A form of extramarital relation 
between two people. 0ne or both of whom might be married. it 
time. and involved a regular transfer of gifts 
which included money and such items as clothes and food. 
Hence Andrew :piegel. on the basis of his study of this 
phenomenon in the mid-1970s, argued that "extramarital 
relations provided one of the routes along which migrants· 
wage-earnings 
Lesotho".1.42 
were diffused within rural communities in 
Contrary to Spiegel's assertion, however. bonyatsi seems to 
have preceded the growth of the migrant labour system. Ernest 
Mabille. who was born and grew up in Lesotho in the middle of 
the 19th century, wrote in 1905 that Basotho "morality is 
·vel'Y low. Prostitution as a social evil is unknown. but 
adultery is general. Every man has his mistress and every 
woman her lover''. A punishment of two cattle was typically 
imposed if a man seduced a woman; six in the case of the woman 
becoming pregnant.144 What can be said. therefore, is that 
rather than causing it, labour migrancy introduced new 
elements to bonvatsi. Writing in 1935, Allan Pim observed 
that "marital fidelity does not appear to have ever been a 
prominent Basuto characteristic but it appears to have 
seriously deteriorated as a result of the prolonged absence of 
the younger men".145 
The other practice affecting the stability of marriages was 
the frequency with which potential wives eloped with men. or 
the chobe 1 i ,3r, . Thi.s practice, as di3cussed in Chapter One. 
142 Spiegel, "Polygyny as a Myth". p.147. 
144 H.E. Mabille, "The Basutos of Basutoland", 
Proceedings of the British and South African Association for 
the Advancement of Science, vol.3. 1905, p.185. 
145 . Pim. Financial and Economic Position, p.42. This 
view was taken to extremes by colonial officials who, as we 
shall see later, regarded bonyatsi as "general prostitution" 
and attributed the spread of beershops and venereal disease, 
to it. This was consistent with the tendency in colonial 
mentality and discourse to exaggerate Africans· sexual 
promiscuity. 
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became almost commonplace as bohali spiralled out of the reach 
~f most men. Elopement could take place while the woman was 
working in the fields or while visiting a friend. The woman 
would appear to be resisting, e'len when she knew about the 
plan in advance. The man would then take her to his moth~r 
who in turn would inform her husband. the man·s father. The 
family of the woman would then be informed, and a fine of siz 
,:attle would be added to the 'cohali price. The common 
practice was for the boy·s family to pay only the chobeliao 
fine. Ashton estimated in the mid-1930s that some 25 percent 
of marriages taking place during that time resulted from this 
practice.i4S He is supported by Pim·s 
practice of elopement and of abduction 
remark that 
is seriously on 
"the 
the 
increase''.147 The increase in chobeliso was accompanied by 
a decline in polygamous marriages. The number of men with more 
than one wife as a percentage of the number of recorded 
marriages, fell from about 19 percent in 1911 to about 16 
percent. 11 percent and eight percent in 1921. 1936 and 1946. 
respectively.i4s 
But Basotho men. or at least the growing number of the poor 
among them. increasingly found even the payment of the 
~hobeliao fine very difficult. By the mid-1930s a practice 
had developed whereby men eloped with women, left them with 
their mothers. and escaped to the labour centres in South 
Africa, without paying their fine. The rate of premarital 
pregnancies and illegitimate children was also on the 
increase. Affected parents approached their chiefs for action 
and tl1is matter was discussed by the Basutoland National 
Council in 1334. Chiefs felt that men who eloped or 
impregnated women without paying either the fine or bohali. 
should be 20nacripted to the mines in South Africa and their 
wages r,=,mi tted tc:i their "in-laws". They wer'e convinced that 
such a measure would prevent the practice from becoming normal 
and acceptable. The only stumbling block was the British 
14e Ashton. Basuto, p.65. 
i
47 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.42. 
14:3 Bonner, "· Desirable or undesirable Basa tho women?·". 
pp.234-41. 
Resident Commi3aioner who argue,.-:l. that the meaaure 
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implemented would violate the righta of the migrants. The 
only legitimate path was that chobeliso cases should be tried 
under :::.::, lc,ni A 1 law as in the past. The problem that chiefs 
had with the Resident Commissioner·a legal solution was that 
it harl no way of ensuring that stockless men. 
social conditions brought about by colonialism and capitalism. 
paid their chobeU ,30 and other related fines. hence they still 
insisted on compulsory conscription to the mi~es. The issue 
was again raised before the Na.tional C,::,urK:il in 19:::;7 when 
chiefs called for the Resident Commissioner to issue letters 
to fathers whose daughters had eloped to South African towns. 
The idea was that the letters could then be presented to the 
authorities in South Africa for their assistance in tracing 
and bringing back the woman.149 
Both the nyatsi and chobeliso practices put many women in a 
vulnerable poaition. As more and more men became labour 
migrants in the 1920s and 1930s, the minimum length of 
contract increased from four to six months in 1919, and nine 
months in 19~4. By the mid-1920s the bulk of Basotho 
recruits employed by the Chamber of Mines were engaged under 
nine month contracts. and in the 1930s many started taking 1 ,-, ..L~ 
mcinths "joins". With an increasing number of men remaining on 
the mines for long periods, not t~ mention some others 
remaining there permanently, and with returning migrants only 
staying for short periods at home, many Basotho homesteads 
effectively fell under the control of women. 
Migrant labour and the prolonged absence of Easotho men 
transformed the nvatai practice. The wives of absent miners 
increa3ingly be~ame prime targets for those men who remained 
at home. Migrants in Quthing even composed a song which 
became popular in the mid-1930s: 
Young men are still away in Kimberley: 
Others are staying behind for the saliva of girls 
~ 49 Litaba. 1934, PP- 114-20: 1937, pp. ~46-50. 
They are above all after: "she l3 now mine". 1.50 
!Iugh Tracey recorded a women~s song d~ring his 1959 tour of 
colonial Lesotho. which pointed to the link between the 
absence of men/husbands and prostitution. The aong uses the 
subordination cf women and their reproductive role to express 
3oci0-economic problems: 
Helele, Masupha!l.51. 
~1at do you people say I should do at home? 
Masupha says we should bear children promiscuously. 
Masupha has allowed us. 
The sling is strangling the baby. 
A hen never goes after a cock, 
But the hens at Kolo seem to be calling the cocks!l.52 
Spiegel was also told during his research in the 1370s "of men 
returning home unexpectedly after having heard that their 
wives were being unfaithful".153 It certainly seems likely 
that this practice became widespread in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Such women. of course. were not simply passive victims; many 
of them, especially those whose husbands were not remitting 
money home. turned to beer-brewing and prostitution as their 
only means of survival, but nonetheless ones which they 
controlled. The "Prostitution and Vagrants" court file for 
Leribe district in the government archives, for example, shows 
that some of the arrested women in the 1930s were the wives of 
absent migrants, and that their huts were used as brothels. 
However. the also shows that several men succeeded in 
becoming leading pimps. and it was their huts that were 
3ometimes used as venues for 
prostitution.l54 
1. 5 o Leselinvana, 5 February 19JC. 
l5l A local chief. 
beer-drinking 3.nd 
'.!.52 H .. Tracey~. '1 Basl1tola11Li Rec:ordi11g Tol11~: ~J()v .. ernber 1~3tl1 
to December 3rd, 1959··, African Music Society Journal, vol.2. 
no.2. 1959. p.73. 
1.53. Spiegel, "Polygyny as Myth", 
1.54. LNA, Leribe Collection, Box 
Prostitution" file in this box has 
proceedings of the 1930s and 1940s, 
number of prostitutes. 
p.147. 
70. The "Vagrants and 
the synopsis of court 
involving a considerable 
Chobeliso could also place women in a precarious situation, as 
they frequently had to deal with their "in-laws". especially 
the "mother-in-law", own. The illtreatment of such women by 
in-laws was quite common; the source of trouble was usually 
money. or rather, the lack of money remitted by the son or 
husband. The legitimacy of the women as a wife and her right 
to what the family's son or her husband was sending, were 
0ften questioned. It was worse ·c lL the son/husband sent 
nothing home. All too often, this happened when some migrants 
found new "wives" among Basotho women on the Rand. Faced with 
little room to manoeuvre, and disowned by their families for 
having agreed to elope in the first place. chobeliso victims 
in such situations were then forced to seek refuge in nearby 
brothels, or open their own beer-brewing and sex "business", 
or cross the border to South Africa, where they settled in the 
towns and mining centres. Other women. who had eloped to 
South Africa only to be abandoned in the locations, were 
forced to return home to face their parents and eventually eke 
out a living in various illicit trades.i55 
Divorced women were another target of Lesotho's pimps. Though 
Mabille noted that "divorce is practically unknown", he 
believed that ·· a divorced woman generally goes away from the 
country and becomes a prostitute in the native locations of 
the towns". 1 56 The two ma.j or causes of divorce were 
misunderstandings and quarrels, especially rife in polygynous 
marriages, and infidelity. The other common cause was the 
"apparent" sterility of the wife, that is her "failure" to 
give birth to a male heir. But Table 7.5 shows that the 
number of divorced women expressed as a percentage was 
remarkably low. but that, in terms of numbers. it increased 
between 1911 and 1936. 
The age breakrlown in the 1911 Basutoland census showed that of 
the 124 099 women who were returned as single, 23 262 were of 
i 55 Litaba, 1934 and 1937. 
i5e Mabille. "The Basutos", p.185. 
the age group years and over.15~ With the avera,2;e 
man7ing age of Basotho women being between 18 and 24 for the 
period under review, these figurea may therefJre suggest that 
=i.b,,ut ~'.) percent of single wc,men were c,f the ma1'rying agoe;. 
With some 50 percent of women being aingle in 1911. 19JS and 
1346 \ see Table 7. 5), socio-economic hardships 1m1st have 
push~d a number of women in this category to beer-brewing and 
prostitution. With bohali prices increasing and the practice 
of arranged and polygamous marriages in decline, the number of 
single women of marrying age must have also increased. 
especially as by the 1930s, as shown in Chapter One, many men 
remained unmarried until they were in their thirties. Many of 
these single women also became targets of chobeliso. However. 
as shown in Chapter Two, Basotho population growth rate 
suffered a drop between 1936 and 1946 due to bokholoa; the 
female population was the most affected. dropping from 320 568 
in 1936 to 314 945 in 1946. The percentage of single women 
dropped from about 51 percent in 1936 to 47 percent in 1946 
(see Table 7.5). This may well suggest that the proportion of 
younger women or girls in the total female population 
increased after 1936, as many older and married women left to 
settle in South African towns and mining centres. 
Table 7_5: The Marital Status of Basotho Women, 1911-1946_ 
Marital 1911 ~~,!( 1936 :?.~* 1946 :~* 
Statu3 
:"3ingls 124 099 56.6 162 300 50.63 148 321 47.09 
Married 
....,...., 
300 35.3 113 '.273 35.34 117 ...., ...., C: 
,..,...., 
. 38 / I I,:..._; u I 
Widowed 17 807 8.1 42 104 13. 1:J 45 056 14.Jl 
Di v,.::,rced 0 0.0 
...., 
:J41 0. .-,,:, 
...., 
216 0.70 u L., f .__, ,:.. 
Unknown 10 0.0 550 ,"\ 1 ...., lJ • _l I 1 G:27 0.52 
Tc;tal 219 224 100 32() 5C8 lCO 314 :=l45 100 
~ource: Baautoland Census. 1911; 19JC; 194G. 
¥ percentage of the total number in that year. 
157 Basutoland Census, 1911. pp.36-37. 
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A key change reflected in Table 7.5 was, however, the 1n2rease 
in the number of widowed women between 1911 and 1346. It is 
pc,s3ible that a significant pa1°t of those returned as "widows" 
were actually married women who had been abandoned by their 
migrant husbands. Some of the widows had probably lost their 
husbands in mine accidents. or because of occupational 
dissase2. 
~idows were more vulnerable than single women who could at 
least be protected by their fathers. A widow could be taken 
as a wife or an additional wife by the brother of her deceased 
husband.l.58 This levirate practice, ho kenela. ensured 
that patriarchal control over women as minors was maintained. 
but arguably also provided the widow and her children with an 
element of social security and care. However. depending on 
her age and whether she had children or not, as well as the 
age and sex of such children. a widow could avoid ho kenela 
with relative ease. Often enough, this meant that widows, 
compared to other women, had more independence and control 
over the means of production; they were the pioneers of women-
headed households. But just as frequently, they were victims 
of the greed and corruption of chiefs: their land was taken 
under false pretexts. One concerned Mosotho man wrote tc, 
L~:,;1~1 i1r:t::ana in 193(3 about prostitution. He argued that the 
problem had begun with the Spanish "Flu" ,)f 1918 which took 
the lives of many men. And it was the chiefs who then had 
taken plots belonging to the widows on the grounds that they 
could not cultivate them. This had forced such women to move 
to South African lccations where 
prostitutes.159 Ashton observed 
they survived 
in the 1930s 
by becoming 
that as it 
ic beccming increasingly difficult to make a living in 
Basu to ls.nd. many families find the burch=,n of maintaining a 
1.~i~ There is, however. some debate as to whether this 
practice should be regarded as marriage or not. as there was 
no bohali transaction; see B. Potash.W ~~i~d~OuWus~~illD~~A~£~1~,1~·L-~~aun 
SocietiAs: Choices and Constraints, <Standford l~iversity 
Press. California. 1986). 
1.5s. Leselinvana, 18 March 19J6. 
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widow too much for them and either neglect her 0r raise no 
objection to her leaving the village and leading he,· own life 
els,=;where". J..6c 
All c,f this suggests that widc,ws. single w,::,men and the wi<t.=:s 
of migrants long absent to employment centres. 
~ulnerable to economic pressures and male demand. 
were the mc:;st 
It was this 
broad category which was apt to turn towards beer-brewing and 
prclsti tut ion. These women were not only subject to socio-
economic pressures, illtreatment from their in-laws and abuse 
by chiefs. but were also targeted by pimps and other men who 
made their living from running after such women. As we saw, 
these women could turn to beer-brewing and prostitution in two 
ways; they could cross the border into South Africa or move to 
Lesntho's nascent towns or. as they were called, "Camps" or 
"Reserves". This is well summarised by a remark made by the 
Catholic Missionary, Laydevant, in the late 1920s: "After the 
period of initiation, the young [Mosotho] man easily finds a 
willing partner, especially in the Camps where there are young 
widows and women whose husbands are absent''_J..BJ.. Table 7.6 
shows that over 70 percent of Basotho women in Basutoland in 
1936 were "peasants", meaning that they were "living" from 
their land. as opposed to less than one percent employed as 
domestic servants and working as farm labourers. 
percent were at schools of one form or another. 
Some le, 
Tl1is shows 
that there was virtually no source of formal employment for 
the majority of women in the country. 
1eo Ashton. Basuto, p.85. 
1s1 R. P. ,J. Laydevant, "Etude Sur La Fami l le En 
Basutoland'', Journal de la So~iete des Africanistes, vol.l. 
no.2. 1931. p.255. 


























Source: Basutoland Census, 1936. 
As part of the same process that was forcing many wome~ in 
colonial Lesotho to opt for the sale of beer and sex. growing 
numbers of women were either "absconding" or becoming the 
"undesirables" in South African towns. Many of Basotho 
"undesirables" who were being repatriated from South 
Africa1e2 continued their illicit trades in Basutoland. 
Like male migrants, therefore. the "undesirables" were great 
travellers. It is at this point that we must turn to 
attempts made to suppress the sale of beer and prostitution in 
Basutoland. 
Beer and Prostitution 
Long before colonial rule. sorghum-based beer had been brewed 
in Lesotho not for sale but for domestic use: ritual and other 
,::eremoni es: exchange for s2rv L::es 1·endered; a.nd for affirming 
=:i.nd strengthening bonds of communal belonging. As with 
-=i.g1· icul tural work. brewing was done by women even though men 
were the major consumers. The were two types of beer, 
differing in taste and alcohol content. Leting was lighter. 
1e2 See Chapter Two. 
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the fermentation period being a couple of hours. Joala was 
stronger. with preparation and fermentation taking longer. 
Both beverages. however. were quite low in alcohol content. 
even .joala rendered one drunk only afte1' large ;uanti ties had 
been consumed. Writing in 130J. Martin Minnie who had lived 
in Lesotho for ten years since 1891. observed that "there are 
no canteens, consequently the number of inebriates is 
wonderfully small. and much of the degradation and misery of 
drunkenness is unknown".1.63 And as we saw earlier in the 
2hapter, Mabille had reported in much the same period that 
"prostitution as a social evil is unknown". What is clear, 
then, is that while the sale of Sotho beer and prostitution 
later became rife, both were largely absent at the beginning 
of the century. 
Drunkenness in Lesotho was initially associated with the 
consumption of brandy. On 8 November 1854 Chief Moshoeshoe 
passed the "Ordinance Against the Introduction and Sale of 
Spirituous Liquors in the Territory of the Basutos'', as a 
response to the invasion of his country by cheap Cape brandy. 
The Ordinance rejected brandy as a foreign drink, unknown to 
the ancestors of the Basotho. This Ordinance was codified 
into Trading Rule of 1877 by the Cape colonial government. But 
control collapsed after the civil that followed the failure of 
Cape colonial policies. and some Orange Free State farmers 
eatablished brandy canteens along the borders and within 
Basutoland. Once the British resumed control of the colony in 
1884, the new Resident Commissioner, Colonel Clarke. targeted 
the sale of brandy and the related problems of drunkenness. 
The 1877 anti-brandy clause was included in the March 1884 
Proclamation, and the following year several chiefs joined 
hands with the French missionaries to form the Blue Cross. By 
1886 the problem of brandy-induced drunkenness was almost 
over. a~d liquor canteens had been removed from the colony. 
Though an illicit liquor traffic continued, especially in the 
Orange Free State border towns, the consumption of brandy was 
163 M. Minnie. Basutoland: Its Legends and Customs, 
<Nichols and Company, London, 1903), p.39. 
nowhere near its previous rate. Increasingly, its c:on.sumption 
was restricted to chiefs and those few wealthy Basotho who 
could afford it.164 
The sale of Sotho beer in Basutoland was first reported in the 
1910s. Commercial beer-brewing and prostitution were already 
well-established in other parts of South Africa, especially in 
Natal and Bloemfontein, and so, as Mabille indicated, Basotho 
women who were forced into or opted for these practices. found 
it easier to leave the country. By 1911 the existence of 
canteens for the sale of Sotho beer was already a factor in 
colonial Lesotho. Officials claimed that men and women in 
many villages were neglecting their responsibilities and 
spending their time in canteens, where the women accepted 
drinks in return for sex. The Assistant Commissioner for 
Leribe was among the first to act against this new phenomenon, 
but was obliged to stand aside after the September 1911 issue 
of Mochochonono criticised him for taking arbitrary action. 
His lone action in any event could scarcely stem the flood of 
"qhadi", a particular kind of beer which had been unleashed by 
Basotho women returning from South African towns and mining 
centres. This new drink was popular with chiefs and commoners 
alike. By 1915, "qhadi" and various other sorts of 
intoxicating drinks" which had "lately begun to be widely 
consumed in the country'', were now seen as a serious problem 
by the colonial government.165 
is4 Paragraph based on G. Tylden, The Rise of the 
Basuto, (Juta & Co .. Cape Town, 1950), p.191; G. Lagden, 
Basutos: The Mountaineers. their Country, Being a Narrative of 
Events Relating to the Tribe From its Formation Early in the 
Nineteenth Century to the PresPnt Day, (Hutchinson & Co., 
London, 1910) Vol.l (p.300) and Vol.2, (p.576): E. Mphatsoe, 
"The Blue Cross Association in Basutoland". Basutoland 
Witne,3s, vol. 8, no. 3, ,July-September 1954; idem. "The Struggle 
Against Alcoholic Drink in Basutoland''. Basutoland Witness, 
vol.11, no.4, December 1957. 
is5_ Paragraph based on Leselinyana, 28 November 1912, 30 
November 1911: LNA, S3/21/4/4. AC (Leribe) to RC, 24 October 
1911: LNA. S3/5/11/6, "Memorandum on Drink Traffic in 
Basutoland" to HC, 14 July 1915. 
Leribe wa3 ahead of other districts in trying to sombat ths 
apread cf canteens. When the new Assi2t.ant c.~,mmis3ic,ne1' fer 
the di.=;trict 3-rrived in Augnst 1914. he convened a ma22: 
meeting. "at the re•;uest Jf a few of the better 
Tts purpose was to discuss the system which 
hs.d been put in place by his predecessor. whereby those 
wi3hing to sell beer were issued with licenses on condition 
the1.t thet'e was no "drunkenness" .:,r "brawling". 
allow the system to continue operating, "warning them [tho.=;e 
present at the pitso] at the same time that if any violent 
conduct should result, I would at once stop the sale of 
joala".1.66 However, as these conditions were not in fact 
met, in December 1915 the Assistant Commissioner convened 
another pitso at which he declared that as "there had b8en 3·.J 
much drunkenness especially among their women'', he was going 
to close down the canteens from January the 1st of the 
following year.167 In this, he was responding to pressure 
from the Anglican and French missionaries. 
members of the Basotho elite in the district. 
and f 1.~om some 
Ey contrast., 
ordinary people in the district sent him a petition, pointing 
out that beer sales brought them sufficient income to buy 
clothes and food and pay tax, and that the beer business was 
more lucrative than selling grain at the local traders· stores 
where prices were low. Petitioners also argued that 
Moshoeshoe only ''requested that his nation may be prote~terl 
from foreign intoxicants and not from the Basuto national 
beverages".1.68 
Tl,e Resident Conunissioner in Maseru let it be known thc:tt he 
favoured the sale of leting, but not Joala. As =i. r2sul t. the 
Assistant Commissioner then formed a "Camp Joala Cc,mrnittee". 
and on its reconunendations and ,=i.fter meeting sjgnatcn'ies (Jf 
the petition, a compromise was reached in April 191 G, wh,:,reb:/ 
the nuinber ,Jf ·.:ante,=;ns was rPstricted and their ,::-i·wners 
iee LNA, SJ/21/4/4. AC rLeribe) to GS. 17 August 1914. 
ie? Ibid .. AC CLeribe) to GS, 19 January 1916. 
1.ee Ibid .. petition to AC, 6 January 1916: a follow-up 
petition to the AC, 8 February 1916. 
undertc,c,k to hand over those "gui 1 ty of uproarious cc;nduct" to 
the pc,lice. ::..69 
But the problem was not only in the district. but ~120 at 
Ficksburg Bridge connecting Leribe to the Orange Free State. 
All had begun with the Major of Ficksburg convening a meeting 
eaTly in February 1912 with the Ficksburg Chamber of Commerce. 
the municipality and Church ministers, and a petition 
subse~uently sent to the South African Minister of Justice. 
The petitioned complained that "within a mile of the centre of 
the town of Ficksburg [across the Basutoland border], a 
building has been erected, and is being used week by week for 
beer drinking, dancing, etc., and that white women and girls 
from this town are frequenting this place. and as we have 
reason to believe, having sexual intercourse with natives". 
The other concern was "the disastrous effect that is being 
produced upon the natives in our locations, and the perilous 
position in 
thereby".1.70 
which our wives 





the High Commissioner who in turn instructed the Assistant 
Commissioner for Leribe to investigate the issue. The 
Assistant Commissioner approached the principal chief of 
Leribe, Jonathan, who then suppressed all canteens save the 
two belonging to himself and his son, Matsarapane. The crisis 
then subsided, only to come up again in 1915 following an 
outcry in the white press.1.71 
In November 1915 the Justice Minister indicated to the High 
Commissioner that "there are beer canteens where disgraceful 
scenes ars witnessed and where the servants of the village [of 
Ficksburg] and neighbourhood congregate causing the 
inhabitants of the Free State great inconvenience by being 
either totally incapable on returning to their service on a 
1.ss Ibid., AC (Leribe) to GS. 29 April 1916. 
170 SAB, JUS 184, 5/33/13. Petition to Minister of 
Justice. 29 February 1912. 
i 7 1._ Ibid., Secretary for Justice to Imp. Sec., 17 June 
1913; Magis. CFicksburg) to AC CLeribe), 1 August 1913. 
Monday morning c,r doing so in a d1°unken condi t icm". 172 In 
December Chief Jonathan, unable to withstand the pressure put 
on him, promised to close down his canteen. I3or:1er patrols 
and the mo11itoring of the canteens by the Basutoland Mounted 
Police were also increased, and Grange Free State Africans 
entering the 
passes.l. 7 3 
district were r0 e·1u ired to show t.11e ir 
In March the "Manager" of JonathanJs canteen 
and one "female servant" were arrested "for resisting the 
Police in the execution of their duty'' in February, and were 
fined L5 or three months~ imprisonment with hard labour and 
5a, respectively. A "European woman and her daughter living 
an immoral life at MotsarapaneJs canteen" were removed to 
Ficksburg 
fulfilling 
in that same 
his promise, the 
period.174. With Jonathan not 
Resident Commissioner rushed to 
Leribe in April 1916 to threaten him. In May the Assistant 
Commissioner for Leribe met the Ficksburg Resident Magistrate. 
putting the blame on the Free State·s liberal policy of 
issuing passes to Africans who wanted to visit Lesotho.1 7 5 
However, intervention by the police led to the decline in the 
number of people frequenting these canteens; the number 
dropped from 638 people in February 1916 to 194 and 136 in 
March and April, respectively.176 
The sale of beer was also a problem in the southern part of 
Basutoland. Up until 1914, the Paramount Chief persisted in 
regarding brandy aa the only cause of drunkenness in the 
country, contenting himself with appeals for the suppression 
of smuggling. He was, however. forced to act the following 
year against a canteen which was flourishing and operating in 
the middle of Mafeteng. According to Leaelinyana. there were 
some "strange women from nowhere. who were seen wandering 
1.7~ LNA. S3/5/l1/6, Minister of ,Justice to Imp. :'3ec .. ::::5 
November 1315. 
1.7 3_ Ibid. 
1.7 4 LNA. S3/5/ll/6. "Memorandum on Drink Traffic in 
Basutoland" to HC. 14 July 1915. 
1.75. Ibid .. RC to HC. 8 May 1916. 
1. 7 e_ Ibid .. AC CLeribe) to GS, 7 April 1916; AC <Leribe) 
to GS, 3 May 1916; AC (Leribe) to GS, 4 March 1916. 
about in town, begging for money from [ local J pe,1ple". 177 
This was part of the Sake and Mainyatso phenomenon discussed 
in Appendix III. At much the same time, the attention of the 
Higp Cc::1mmissioner in Cape Town was drawn to the question of 
canteens in Basutoland by a complaint that appeared in the 
Friend of the Free State in June 1915. The ensuin5 
investigation once again drew a distinction between leting, 
which appears to be a wholesome stimulant and its use [aicJ 
seldom leads to any abuse", and :ioala "which is simply used as 
an intoxicant". While recognising that the consumption of 
"qhadi" and other similar drinks was growing, the 
investigation's main emphasis rested on the suppression of the 
illicit trade in brandy. As before, the problem was seen as 
one of policing.178 
There were two considerations that made the suppression of the 
sale of beer difficult for the colonial authorities. Firstly, 
African labourers in the Orange Free State, many of whom came 
from Basutoland, imbibed leting and joala as food and 
nourishment. and recognising this. the police confined their 
action to preventing beer from being sold on Saturday 
afternoons and Sundays. Secondly. as the British well knew. 
"these houses serve a real need of the travelling Basuto 
native public. many of whom arrive at Ficksburg by train and 
must sleep somewhere before proceeding journey". They 
therefore did "not attempt to .shut them down. but merely 
prohibited the sale of beer by them".179 Indeed, the term 
"eating houses" and "beer canteens" were used interchangeably 
by the Resident 
establishments.1so 
Commissioner when referring to 
177 Leselinvana. 14 May 1915: 11 June 1915. 
these 
17 '3 LNA, S3/5/11/6, "Memorandum on Drink Traffic in 
Basutoland" to HC. 14 July 1915. 
17 s SAB, JUS 184, 5/33/13, Secretary for Justice to 
Magistrate CFicksburg), 23 February 1917. 
iso LNA, S3/5/11/6, RC to HC, 8 May 1916. 
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In fact, the colonial authorities increasingly came to realiae 
that they would achieve more by working behind scenes. The 
policy of working with the Paramount Chief was given an added 
impetus early in 1918 when the editor of Mochochonono 
criticised the Assistant Commissioner for Maseru over the way 
in which police raids against beer sellers were themselves of 
dubiou.=:; legality. The editorial closed with a call: "Law! Law! 
Let us be governed according t o law!".1.81. With the tacit 
approval of the Resident Commissioner, the isaue was raised 
at the National Council sitting later that year. The 
preoccupation of a growing number of the chiefs with the 
drunkenness of their subjects was expressed by the National 
CouncilJs rejection of the recommendation of the Select 
Committee on the Working of the Native Liquor Laws in the 
Transvaal that light spirits could be issued to African miners 
in the gold mine compounds of the Rand. The National Council, 
and later the French missionaries and the Basutoland Chamber 
of Commerce (BCC), all sent a petition to this effect to the 
High Commissioner. Some chiefs even threatened to prevent 
their men from going to the mines if such a recommendation was 
implemented. Besides the concern that this recommendation 
would lead to the "killing of the Basuto" and that it was 
against the wishes of Moshoeshoe, the chiefs were also worried 
that "it would be a great danger to our young men and all 
native tribes who have gone to work on the mines, because all 
the money they have earned would be spent on this drink, from 
which we natives have no power to abstain". "Drunkenness", 
declared the chiefs, "would spread among the different tribes 
to which these people will have to return".1.82 
During the same sitting of the National Council . a new law 
was passed after long deba.te. This Law 2 1 banned the sale of 
Sotho beer in all areas under the control o f the chiefs. 
Debate initially apanned three pos itions . Some c hiefs wanted 
1.s 1 LNA, S3/21/4/4, "Basuto Beer Always!", 16 February 
1918. 
1.e2 LNA, S3/21/4/3, BNC petition to HC, 11 September 
1918; PEMS petition, 30 September 1918; BCC resolution, 30 
January 1919. 
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to ban domestic production and conswnption of beer, as well as 
its sale. At the other extreme were those who wanted the 5ale 
of beer to continue. They a rgued that ita sale provided 
widows and the poor with income enough to purchase necessities 
and to pay tax . The third position, which was one the one 
finally accepted, was that only the sale of beer and not its 
non-commercial use should be suppressed. Sixty-nine voted in 
favour of the proposed law. eight against . six abstained . and 
16, including Chief Jonathan, were absent. The Resident 
Commissioner immediately sent a circular to all Assistant 
Commissioners instructing them to implement the decision of 
the National Council. The Assistant Commissioner for Leribe 
received a petition against the new law, and one 
in Teyateyaneng addressed an appeal to 
white trader 
the Resident 
Commissioner, but this time the authorities were determined to 
act.l.83 Their resolution was strengthened by the 
Basutoland Chamber of Commerce which sent a memorandum to the 
Resident Commissioner in May 1919 urging him to use Law 21 to 
get rid of "the nuisance of ' Beer shops' being carried on so 
near Trading stores" of its members. Drunkenness and 
"instances of assault" were having the effect of driving away 
their customers . 1.84 
By the time that Law 21 came into effect, canteens had spread 
from the Camps and roadsides as far as villages right next to 
the chiefs' headquarters . Their location related to the 
routes used by the migrants to and from recruitment stations 
and the labour centres. Only Qachas Nek was said to be free 
of canteens . By 1920, one of the two canteens at Ficksburg 
bridge was popularly known as "Pretoria" . The Medical Officer 
for Leribe, Neil Macfarlane, joined the crusade in 1920, 
blaming the two canteens for the spread of venereal 
disease. i •35 In April 1922 the liquor Proclamation was 
amended t o include "qhadi" in the definition of intoxicants. 
The Proclamation covered any liquor which had three percent 
1.s3 Litaba, 1918, pp. 90-122; LNA, S3/21/4/4. GS' 
circular to ACs, 30 may 1919. 
1.s4 LNA, S3/ 21 / 4/4, BCC to GS, 27 March 1919. 
1.so . Ibid., Macfarlane to AC (Leribe), 12 August 1920 . 
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alcohol content, and this was amended in September to two 
percent.1.86 
The new law put the Resident Commissioner, supported by the 
Paramount Chief, in a stronger position against Chief 
Jonathan. The latter responded by notionally converting his 
canteen into a "butchery" as a cover-up. It was only in 1924 
that Jonathan finally gave in. He even called a pitso at the 
vicinity of the bridge where he appointed men to help the 
police in closing down the two canteens. This was probably 
not unrelated to the fact that the Acting Assistant 
Commissioner for Leribe had earlier suggested to the High 
Commissioner that Jonathan should be threatened with 
forfeiture of his annual L400 allowance from the government if 
he continued resisting.1.s7 
Simone Phamotse, a representative of the Basutoland 
Progressive Association, challenged Law 21 at the 1924 session 
in the National Council . The law was failing, he argued, 
because the people were against it. He also saw it as part of 
the colonial strategy to prevent Basotho from becoming 
traders. But the majority of chiefs were adamant. The sale of 
beer affected the turnover of men for tribute labour. letsema, 
farms, and attendance at the khotla. Money that could be paid 
as tax was squandered in these canteens. Even so, support for 
the law was weakening; 51 voted against the repeal of the law, 
and 32 voted for.1.ss As for colonial authorities, the 
existence of canteens at such points as the Ficksburg Bridge 
affected border relations with the Orange Free State. The 
discipline of labour, particularly of Basotho commuters to the 
Free State borderline towns, also needed to be ensured . The 
s ecurity o f white communities in b o th the Free State and 
Leso tho . required the control of drunken "natives " . This was 
so as attacks on and the harassment of white pedestrians were 
not infrequent. 
1.ss Basutoland Proclamations and Notices, 1922. 
187. LNA, S3/5/ll/6, Act. RC to HC, 30 July 1924. 
1.as Litaba, 1924, pp.247-61. 
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There was little sign, however, that intensified po lic e a c tion 
was having any lasting effect on either the sale of beer, or 
on prostitution. In 1923 the Assistant Commissioner f o r 
Quthing reported an increase in the s ale of beer in his 
district, and the difficulty he had in suppressing the 
business. By 1926 prostitution was rife in the distri c t; f our 
canteens were 
more were on 
linked to the 
in operation in Qachas Nek, and at 
the Matatiele side of the bo rder. 
opening in 1924 of the railway 
leas t f our 
This was 
line fr om 
Matatiele to a branch of the Pietermaritzburg main line. And 
despite the fact that the Paramount Chief was sending his 
"messengers" to the Camps and villages to spill beer and 
destroy canteens, little or nothing was achieved. In August 
1926, for example, he sent three messengers, themselves 
accompanied by JonathanJs messengers, to destroy beer shops in 
the Butha Buthe sub-district. But all too often, such 
messengers, described as persons of no standing" by the 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner for the sub-district, were 
corrupt and readily accepted beer bribes. One sub-chief, 
Mopeli, warned an Indian business associate, S .R. Naidoo, that 
messengers were way to his shop, and so the trader was able 
to hide his beer. On another occasion, Mopeli manipulated the 
messengers, using them to destroy a building belonging to one 
of his enemies. Similarly, another sub-chief, Matela, used 
the messengers for his own purposes, in this instance to 
destroy a butchery belonging to a woman who was an enemy of 
his son . Even when messengers actually did destroy roadside-
c anteens, their owners soon resumed business once the 
Paramount ChiefJs servants had departed. Other canteens 
simply sought the protection of sub-chiefs like Seitlheko who 
is discussed in Appendix III.iss 
By 1928 the problem of prostitution was rife throughout the 
country. In his quarterly report for the period ended 
September 1927, the Assistant Commissioner f o r Maseru had 
ia9 LNA, QN 3/1/13, AC (Qachas Nek) to GS. 6 September 
1926; LNA, S3/ 21 / 4 / 4, Inspector BMP to AC CLeribe), 8 
September 1926 . 
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raised the idea of erecting beerhalls in order to " protect" 
migrants from prostitutes and beer-brewers. He was worr i ed 
that labour migrants, while waiting f o r attestati on, would be 
tempted by "bad dz' ink and worse women , and it is common sto ry 
for them to get drunk and fall an easy prey t o the disease 
ridden prostitutes which infest the Reserve " . The situation 
wa s even worse, he added, with returning migrants or after 
workers had collected their deferred pay at the offic es in 
Maseru . Beerhalls, he thought, would not only provide 
protection, but also facilities for accommodation, f ood and 
recreation.1.so 
The same Assistant Commissioner took the opportunity of 
raising the issue during a debate which was sparked off by an 
article in the Basutoland News the following year. The 
difficulty was not that of brothels per se, because "so far as 
I know prostitutes flock, in any country, to places where 
labour congregates en passant and has leisure and money". 
Rather, the problem was that, "prostitution [in the sense of 
nyatsi practice] throughout Basutoland is far too big a thing 
to be touched, it is firmly embedded in the National life, but 
we certainly could clear up the Reserves more than we do at 
present if we had the proper authority to do so".l.91. While 
the Resident Commissioner accepted that "drunkenness amongst 
the Basuto [men and women] has reached an appalling state'', he 
was not convinced that the solution lay in erecting beerhalls. 
He thought that such a measure would be in c onfli c t with the 
National CouncilJs Law 21, and would necessitate new 
l egislation, which would anyway depend on police enforcement. 
He also feared that Jonathan would f i nd a goo d e xcuse t o 
reopen his Ficksburg Bridge canteen. He preferred to find 
ways o f contro lling and ultimate ly e liminating prostitutes, 
a l l t he time leaving the provision o f shelters f o r migrants to 
l abour agents who ae legal responsibili ty it was.1.92 
1.so LNA. S3 / 5 / 18/ 10, AC (Maseru ) Quarterly Report ended 
Septeml:,er 1927. 
is1. Ibid .. AC Maseru to RC, 21 May 1928. 
1.s2 Ibid. 
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To this end, the High Commissioner passed a Proclamation in 
December 1928 making "vagrancy" and prostitution punishable 
c rimes. Vagrancy involved "loitering near any place", a 
definition so broad that it covered almost every public space 
in the country, while the definition of "vagrant" included 
any native woman leading an immoral life or found wandering 
from her village without lawful occasion or excuse". A fine 
o f not more than 15 or imprisonment for a period of not more 
than three months, could be imposed on such persons. The law 
also empowered the government to deal with pimps and brothels. 
The sale of beer in the Camps could now only take place if 
permission had been granted by local authorities. This law 
marked a final attempt to combat the sale of beer and the 
spread of prostitution. In the past, the only way that the 
government had dealt with prostitutes was periodically to 
expel them from the Camps with the help of the police and 
headmen, but the women would simply return to their "beats" 
later on. l.93 The passing of the law, therefore, reflected 
not only the seriousness of the problem but also the 
desperation of the colonial government. 
The economically depressed 1930s were difficult years indeed. 
The problem of drunkenness even invaded the ranks of the Paris 








leading figures of the PEMS to 
Blue Cross throughout the 
observed in the 1930s that "violent 
intoxicating beverages, such as Barbeton, Skokiaan and JKill-
me-quickJ, brewed in Union slums, where Basuto women have an 
unenviable reputation as Skokiaan Queens, are finding their 
way into the country, mainly in the villages near Government 
centres and chiefsJ headquarters, where there is always a lot 
o f coming and going of unattached men".l.95 
193 Litaba, 1928, PP- 39-55; Proclamations and Notices, 
1928; LNA, S3/5/18/ 10, AC (Maseru) to RC, 21 May 1928. 
1.94 T. Verdier. "LJAlcoholisme au Lessouto", JME, vol.1, 
1930, pp. 290-295; Mphatsoe, "Blue Cross". 
1.s5 Ashton. Basuto, p.95. 
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As ordinary men and women inc reasingly f ound the pressures 
difficult t o cope with. s o o lder s oc ial norms were 
transgressed, s ometimes fatally. In Au gus t 1930, f o r example , 
an abandoned baby was f ound in Morija. It had been bitten by 
dogs. In February 1932, a woman in Mohales Hoek returned home 
fr om Johannes burg with a f our-month baby; her husband 
assaulted her and the child so badly , that the infant died. 
Outright defiance by matekatse was also increasing . In May 
193 1 f our prostitutes were rounded up in Mohal e s Hoe k and 
taken to the Assistant Commissioner~s office, where they were 
sentenced to prison for refusing to leave the area when they 
were ordered to do so. Another two were sentenced to six 
weeks imprisonment or a fine of 12.lOs, which they refused to 
pay. Still others conducted their business with blatant 
dis~egard for the law. In Teyateyaneng in 1932 , matekatse 
were openly "servicing" clients on a lorry transporting 
recruits to and from Maseru train station. Moving in big 
groups, the prostitutes accompanied these likoata to their 
lorry, where the men offered them in part-payment the bread 
they had been provided with by labour agents as provision for 
the road.1.96 And in 1940, c omplaints by the African 
Methodist Episcopal ministers in Leribe sounded a familiar 
note. The problem, the local Assistant Commissioner was told , 
was women: 
who go out in groups to meet mine boys at Commando Nek 
Siding [on the Bethlehem-Moorderpoort rail-line to 
Bloemfontein].. Men are robbed of their money by women 
who are not their wives. Many of these men who are 
arriving spend all their money with these women and 
subse quently have to return to the mines having only gone 
as far as Hl o tse and before reaching their homes to give 
their earnings to their families.1.97 
196 Mochochonono , 3 January 1931; 6 January 1932 : 10 
February 1932 ; 24 August 1932 ; 20 August 1930 ; 13 May 1931; 27 
May 1931; LNA. Leribe Co llection, Box 70 , George to AC 
( Leribe ) , 18 March 1939. 
1.97 LNA, Leribe Collection, Box 70, AME petition to AC 
( Leribe ) , 10 April 1940. A s i milar phenomenon was taking 
plac e i n the southern part of Basutoland, where prostitutes 
accompanied migrants and carried their luggage between Quthing 
a nd Mafeteng, as far as Wepener station. See Appendix III. 
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In the course of the 1930s, efforts against matekatae mounted 
in intensity. They were hunted down by chiefs, police, 
headmen, the Assistant Commissioners, the Paramount Chief and 
even the Resident Commissioner. 
expelled, imprisoned or fined. 
If caught, they were 
But what frustrated the 
authorities at almost every turn was that matekatse would 
sometimes obey when they were ordered to vacate an area, but 
would reappear as soon as the trouble subsided. Or they would 
be sentenced to a prison term but continue with their business 
release . In 1936, Chief Sempe Nkoebe of Quthing, in a 
desperate move, resorted to fining, expelling and confiscating 
the property of matekatse. In an act of complete defiance, 
however, one woman approached the local Assistant Commissioner 
to complain and demand the return of her property!i98 
To sum up this chapter so far, one can suggest that botekatse 
had a paradoxical nature. It was both essential to the 
functioning of labour migrant system, and at the same time, 
expressed the social collapse set in motion by migrancy 
itself. Arguably, botekatse retained a discretionary 
character until mid-1929s, but certainly in the course of the 
late 1920s and 1930s it reflected the accelerating breakdown 
of much of Basotho society. But while the spread of venereal 
disease and widespread drunkenness were all symptomatic o f 
social breakdown, one key indice of tension was the 
deteriorating relationship between male elders and 
recalcitrant women. 
Many matekatse in colonial Lesotho had originally been the 
"undesirables" repatriated from the Rand, and consequently 
they were extremely experienced when it came to brutal anti-
beer raids. But for all that they developed their own forms 
of resistance . including passive resistance to 
expulsions by the police, even occasionally 
their fines. But there were no instances 
i 9 s Mochochonono, 1 August 1936; 
Leselinyana, 28 October 1936. 
their periodic 
refusing to pay 
of the kind of 
March 1933; 
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resistance noted in other parts of South outright 
Africa.iss This may have been so because the option of 
simply relocating to a safe village was always there. The 
other loophole which matekatse could exploit was the legal 
status of non-co~nercial and domestic beer-brewing. This gave 
purveyors and consumers considerable room for manoeuvre. 
People could, for example, pay their money in advance or 
secretly, and pretend to be merely visitors who were being 
entertainea.200 A triangular relationship between 
matekatse, beer and likoata, developed in the 1930s. This 
system had developed on the Rand, and spread to Basutoland. 
For a male migrant to be with matekatse and to drink, was now 
a normal part of being koata. 
With unemployment growing in the country in the 1930s as the 
number of Basotho going to the mines was limited by quota, the 
number of pimps almost certainly increased. While pimping 
initially was the resort of men who saw the business as an 
alternative to mine work, later on it included men who saw it 
as their only chance of making easy money. They found recruits 
among women who were arriving in Camps and chiefsJ 
headquarters from the villages, to look for employment, food 
or money. Despite the fragmentary nature of the sources on 
this, there were, certainly, a number of notorious pimps. In 
persons were found in one Leribe, for example, eight 
brothel, and four in another. It appears as if the owners 
were usually able to evade arrest by relocating to safer 
villages. Most of the prostitutes were in their twenties and 
thirties, with few in their fourties. Fighting amongst 
migrants over the most famous prostitutes or among matekatse 
themselves, was becoming a feature of Camp and village 
life.201 Matekatse, as the case of Sake and Mainyatso in 
199 See. for example, H. Bradford, "JWe Women Will Show 
ThemJ: Beer Protests in the Natal Countryside, 1929", .in Crush 
and Ambler, (eds.), Liguor and Labor. 
200_ Verdier, "LJAlcoholisme", p.15. 
201 I am drawing these generalisations from the Leribe 
Collection, Box 70, "Prostitutes and Vagrants" file. On 
famous prostitutes, see D.B. Coplan, "Fictions that Save: 
MigrantsJ Performance and Basotho National Culture", Cultural 
TTT 
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This is a theme from a song sung by Basotho women recorded by 
Hugh Tracey in 1959 in Mohalea Hoek: 
Women on the Rand are like vagrants, 
They wear shoes without stockinga !202 
Together with likoata, they wer3 1·enow-n fo1' their rude talk 
and abusive behaviour. And all of these symptoms were signs 
of the disease eating away at the core of Basotho economy and 
society. 
Conclusion 
The 1•egular movement of Basotho mig1•ant workers between South 
African mine3 and other employment centres made it possible 
for hitherto unknown diseases to reach Basutoland. An 
additional factor was the repatriation of miners found to be 
carrying syphilis or TB, as the gold mine managements wanted 
to cut expenditure on labour by transferring the cost of 
caring for the sick to the rural areas_ 
Growing numbers of Basotho women, especially those from poor 
households, in the face of the economic depression of the late 
1920s and 1930s, opted for the comme1•cial brewing of Sotho 
beer, and for the sale of sex. But becoming involved in beer-
brewing and commercial sex was nc,t only a symptom of 
breakdown of the Basotho society, it was also a way for many 
women to escape and challenge patriarchal control_ And, as 
Luise White observed in her study of prostitution in colonial 
Kenya, prostitutes in such cases were not simply selling sex, 
but provided items and services necessary far the reproduction 
o f male energies_203 Canteens and brothels provided the 
Anthropology, vol.6, 1991, pp.180-83. 
202 Tr::1.cey, "Basutoland Rec,:,rding Tour", p. 73. 
203 . See L. White, The Comforts of Homs· P1·Qsti tuti,;in in 
Colonial Nairobi, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1390), especially pp.10-21. 
Basotho migrant tr~ffic with such services ~s sex, food, beer, 
music and dance, and accomodation . 
CONCLUSION 
·J·-in 
._1 o...) /_) 
This study has suggested that the 1920s and 1980s were a 
critical turning-point in the history of Lesotho and the 
system of migratory labour in that country. It was during 
these decades that the balance of power increasingly shifted 
in favour of the colonial state. as well as towards chiefs. 
traders, labour recr11iters and, especially. mine employers. 
Although Basotho men had earlier oscillated between their 
homes and South African labour centres to rebuild their stock 
in the aftermath of wars and ecological disasters. by the 
1920s growing numbers were migrating to the mines out of sheer 
necessity because of the worsening socio-economic situation at 
home. That labour migration by men was predicated on the prior 
subordination of women, as suggested by a number of scholars, 
may well be the case, but in the absence of female testimony, 
this study has been unable fully to develop this point. All 
that can be concluded from the fragmentary evidence adduced in 
Part I. is that womenJs experiences were ambiguous partly 
because they were refracted through different class positions, 
and partly because they were generational. Mounting 
dependence on migrants· wages led to intensified struggles 
over these earnings within homesteads. as well as between 
chiefs and the colonial government on the one hand. and 
migrants on the other. 
But not all Basotho became reliant 
maintain their homesteads. Members of 
and privileged mission converts. 
on migrant labour to 
the dominant lineages 
benefitAd from the 
commoditisation of production and the monetisation of the 
Basotho economy. These were the social groups who survived 
wars and ecological disasters somewhat better than the 
majority of Basotho because of the concentration of stock, 
land, wagons and ploughs, in their hands. Some members of 
this elite even invested their wealth productively and later 
expanded into retail, taxi, and labour recruitment business. 
while 11ouseholds dependent. on migrant.a' ,c:,arnings spent their 
income on food and clothing. 
A partic11lar feature of the 1920a and 1930s was that Basoth0 
migrants gradually became concentrated on the Rand gold mines. 
as distinct from the diamond mines and other employment 
centres that were formerly important to them. In the course 
of this transition, Basotho men accepted longer and longer 
contracts that kept them on the mines even during ploughing 
and harvesting seasons; while those returning home stayed for 
shorter periods before taking new mine contracts. Over much 
the same period. Basotho migrants ousted other African 
migrants from several better-paying job categories. They 
turned to more dangerous jobs and worked in the deepest mines: 
and by the mid-1930s were already established as the best 
shaft-sinkers on the gold mines. 
But Basotho 
dangers of 
migrants did so with their eyes open to the 
mine work. More than this. they devised ways and 
means of coping with, and rationalising, their experiences of 
migrancy and underground labour. Going to the mines was 
equated with going to war. and wages were regarded as 
"cattle". In this way, a koat.a culture emerged, and became 
entrenched in Basotho society. On the mine. Basotho workers 
devised ways of dealing with industria.l forms of death. 
sickness and destitution. To a sjgnificant extent. they, 
together with other African miners. transformed the mine 
compounds which were intended to control them into homes in 
which they lived with at least some humanity and dignity. 
They introduced recreational activities from their rural 
homes, especially dances which were performed on Sundays and 
other mine holidays. They discovPred and adopted new sports. 
e~pecially cricket and soccer, and established mine-based 
teams and tournaments. 
For a significant number of Basotho miners. conversion to 
Christianity was 
and mine life. 
process was never 
an important aspect of coping with compound 
But as Chapter Five attempted to show, this 
as subversive as some more recent studies 
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would like to believe, while it was eaqually clearly neve1· as 
one-dimensionally "functional" to the needs of capital 
~ccumulation as some earlier accounts insisted. Mineowners 
benefited from the conversion of their Africans employees to 
Christianity as this religion instilled the workers with an 
ethic and discipline necessary for control and mine work. but 
their relationship with missionary societies and converts was 
not without its problems. And although South African mine 
c:ompounds never experienced the conspicuous presence of 
religious sects such as the Watch Tower movement which briefly 
flourished in Southern Rhodesian and Copperbelt mines,i 
conversion to Christianity had multiple and contradictory 
significance for African miners. Church forums and activities 
not only provided leisure and space, but could also be 
harnessed by workers and used as one of several survival 
strategies. Converts with their organisations in the 
compounds, spiritually and materially supported each other, 
and developed a culture of their own. Conversion often 
involved imparting Africans with literacy skills 
the bible, and could bring with it promotion 
for reading 
and other 
benefits to miners. Some converts even took the new religion 
home with them at the expiry of their mine contracts.2 But 
even where Christianity was in African hands, it was not 
necessarily very different from the missionary product. Many 
African evangelists and pastors, themselves products of 
mission education, despised African ways of life as much as 
their missionary superiors. On the mines, their views, and 
those of many of their converts. were moderate in the extreme. 
i For these, see amongst others. van Onselen. Chibaro, 
pp.204-09; S. Cross, "The Watch Tower Movement in South-
Central Africa. 1908-1945''. (PhD. Oxford University, 1973l; 
and T. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 189B-
l.8..3.Q. (Heinemann. London. 1970), pp.143-47. 
~ One Mosotho migrant from the Maluti exclaimed to 
his compatriots on his return from the mines: "This is truly a 
mission ... In Johannesburg I met· a white missionary of the 
Protestant mission of Lesotho, who spoke Sesotho well, and 
again, today. back at home, in the midst of mountains, there 
is again a white missionary of the same mission that I met. I 
now believe in their work ... It is a solid and true one ... ". 
See Journal des Missions Evangeligues, 1928, p.145. 
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Yet conservative as these convictions were, they were never 
entirely 
in any 
at the beck and 
event, were 
call of the mining companies. Nor. 
all African miners Christian. 
·:onsequently, mine managements, concerned primarily with 
labour productivity and profit, devised other strategies to 
keep their African workers as disciplined and hard-working as 
possible. One of these strategies was the ethnic 
compartmentalisation of the African labour force. TI1is. in 
turn, contributed to the ways in which African miners 
themselves came to rely on chiefly structures, home-boy 
networks and ethnic sectarianism, for organisation and 
collective bargaining on the mines. This resulted in 
conflicting survival strategies and competition, which 
sometimes culminated in collective violence. Some historians 
and other social scientists have emphasised ethnicity in their 
analysis of these "faction fights", paying little attention to 
prior material conditions, or to the complex interaction of 
management and worker strategies as expressed through racial 
and class dynamics. The close analysis in Chapter Six of 
three "faction fights" at the Premier Diamond Mine 
demonstrated the need for a more macroscopic and longer 
historical approach to this phenomenon. 
Moreover, as this thesis has so11ght to demonstrate at every 
stage. labour migrancy was more than simply the movement of 
men to the labour centres. The other leg of this process was 
the return of migrants to their families in Lesotho when their 
contracts expired, and the impact of labour migration more 
generally on Basotho society. Diseases brought from the 
mines. as well as the cynical repatriation of miners s11ffering 
frc1m syphj li3 or TB. all of which transferred the cost of 
caring for the sick onto the 
pressure on Basotho families 
economy. One reason that these 
rural areas. placed enormous 
and the country·s declining 
diseases, including smallpox, 
were rarely controlled during the period under review. was not 
because of the "ignorance" or "indifference" of Basotho as the 
colonial authorities claimed. Nor was the spread of syphilis 
due to "personal hygiene" and "immorality" as the Principal 
Medical Officer thought.3 The most critical factor was the 
constant arrival of newly contaminated Basotho migrants from 
the mines and other employment centres. Some of the3e 
diseases. especially syphilis and TB. continue to pose serious 
social problems to Basotho to this very day. 
Basotho women, very largely excluded from formal employment 
and with their labour power used to subsidise migrants· 
earnings. were affected in a number of ways by the prolonged 
absence of their men. For some women, partic11larly younger 
ones. the erosion of chiefly and patriarchal power occasioned 
by the social changes of the 1920s and 1930s, provided an 
opportunity to escape to the towns. The majority of women in 
Lesotho itself, however, appear to have experienced a 
significant worsening of their material conditions of 
existence. A smaller, yet significant, number were drawn into 
prostitution and co~nercial beer-brewing. 
In making these points, this thesis is well aware of the many 
holes which remain in the fabric of this subject. It is quite 
clear, for example, that one of the largest remaining gaps in 
southern Africa·s historiography is the lack of a detailed 
economic and social history of Lesotho. While Chapters One, 
Three and Seven of this thesis go some way towards that goal. 
much more work, beginning where Eldredge·s A South African 
Kingdom has ended, remains to be done. No less urgent is the 
need for a detailed history of the Premier Diamond Mine, and 
1)range Free State diamond mines. particularly Jagersfontein 
and Koffyfontein mines. And finally, for all that Harries, 
~oodie and this thesis have examined life in mine compounds. 
the resulting coverage remains impressionistic. It is neither 
chronologically comprehensive nor thematically complete. Once 
again, this thesis would suggest that a detailed study of 
independent churches and missionary societies. and sports and 
recreation in the compounds, might go some way towards 
addressing this gap. 
3 Macfarlane. "Some Observations", p.494. 
0v~ra11, then, this theais has attempted to recover at lea~t 
part of the history of Basotho labour migrancy. and in so 
doing ,:::ontribute to a more r01mded understanding ,:::if ,:::olc,nial 
Lesc,thc1, s past in the period to World War II. Yet. it 
also tried to be more than just another case study. however 
important that aspect may be. Throu~hout. this thesis has 
argued, implicitly and sometimes explicitly. that the 
historic,graphical pendulum has swung too far in the direction 
,-:if broadly cultural studies. While never arguing in favour of 
c:-conomism, this thesis does suggest that an historically 
informed combination of materialism and idealism offers a 
valuable perspective on the past. And finally, because many 
of the issues which this thesis has examined continue td pose 
serious problems for Lesotho and its people to this day, it is 
to be hoped that a critical understanding of their origins may 
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TRAVELLING TO THE MINES 
The expansion of the migrant labour system necessitated the 
improvement of facilities for and conditions relating to the 
movement of Basotho migrants. As Gordon Pirie has noted, the 
Randlords' efforts to tap potential sources of labour in the 
region led to the development and expansion of transport 
networks.1. 
The earliest form of transport to the labour centres were the 
workers' own legs and feet. Thousands of Basotho men simply 
walked to mines, farms and towns. Individual men walked from 
their villages, waited at some common spot for others, and 
proceeded on the long journey in groups, sometimes in the 
company of a tout employed by a labour agent. Sleeping took 
place along the way, sometimes next to the footpaths and 
occasionally in villages which provided some security against 
robbery. Staying in a village also allowed migrants to 
request directions, food and water.2 
A departing Mosotho migrant took with him the provisions that 
Basotho traditionally carried for long journeys and hunting 
expeditions. Lipabi is a dry, ground and fried maize. mixed 
with salt and sugar. It was preferred because in its 
desiccated form, it was easily preserved, portable. and 
consumable with water. Above all else, it filled the stomach 
very quickly! The other main item was magebekoane, a hard. 
ma.i Ze dumpling, shaped to the size of a f L3t to make them 
portable and manageable. It remained edible for a long time 
1. G. Pirie, "Railways and Labour Migration to the Rand 
Mines: Constraints and Significance'', Journal of Southern 
_A_f_r_i_c_a~o~S-t_u_d~i_e_s, vol.19, no.4. 1993. 
2 Interview with Solomon Mokoaleli. born 1914. 
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without rotting. These items were prepared by a sister. wife 
or mother. while a departing migrant visited friends. 
relatives and a diviner in preparing himself and his mind for 
the long journey. The preparation of lipabi even came to 
3ymbolise the act of leaving for the mines.3 
The anxiety of preparing for departure is well captured in the 
following extract taken from Ntsane·s famous poem "When we go 
to the Witwatersrand"; the composition of which was inspired 
by the poet·s work at one mine in Springs in 1940: 
Our provision we had prepared, 
Prepared by the day before, 
Our baggage we had tied, we the poor dogs, 
Dogs of our chief, we who are always ready. 
Command. chief, we are ready, 
Ready to get into the hole of the mice, 
These mice are four-legged. they speak, 
They speak English, the language of the whites. 
The night downed as we were waiting in vigil. 
Damned, awaiting wonders, 
For there are wonders in strange worlds. 
We woke up before sunset, 
When the whiteman·s clock chimed. 
Chiming and scattering gatherings in the fields; 
What gatherings are there by thofle riversides':' 
Riversides are places for grannies like 'Matshilontshile. 
My mate gave up his mother, I gave up my grandmother. 
We gave up our relatives and left our ancestors; 
liv'here we are going we shall meet them. 
The ancestors in the mines do eat, 
They eat the mother's beloved child. 
Beloved by her as the only child, 
The only child is a thing to be cherished. 
He takes everything and ends the feast.4 
As a matter of course. men visited diviners to be doctored for 
going to the mines, and this did not cease with the coming of 
trains and motor transport. One Mosotho informant told Jeff 
3 Interviews with Tebello Mot.hai, date of bjrth not 
available (but he first went to the mines in the mid-1940s>; 
Solomon Mosunyana, born, 1913. Details of all those 
interviewed are contained in the bibliography. 
4 K.E. Ntsane. Mmusa-Pelo II, (A.P.B, Johannesburg, 
1955>, p.61; J.M. Lenake, The Poetry of K.E. Ntsane, (J.L. Van 
Schaik. Pretoria, 1984), pp.85-87. I am grateful to Nhlanhla 
Maake who assisted with the translation of the poem. 
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I think it is in Vereeninging. That place had a bush 
stretching from here to that place of Ntsane. We found 
that this place was not walkable and not clear. We just 
shoved ourselves because we were told that there was a 
way at the other end, and Transvaal mines were there. 
They encountered a hyena, which they killed with a shower of 
.3tones . 
. .. we [then] reached the end of the bush, and found a 
group of people working, digging out these trees . We 
asked for work there, and we got it. We took a month and 
continued. After a month we left; we had not yet reached 
our destination. We walked until we reached Cullinan 
where we wanted to go ... 
But the Orange Free State Boers were the greatest danger to 
these travelling men. They often assaulted migrants, and 
forced them to work farms. Mokoaleli remembered one 
incident: 
... there were wild Boers who wanted to catch us while we 
were in Theunisen ... They were riding in a motorcar ... 
they alighted and called us; they were four of them. 
They asked us where we were going and what we were 
looking for, and we answered. Because we were young we 
did not have time for a Boer; our intention was to beat 
them. We were very naughty ... ! The eldest of these Boers 
ordered that we be caught and beaten. That was how we 
were provoked, and we started our thing. We said to one 
of us that he should stand next to this motorcar to 
prevent these people from getting into it to go and call 
others for help ... We beat them, they fled and 
disappeared. It was towards sunset ... we· were now worried 
that now these Boers have done this, we will have to take 
care because now it was dark. We had to watch where we 
were going so as not to find ourselves in a bush. We 
decided to continue the following day at sunrise ... 
We then slept, and while we were asleep there in the 
bush, we saw three motorcars approaching. One man among 
us said: "Do not look at those motorcars, because if you 
do so those Boers will shoot you as those [car] lights 
will shine on your eyes ... ". We then covered ourselves, 
when peeping we saw that they had passed us and we 
started chatting about our own things. Every time we saw 
a motorc ar approaching we would cover our heads .... e 
Before the advent o f trains and motor transport, horse carts 
and wagons known as "cabs", operated between different points 
s Ibid. 
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in Lesotho and South Africa. Going to the mines, men would use 
"cabs" as far as Bloemfontein or Thaba Nchu and continue from 
there by foot. The Rolong, Basotho and Boer wagon-riders who 
transported grain and other trade goods. also operated a 
regular "cab" service between Thaba Nchu, Bloemfontein and 
Maseru. Postal carts also offered lifts to individual 
migrants. Bloemfontein-Kimberley, Thaba Nchu- Bloemfontein, 
Wepener-Thaba Nchu, and Maseru-Thaba Nchu, were all common 
routes. One Mosotho in 1889 walked from Kimberley, obtained a 
lift from a postal cart on the way to Bloemfontein, and 
continued with a "cab" to Maseru. In the same year, two men 
took six days to travel by a "cab" from Matsieng (near Maseru) 
to Bloemfontein. Men from the south walked to Wepener where 
they caught "cabs" for the ten hour journey to 
Bloemfontein.10 
Trains 
The expansion of deep-level mining on the Rand was accompanied 
by the construction of railway lines linking the mines to the 
Transvaal·s rural areas, Natal and the Cape Colony.11 And 
during the South African War, the British, as part of their 
strategy to defeat the Boers , constructed additional railway 
lines in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. These lines 
all came to play a crucial role in post-war efforts to address 
the acute labour shortage on the gold mines. Lesotho could 
not escape this process. 
The extension of the Cape Town railway line to Johannesburg in 
1892 redrew the journey map for Basotho migrants from the 
southern .and central districts. Men now travelled, either by 
foot or "cabs", to Bloemfontein station. The later extension 
o f this Johannesburg line to Winburg shortened the route for 
men from Leribe and But.ha Buthe, despite the problems of 
10_ Leselinyana, 1 July 1889; 1 December 1889; 1 October 
1895; 15 July 1899; interview with Willy "Ramosoeu" Hawkins, 
bo1•n 1901. 
11 Pirie, "Railways and Labour Migration", p.716. 
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c r oss ing the Caledon River. Migr an t s h e ading f or Kimber l e y 
cont inued t o walk fr om Bloemfonte i n un t i l t he opening o f the 
Bloemfontein-Kimbe rley railway line in 1908. The Sannaspos 
b r a nc h from the Bloemfon t ein line Cbuilt during the war) was 
extended t o reach Maseru in December 190 5 , a nd f rom thi s time 
many Baso tho migrants left their c ountry through t his line , 
changing at Marseilles to take the ir connec t ion . This 
Marseil les line was extended to Modderpoort t o r e a c h Beth l ehem 
i n 1907, giving the north of Lesotho a convenient a cce s s t o 
Fic ksburg, Gumtree, Generalsnek , and Fourisburg stations. In 
1911 this Bloemfontein-Bethlehem line was extended from 
Sannaspos to reach Wepener through Dewetsdorp. The 
construction of the Aliwal North line to Zastron in 1916 and 
the further extension of this line to Wepener in 1924, 
c onnected the south of Lesotho to the East London line. The 
o pening of Underberg station in 1916 linking Himeville to the 
Pietermaritzburg line Y..i..a Donnybrook, provided migrants from 
Mokhotlong with access to this town through the Sani Pass. The 
railhead only reached Matatiele in 1924 to serve that area and 
Qachas Nek, completing the encirclement of Lesotho with the 
railway lines oriented towards the transportation of labour to 
South Afric a (see Maps One and Four in Appendix I ) . A proposal 
had been made in March 1905 to construct 155 kms of railway 
track fr om Aliwal North through Mohales Hoek to Mafeteng, but 
this was turned down by the General Manager o f the Cape 
Government Railways on the grounds 
would compete with a projected Aliwal 
any event, such a line might have 
c ompe ting with Cape farmers.12 
that the proposed line 
North-Wepener line. In 
led to Basotho peasants 
The tra in from Maseru to Marseilles for onwards c onnec tion to 
Bloemfontein was an ordinary passenger train . On thi s line, 
t here were no special labour trains ( like the bombela used for 
12 On the c onstruction of the railways, see Report of 
the General Manager of the South African Railways and 
Harbours, 1911-1928; Leselinyana, 15 May 1908. On the proposal 
t o build the 155 km line, see Cape Archives Depot, CGR 
2/1/ 4 / 35, 473/2/38793, General Manager (CGR) to Resident 
Engineer (Aliwal North), 7 March 1905. 
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transporting mine recruits from the Eastern Cape and the 
Transkei ) for migrants. Recruits entraining at Maseru station 
were put in 3rd class coaches, the 1st class ones reserved for 
whites and Basotho chiefs and other members of the elite.13 
The coming of rail transport introduced new factors and new 
c hallenges for both the colonial government and Basotho 
travellers. These revolved around the control of migrants as 
passengers; the provision of shelters at the stations; the 
exemption of chiefs and the Basotho elite from certain travel 
regulations binding the migrants; and the conflicting 
interests of the labour agents. The shelter erected at Maseru 
station in 1907 was rudimentary and very inadequate. The 
train bringing returning migrants arrived at 9 p.m., and this 
created a problem for those men who had long distances still 
to travel to their homes . Labour . recruiters who were 
concerned with the popularity of their mines and companies, 
took the initiative and waited at the station to receive the 
returning men and give them temporary accommodation for the 
night . This led to competition among labour agents, each 
claiming the returning men to be "theirs". Traders also 
opened their shops at night in order to tempt migrants to 
spend their earnings, some even striking deals with labour 
agents. The Basutoland Chamber of Commerce appealed to the 
government in 1907 to act against those traders who were 
preventing "their" migrants from buying at other stores, but 
nothing could be done unless adequate shelter was provided. 
The Central South African Railways was asked to extend the 
shelter, but said that the L420 which it would cost must be 
met by the Basutoland government.14 
Although few improvements were made to the shelter, conditions 
at the Maseru (and Marseilles) stations were still 
13 LNA, S7/7/40, General Manager (Central SAR) to RC, 6 
September 1907; S7/1/4/18, GM (CSAR) to RC, 19 July 1907. 
14_ LNA, S7/1/4/18, Sterley to AC (Maseru), 4 November 
1907; GM (CSAR) to GS, 20 July 1907; S7/7/42, GS to GM 
( CSAR), 13 January 1908; CAR, 1907-08. 
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unsatisfactory, as a 1916 memorandum to the General Manager o f 
the South Afri c an Railways shows: 
A ... matter upon which I wish t o approach you is that o f 
accommodation for natives at Marseilles Station. Many 
Basuto chiefs use the train between Maseru and Ficksburg, 
and have to spend some time at Marseilles while changing . 
That place is very cold in the Winter months. and the 
native waiting room is of iron and wood and with a c ement 
floor. I beg to enquire if, in view o f the circumstances, 
you would be prepared to erect a larger room made o f 
brick or stone ... 
Finally, I should be 
prepared to consider 
building at Maseru, 
station. The present 
very impressive.15 
glad to know if 
the erection of a 
of the type of a 
building is small, 
you would be 
better station 
second class 
cold, and not 
While the response of the General Manager was partly 
it also clearly revealed the determined by wartime shortages, 
attitude of the railway authorities towards African 
passengers: ''With regard to the waiting room accommodation at 
Marseilles; I am sorry I cannot seriously consider the 
provision of a new building in the meantime, but when labour 
and material is available, with the advent of more normal 
times, I am prepared to give the question consideration. The 
Maseru station buildings however, are, in my opinion, quite in 
keeping with requirements".16 
Two years later the Assistant General Manager of the South 
African Railways wrote to the Resident Commissioner arguing 
that as ''the native shelter provided by this Administration at 
Maseru Railway Station being but little used, and there being 
a great shortage of material, it is proposed to remove the 
building for use elsewhere".17 The Government Secretary 




for women and the "ordinary 
as there was no 
travelling native 
public" .18 The Railways authorities~ attitude to facilities 
15 LNA, S7 / 7 /67, RC to GM SAR, 4 October 1916. 
is Ibid., GM to RC, 23 October 1916. 
17 LNA, S3/19/2, Assistant GM to RC, 21 September 1918. 
is Ibid, GS to GM SAR, 30 September 1918. 
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at the Maseru station was in line with South African 
perc eptions of Lesotho as nothing but a labour reserve. 
So little was spent on transporting migrants that this 
aometimes led to conflict between the railways and the mine 
and Basutoland authorities. The President of the Transvaal 
Compound Managers Association attacked the bombela at the 
Association>s third annual meeting in 1921: 
From every point of view. . . acconunodation, lighting. 
sanitation, catering, the return which Native 
passengers get for their money is scandalous. The 
coaches are nothing better than converted cattle trucks, 
probably converted because they were no longer good 
enough for cattle. I have it on good authority that 
Native mine labourers, travelling from Umtata for 
instance, have to remain in a standing or sitting 
position for not less than eighty-four hours.1.e 
The mine authorities> expressions of concern were not, 
however, altruistic. They were concerned about the welfare of 
their African employees only insofar as it affected the 
popularity of their mines and the labour supply. They did not 
want recruits arriving at the mines suffering from exhaustion. 
The bad conditions in the labour trains infuriated members of 
the Basotho elite when they were refused special treatment. 
In theory, chiefs, evangelists and "educated" Basotho, were 
exempted from the 3rd class coaches reserved for labourers and 
poorer sections of the community . One important condition for 
being granted exemption besides education and social 
standing - was dress. Hence a Mosotho clerk was granted 
permission to board a 1st class coach in 1907 because he "was 
c lean in his person, educated, and his dress neat and in good 
order".20 For this reason he was not to be put in the "3rd 
c lass carriage set apart for the disrespectably dressed 
natives" .21. But more often than not Maseru station staff 
t'efused to sell 1st class tickets to Basotho who qualified for 
special treatment; or put those carrying valid 1st class 
ie Umteteli, 1 October 1921. 
20 LNA, S7/7/39, GS to GM SAR, 11 June 1907. 
21. Ibid., RC to Maseru Station Master, 1 July 1907. 
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tickets in 3rd class coaches. This led to an outcry in the 
Basotho press from the local elite. Declining to be mixed with 
the migrants, their outcry was coded in attacks on 
segregation.22 One complaint was more direct: 
What is this train here for in Lesotho? - I was fooling 
myself believing that it here for us Basotho, but the way 
I see it is that it is here for the men going to 
Johannesburg, for grain, for the wool from the stores, 
and for the whites in this country. As to an ordinary 
travelling Mosotho, no, it is not here for him.23 
Bridges and Motor Transport 
The arrival of a railhead at Maseru and 
Mooderpoort-Bethlehem line, opened 
construction of bridges and motor roads 
The first bridge was built at the Caledon 
the building of the 
the way for the 
in colonial Lesotho. 
River to connect the 
railway line from Marseilles to Maseru. The second bridge 
connected Leribe to Ficksburg, making it easier for goods and 
migrants from Peka and Hlotse to reach Gumtree, Generalsnek 
and Ficksburg stations and Ficksburg town. Traders and the 
general public played an important role in facilitating this 
process. After the opening of the Mooderpoort-Bethlehem line 
a Road Communication Conference was held at Ficksburg and 
Fourisburg in September 1907, with representation from the 
Orange River Colony (the Orange Free State colony ) , Basutoland 
government and the Central South African Railways. Discussion 
centred on the road link between the Orange River Colony 
border towns and Lesotho. One of the proposals made was for 
the construction of a Ll 500 road from Butha Buthe Yi.a the 
Caledonpoort to shorten the three-hour routes Yi.a Brindisi and 
Joel Drift. This proposal was motivated by the important 
22 Leselinyana, 28 November 1912; 19 December 1912; 16 
January 1913; 30 January 1913; 27 February 1913; 22 May 1913. 
23_ Ibid., 28 November 1912. 
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trade links and growing migrant labour traffic between the 
two colonies.24 
From 1913 the residents of Butha Buthe petitioned the 
Assistant Commissioner for the construction of a bridge at 
Caledonpoort. Other petitions were sent in 1919. 1920 and 
1926. The 1919 petition argued that a bridge was needed 
because "the Native Pass Office being at Butha Buthe Camp, and 
the nearest rail head, Fourisburg, there is a continuous 
procession of natives tr'avelling to and from the mines, whose 
journeys are frequently interrupted by the river being full, 
and who are compelled by circumstances to go much out of their 
way to effect crossing".25 The 1926 petition put this more 
dramatically: "Natives use this crossing continually when 
going to and from the mines in the Union, or to work on farms. 
Some lives have been lost, when the River was in flood".26 
While the colonial government was still considering whether or 
not to build the Caledonpoort bridge, people in the south also 
campaigned for bridges in their districts. In 1928 
Leselinvana published an appeal 
River in Mohales Hoek should be 
that a bridge over Maphutseng 
the priority rather than at 
Caledonpoort . The Maphutseng River, the article argued, "is 
dangerous, floods very quickly, and has nearly taken the lives 
of many travellers, motorcars, carts and wagons".27 
The bridges at Caledonpoort and Makhaleng were finally built 
in 1936 . Though the Makhaleng bridge made access to Zastron 
from Mohales Hoek easier, the greatest obstacles to movement 
in the south remained the crossing of the Orange River at the 
Seaka drift between Quthing and Mohales Hoek. Before the 
construction of a bridge there in 1956, a rope-pulled raft was 
used to cross the drift at very great risk . In Qachas Nek 
24 VAB, CO 463, 4478/07, Director of Public Works CORC ) 
to Col. Sec., 8 October 1907; other related reports are 
attached to this correspondence; Leselinyana, 27 August 1910. 
25 LNA, S3/24/7/3, petition to AC <Butha Buthe), 3 
September 1919. 
26 Ibid . , petition to AC (Butha Buthe), 30 June 1926. 
27 . Leselinvana, 14 September 1928. 
•JC: ,, 
,.; .,._1,:..1 
private and government boats were used to cross the Orange and 
Tsoelike rivers to the Qachas Nek town and Matatiele, and to 
link with Mokhotlong in the north. A bridge at Tsoelike was 
built in 1930 . Mokhotlong remained isolated due .... -L,U its 
mountainous terrain where pack-animals continued to be the 
principal form of transport. Basotho migrants from Mokhotlong 
used to "trek f or a week or more to reach a ra ilhead and they 
have to make a longer rail journey way to the mines".28 
Travelling for Basotho migrants before bridges were built was 
dangerous, especially during rainy seasons when the rivers 
flooded, making crossing almost impossible. This theme comes 
through in one of the Basotho songs collected by Hugh Tracey 
in 1959 . The following song was inspired by the experience of 
a mine deserter and the dangers he faced: 
Basutoland is my fatherland, 
At Bushman·s Nek, near Machacha, in the mountains. 
I joined up for work on the mines, 
But when I arrived I found myself in trouble. 
I was with Molelekoa, son of Smith. 
So I crossed the Vaal very early in the morning 
That was when I was nearly swept down with the river. 
Perhaps it was because I was running away, 
Running away and leaving my passes on the veld. 
I left mine in the western Transvaal, 
I left both my pass and my tax receipt!29 
As in Bechuanaland and central Africa where WNLA.3 efforts to 
build a northern "labour empire" resulted in the building of 
transport networks,30 the NRC introduced its motor service 
in Lesotho in 1930. Within a few months, the Corporation ·s 
lorrie3 were operat ing between Mafeteng, Mohales Hoek and the 
Seaka drift . The South African Railways began a bus service 
between Butha Buthe and Fourisburg in 1936, and in the south, 
between Zastron and Mohales Hoek and Zastron and Quthing . This 
development, together with the opening of the Makhaleng bridge 
2 e t1ining Survey, vol. 6, no. 2, June 1955. 
29 H. Tracey, "Baautoland Recording Tour , November 19th 
to December 3rd, 1959 '', African Music Society Journal, vol.2, 
no.2, 1959, p.73. 
30_ J. Crush, A. Jeeves and D. Yudelman, South Africa·s 
Labor Empire: A Hiatorv of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines , 
(Westview Press, Oxford, 1991), pp. 37-48. 
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i n tha t year, shortened the routes f o r migrants from Quthing 
and Mohales Hoek and made the route t o Zastron easier and more 
c onvenient.31 Parallel to this process, the NRC. like WNLA 
in t he no rthe rn " fr ontier " . bui l t "rest h ou s es " in the 
interior and "garages" at different points o f its moto r 
servic e. One "resthouse" was e rec ted at Blue Gums and later 
removed t o Seaka in 1932. Huts whi c h were supplied wi th 
c ooking and eating utensils, were erec ted on the Maluti f o r 
migrants travelling from Mokhotlong (under the escort o f 
labour agents ) for lodging at night.32 
But this development and improvement of the road and transport 
infrastructure had not been without contradictions. The 
absence of bridges and poor transport facilities provided 
avenues for Basotho entrepreneurs who operated taxis for 
migrants and ordinary travellers in the north and in Mafeteng. 
Of the ten boats operating at the Orange river in Qachas Nek 
in 1918, nine were owned by Basotho; and of the five operating 
at Tsoelike, four were in the hands of these men of 
Moshoeshoe. Of the eleven lorries running between Wepener and 
Mafeteng in 1931, seven were passenger lorries owned by 
Basotho; and by 1937 lorries had replaced wagons as a common 
form of transport in Quthing.33 
The opening of bridges and, more importantly, the arrival o f 
motor transport , therefore threatened the interests of Basotho 
e ntrepreneurs. Complaints about the NRc·s lorries and buses 
wer e raised in the Basotho press.34 Competition appears to 
have been partic ularly rife in the north. By 1940, eighteen 
passenger moto r c ars and lorries operated between Butha 
Buthe / Hlo tse / Peka and Ficksburg. In Mafeteng, Basotho taxi 
owners were in a stronger position, but they a bused their 
31 LNA. S3 / 5 / 18 / 3, NRC Di s tr ic t Superintendent t o RC , 12 
May 1930 ; .GAR, 1930; 1936. 
32_ LNA, S3/ 19/ 71, AC (Mafeteng) to GS, 21 January 1931; 
SB/2/ 2 / 28, RC to PC, 9 July 1932; S3/5/18/ 3, NRC District 
Superinte ndent t o RC, 12 May 1930; Leselinyana, 24 April 1931. 
33_ LNA, 33/ 26/ 7/4, AC (Qachas Nek) to GS, 7 April 1918; 
Mochochonono, 24 September 1938. 
34 . Mochochonono, 24 September 1938. 
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strength by charging higher rates. In 1946 the people in the 
district campaigned against the 15s fare to Wepener, and 
requested South African Railways buses.35 
The encirclement of colonial Lesotho by railway networks and 
the c onstruction of roads and bridges in that country, greatly 
fac ilitated the flow of labour to the gold mines. Although 
there were other factors at work, it undoubtedly contributed 
to the fact that the proportion of Basotho workers on the Rand 
mines increased from 3.17 percent of the total African 
workforce in 1910 to 10.53 percent in 1929 and 14.98 percent 
in 1939.36 Moreover, Basotho recruits no longer arrived on 
these mines suffering from exhaustion. Nor were they still 
subject to harassment and assault by Free State farmers. 
35 LNA, Leribe Collection, Box 50, has a 1940 hand-drawn 
map showing road links and motor transport available 
( including the capacity and the owners ) between the north 
(Butha Buthe, Leribe and Teyateyanengl and the Free State 
bordering towns; QR.A, 1936; Mochochonono, 19 October 1946. 
ae. Van der Horst, Native Labour, pp.216-17. 
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APPENDIX III 
SAKE AND MAINYATSO: THE CASE OF TWO WOMEN PROSTITUTES 
Section Two o f Chapter Seven discussed in detail the history 
and dynamics of commercial beer-brewing and the sale of sex in 
colonial Lesotho. These next few pages intend to use the case 
o f two Basotho women prostitutes, Sake and Mainyatso, to 
illustrate the points raised in the chapter in question. As 
far as the migrants I interviewed outside Mafeteng were 
concerned, Sake and Mainyatso do not refer to historical 
figures. They were names applied to all prostitutes operating 
in Mafeteng. One of them referred to Sake and Mainyatso as 
"Managers" of Mafeteng matekatse.1. What is remembered about 
these women is that they carried the luggage2 of migrants at 
different points of their long journey between Wepener station 
and Quthing. Such women would spend time, even the night, with 
migrants in Quthing at the shelter provided by labour agents 
or the recruiting agency, performing domestic chores in the 
process. The women would then accompany the men up to Seaka 
drift. There, more women would take over until the next stop 
which was usually Mohales Hoek, where yet another group of 
women continued with the migrants until Mafeteng where the 
chain continued all the way to Wepener station. Returning 
migrants were similarly servic ed. When the NRC established 
the Mafeteng-Mohales Hoek-Seaka lorry service in 1930 and 
opened a "resthouse" and "garage" at Seaka in 1932,3 
matekatse adapted to the new situation by spending time with 
1 Interview with Phomolo Matsabisa, born 1914. 
2 Basotho women were use d to carrying heavy loads on 
t heir heads, from their experience in carrying bowls of water 
from the river and loads from the fields. In the 1920s, in 
mountainous areas inaccessible to wheeled transport, women 
r aised income by carrying fragile and liquid items from 
tradi ng stores. They charged up to 3s per 25kg. See 
especially, R. U. Sayce, "Ethno-Geographical Essay on 
Basutoland", Geographical Teacher , vol.12, 1924, p.285. 
3 See Appendix II. 
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migrants at these establishments and accompanying them to the 
lorries and buses. 
But for all that "Sake" and "Mainyatso" became generic types, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that their origins were 
specific and individual. The f o llowing account. based on 
.information from Willy "Ramosoeu" Hawkins,4 would seem to 
demonstrate that Sake and Mainyatso did once exist. Sake, 
according to "Ramosoeu", was from Mafeteng and by the 1920s 
was no longer staying with her family. She made a living by 
selling her body. It is not clear what pushed her into 
prostitution; her father was a relatively well-paid civil 
servant in the district colonial administration office . When 
Mainyatso, who left Thaba Bosiu to avoid harassment, joined 
her, Sake was already established and notorious with the local 
population. Sake and Mainyatso, together with other women, 
would wait for returning migrants at a store called "Raleting" 
<i.e. "Mr leting") situated on the way to Wepener. Sometimes 
they would leave quite early in the morning to meet returning 
migrants. Once a bargain had been struck, the women carried 
the migrants~ luggage for a charge of about 12,5 and often 
taking them to their brothel at Seitlheko just outside 
Mafeteng on the road to Mohales Hoek. Their brothel was so 
famous, that Seitlheko became known as "Hats}mraboleng" ( i.e. 
where people are peeled off) and "Pai la ihlatsoa la ba la 
ikaneha" ( i.e. "where a cloth washes and hangs itself [ to 
dry]", meaning where men lose their money).6 
Botekatse was particularly rife in Mafeteng during these years 
not only because chiefs tolerated the practice, but also 
because the colonial administration was weak. The Assistant 
Commissioner conceded in 1927 that ''this Reserve has been much 
neglected; there was little or no order; the residents, white 
4 Interview with Willy "Ramosoeu" Hawkins, born 1902. 
His father was a white trader who married a Mosotho woman, 
hence the reference "Ramosoeu" (whiteman ) . He has lived in 
the area all his life. 
5 Interview with Solomon Mosunyane, born 1913. 
e_ Interview with Hawkins. 
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and black ~ave been allowed to do as they pleased; drunkenness 
was steadily increasing".7 
Sake and Mainyatso are also remembered for their mode of dress 
and behaviour. According to "Ramosoeu", they put on long and 
big "Victorian" dresses, and sometimes would go dressed onl y 
in their underwear: 
They were drinking. They would wear [those big 
dresses]... They were so slender but would look very 
big! They bragged that they never buy blankets [like 
many Basotho]: "These [big dresses] are our blankets that 
we sleep with; this [dress] that I am wearing during the 
day is enough. These men [migrants] dress us in these 
clothes!".8 
Sake, Mainyatso and their companions, moved in groups, 
surrounded by their likoatas way to Seitlheko. Always in 
the company of their likoata groups of between ten and fifteen 
men, they talked abusively, proudly and loudly about their 
business. One Tanka Madiba, from Quthing, who played a 
concertina, was often seen in their company. This may suggest 
that it was in such a context that falllQ and focho dances and 
music emerged.10 
Sake. who was a bit older than Mainyatso who was in her 20s, 
died just before 1933. She was aged about 35 years old. 
"Ramosoeu" has this explanation about the cause o f her death: 
Two. 
Four. 
Truly speaking we can simply say that she died from cold , 
bec ause coldness was already in her blood. She is a 
person who used to run even in the night! Today she 
would sleep here, the next day she would sleep that side 
at the cemetery with these likoata of hers. She would 
come from up there bringing some of these [likoata] here. 
The next moment she is waiting for those who are 
receiving their [deferred] pay ... it was for this reason 
7 LNA, S3/3/ l / 3, AC to GS, 21 Oct. 1927. 
s Interview with Hawkins. 
9 Fo r a discussion of the koata phenomenon, see Chapter 
io Ibid. On these forms of dance and music, see Chapter 
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that that place came to be called ha Sei tlheko , pal la 
itlhatswa la ba la ikaneha. 11 
The "coldness in her blood" probably refers t o a venereal 
d isease. 
Surprisingly, Mainyatso later married one Sakease, son of 
Labane Lichaba, the local chief. But she did not c hange her 
ways. In the late 1940s, "she died a whore. What could be 
expected when she was running with young boys even when she 
was married. 
look".1.2 
The old man [her husband] had but only to 
Many parents, particularly those who were Christians, warned 
their children against going near either Sake or Mainyatso and 
their likoata. But otherwise, the two prostitutes were 
usually left undisturbed. "Ramosoeu", for example, does not 
remember any instance of the police raiding the brothel at 
Seitlheko or arresting or expelling the Sake-and-Mainyatso 
group. The fact that Mainyatso was later married to the son 
of the local chief, and that many prostitutes relocated 
themselves to Mafeteng as early as 1915, serve as indicators 
that Labane Lichaba and his sub-chief openly tolerated these 
practices. Occasionally, though, the general rule was broken. 
From some of the lifela (i.e . migrants' song-poems; sing: 
sefela ) collected by David Coplan, it would appear that at 
least. some action was once taken against the Sake and 
Mainyatso group. 1 3 Makeka Likhojane's sefela describes how 
We arrived at Mafeteng camp; 
Koenanel.4 drove out the prostitutes , 
He left Mainyatso to Sakease, 
That Sake he told her to push off. 
Th i s point is more developed in his o ther sefela: 
1.1. Interview with Hawkins. 
1.2 Ibid. 
1.s I am grateful to David Coplan for allowing me to use 
these lifela fr om his forthcoming book. 
14. I have not being able to establish who this person 
was, but there is no doubt that he was one of the local 
authorities. 
3 66 
When Koenane expels prostitutes, 
He thus expels Sake and leaves Mainyatso ( so as to marry 
Sake, he expels her, she moved on; 
She had finished the money of men, 
She had l ong been consuming half-crowns, 
Long finishing men·s banknotes, 
Listen as I search out true reasons. 
her ) . 1.5 
Ye t Serame Thuhloane makes a rather different po i n t, in t he 
course of which implicating sub-chief Seithleko: 
They are cruel, the women of Likhoele, at Ramapepe 
Kholokoe. 
Seithleko chased away prostitutes. 
Leaving behind Sake and Mainyatso, 
Sake used to brew intoxicating drink for him. 
It is clear from his account that where expulsions of 
prostitutes were attempted, they were done half-heartedly, and 
anyway left Sake and Mainyatso untouched. The claim that 
Seithleko was being paid-off in drink by rnatekatse was 
possibly true. 
Neither Sake nor Mainyatso had children. Their names are 
remembered nonetheless because, according to "Ramosoeu", they 
were the ones who introduced botekatse to Mafeteng. 
It [botekatse] died with them [Sake and Mainyatso]. It 
ended with them because the [type of] botekatse that 
followed is still continuing to this day. It is not like 
that one that was "plain" [done in public] . They were 
seen by any person. She [they] even praised 
herself!l.6 
They are also remembered because they were always more than 
simply prostitutes. In Thuhloane·s sefela, they are given 
ano ther role: 
I had gone t o them [Sake and Mainyatso] to be 
strengthened with medicines, 
I said I was l ooking for a charm t o make me a 
fo r e man, 
But above all one that would make me a 
1.5 This addition by Coplan is debatable. Mainyatso, as 
Makeka indicates in his other sefela, was married to Sakease. 
1.6. Interview with Hawkins. 
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mine compound policeman. 
Charms were used by Basotho migrants f o r protecti on against 
aorcerers and misfortune, and to control the external world 
( like bringing luck to one) . Diviners were consulted for 
strength for the long road or to bring luck to those going to 
the mines.17 However, it is difficult to know whether these 
women were actually diviners. But the song confirms the point 
already made about their power and strength. and their 
centrality in the life experiences of Basotho migrants in the 
south. 
Sake and Mainyatso, whether as individuals or type, were 
clearly an important part of migrant experiences. Their case 
demonstrates the multiple services that Basotho prostitutes 
rendered to their clients, and the significance of the labour 
of these women to the reproduction of the migrants labour 
system itself. Sake and Mainyatso survive today in the 
memories of some of the old migrants and the songs they 
remember. Men hated these women for robbing them of their 
money, but still loved them. 
17 Ashton, Basuto, pp. 282-316; Dieterlen, "La Medecine 
et les Medecins", especially p.24. 
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